



Gian Luca Gardini (ed.)

Learning and Teaching EU-Latin America
and the Caribbean Relations.

An open educational resource

FAU
University Press

Gian Luca Gardini (ed.)
Learning and Teaching EU-Latin America and the Caribbean
Relations. An open educational resource

With the support of the
Erasmus+ Programme
of the European Union



Friedrich-Alexander-Universität
Erlangen-Nürnberg



INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
AND SOCIETY RELATIONS
MIT SCHWERPUNKT LATEINAMERIKA



Università
Ca'Foscari
Venezia



Universidad de Deusto
University of Deusto

Deusto



UNIVERSITY OF
BATH



Universitat d'Alacant
Universidad de Alicante



Gian Luca Gardini (ed.)

Learning and Teaching EU-Latin America
and the Caribbean Relations.
An open educational resource

Erlangen
FAU University Press
2023

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek:
Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der
Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten
sind im Internet über <http://dnb.d-nb.de> abrufbar.

Bitte zitieren als

Gian Luca Gardini (ed.). 2023. *Learning and Teaching EU-Latin America and the Caribbean Relations. An open educational resource*. Erlangen: FAU University Press. DOI: 10.25593/ 978-3-96147-672-5.

Das Werk, einschließlich seiner Teile, ist urheberrechtlich geschützt.
Die Rechte an allen Inhalten liegen bei ihren jeweiligen Autoren.
Sie sind nutzbar unter der Creative-Commons-Lizenz BY.

Der vollständige Inhalt des Buchs ist als PDF über den OPUS-Server
der Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg abrufbar:
<https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-fau/home>

Verlag und Auslieferung:
FAU University Press, Universitätsstraße 4, 91054 Erlangen

Druck: docupoint GmbH

eISBN: 978-3-96147-672-5 (Online-Ausgabe)
DOI: 10.25593/978-3-96147-672-5

Content

Acknowledgements	iii
The Contributors	v
Introduction: Teaching and learning European Union- Latin America and the Caribbean relations	xi
Lecture 1: EU-Latin America and the Caribbean relations in historical and political context.....	1
Lecture 2: Autonomy as a foreign policy objective: Perspectives from Europe and Latin America.....	23
Lecture 3: Desafíos en la vinculación con América Latina para la Unión Europea	45
Lecture 4: EU-LAC relations in times of US-China competition.....	67
Lecture 5: Política exterior de España hacia América Latina: ¿tiempo para la redefinición?	89
Lecture 6: Portuguese foreign policy towards Latin America: A yo-yo approach	109
Lecture 7: América Latina y el Caribe en la Política Exterior Alemana	129
Lecture 8: América Latina: inmigración y política exterior italiana.....	151
Lecture 9: The UK and Latin America. Policy continuity in a post-Brexit era or waning relevance?.....	173
Lecture 10: EU-Brazil relations	193
Lecture 11: A technical EU-LAC agenda.....	215

Content

Lecture 12: Decentralising cooperation through regional policy dialogues	237
Lecture 13: Acción por el clima y vida en ecosistemas terrestres	259
Lecture 14: Migraciones y Global Compact en la relación UE-América Latina	281
Lecture 15: La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) y la Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos (CEDH) ...	303
Lecture 16: Regional institutions in Latin America	325

Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to thank the European Union, and in particular the Erasmus+ Programme, for the generous support provided to the Jean Monnet Project “The reconfiguration of the European Union presence in Latin America and the Caribbean” (EUinLAC) - 620093-EPP-1-2020-1-DE-EPPJMO-PROJECT. This book, or rather open educational resource, or teaching tool, is one of the key deliverables of EUinLAC.

I am very grateful to all the colleagues who accompanied me in the EUinLAC project. In particular, I would like to thank the contributors to this novel teaching tool on EU-LAC relations for their hard work and for responding quickly and attending to all my editorial requests. I am indebted to the colleagues and friends who co-organised the EUinLAC plenary events in Nuremberg (Germany), Concepción (Chile) and Venice (Italy). Thank you to Sophia Ehrlinger. A big thank you to Helen Weiß, who did a great job with the layout of this educational resource. Many thanks to Paulina Astroza, Carolina Fuentealba, and Antonia Prado Paredes, and all the team members of the European Studies Centre at the University of Concepción. Many thanks to Luis Beneduzi for the concluding event in Venice, where this teaching tool was presented.

I also want to thank Barbara Haefner and Felipe Merino for the linguistic revision, in English and Spanish respectively.

Many thanks to Markus Putnings at Friedrich-Alexander University Press for believing in this idea and making it a reality to publish with FAU Press. It is great that the university that coordinated the EUinLAC project has also published one of the key deliverables under its own Press.

Gian Luca Gardini (Editor)

Udine (Italy), March 2023

The Contributors

Juan Carlos Aguirre is a Political Scientist, M.A. in International Studies and doctoral researcher at the Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg since October 2018. His research focuses on international politics in Latin America, foreign policy decision-making and regional integration processes. Juan Carlos Aguirre has been an advisor for international affairs in different Ministries in Chile. He has also been a lecturer in international relations at various universities in Chile.

Paulina Astroza Suarez is a lawyer and a professor at the University of Concepción, Chile. She has a doctoral degree in Political and Social Sciences, a master in Political Science and International Relations and a diploma in International Relations and Comparative Politics, all from the Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium. She is the Director of the European Studies Program at the Universidad de Concepción. Her research areas are European political integration and EU-Latin America relations.

Luís Fernando Beneduzi is Full Professor of Latin American History. He has been Chair of History and Institutions of the Americas at the Ca' Foscari University of Venice since 2020. He has previously taught at The Johns Hopkins University, at the University of Bologna, and at the Lutheran University of Brazil. His main research interests cover international migration, the relations between Europe and Latin America, especially Italy and Brazil, and the Nation-State building process in Latin America.

Sergio Caballero is a professor at the Department of IR at the University of Deusto, Bilbao (Spain), where he has been Vice Dean as well as the Principal Investigator of the research team “International Relations and Multidimensional Security”. He holds a PhD in International Relations from the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. His main research

lines include Latin American regional integration and Brazil's foreign policy, as well as IR theories and EU-Latin American relations.

Carmen Fonseca is assistant professor of International Relations at the Nova University of Lisbon, Portugal, and a researcher at the Portuguese Institute of International Relations (IPRI-NOVA). She was Visiting Fellow at Getulio Vargas Foundation and at the Institute of Social and Political Studies of the State University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. She is the editor of the journal *Relações Internacionais*. Her research interests cover Brazilian foreign policy, Brazil-Portugal relations and emerging and regional powers.

Maria Garcia is a senior lecturer and the Head of the Department of Politics, Languages and International Studies at the University of Bath (UK). Prior to that she held a Marie Curie International Fellowship at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand. Her research focuses on EU trade policy, EU-Latin American trade agreements, labour and gender clauses in trade agreements, and, more recently, the trade implications of Brexit. She has published extensively on EU-Latin American relations.

Gian Luca Gardini is Chair of History of International Relations at the University of Udine, Italy, and Carlos Saavedra Lamas visiting professor in International Relations at the Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany. He has previously taught at the University of Cambridge and at the University of Bath in the UK. His main research interests cover the international relations of Latin America, foreign policy analysis, and comparative regional integration.

Beatriz Larrain Martinez is a professor at the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences of the Universidad de Concepción in Chile. She holds a PhD in Law, Politics and Society from Northeastern University in Boston, Massachusetts. Her area of interest and research is the judicialisation of politics and judicial activism in Chile and the world. She has

been a member of the European Studies Program of the Universidad de Concepción since its inception in 2002.

Elena Lazarou is an associate fellow in the US and the Americas Programme at Chatham House, UK. She holds a PhD in International Studies from the University of Cambridge. Her research focuses on EU relations with Brazil and Latin America, multilateralism, regionalism, and foreign policy analysis. She was previously assistant professor of international relations at the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) in Brazil. She is currently working as acting head of external policies at the European Parliament's Research Service.

Jaime León Gonzalez is a lecturer at the Catholic University of Eichstätt-Ingolstadt, Germany, and doctoral researcher at Friedrich-Alexander University at Erlangen- Nuremberg (FAU). Formerly he was research and teaching associate at FAU. His research focuses on Germany's foreign policy towards Latin America, the role of actors and decision-making processes. He has managed two projects on Latin America sponsored by the Bavarian Virtual High School (VHB).

Paz Veronica Milet is an Associate Professor of the Institute of International Studies of the University of Chile. Her main lines of investigation are multilateralism, spaces for regional integration, Latin American foreign policy, Latin American relations with other regions and Chile's relations with its neighbours. She also coordinates the Chilean team of the Generation of Dialogue Chile-Perú/Perú-Chile Project and the Chile-Morocco Chair in the framework of the America Latina-Africa Foundation.

Diego Ponce is a research assistant and a student at the School of International Relations of the Getulio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo, Brazil, and a research trainee at ELIAMEP, the Hellenic Institute for European and Foreign Policy, Athens, Greece. Prior to joining ELIAMEP, he also took courses in political science at KU Leuven, Belgium, and at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, in Barcelona, Spain.

Millán Requena is an Assistant Professor of Public International Law and International Relations at the University of Alicante, Spain. He is also visiting professor at the University of Lisbon. He is the author of various publications in the field of International Investment Law, EU law and protection of national minorities in Europe. He was Academic Secretary of the Faculty of Law at the University of Alicante (2012-2016) and at present he serves as Head of Department of Public International Law and Criminal Law.

Mauricio J. Rondanelli Reyes is a Biologist, Master of Science, and Doctor of Biological Sciences. Associate Professor at the University of Concepción, Chile. Member of the European Studies Program at the University of Concepción. Researcher on environmental issues, plant ecology and biodiversity. Professor at the Chairs of Research Methodology and Conservation Biology. Director of undergraduate and postgraduate theses and author of scientific publications in indexed journals of the discipline.

Javier Sepúlveda Estrada is a law graduate from the Universidad de Concepción. Awarded the Rolando Peña López Prize for Best Bachelor Thesis in Public International Law. He was also part of the Chilean Delegation that negotiated at COP 27 in Sharm-El-Sheikh, Egypt. He is also a research assistant and member of the Centre for European Studies at the University of Concepción. His main research interests are integration processes, strategic autonomy, geopolitics and climate change.

Jeanne Simon holds a doctoral degree in International Studies from the University of Denver (USA). Her research interests are the democratisation and territorialisation of social and economic policies, combining comparative analysis of (sub)national responses with the study of supranational governance, including the European Union and the United Nations. She has led several applied research grants on policy transfer, such as the adaptation of the Swedish EcoMunicipality model to the Chilean context.

Sandra Zapata is a post-doctoral researcher at the Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg in Germany. She holds a PhD in Social Sciences from the Salamanca University, Spain. She has a master's degree in International Relations from FLACSO-Ecuador and in Development Policies from the Seoul National University in South Korea. Her research topics include US-China competition, South-South cooperation, regionalism and international political economy of development.

Introduction: Teaching and learning European Union-Latin America and the Caribbean relations

Gian Luca Gardini

The project “The reconfiguration of the European Union presence in Latin America and the Caribbean” (EUinLAC) was conceived and launched between 2019 and 2020. The European Union Jean Monnet programme generously financed it in 2020 and the project activities were carried out between 2020 and 2023. The project was designed to promote both research and teaching on European Union (EU)-Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) relations. The first mission was accomplished with the publication of the volume named after the project “The Redefinition of EU presence in Latin America and the Caribbean”, which brings together 18 original contributions on the topic and was published by Peter Lang in 2023. The second objective was met by the release of this innovative open educational resource, or teaching tool, an undertaking that Friedrich-Alexander University Press enthusiastically embraced and published in full open access to reach as wide an audience as possible.

Rationale and structure of the teaching tool

The teaching tool is meant to provide lecturers in particular - but also students - with an interactive, bilingual, multimodality and cost-free instrument to facilitate the teaching and learning of an understudied topic in international affairs such as EU-LAC relations. This teaching tool can be used as a full course or as complementary material for courses in a wide range of disciplines and subjects, from International Relations to EU and Latin American Studies, from Diplomacy and Foreign Policy Analysis to International History, Regionalism, Governance or more specific topics discussed in the teaching tool. Furthermore, this tool is designed for lecturers with students of all levels from BA upwards. This means that the lecturer has the possibility to go more or less deeply into the topics and make content more or less sophisticated. The material is equally suitable to teach university students at BA, MA and

PhD levels and professionals, to train diplomats, ministerial staff or journalists and local administration officials. The contributors thought of this teaching tool as an all-round functional instrument for lecturers of different kinds, levels, and backgrounds addressing diverse audiences.

The teaching tool is structured in sixteen chapters that correspond to sixteen topics relevant to teach and learn (as well as to understand and reflect on) EU-LAC relations. Chapter 1 is an introductory session to the key concepts, history, mechanisms and current challenges of EU-LAC relations. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 discuss crucial aspects of the context in which EU-LAC relations take place. EU-LAC relations do not happen in a vacuum and the historical, political, economic and social contexts are fundamental to understand the unfolding of EU-LAC relations. Equally central is the role that the foreign policies towards Latin America of key EU member states play in defining both major bilateral relations and the EU agenda and projection to the Latin American region. Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 address the foreign policy of Spain, Portugal, Germany and Italy respectively vis-à-vis the continent. Chapter 9 addresses the peculiar case of the United Kingdom's policy towards Latin America post-Brexit. Chapter 10 discusses the role and weight of Brazil in shaping the bi-regional relationship. Chapters 11 to 15 cover major issues on the EU-LAC agenda, including digitalisation, energy, entrepreneurship and small and medium-size companies, smart cities, climate change and biodiversity, migration and the global compact, and the regional courts of human rights in Europe and the Americas. Finally, chapter 16 covers Latin American regionalism and some of its key institutions, a fundamental factor in bi-regional relations.

Of course, there would be many different and alternative ways to design a course and a teaching tool on EU-LAC relations. Different topics could have been addressed. A different structure could have been proposed. More theoretical material could have been included and so on, endlessly. We consider that the range of topics in this teaching tool is quite exhaustive, practice-oriented and with a not too short life shelf. This is an important factor to consider when preparing any teaching material, as any good instructor is painfully aware of. The EU-LAC project that has produced this teaching tool is a 3-year project. As such, we cannot constantly update this teaching tool. That is why we opted for topics that are generally valid and not too time-contingent, and we made a

huge effort to provide fully updated material to the beginning of 2023. It will be up to the lecturers who use the teaching tool to add possible updates and revise the material.

Each of the sixteen chapters can be used in different ways. It can be a lecture, a part of it, a hint for a practical activity or a suggestion for diverse exercises by students. Each chapter follows the same logic and structure:

- A set of 10 content slides
- A set of accompanying explanations, one page per each slide
- Suggestions for further readings
- A box with questions and issues to stimulate debate and class discussions

The introductory video, hyperlinked at the beginning of each chapter, can open the session or summarise it or provide a hint for discussion. Slides and explanations help lecturers to set up efficiently an insightful lecture or seminar or another type of session. Lecturers with expertise on the subject may use the teaching tool to deepen specific aspects or address new topics. They have of course full freedom and flexibility to adapt and refine the material and the argument(s) to their own needs and timing. At the same time, commentaries and slides help lecturers who are not necessarily very familiar with the subject to prepare and deliver a good lecture, saving time but guaranteeing rigour and edge. Suggestions for further readings help lecturers with bibliographies and provide ideas for further activities. Questions and issues at the end of each chapter provide ideas for seminars, discussions, and broadly to stimulate a proactive engagement of students.

The unique features of this teaching tool

The material ahead is not a simple book or textbook but much more than that. It is a full-package teaching tool to teach and learn EU-LAC relations, as a standalone course or as part(s) of an existing syllabus or just as complementary material. As far as I know, this is the only teaching tool available internationally that is specifically designed to teach and learn EU-LAC relations. This teaching tool has unique features and advantages:

1. It is specifically designed for lecturers.
2. It is interactive.

3. It is bilingual.
4. It is multimodality as it uses several teaching instruments.
5. It is free for all and easily downloadable.

First, this teaching tool is specifically designed for lecturers, both those who specialise in EU-LAC relations and those who do not. The former will find thematic and geographic ideas to enrich and further develop their courses. The latter can easily find accessible and manageable material to teach on EU-LAC relations even if this is not their area of expertise.

The teaching tool is specifically thought out and designed for lecturers. Each of the 16 chapters corresponds to a topic, a lecture or a session. The teaching tool provides, per each topic, a set of 10 content slides, one page of commentary and key explanations for each slide, the link to a short video on the topic of the chapter, references for further readings and a box with topics and ideas to generate discussion and debate among students. In this way, the teaching tool is suitable to run or complement courses in traditional frontal lecture style or in seminar or practical case mode, or in a combination of these.

Lecturers can pick and choose the topics they prefer to create and shape the number and form of sessions that they prefer. They can also pick and choose the instruments that they prefer: videos, slides, lecture notes, questions for debate or any combination thereof. They can use the teaching tool as a complete course on EU-LAC relations or profit from some parts only to complement or update existing syllabuses.

This teaching tool is also a learning tool. The slides can be used in class as a visual aid to students and suggested readings and relevant questions are as useful for lecturers as they are for students. The teaching tool can be used jointly with the original book of the project, which can serve as a textbook or a complementary reading for students. The full reference of the scientific book is: Gian Luca Gardini (Ed.), "The reconfiguration of the EU presence in Latin America and the Caribbean", New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2023.

Second, the teaching tool is designed to be interactive and promotes a proactive approach of students to the topic. The lecturer can use the videos to generate a discussion with students or to stimulate their attention, curiosity and questions. The videos were made by the authors of

the chapters as a mini-lecture summarising the main issues at stake in the session and offering a quick and effective method to introduce students to the topic and/or the session. The lecturer can recommend the suggested readings listed at the end of each chapter to prepare individual or group presentations, seminar sessions, and case studies. Each chapter also offers a set of issues and questions for discussion. This set of instruments is designed to involve students proactively in each of the topics and to help them understand and reflect on the importance of the topic for EU-LAC relations.

Third, the teaching tool is bilingual. Of the sixteen chapters, nine are in English and seven are in Spanish. This mix is designed to reach a wide audience as well as to provide students with the necessary language skills to prosper in competitive international environments and in particular in the EU-LAC context. All those studying EU-LAC relations should be able to practice and improve their English as this is the international working language. They should also practice and improve their Spanish as this is key to living, working and studying in most of Latin America and the Caribbean. The teaching tool is thus suitable for Spanish speaking natives and for international students with at least an intermediate level of English and/or Spanish.

This double-language approach was a deliberate and well thought-through choice based on the very successful experiences that my staff and I had at the Friedrich-Alexander University, Erlangen-Nuremberg in Germany. There, we developed two online bilingual courses with the generous financial support and technical cooperation of the Virtuelle Hochschule Bayern (VHB). The two online courses were “Economy, Politics and Society in Latin America”, and “International Developments in the 21st Century: What is the place of Latin America in world politics?”. The former was meant to provide a basic overview on Latin America for beginners or for those with limited knowledge in one of the two languages of the course, German or Spanish. The latter provided a more sophisticated analysis of the place of Latin America in international relations and was meant to increase content knowledge as well as improving more advanced language skills.

In both cases, the idea was two-fold. On the one hand, we wanted to reach those German students interested in Latin America who were relatively proficient but not very self-confident in Spanish. We provided

those students with some material in their own native language accompanied by some parts of the course in Spanish. They could thus improve their foreign language skills and increase their feel for Latin America. On the other hand, we intended to reach those Spanish-speaking students who wanted to study in Germany and had a limited-to-decent level of German but did not feel comfortable to study in German only. We equipped these students with a mix of material in Spanish and German, offering them the chance to improve their German while learning key content in their native language. This made them feel more relaxed about learning and being tested. Obviously, the courses were also open, and beneficial, to those students fluent in both Spanish and German and eager to learn about Latin America.

We trust that we can replicate that successful experience here with English and Spanish. We also trust that this teaching tool will enrich both content and language learning and teaching for both students and lecturers. The latter can of course choose to teach, and select the relative material, in one language only. For the future, we also plan a full English and a full Spanish edition of this teaching tool.

Fourth, the teaching tool is characterised by a multimodality of teaching and learning. It employs a variety of teaching methods, techniques and instruments. Each chapter displays in read mode - that is, on two pages displayed at the same time - the slide that students may see projected on screen in class (left page) and the accompanying commentary and explanations (right page). The lecturer can so see at once the slides and the corresponding lecture notes, which the lecturer may use while displaying and explaining the content of the slide. Each chapter begins with a short video meant to introduce students to the key points of the topic. At the end of each chapter, there are suggestions for further readings on the subject and a set of issues and questions for discussion on the topic. The teaching tool therefore includes video/audio material, written texts, suggestions for debates and seminar style discussions, chances to go deeper into the topic and slides to use in class or at home to summarise key points.

Fifth, all this is free for all, thanks to the generosity and support of the European Union Erasmus+ programme. All the material is available and easily downloadable via the EUinLAC webpage www.euinlac.eu. All the

material is open access and accessible at no cost from every and any corner of the world. We just ask users to acknowledge the source, the authors and the support of the European Union.

How to use this tool is ultimately and obviously the lecturer's choice. There is a wide range of possibilities. This tool was thought out, realised and tested by lecturers for lecturers and students. The EUinLAC team includes members from several countries on the two continents, from different scholarly backgrounds (International Relations, Political Science, Political Economy, History, Law, Biology), at different career levels, and is gender-balanced. This makes for a richness and plurality in approach and methods of teaching that are fully reflected in the teaching tool. As the coordinator of the project, I simply tried to systematise the material in an organic and consistent way to facilitate the final users of the teaching tool. The EUinLAC members and I believe that we have reached a valuable synthesis and produced a useful instrument to contribute to teaching and learning about Europe, the European Union and its values and role worldwide. We have done that with specific reference to Latin America and the Caribbean, an often under-studied and under-researched area of the world, which as a team we are all very passionate and caring about. We do hope that the users will find our effort useful and we welcome comments and constructive suggestions for improvement.

The EUinLAC team and I wish all our interested colleagues, fellow scholars and students of all disciplines and latitudes success in their work. And we stress that learning or going to university is a little like going to the gym. It is not enough to enrol at the gym to make one's muscles grow. By the same token, it is not enough to enrol at university or college or a training course to make one's knowledge and wisdom grow. One has to exercise at the gym and to study and commit to education institutions. This teaching tool is an instrument to facilitate this.

Lecture 1: EU-Latin America and the Caribbean relations in historical and political context

Gian Luca Gardini

EU-Latin America and the Caribbean relations in historical and political context

Gian Luca Gardini

Hyperlink to [video](#)

Hyperlink to the [slides](#)

Content

1. Before the EU: Europe-LAC cultural and historical links
2. From World War 2 to the end of the 20th Century
3. The evolution of EU-LAC relations to the present day
4. EU-LAC relations: The current picture
5. The model of relations proposed by the EU
6. A new (missed) chance for the EU in LAC?
7. The EU: A reference, not a model for LAC (I)
8. The EU: A reference, not a model for LAC (II)
9. The importance of context for any assessment
10. Conclusion

Before the EU: Europe-LAC cultural and historical links

The colonial legacy

- Economic models and interdependence
- Social models and political elites (creoles)

Latin American independence and events in Europe

- The US and French revolutions
- The Napoleonic wars and their impact on Latin America
- The Cadiz mutiny (1820) and the arrangement with the rebels

The Golden Age (1880-1915)

- European investments (railways)
- European migration: Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Venezuela
- Trade with Europe
- M. Brown (ed.), *Informal Empire in Latin America: Culture, Commerce and Capital* (2008)

1. Before the EU: Europe-LAC cultural and historical links

Relations between Europe and Latin America have a long and deep-seated history. Latin America was colonised primarily by Spain and Portugal, and events that took place in Europe, such as the Napoleonic wars, were at the root of Latin American independence in the early 19th Century.

During colonial times from the 15th to the 19th Century, Spain and Portugal imposed both economic and social systems that had a long-lasting impact on Latin American economic and social organisation. On the economic side, trade in the colonies was a monopoly of the motherland and the essentially predatory economy was based on the extraction and shipment of the richness of soil and subsoil to fuel the master's economy. This meant an economic and productive matrix based on extraction and export, which largely remains today. On the social side, the legacy of the Catholic religion and Iberian customs took deep root in Latin American societies. Political and economic life were strictly connected and dominated by creole elites (born in Latin America of European descent) who nurtured feelings of European belonging and imported ideas and ideals from Europe.

Lecture 1: EU-Latin America and the Caribbean relations in historical and political context

The Latin American independence process owes much to events and ideas in Europe or of European origin. The ideals of the French revolution formed the culture and mentality of the creole elites. Liberty, equality and fraternity largely shaped Latin American constitutions, national anthems and aspirations. The legacy of the US revolution, its ideals and form of government - presidentialism - were largely imported into Latin America. Events in Europe were crucial for the fate of independence in Latin America. The Napoleonic wars greatly debilitated the Spanish and the Portuguese crowns both militarily and financially. Spain did not have the resources to stop the independence movement. Portugal's crown had moved to Brazil to escape the French invasion and, even after restoration in Europe, Brazil kept a vast autonomy promoted by the monarchy itself that eventually resulted in full independence in 1822. When in 1820 Spain tried to assemble a military contingent to regain its Latin American territories, the soldiers and mercenaries refused to leave the Port of Cadiz due to a dispute about pay. This allowed the consolidation of Latin American newly independent republics and led to an arrangement with Spain.

Up until the end of the First World War the wealth of many Latin American countries depended on commercial ties with European powers, particularly Great Britain. With independence and the break of colonial ties but with an economy dependent on export, Latin American republics opened themselves to free trade to replace the lost markets in the motherland. Flows of European investments reached Latin America. Masses of European migrants brought hopes and ideas to Latin America. Flourishing trade with Europe - and partly with the emerging power of that time, the United States - financed the construction and consolidation of modern states on the continent and supported growing economies based on agricultural and beef exports.

The European presence in Latin America in the 19th and early 20th Century was deep and multifaceted. The role and influence of Britain were preponderant to the point that Matthew Brown and his team of researchers asked themselves if it was possible to speak of a British "informal empire" in Latin America. The answer was negative in that the relationship lacked the political formal domination and structure necessary. Still, Britain and Europe largely contributed to what is often perceived as an economic and cultural golden age for Latin America.

From WW2 to the end of the 20th Century

The decline of European influence and the creation of the EU

- World War II, reconstruction in Europe, and the Cold War
- The marginalisation of Latin America in the European agenda
- The creation of the EEC and the EU doesn't change the general framework (1957-1985)
- The EU enlargement to Spain and Portugal (1986)
- Lat Am not a priority but the EU as a global actor deals with Latin America too (investments, trade, political dialogue)

Latin America as the "Extreme West" (Rouquié, 1998)

- Language
- Religion
- Art
- Culture
- Europe as a reference or a dream (Arg, Uru) or a model (economic, social, EU)

2. From WW2 to the end of the 20th Century

Following the two World Wars, and in particular WW2, and with the onset of the Cold War, European former colonial powers lost their status as world powers. Spain and Portugal had long declined in international hierarchies and Britain and France saw their status significantly diminished in a bipolar world. European countries, devastated and impoverished by war, did not have the economic resources or the political appetite for global competition. They had to concentrate their efforts on post-war reconstruction, looking mostly inward. Relations with Latin America were put on the back burner.

The establishment of the European Economic Community in 1957 did little to reverse this trend, and Latin America increasingly became a sideline in European international affairs. France, Belgium and later Britain - after joining the European Economic Community in 1973 - led European international efforts to focus on their former colonies, thus essentially in Africa. Furthermore, European international projection in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s largely took place under the benevolent umbrella and direction of the United States. However, when Spain and Portugal joined the European Union in 1986, relations between the EU and Latin America took on a new elan, with European political and economic presence reaching new heights. Latin America has not become a priority area for the EU. Nonetheless, in its strategy as a global player

from the 1990s, the EU has adopted a rather active and dynamic position regarding Latin America.

In spite of a rather limited political and institutionalised agenda until the 1990s, Europe maintained its cultural appeal to Latin America. After all, Latin America arguably was and still is part of the broad West. The colonial legacy and continuous European influence have moulded Latin American mentality, world views and values to such an extent that the continent can be seen, in the words of the renowned French scholar Alain Rouquié (1998), as an “extreme West”, in the sense that Latin America may be peripheral and quite peculiar, but it shares many political, social and cultural traits with the Western core, Europe and North America.

Commonalities span across a number of areas and Europe and later the EU has remained a model for the continent in several respects. Europe and Latin America share the same religion, largely Catholicism, which provides for a common set of values and wisdom. Protestantism is gaining significant ground in Latin America, but Catholicism and its cultural legacy remain driving forces socially. Of course, Latin languages are another common and unifying factor. Europe remains a point of reference for Latin America and worldwide in the arts and in culture. Many Latin American artists, especially painters and sculpturers, have trained in Europe or engaged in fruitful collaboration with European artists and milieus. The examples of the Brazilian painter Emiliano Di Cavalcanti or the Mexican Diego Rivera are cases in point. In this respect, the novel “The country of carnival” (1931) by the Brazilian writer Jorge Amado perfectly captures the desire of progressive Latin American elites to train abroad, especially in Europe until the second World War, and bring back what they have learnt, thus perpetuating and disseminating European influence and ideas.

Ultimately, Europe remains a dream and a model. Until the end of the 20th Century and in part still today, elites in Argentina, Uruguay and to a lesser extent Brazil and other countries proudly show off their European origins and feel European. In spite of several setbacks in the last 10-15 years, Europe remains a model and an aspiration for its economic success, social cohesion and welfare, and regional integration achievements through the European Union.

The evolution of EU-LAC relations to the present day

First agreements in the 1980s

- Andean Group (1983)
- Central American Common Market (1985)
- San José dialogue between EC and Central America (1984)

The strategic partnership phase: EU-LAC (1999-2010)

- Involvement of civil society and horizontal programmes
- 2010 Madrid Action Plan added the social and economic dimension
- Strategic partnership with Brazil (2006)

The Celac era (2013-?)

- From the 2013 first EU-Celac summit and enthusiasm...
- ...to the 2015 Brussels summit and stalemate - the 2023 promises
- Yet, solid and cordial relations (EU aid during the pandemic)

3. The evolution of EU-LAC relations and the Situation at Present

The process of democratic transition in the region experienced during the 1980s and 1990s fuelled the re-launch of Latin American integration projects and led to a process of sub-regionalisation of the relationship of the European Community (EC) institutions with LAC. This began with the San José dialogue between the EC and Central America in 1984 in support of the Regional Peace Process and was intensified from 1987 on with the EC-Rio Group dialogue that was institutionalised in 1990. The first agreements between the EEC and LAC regional organisations were formalised with the Andean Group in 1983 and with the Central American Common Market in 1985.

In the 1990s, with the second regionalist wave called "open regionalism", new regional initiatives arose and support for different processes of regional integration in Latin America became one of the pillars of the EU relationship with LAC. The strategic partnership EU-LAC was launched in 1999 to consolidate a space for political cooperation complemented by the gradual establishment of a euro-Latin American free trade area.

Europe tried to go beyond a purely commercial approach and promoted a regulatory model that incorporated three dimensions: political,

through dialogue at various levels; economic, including trade and investment; and development cooperation, incorporating social policies. The strategic partnership between the EU and LAC is not only a top-down process led by governments, but integrates multiple consultation mechanisms between social partners, civil society and even parliamentarians. Such a dense social network is a specific quality of the EU dialogue with LAC. One noticeable aspect of the EU-LAC cooperation is the horizontality through cooperation programmes that put institutions, private actors and civil society of both regions into direct contact. The 2010 Madrid Action Plan added the social and economic dimension to the institutional and political dialogue. The plan was structured into thematic sections including: science, research, innovation and technology; sustainable development, environment, climate change, biodiversity and energy; regional integration and inter-connectivity; education and employment; and the fight against illicit drug trafficking. In 2006 the EU signed its first strategic partnership with a LAC country: Brazil.

The 21st Century has altered the relationship between the developing world and the traditional powers. The appearance of new state and non-state actors, new instruments and forms of cooperation, new standards of quality and greater accountability in relation to the results of political action have all brought in significant innovation.

The launch of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (Celac) was meant to give the continent one unified voice in global affairs. This has prompted a new format of bi-regional dialogue: the EU-Celac summit, inaugurated at Santiago de Chile in 2013. Yet, since the 2015 summit in Brussels, no other top-level summit between the parties has taken place. This was due to internal divisions in both Europe and Latin America (i.e. Brexit, crisis in Venezuela) as well as to the exhaustion of a political and economic season. Due to the rise of China, the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic, the 2022 war in Ukraine and the need for a speedy ecological transition, a new EU-Celac summit is now scheduled for July 2023. EU-LAC relations remain solid and cordial, as the EU donations to and support for LAC during the pandemic have demonstrated.

EU-LAC relations: The current picture

- 1) **The economic dimension: Key data and features**
 - EU 1st investor (stock) in LAC, yet 50% of investments from the EU to Brazil and Mexico and relative decline in the last few years
 - EU 2nd major trade partner until 2015, now 3rd but stable:
 - EU 12% of LAC exports in 2000 and 2017
 - LAC 5,3% of EU imports and 6,0% of EU exports (asymmetry)
 - 5% of LAC exports to EU are commodities (over 70% to China)
 - The consequences of Covid-19 on bi-regional trade relations
 - EU 1st provider of aid cooperation to LAC
- 2) **Political dialogue at the regional level (1990-2012)**
 - The EU-Latin America and the Caribbean Summits (1990-2012)
 - Every two years, alternate location – Head of state or government
 - The EU-Group of Rio Summits (1990-2012)
 - Every two years, alternate location – Ministers
 - The first EU-Celac Summit in 2013
 - EU-Celac Summit suspended since 2015, to be resumed in 2023
 - Crisis and decline of Europe as a power and as a model
 - Changes in Latin America (regionalism, Brazil, Asia)

4. EU-LAC relations: The current picture

On the economic side, data show that the EU is still a key partner for Latin America. The EU position may not be so powerful as it was in the 1990s, but the EU is still the first investor, in terms of stock (not of flows), in LAC. Still, over 50% of EU investments on the continent are concentrated in Brazil and Mexico. European investments in LAC have declined in the last two decades, due to less opportunities available as well as the rise of other competitors.

The EU27 is today the third largest trade partner of LAC, and it was the second largest until 2015 when it was surpassed by China. In the 20th Century until pre-Covid times, the EU in fact had not lost much economic ground in LAC. The position of the US was much more eroded, especially in South America, by the rise of China and other non-traditional partners. In absolute terms, EU-LAC trade increased between 2000 and 2017. LAC represented then approximately 5-6% of EU imports and exports, while the EU accounted for 12% of LAC total exports. There is a clear asymmetry of relevance here. More importantly, just over 50% of all LAC exports to the EU are commodities, compared to over 70% in the case of China. The terms of trade with the EU are more favourable to LAC than those with many other partners. The Covid-19 pandemic has altered the picture: EU trade with LAC in 2020 represented 4.8% of total EU trade and fell by almost 16% in 2020, when LAC

recorded a negative performance, with exports and imports falling by 13% and 20% respectively. Only time will tell if this is a temporary or enduring pattern.

Finally, the EU is the first provider of aid cooperation to the continent.

At the political level, the bi-regional dialogue has gone through a significant evolution. From 1999 to 2010, there were two official mechanisms: the EU-Latin America/Caribbean summits and the EU-Rio Group summits. The first were biennial meetings between heads of state and government which identify the basic drivers and priorities for the bi-regional relationship. The Rio Group was created in the mid-1980s by a group of Latin American countries to support democratic consolidation. It later expanded to include almost all the countries on the continent, and even Cuba joined in 2008. The EU-Rio Group summits of ministers take place every two years, alternating with the EU-Latin America summits. The last two of these summits, held in Santo Domingo in 2007 and Prague in 2009, significantly marked the EU-Latin American agenda and - perhaps surprisingly - prove themselves to be extremely topical also today. Pressing international concerns such as energy and renewable resources, the environment and climate change, and recovery of financial stability and the growth of the world economy after the 2008 global crisis were discussed.

Since 2013, a new mechanism has replaced and streamlined the two discussed above. The EU-Celac summit now represents a genuinely region-to-region forum where the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (Celac) and the European Union meet, in alternate years, at the level of heads of state and governments and at the ministerial level. In spite of the initial elan, the format has been suspended since 2015 and a new summit is now scheduled for July 2023. This partly reflects divisions inside and between the two parties. It also reflects deeper changes at the international level: On the one hand, the perceived decline of Europe after the 2008 financial crisis, Brexit, Covid and the difficult economic and political situation following the war in Ukraine. On the other, the steady decline of Latin America, the economic recession and political instability in Brazil, the crisis of LAC regional organisation and the rising influence of China and other Asian powers in Latin America.

The model of relations proposed by the EU

Levels (institutionalised)

- Regional
- Sub-regional
- Bilateral

Thematic areas (institutionalised) and horizontal programmes

- Political dialogue
- Trade
- Cooperation

The influence of the EU over Latin American political thinking

- Model for integration
- Model for social protection
- The example of Spain and Portugal (democracy, integration, development)

5. The EU model of relations

The EU sustains a complex network of relationships with Latin America in politics, the economic/trade sector and in cooperation for development. This mesh shapes the relational and development model which Brussels offers to Latin America.

The model of relations proposed by the EU interacts with Latin America at several levels with specific mechanisms and institutions: regional, subregional, bilateral and through civil society exchanges fuelled by EU dedicated programmes. Regional level means exchanges between the EU and the whole of Latin America and the Caribbean, nowadays under the form of the Celac organisation. Sub-regional refers to relations between the EU and sub-regional (or sub-Latin American) organisations. At present, the EU has institutionalised relations with Mercosur, CAN, CARICOM and SICA. All these subregional relations are articulated in three interconnected strategic fields: political dialogue, development cooperation, and trade and investments. Finally, the bilateral level refers to the relations that the EU entertains with each Latin American and Caribbean country, in this case too based on the three pillars just mentioned. Notwithstanding Brussels' preference for and support of region-to-region (inter-regionalism) political dialogue, there are three major exceptions: Brazil for its size and importance; Mexico for its

membership in sub-regional organisations, such as NAFTA, would imply the presence of the US; and Chile, as this country is a full member only of the Pacific Alliance, which does not yet have a formal political dialogue with the EU.

The thematic and geographical variety of the EU relational model with Latin America certainly has advantages, but also drawbacks. It is somewhat dispersive, rarely leads to significant commitments, and is quite expensive. Europe's approach to Latin America is a perfect embodiment of the soft power for which the EU is known worldwide, namely with a global presence and power based on dialogue, values, positive incentives and commercial influence.

Another key feature of EU relations with Latin America is the so-called 'horizontal cooperation programmes' that the EU has successfully carried out over the years to support Latin American development. Some of the key programmes were Al-Invest, which supported European SMEs interested in investing in Latin America; Alfa and Alban for cooperation in the higher education sector; Urbal for the creation of direct links between cities; @LIS to promote the information society and reduce the digital gap in Latin America; and Eurosocal, to reinforce social cohesion and reduce inequality.

The European Union as an organisation and an ideal archetype exercises considerable influence on Latin America's political thinking. The most obvious aspect is the EU's successful example of political, economic and social integration that was able to regenerate itself and prosper also in times of crisis. The appendix to this is the successful model of social welfare, social cohesion and cooperation (via for instance the Structural Funds, the European Social Fund etc.) that the EU represents. Finally, the example set by the former colonial masters Spain and Portugal had a major impact on Latin America's collective expectations. Similarly to Latin America, Spain and Portugal went through dictatorship until the 1970s, then democratised and later joined the regional integration project of reference, achieving fast social and economic progress. Latin Americans thought that after dictatorship and democratisation, the strengthening of Latin American regionalism and integration could have brought economic and social wellbeing on the back of the Spanish and Portuguese experience. The extent of success is debatable, the impact of the example is undeniable.

A new (missed) chance for the EU in LAC?

1. The Commission's joint communication (April 2019)
2. The EU-Mercosur agreement (June 2019)
3. The new Commission (December 2019)
4. The new German strategy (May 2019)

BUT...

1. Political coherence (GER & POR EU presidencies)
2. Opportunity cost
3. Covid-19 and EU cooperation
4. Significant investment in outreach policy

6. A new (missed) chance for the EU in LAC?

The year 2019 could have been decisive for the relaunch of EU-LAC relations. A new set of major circumstances and key initiatives had the potential to be a game changer. First, in April 2019, after ten years of silence, the European Commission issued a new communication on EU-LAC relations aimed at designing the pillars of a new EU approach towards the region. The argument made was very compelling: The EU and LAC share common values and interests, beyond rhetoric, and a stronger partnership is vital to the preservation of such values and the defence of such interests in the face of challenges at the global level.

Second, in June of the same year, the European Union and Mercosur reached agreement on a trade deal. After twenty years of negotiations, the EU could be the first major trade partner of Mercosur to have a free trade area in place with the South American bloc. The agreement reaffirmed the commitment of both parties to rules-based international trade. It also included important clauses on labour and environmental protection, committing the signatories to the implementation of the Paris Agreement on climate change. The sticky issue of agriculture had substantially been addressed.

The third step was the formation of a new European Commission, which took office in early 2020. The appointment of Ursula von der Leyen of

Germany as President and Josep Borrell of Spain as High Representative for European Foreign and Security Policy were positive signals for Latin America. Von der Leyen was very close to German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and the German government had then relaunched its Latin America policy very strongly. Borrell is a very experienced politician who was considered a friend of Latin America.

Fourthly, and more significantly, in 2019 Germany identified Latin America as a key partner for its international strategy. This gave bi-regional relations two big assets. Firstly, the partnership enjoyed the support of the EU's single most powerful political and economic player. Secondly, when Germany pursues an objective, it generally achieves it.

And yet, none of these signals and initiatives has brought a significant improvement of LAC's position in Brussels' international agenda. The German and Portuguese presidencies of the EU, two countries favourably disposed towards LAC, between the end of 2020 and the beginning of 2021, left LAC well behind in their agenda and programmes. This amplified a widespread perception in LAC of a gap between the EU discourse and its action. It is also true that the economic weight of LAC in the EU's economy is marginal, and a further significant investment in this bi-regional relationship would entail considerable opportunity cost with unsure future returns.

The Covid-19 pandemic and the reorientation of all political and economic priorities in Brussels have something to do with the stalemate in EU-LAC negotiations. Yet, the EU needs a re-branding and a massive marketing campaign in LAC to improve its position and image. This is certified by surveys conducted by Latinobarometer in 2018 and 2022. These confirmed that the EU has overall a positive image but trails well behind the US and China in terms of perceived importance in LAC and globally. Furthermore, all the good things that the EU does, do not seem to make the headlines in the media. This in spite of the nearly 1 bn Euros that the EU donated to LAC in the early phases of the pandemic. More coherence between words and deed but also a major revision of the communication strategy are fundamental steps for a new elan in EU-LAC relations.

The EU: a reference, not a model for LAC (I)

The EU cannot be a model (blueprint) for LAC for:

- Geography
- Demography
- Trade patterns
- The security factor
- Demography and politics

7. The EU: reference, not model for LAC (I)

Can the European Union be a model for Latin American integration? Or is it rather a reference? By "model" we mean an archetype, a "blueprint" that can be imitated or replicated. By "reference", we mean a basis to make comparisons, to refer to previous experiences with similar issues. The question is not why the European Union has been a successful model of integration and Latin America not so much. The question is why the EU has been so different.

Geography makes a difference. South America is four times the size of Europe. The EU 27 comfortably fits twice into Brazil alone. Integrating a very large territory, with a lot of diversity, is difficult. Furthermore, in the area corresponding to the axis of European integration, between France and Germany, there is a flat area, where many things are grown, produced and exchanged. This resulted in a continuous encounter of populations. In South America, the river system has been more of a barrier than a transport network. The Andes are a barrier too. Traditionally it has been very difficult to move people, goods, and ideas from one side of South America to the other.

The demographic aspect is also important. The axis of European integration is precisely where a majority of the European population is

concentrated. In South America, the majority of the population is concentrated on the coasts, in the area of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, the Santiago-Concepción area, Lima. It is no coincidence that integration, or some of the Latin American integration schemes, have developed precisely in these areas. But what is in the middle? It is jungle, mountains, so, traditionally, it has been very difficult to exchange goods and ideas.

Trade patterns count. In the EU, Europeans trade a lot with each other. Germany trades around 60% of its foreign trade with other EU countries. In Latin America, in Mercosur for example, almost all trade is with extra-continental partners. Chile has similar patterns. The importance of extra-continental trade partners is also enormous for the Andean countries. This can be seen very well in the Eclac data, intra-European trade is more than 60%. In the case of Mercosur, CAN, or Latin America and the Caribbean, intra-regional trade is relatively small, currently around 12% for LAC.

The security factor was very important for European integration. Alcide De Gasperi, one of the founding fathers of the European Union, noted that almost all the confederations were formed for security reasons. South America is a zone of peace and integration was not needed to pursue peace. In 200 years, no state has disappeared, and only one has been created: Panama. We have a nuclear-free zone and the last war was the 1935 war between Bolivia and Paraguay. Demographic and political factors are linked. What would happen in Europe if we were to transpose the Mercosur demographic situation to Europe, where Brazil has over 200 million people, Argentina over 40, Paraguay 6, Uruguay 3. In Europe this would result, by keeping the same proportions, in a regional union composed of Germany, the Netherlands, Latvia and Estonia. Would Germany be much more inclined to leadership than Brazil? Would we have common effective institutions? How do we elect representatives? With direct proportionality, Brazil would control everything. With a significantly attenuated proportionality, Brazil will not be happy; with a softly attenuated proportionality, the others would not want to give power to the common institutions. In such a different structural framework, to what extent can the EU model be applied to or adapted in Latin America?

The EU: a reference, not a model for LAC (II)

But the EU can be a reference (best practices) for LAC:

- Regional parliaments and the democratic gap
- Customs Union
- Enlargement to new members

Towards a theory of regional convergence:

- Common position vis-a-vis the world superpower (US and increasingly so China)
- Common position vis-a-vis regional leadership (Brazil or else)
- Common development model

8. The EU: reference, not model for LAC (II)

It is very difficult to use the European Union as a model. Yet, one can use the experience, the good practice of the European Union, as a reference. Here are three examples and one theoretical lesson.

First: Latin American regional parliaments do not have much power. In the beginning, the European Parliament did not have much power and it was not directly elected either, this came gradually. Now, in the case of Mercosur, for example, from a legal point of view there is nothing to prevent the same from happening in Parlasur. The possibility exists for regional regulations to be internalised in the member states by a quicker passage through national parliaments if these rules have already been approved by the regional parliament. At the moment, only Brazil has such a rule in place, but if it were applied to all states, Parlasur could decide the speed of entry into force of regional rules.

Second example: There is a discussion in Mercosur on how to complete the customs union. The principle of eliminating the double collection of customs duties was established in 2010 but it is not yet implemented. There are two possible paths: the example of the European Union where each member state collects the EU customs tax and transfers it on to Brussels where it becomes a centralised resource of the Union. Or the case of SADC, the Southern Africa Development Community, where the

common external duty is collected by each member state and then re-distributed among the others according to fixed percentages and the budget is not centralised.

Third: the issue of enlargement of regional projects to new partners. In the European Union, it is first discussed how the new member states will adopt the EU rules and on what timetable. In the case of Venezuela's accession to Mercosur, the Accession Protocol was signed without first negotiating the conditions. The result is that Venezuela never complied with its economic and democratic obligations and is currently suspended from the organisation. This may be a good political formula, but the result is a void agreement that added instability with no benefit for Mercosur.

More broadly, there is a theoretical lesson to be learnt in terms of convergence in key areas as an indispensable factor for integration. The European Union is an example of convergence and regional cohesion. There is convergence on the three fundamental points for creating a regional bloc: first, a common position towards the great powers, such as the United States and increasingly so China. Second, a definition of the role of the regional leadership. And third, a common development strategy. In Latin America, projects such as Unasaur, Mercosur, the Pacific Alliance, ALBA and Celac itself have very different answers to these three fundamental questions. In the case of the European Union, the transatlantic relationship with the United States was never questioned. There is a consensus on the issue of leadership, or rather shared leadership, with no countries prevailing but with France and Germany often taking the lead, with Germany as a *primus inter pares*. There is a common development and economic strategy: capitalism, free trade and open markets. There is convergence in Europe and fragmentation or divergence in Latin America. This provides the three elements to construct a theory of regional convergence, which is also a good recipe for regional cohesion and eventual success in integration, be it political or economic.

The European Union can provide good practices and lessons based on its experience with key issues of integration. The EU is perhaps not a model, but it certainly makes a good reference.

The importance of context for any assessment

Structure vs agency

1. Covid-19
2. The rise of China and other emerging powers
3. Globalisation in transition
4. The crisis of multilateralism
5. Redefinition of the role and f.p. of the US
6. Resilience of Europe
7. Decline of LAC
8. The war in Ukraine: liberal order and sovereignty

9. The importance of context

A proper understanding of the context of EU-LAC relations is key for a balanced and realistic assessment. Since the 1990s and until recently (2008 Financial crisis, Covid-19 pandemic, war in Ukraine), the study of EU-LAC relations has noticeably focused on actors, their preferences and possible shortcomings, as if these were detached from the context. The contextual constraints are equally important and drive resource allocation. International outcomes are as context-dependent and timing-dependent, as they are actor-dependent. This is the current context of EU-LAC relations:

1. The Covid-19 pandemic. This has changed foreign policy priorities and thinking of most actors. Self-reliance and autonomy are predominant. While this opens new ways to cooperate, it also challenges traditional modes of operating and trading internationally. This has favoured the expansion of China and other non-traditional partners in LAC.
2. The rise of China and other emerging actors. These players have eroded political and economic space to traditional powers. They have also changed the international agenda towards development issues and proposed new channels of cooperation. Their role and participation in global issues and institutions cannot be taken for granted.

3. Globalisation in transition. The world is not de-globalising. We produce and export ever more. Yet distances of export are reduced. This means that diverse forms of globalisation in which regional deals based on political considerations may outpace purely economic considerations. This may prompt a redefinition of interregionalism.
4. Supposed crisis of multilateralism. The loss of credibility, prestige and operativity of several multilateral organisations, from the UN to the WB, IMF and the WTO concerned mostly the liberal institutions of western imprint. There is a multilateralism led by China that is thriving in the political, economic, cooperation and security realm.
5. Redefinition of the international role of the United States. The Trump presidency was the tip of the iceberg, but the US is redefining its international role and the resources attached to it. Washington is not willing - or in a position - to lead almost automatically the rest of the world. It is critical of multilateralism and repositioning seems more of a defensive nature.
6. The resilience of Europe. In spite of the widespread “decline narrative”, Europe and the European Union have proven themselves to be resilient. The EU performance has been positive during the pandemic and the war in Ukraine combining a sense of unity, international solidarity and a firm position in defence of its interests and values.
7. The inexorable decline of Latin America. LAC has been in decline for the last hundred years. Data about proportion of world population, strategic weight, trade volumes, military projection, and diplomatic capacity show a loss of importance. This affects LAC international insertion.
8. The war in Ukraine. Besides the human and economic losses, this war is a competition between the autocratic and the democratic world. It is an attempt to redefine international values, rules and accepted behaviour of the last hundred years. LAC countries have not taken a firm position, but short-sighted political convenience may be very costly in the long term.

Conclusion

- Ups and downs of the relationship: long term and in recent years
- Political dialogue
- Trade relations and investments
 - Absolute volumes increased
 - EU share of LAC's global trade constant
 - Comparatively favourable terms of trade
- Development cooperation
- Overall positive picture and results considering systemic constraints

10. Conclusion: A positive assessment of EU-LAC relations

EU-LAC relations are overall very positive, strong and cordial. The intensity of the relations is not only measured against political affinity, economic exchanges and cooperation programmes, but also against the dense network of civil society interaction and institutional exchanges. The EU is a significant partner for LAC across the board. Perhaps the opposite may be more debatable but is undeniable too. Agents' preferences and systemic conditions determine the intensity of the relations. This has remained stable over the years, but a natural level of fluctuation in mutual interests and relations is to a degree inescapable.

From an historical, long-term perspective, the bi-regional relationship has remained solid and stable since its institutionalisation in the 1990s. It has also experienced peaks of enthusiasm and disillusion. The decade of the 1990s was the apogee of the relationship, with Spain and Portugal pushing the EU agenda towards Latin America, with the first EU-LAC summit in Rio in 1999, the EU taking on a role as a global actor and a unique coincidence of values and interests due to the unipolar moment that followed the end of the Cold War and the triumph of the Western liberal model based on democracy and open economy, soon adopted by a vast majority of LAC countries. The first decade of the 21st Century

saw the commodity boom, the economic and social advance of LAC, the rise of China, and the questioning of the neoliberal model thus inevitably distancing LAC from the EU or at least looking into other possibilities. In the second decade of this century, the enthusiasm for the first EU-Celac summit soon left space to the migration crisis in Europe, recession in Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela, the ideational more than practical impact of Brexit, the orientation towards Asia of many LAC countries and the stalemate of LAC regionalism. Events such as the pandemic and the war in Ukraine again put the relationship under strain but also offer opportunities to strengthen it.

A more short-term historical perspective also shows ups and downs. At the beginning of 2019, there had not been an EU-LAC summit for six years, there was no common position on the crisis in Venezuela and the EU-Mercosur negotiations seemed to have come to a halt. At the beginning of 2020, a new elan had emerged. A new Communication by the EU Commission relaunched the bi-regional entente, a political agreement on the EU-Mercosur trade deal was announced, the new composition of the EU Commission seemed particularly favourable to LAC, and Germany announced a new strategy for Latin America. At the beginning of 2021, the pandemic had displayed its worst economic and social effects, difficulties for the ratification of the EU-Mercosur deal clearly emerged, the German presidency of the EU had other priorities than LAC and the role of China on the continent was booming. At the beginning of 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. The rest is in the making.

This is to say that ups and downs are normal in international relations. Indeed, the bi-regional political dialogue was never interrupted even without a formal summit at the highest level. Trade and investments have positive patterns in absolute terms and remain quite stable in relative terms. The terms of trade with the EU as compared to other competitors are quite favourable to Latin America. The EU remains the first provider of aid cooperation to Latin America and the Caribbean.

If one considers the unpropitious international context and the relatively limited economic significance of LAC to the EU, the bi-regional relationship is solid and actually performs well according to all significant indicators. It is precisely where the structure does not help that agency and politics make a difference. After all, EU-LAC relations are what their stakeholders make of them.

Further readings

1. Gardini, Gian Luca and Anna Ayuso (2015), "EU-Latin America and Caribbean Inter-regional Relations: Complexity and Change". Scientific Paper 04/2015 - Project Atlantic Future. Online: https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/project_papers/atlantic_future_papers/scientific_paper/eu_latina_america_and_caribbean_inter_regional_relations_complexity_and_change
2. Gardini, Gian Luca (2021), "The European Union in Latin America: A 'neighbour' of values", in Gardini, Gian Luca (Ed.), *External Powers in Latin America*, Routledge, London, 2021, pp. 29-43.
3. Maihold, G., T. Muscio Blanco and C. Zilla (2023), "From Common Values to Complementary Interests", *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)*, SWP Comment No. 1, January.
4. Nolte, D. (2023), "The European Union and Latin America: Renewing the Partnership after Drifting Apart", *GIGA Focus*, N. 2, January.
5. Sanahuja, José Antonio (Ed.) (2022), "Relanzar las relaciones entre América Latina y la Unión Europea. Autonomía estratégica, cooperación avanzada y recuperación digital, verde y social". Madrid: Fundación Carolina. Online: <https://www.fundacioncarolina.es/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/LibroRelanzarRelacionesALyUE.pdf>

Questions for discussion and debate

1. Can history and common values still constitute the basis for EU-LAC relations?
2. According to what criteria can one judge EU-LAC relations as quite positive or rather disappointing?
3. Can EU integration be a model or even a reference for LAC?

Lecture 2: Autonomy as a foreign policy objective: Perspectives from Europe and Latin America

Paulina Astroza and Javier Sepulveda

Autonomy as a foreign policy objective: Perspectives from Europe and Latin America

Paulina Astroza Suárez
Javier Sepúlveda Estrada

Hyperlink to [video](#)

Hyperlink to the [slides](#)

Content

1. Introduction: Times of liquidity
2. Autonomy as a response to navigate a liquid scenario
3. Contemporary scenario (I)
4. Contemporary scenario (II)
5. Autonomy: Europe's case (I)
6. Autonomy: Europe's case (II)
7. Latin America and autonomy (I)
8. Latin America and autonomy (II)
9. A new concept of autonomy for Latin America
10. What an autonomic foreign policy should mean?

Introduction: Times of liquidity

- Today we are facing times of liquidity, fragmentation, and multiple simultaneous changes. In consequence, how does the field of International Relations approach this?
- Various authors have indicated that the international environment can be described mostly by a complex interdependence scenario. As such, **Barbé** defines it as *“the interpenetration of societies that derives from the flows of goods, services, capital, ideas, and people, associating societies with others in a multitude of dimensions, in the economic, the human, the scientific and the intellectual aspects”*.
- Consequently, is important to what Fagaburu points out as characteristics of this paradigm: the existence of multi-level relationships given the plurality of actors; the non-existence of a thematic hierarchy at the international level; the blurring of the line that divides internal issues from external ones; and the use of seductive means to obtain presence in the international realm.

1. Introduction: Times of liquidity

In contrast to its opposing doctrine - neorealism -, neoclassical liberal ideas do not emphasise the conditioning factor of anarchy within the international system, but rather focus on the multiple relationships that exist between international actors, as if they were a large spider's web or network linking the different actors. Thus, for sectors related to these perspectives within International Relations, they have argued that a paradigm of complex interdependence is configured, in accordance with the postulates of Nye and Keohane that they made at the time with respect to transnationalism, and of which the idea of interdependence is a key concept. Accordingly, both authors indicate it as:

"Interdependence, defined more simply, means mutual dependence. Interdependence in world politics refers to situations characterised by reciprocal effects between countries or between actors in different countries".

Barbé gives a good definition about this as well: “the interpenetration of societies that derives from the flows of goods, services, capital, ideas, and people, associating societies with others in a multitude of dimensions, in the economic, the human, the scientific and the intellectual aspects”.

This is fully applicable in today's international arena. Today's world is highly interconnected, linked to each other at different levels and in different areas. If we take the events of the Covid-19 pandemic as a case study, it is clear how central these links have become: From the speed with which the disease spread, the dependence of certain recipient countries on those producing medical supplies, the disruption of international trade and the volatility of commodity prices, to the current crisis in logistics and inflation in individual states, it is clear that the world lives in a web-like network linking all international actors and linking them to each other in a variety of events.

In that sense, is important what Fagaburu points out as characteristics of this paradigm:

1. The existence of multi-level relationships given the plurality of actors; where subjects such as Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), transnational corporations, civil society as a whole and sub-state entities (regions, provinces and cities) open up the range of actors in the international arena and in the areas where the "global" is interconnected. Thus, they become true nodes of broad cross-border networks, which shape their own interests and influence the way in which states act.
2. The non-existence of a thematic hierarchy at the international level. The plurality of actors also implies that the areas of discussion in the global arena are expanding. If in realism it is possible to establish an analogy of a war room, here issues that were normally left aside (climate agenda, education, development aid, among others) have greater prominence and even greater influence.
3. The blurring of the line that divides internal issues from external ones, due to interconnectivity.
4. The use of seductive means to obtain presence in the international realm, especially through soft power mechanisms.

Autonomy as a response to navigate a liquid scenario

- Therefore, accepting interdependence in the external environment **marks a profound change in the way in which power is used in foreign affairs**: the typical means to exert influence in the international arena, such as arms power or hard elements, **have given way to new soft ones, especially those related to the economic sector, the demonstration of values or international prestige.**
- Likewise, the multiple relationships between actors have also brought various problems to the public arena, whose scope is neither national nor regional, but global. In this way, pandemics, the climate emergency, economic crises, contemporary wars, and internal changes no longer have only an impact on their main actors, but also indirectly impact all the participants on the international scene, in multiple areas and in varied intensities.
- Consequently, uncertainty becomes the rule and liquidity in the general order. Given this, what can be done, within the field of foreign policy, to respond to an increasingly difficult scenario? Is autonomy an answer for that? What is it? What is it based on? What means would operationalise it? Is there any agreement regarding this concept?

2. Autonomy as a response to navigate a liquid scenario

Therefore, accepting interdependence in the external environment marks a profound change in the way in which power is used in foreign affairs: The typical means to exert influence in the international arena, such as arms power or hard elements, have given way to new soft ones, especially those related to the economic sector, the demonstration of values or international prestige. Is the consequence of all the above that the tools to be used at the international level or others - such as culture, prestige, economic networks, public and multisectoral diplomacy - to the detriment of those based on the demonstration of force, such as military power or defensive capabilities?

Likewise, the multiple relationships between actors have also brought various problems to the public arena, whose scope is neither national nor regional, but global. In this way, pandemics, the climate emergency, economic crises, contemporary wars, and internal changes no longer have only an impact on their main actors, but also indirectly impact all the participants on the international scene, in multiple areas and varied intensities.

Consequently, what areas are currently becoming relevant in the international arena? New technologies, data management, trade as a way of

expressing power and the use of soft power are increasingly relevant. Situations such as the trade wars that were fought between 2016 and 2021; the bans by certain countries on the 5G technology developed by China at the time; the accusations that apps of Chinese origin such as TikTok or Weibo were used as instruments of espionage; the issue of privacy and online censorship; the incredibly rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI); or even the development of cutting-edge technology that allows industries to be carbon neutral, are examples of the aforementioned. The hard power means used in the past are of no value in a world where interdependence is the norm and the seductive, soft power means that international actors will prefer in the future.

Therefore, uncertainty becomes the rule and liquidity in the general order. Given this, what can be done, within the field of foreign policy, to respond to an increasingly difficult scenario? Is autonomy an answer for that? What is it? What is it based on? What means would operationalise it? Is there any agreement regarding this concept?

Contemporary scenario (I)

- After the various events that have occurred since 2001, international relations ended up in 2008 in an open struggle for influence, ending the clear US hegemony of the epoch. Thus, the beginning of the 2008 economic crisis meant the relative rise of emerging powers, especially for an already economically inserted China, which adopted increasingly assertive foreign agendas and clashing with the American interests.
- The **Sino-American relations are not new**. The Obama Administration applied a "**Pivot to Asia**" foreign policy, aiming to get reciprocity in key areas for Washington DC and decrease polarisation. However, it did not get the results that they expected, and Chinese reciprocity never happened.
- The tensions between the US and a rising China were made more patent **with the irruption of the Trump Administration**. The period was marked by the withdrawal of the United States from various international instances and the launching of commercial wars against partners and rivals, worsening its relative decline in comparison with other actors and damaging the presence of the US on the world stage.
- On the other hand, **China appears as a more assertive player in the international arena**. Since the presentation of projects like the Belt and Road Initiative, the beginning of inversions on infrastructure in African countries, the displacement of important commercial partners in Latin America, and the rejection alongside Russia of a new expansion of NATO, the Middle Empire has known how to take a stance as a relevant actor and undoubtedly as a global economic power. **Therefore, the tension increase between the two powers is undeniable.**

3. Contemporary scenario (I)

In order to study the concept of autonomy, we must first analyse the contemporary scenario. After the various events that have occurred since 2001, despite being diffuse and confusing, international relations ended up in 2008 in an open struggle for influence, ending the clear US hegemony that was present at that time. Thus, the beginning of the 2008 economic crisis meant the relative rise of emerging powers, especially for an already economically inserted China, which adopted increasingly assertive foreign agendas (Schulz, 2016). In consequence, the redistribution of power from the West to new actors (China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, among others) or resurgents (Russia) has encouraged the competition for power, a fact that was absent or concealed in previous phases.

The best case study to understand this new competition for influence are the Sino-American relations of the last decade. The first approaches made by Washington towards China in this new scenario were undertaken by the Obama Administration, taking a hybrid strategy called "Pivot to Asia": on the one hand, presenting elements of anchoring and integration; and on the other, elements of containment and dissuasion. The idea of the Obama strategy was, through a selective approach, to achieve reciprocal cooperation with Beijing in important areas and to avoid the appearance of zero-sum thinking. However, it did not yield

the expected results and Chinese diplomacy did not show signs of reciprocity in sensitive sectors for the United States: In the negotiations at COP15, China did not respond as expected to the proposal to reduce carbon emissions, nor did it show signs of collaboration in the situation of North Korea and nuclear disarmament, and even exercised more pressure on the claims over the South China Sea.

Yet, the tensions between the declining power and the rising one were made more patent with the irruption of the Trump Administration. The period between 2016 and 2020 was one marked by the withdrawal of the United States from various international instances, worsening its relative decline in comparison with other actors. The denouncing of the Paris Accord on Climate Change and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the launching of commercial wars against partners and rivals such as the EU or China, or the retreat from instances such as the WHO or the UN-HRC exemplify the damage that the Trump Administration did to the American presence in the world. In consequence, the Wilsonian ideal that the United States has promoted since the end of the Cold War was undermined by these events, souring the position of Washington with its allies, third countries and adversaries, things that the current Biden Administration is trying to reverse.

On the other hand, China appears as a more assertive player in the international arena. Since the presentation of projects like the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, the beginning of inversions on infrastructure in African countries such as Nigeria, Angola and Sudan (Lechini, 2013), the displacement of important commercial partners in Latin America (Bonialian, 2021), and the rejection together with Russia of a new expansion of NATO (El Pais, 2022), the Middle Empire has known how to take a stance as a relevant actor and undoubtedly as a global economic power.

Contemporary scenario (II)

- However, **it is not possible to describe this relationship as like a New Cold War**. In situations where the challenges are increasingly global and interdependent, relations between the two powers should be rather approximated to a **cooperative rivalry scenario** instead of an adversarial rivalry. **In this sense, there will be areas where there will be intense competition between both actors** - new technologies, the space race, and international trade - **but at the same time, there will be other instances where cooperation will be required to face challenges that the actors alone cannot counteract**, such as climate change or upcoming pandemics. Therefore, in some cases, power should be exercised jointly between China and the United States, in a type of positive-sum game where all the intervening subjects win, rather than the dominance of one actor over another.
- So, in this new international dynamic, **which guideline is the most appropriate?** What kind of foreign projection and strategy may provide appropriate responses and mechanisms for a changing entropic world? **Several academics on both sides of the Atlantic have argued that autonomy should be the main factor to consider.** But what is autonomy as a concept? What development has it had both in Europe and Latin America?

4. Contemporary scenario (II)

However, it is not possible to describe this relationship as similar to a New Cold War. The level of economic exchange, the multiple political and cultural relations, and the existence of a systemic multipolarism show that the relationship between Beijing and Washington is diametrically different from the one the latter had with Moscow. In situations where the challenges are increasingly global and interdependent, the relations between the two powers should be rather approximated to a cooperative rivalry scenario (Nye, 2018) instead of an adversarial rivalry one (as during the Cold War). In this sense, there will be areas where there will be intense competition between both actors - new technologies, the space race and international trade - but at the same time, there will be other instances where cooperation will be required to face challenges that the actors alone cannot counteract, such as climate change or upcoming pandemics. Therefore, in some cases, power should be exercised jointly between China and the United States, in a type of positive-sum game where all the intervening subjects win, rather than the dominance of one actor over another.

We believe that we are not in a Cold War scenario and that applying the logic that inspired bipolarity for decades is a mistake. Neither is China the Soviet Union nor is the US's relationship with both comparable. We have already quoted J. Nye to make this point. Systemically, there is a

confrontation between China and the United States, but in Jonathan Ward's words, the current phenomenon is a "unique and original competition" because it is not military in nature, or ideological, with two poles completely opposed and decoupled from each other. Thus, José Antonio Sanahuja and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian point out that categorising it in this way is a conceptual and political error, due to the reciprocal nature of the two powers, as well as the existence of other figures on the international stage (such as the EU, Russia, India, Brazil) that have their own external agendas and are not aligned, and that at the same time there are no domestic actors who are calling to end or veto existing ties with either China or the United States, but on the contrary, wish to deepen them.

Again, and following Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane, there is a complex interdependence between the two actors that imposes a situation of cooperation and competition on them rather than one of direct confrontation.

Consequently, the existence of multiple channels between the US and China - such as the existence of dynamic economic and cultural activity between communities, non-state actors, transnational corporations and sub-state actors in both states-; the low hierarchy of issues to be addressed between them, not always dominated by a security or military agenda; and the lesser role of military means or hard power in economic or environmental issues on the international stage, demonstrate that the relationship between Washington and Beijing does not respond to a logic of confrontation, but rather one of competition and mutual dependence, especially as a rivalry for technological predominance, disguised in some cases as a commercial war, for the development of Artificial Intelligence and data management.

Autonomy: Europe's case (I)

- The first approach to an idea of autonomy occurred in post-war Europe, specifically within NATO circles and the European integration process. However, the concept was relegated to a secondary plane and little theoretical relevance during the Cold War. **Only after the fall of the Berlin Wall did the idea of European autonomy re-emerge, with the declaration of Saint-Malo in 1998 and the idea of "capacity of action".**
- Consequently, the first constructions that arose around the concept were closely related to the field of defence and security, framed within the expression of capacity for action, having three important factors to consider:
 - Political capacity, in terms of defining strategies and following them.
 - Operational capacity, in terms of logistical and institutional power to execute the defined strategy.
 - Industrial capacity, regarding the construction, development, and maintenance of said faculties.
- However, it was necessary to wait until 2013 for the term strategic autonomy to appear. It was the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union that first created the concept and elevated it to the European Global Strategy in 2016. Thus, only in 2017 was it possible to give a concrete definition of this idea: ***the ability to act and cooperate with international and regional partners whenever possible, while being able to operate autonomously when and where necessary.*** This definition applies to new non-traditional areas.

5. Autonomy: Europe's case (I)

Etymologically, autonomy comes from the Greek *autos* (αυτος - by itself), *nomos* (νομος - rule), and the suffix *ia* (quality), thereby expressing the quality of being under one's own rule or within one's government. However, the concept is not based solely on this definition, but rather is diffuse, not due to an ambiguity in its content, but consequence of a great richness in terms of its development.

On the Old Continent, the idea is already a long-standing concept. The first approaches to an idea of autonomy occurred in post-WW2 Europe, specifically within NATO circles and the European integration process. However, with the rejection of the European Defence Community during the 1950s and the consolidation of NATO as the guarantor of security in Europe, the concept was relegated to a secondary plane with little theoretical relevance during the Cold War (Le Gleut and Conway-Mouret, 2019:15). Only after the fall of the Berlin Wall did the idea of European autonomy re-emerge.

One of the first references made to it in a formal declaration occurred in Saint-Malo in 1998 when the French and British governments indicated that the new European Union "must have an autonomous capacity for action, supported by credible military forces" (Sénat, 1998). Consequently, the first constructions that arose around the concept were

closely related to the field of defence and security, framed within the expression of capacity for action, having three important factors to consider:

1. Political capacity, in terms of defining strategies and following them;
2. Operational capacity, in terms of logistical and institutional power to execute the defined strategy;
3. Industrial capacity, regarding the construction, development and maintenance of said facilities.

However, it was necessary to wait until 2013 for the term strategic autonomy to appear. It was the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union that first created the concept and elevated it to the European Global Strategy in 2016 after the Brexit referendum (Tocci, 2021). Thus, only from 2017 on was it possible to give a concrete definition of this idea: the ability to act and cooperate with international and regional partners whenever possible, while being able to operate autonomously when and where necessary (High Representative of the EU, 2016). Unlike what was mentioned before, here the term is broader and far from the conceptions of international security that had marked it for nearly twenty years, applying to new non-traditional areas: "Europe's strategic autonomy allows to reduce dependence on others in relation to the most necessary things: critical materials and technologies, food, infrastructure, security and other strategic areas" (European Commission, 2020).

What motivated this change for Europe? Two precise events caused a transformation of what has been understood by strategic autonomy: the election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States in 2016, and the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. On the one hand, the arrival of the magnate caused a severe setback to transatlantic relations, especially in terms of compliance with Article V of the NATO Treaty, meanwhile the pandemic exposed Europe's dependence on foreign countries in strategic sectors, such as energy, medical supplies and pharmaceuticals. Therefore, Brussels is facing a situation that is delicate and which is part of other events that have already marked the European agenda, like the deterioration of the European neighbourhood from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa and Turkey, mass migration flows, terrorism, cyber threats, and Brexit, among others.

Autonomy: Europe's case (II)

- Thus, European strategic autonomy is trying to respond to new challenges that were not previously related to geopolitics, but that have become relevant. In this way, progress has been made in certain areas:
- First by **strengthening the euro as an international currency and element of economic sovereignty**; the development of efforts to maintain global economic governance; the rethinking of trade policy as a tool of European foreign policy.
- Second, by **having a strong look at the technological, competitive, and productive capacity of the EU**. Brussels has encouraged investment and innovation as the main tools to rebuild Europe's industrial capacity and take it to the next stage of development, like with Next Generation EU or SURE.
- Third, to **create a common defence culture as well as an own European identity in the face of new threats**. Because of this, the European Global Strategy was approved in 2016, creating the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the subsequent European Intervention Initiative (I₂), the endowment of a European Defence Fund in 2017, the encouragement of associativity between agents within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the creation of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC). In addition, in mid-February 2022, the Commission unveiled proposals for actions to contribute to community defence.
- It must be stated that not all member states of the European Union agree in which direction strategic autonomy should point, both geographically and functionally. However, the start of the Kremlin's invasion of Ukraine has been a major shock, once again launching the discussion of community security within the EU.

6. Autonomy: Europe's case (II)

Thus, the European strategic autonomy is trying to respond to new challenges that were not previously related to geopolitics. In this way, progress has been made in certain areas:

First, in the economic sector, by strengthening the euro as an international currency and as an element of economic sovereignty; the development of efforts to maintain global economic governance, especially within the WTO; the rethinking of trade policy as a tool of European foreign policy.

Second, in the field of industry, by having a strong look at the technological, competitive and productive capacity of the EU. The Union itself has pointed out that it "gives European industry the opportunity to develop its own markets, products and services that boost competitiveness" as a manner to respond to external events. In this sense, Brussels has encouraged investment and innovation as the main tools to rebuild Europe's industrial capacity and take it to the next stage of development, such as with Next Generation EU or SURE.

Third, in the realm of security and defence, to create a common defence culture as well as an own European identity in the face of new threats. Because of this, the European Global Strategy was approved in 2016,

creating the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the subsequent European Intervention Initiative (I₂), the endowment of a European Defence Fund in 2017, the encouragement of associativity between agents within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the creation of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC). In addition, in mid-February 2022, the Commission unveiled proposals for actions to contribute to community defence, drive innovation and address strategic dependencies, as well as the unprecedented financing of the Ukrainian war effort against Russian aggression.

However, not all the member states of the European Union agree in which direction strategic autonomy should point, both geographically and functionally.

France is the country that most strongly defends a notion based on European sovereignty and interests. Paris considers the establishment of an autonomy by the EU as key to France's own strategic autonomy; therefore, a development at the European level would imply a greater French presence on the international scene. On the other hand, Germany maintains that strategic autonomy should be developed as a pillar within the EU, being not a mutually exclusive project with NATO, but rather a complementary one. Thus, Berlin considers that adopting the French proposal would imply matching European interests to French ones, which would mean putting their own interests and the geopolitical closeness with Washington at stake.

In addition to these positions, there are other proposals made by other European capitals. At the beginning of 2021, Spain and the Netherlands jointly proposed a point of synthesis between the French and German ideas, indicating that the European Union must become a global player with real capabilities based on tailor made solutions. In contrast, Poland considers the issue of strategic autonomy to be a discussion about how to update NATO in the face of new Russian pressure; meanwhile, Sweden and Austria consider certain proposals as controversial to their historical neutrality, for which they have placed greater emphasis on operational or logistical autonomy rather than on defence. However, the start of the Kremlin's invasion of Ukraine has been a major shock, once again launching the discussion of community security within the EU.

Latin America and autonomy: Do we find something similar? (I)

- The concept of autonomy has had a continuous and successive development in Latin America too, constituting a true current of thought of its own.
- The first approach to this concept was carried out by **Juan Carlos Puig and Helio Jaguaribe** through the so-called *heterodox autonomy*. **Jaguaribe** considers autonomous actors as those that have a *margin of self-determination in domestic affairs and the capacity for independent international action*, being conditioned to two factors that are essential: national viability (internal element) and international permissibility (external element).
- **Puig**, on the other hand, delves further into the role that Latin American elites have in the dependency relationships that an actor has with a foreign entity, which can range from complete dependency to full autonomy.
- In reaction to what was pointed out by the previous authors, and after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, **Escudé** reformulated the concept of autonomy within his utilitarian vision of foreign relations: *peripheral realism*. In it, he proposes an association of the concept with the idea of confrontation resulting from an overestimation of the room for maneuver of weak states, which did not distinguish between the autonomy that a state possesses (which is a consequence of its power) and the use of it. In that way, autonomy for Escudé is achieved *through an in-depth analysis of the costs and benefits that a certain actor has in his decisions, trying to ensure the maintenance or increase of the material well-being of the population, without contradicting the guidelines established by the then-hegemon - the United States*.

7. Latin America and autonomy: Do we find something similar? (I)

The concept of autonomy has had a continuous and successive development in Latin America too, constituting a true current of thought of its own. In this sense, it is a highly valuable aspect, since they are proposals that are born from a peripheral space within international dynamics, as is the case in Latin America, and not based on a rearrangement of doctrines brought from abroad.

A first approach to this concept was carried out by Juan Carlos Puig in Argentina and Helio Jaguaribe in Brazil at the beginning of the Cold War, through the so-called heterodox autonomy. The authors try to answer the various criticisms that the Eclac had made regarding the dependence of the Latin American States of that time, both economically and politically, to the international dynamics, emphasising the role of local elites in this relationship. In this way, Jaguaribe considers autonomous actors those that have a “margin of self-determination in domestic affairs and the capacity for independent international action”, being conditioned to two factors that are essential: national viability (internal element) and international permissibility (external element).

Puig, on the other hand, delves further into the role that Latin American elites have in the dependency relationships that an actor has with a foreign entity, which can range from complete dependency to full autonomy. In consequence, and according to the interpretation of Míguez, he considers the latter as "the maximum self-decision capacity that can be achieved, taking into account the objective constraints of the real world". This autonomy could be expressed in four theoretical models according to the behaviour of the ruling elites:

1. Paracolonyal dependency, where the ruling elites of a peripheral state act in accordance with the central power, with no purpose of their own;
2. National dependency, where the national elites have a foreign policy project but are still subordinate to the demands of the central power.
3. Heterodox autonomy, characterised by the fact that the local elites had to present dissident foreign policy projects that looked after national interests, but were not strategically contradictory to those of the dominant power;
4. Secessionist autonomy, in which elites cause internal and external problems by a total break with the hegemonic power, without proper assessment of the consequences.

In reaction to what was pointed out by the previous authors, and after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Escudé reformulated the concept of autonomy within his utilitarian vision of foreign relations: peripheral realism. In it, he proposes an association of the concept with the idea of confrontation resulting from an overestimation of the room for manoeuvre of weak states, which did not distinguish between the autonomy that a state possesses (which is a consequence of its power) and the use of it. In that way, autonomy for Escudé is achieved through an in-depth analysis of the costs and benefits that a certain actor has in his decisions, trying to ensure the maintenance or increase of the material well-being of the population, without contradicting the guidelines established by the then hegemon - the United States - according to what is affirmed by Tokatlian and Russell.

Latin America and autonomy: Do we find something similar? (II)

- After the arrival of the new century, Tokatlian and Russell proposed their postulates on *relational autonomy*. In this sense, they indicate that in the face of the irruption of new factors there has been a modification of the "context of action" in Latin America, making a new definition of autonomy necessary, no longer based on contrasts but on relationships with other actors. Therefore, autonomy for them should be understood as "the capacity and willingness of a country to make decisions with others of its own free will and to jointly deal with situations and processes occurring within and outside its borders".
- Similarly, especially in a Brazilian context, the so-called *autonomies with adjectives* appear, represented by the ideas of **Tullo Vigevani** and **Gabriel Cepaluni**. They point out three different progressive degrees when talking about the concept in question, from tendencies to isolation (autonomy in the distance), to participation in multilateralism (autonomy in participation), and finally to open relations with the Global South (autonomy in diversification). In addition, **Miriam Gomes Saraiva** indicated the several currents that had happened in Brazilian diplomacy, especially an autonomic position that occurred during the presidency of **Lula da Silva**: the ability to manoeuvre on the international stage, universalism, and above all, strengthening Brazil's presence on the international stage.
- Finally, **Actis** and **Malacalza** proposed the notion of *liquid autonomy*. They point out that, faced with an entropic scenario and where there is a double tension between "Westphalia" and "globalisation", it is necessary to focus on the recognition of the fragility of the global and regional scenarios, the capacity for resilience in the face of adverse events by taking opportunities and mitigating impacts.

8. Latin America and autonomy: Do we find something similar? (II)

Subsequently, and after the arrival of the new century, Tokatlian and Russell distanced themselves from the propositions of Escudé and they took up the autonomist current through their postulates on relational autonomy. In this sense, they indicate that in the face of the irruption of new factors (such as globalisation, the end of the Cold War and the deepening of democratic and integration processes in the region), there has been a modification of the "context of action" in Latin America, making a new definition of autonomy necessary, no longer based on contrasts but on relationships with other actors.

Therefore, the authors considered that this new approach should be understood as "the capacity and willingness of a country to make decisions with others of its own free will and to jointly deal with situations and processes occurring within and outside its borders" (Tokatlian and Russell, 2002). Thus, the definition in terms of conditioning would be the aforementioned capacity and disposition, done in a competent, committed and responsible manner. Meanwhile, as a national interest (in order to increase the degrees of freedom) it is based on a new pattern of activity in the international orchestra, coming with new structures, identities and ideas, as well as gaining relevance within foreign relations

with the understanding that the other is no longer something opposite, but something integral to the international agent itself (Tokatlian and Russell, 2002:179).

Similarly, in South America, especially in a Brazilian context, the so-called autonomies with adjectives appear, represented by the ideas of Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni (2007:283). In that sense, they point out three different progressive degrees when talking about the concept in question:

1. Autonomy in the distance, when the country confronts international norms and institutions and the great power, while tending towards isolation and self-sufficient development;
2. Autonomy in participation, when external guidance is based on a commitment for global governance and multilateral institutions;
3. Autonomy in diversification, when it is based mainly on relations with the Global South.

In addition, Miriam Gomes Saraiva (2010:48) indicated the several currents that have happened in Brazilian diplomacy, especially an autonomic position that occurred during the first two presidencies of Lula da Silva: the ability to manoeuvre on the international stage, universalism, and above all, strengthening Brazil's presence on the international stage.

Finally, it is also interesting to highlight the contributions made by Actis and Malacalza (2021), who propose their own notion: liquid autonomy. They point out that, faced with an entropic scenario and where there is a double tension between "Westphalia" and "globalisation" (the interactions between States on the one hand, and on the other, globalisation and transnational relations), it is necessary to focus on the recognition of the fragility of the global and regional scenarios, the capacity for resilience in the face of adverse events by taking opportunities, and mitigating impacts.

A new concept of autonomy for a new period in Latin America

- Given this long theoretical development, what can we consider as autonomy today in a Latin American context? Firstly, we should bring as a starting point the definition of autonomy from the European context. However, **Latin America does not work under European logic, nor does Europe work under Latin American logic**, even if having common interests.
- Thus, for establishing strategic autonomy for Latin America, **it is important to put on the table the notions of autonomy that already exist on the continent**. In this way, **the closest definition to the prevailing type of paradigm is relational autonomy**. However, it lacks further development in terms of areas of an operational or productive nature, explainable due to the period in which the theory was developed.
- As well, **new contributions in the area must also be brought to light**, especially the proposal of liquid autonomy that includes the identification of the fragility of international scenarios, resilience in the face of adverse events by taking opportunities, and the mitigation of the various impacts that may occur in the future.
- Thus, a Latin American-style strategic autonomy could be conceptualised as ***the ability and willingness to act, cooperate and relate to other international and regional actors voluntarily, whenever possible, to expand the spaces for action and the areas related to them by opportunity-taking; or to maintain them through resilience or the mitigation of external shocks***. Consequently, autonomy should not be related to concepts such as autarchy or isolationism.

9. A new concept of autonomy for a new period in Latin America

Given this long theoretical development, what can we consider as autonomy today in a Latin American context? Firstly, and starting with the European context, it is possible to define it as "the ability to set one's own priorities and make one's own decisions in matters of foreign policy and security, together with the institutional, political and material wherewithal to carry these through - in cooperation with third parties, or if need be alone" (Lippert, von Ondarza and Perthes, 2019:5).

Despite this, adopting foreign definitions without adapting them to the local reality would result in an error. Latin America does not work under European logic, nor does Europe work under Latin American logic, despite having common interests. Thus, to establish a strategic autonomy for Latin America, it is important to put the notions of autonomy that already exist on the continent on the table. In this way, the closest definition to the prevailing type of paradigm is the relational autonomy (Tokatlian and Russell, 2002). This constitutes an important basis since it denotes two important things: first, the capacity and willingness of a country to make decisions with others of its own free will; and then, that said capacity to face, jointly with other actors, situations and processes

that have occurred in the international scenario. However, it lacks further development in terms of areas of an operational or productive nature, explainable due to the period in which the theory was developed.

In addition, new contributions in the area must also be brought to light, especially the proposal of liquid autonomy (Actis and Malacalza, 2021). The identification of the fragility of the global and regional scenarios, resilience in the face of adverse events by taking opportunities, and the mitigation of the various impacts that may occur in the future are necessary points to emphasise in a chaotic, fast changing international arena.

Thus, a Latin American-style strategic autonomy could be conceptualised as the ability and willingness to act, cooperate and relate to other international and regional actors voluntarily, whenever possible, with a view to expanding the spaces for action and the areas related to them by opportunity taking; or to maintain them through resilience or the mitigation of external shocks.

Consequently, autonomy should not be related to concepts such as autarchy or isolationism. In the first place, it is not comparable to autarchy, understood as a state policy by which it tries to subsist with its own resources, since strategic autonomy is based on association with other actors and is therefore a foreign policy open to the world. Nor is it isolationism, such as a policy of separation or non-intervention in international relations; on the contrary, the autonomy in question requires a willingness to act, to establish the necessary positions in the foreign arena, and even socialise it with other entities in order to expand the spaces for action or to maintain them.

What should an autonomic foreign policy should mean?

- It is also necessary to emphasise that the adoption of a policy of this type imposes certain challenges at the same time. Neither the creation of spaces nor the development of inherent aspects can be conceived spontaneously, but it is necessary adequate means allow the realisation of these objectives.
- In this way, what means are adequate to carry out an agenda based on strategic autonomy?
- **Deployment of entrepreneurial diplomacy**, within an approach that integrates policies at the domestic level in a holistic manner or a whole-of-government sense. Consequently, the deployment of foreign action of this type implies a greater strategic role for the state in identifying and developing areas where there are interests of its own, especially those where there are comparative advantages over other players on the global scene, called niche diplomacy.
- On the other hand, and as mentioned above, an autonomous agenda **also implies the association and diversification of ties with strategic partners**. In this case, Euro-Latin American relations represent a potential axis, due to their cultural and political proximity. However, both regions have different challenges.
 - Regarding Latin America, the priority corresponds to retaking the various regional spaces that have been abandoned in the last decade.
 - Regarding the European Union, deepening the strategic association constitutes an opportunity to broaden horizons both from Brussels and from the different American capitals

10. What should an autonomic foreign policy mean?

It is also necessary to emphasise that the adoption of a policy of this type imposes certain challenges at the same time. Neither the creation of spaces nor the development of inherent aspects can be conceived spontaneously, but it is necessary adequate means allow the realisation of these objectives. Thus, the strategic management of the state will be decisive in the coming year, especially in terms of the domestic sphere, since the current economic opening must be reconciled with vulnerability to foreign events, in addition to the construction of agreements by internal politics that make it viable.

In this way, what means are adequate to carry out an agenda based on strategic autonomy? Firstly, the same authors mentioned above indicate that there must be a deployment of an entrepreneurial diplomacy, within an approach that integrates policies at the domestic level in a holistic manner or a whole-of-government sense (Cooper, 2018:596-608). They explain that, given the lack of hard power capabilities that distinguish the great powers, small and medium-sized countries - such as Latin American and some European countries - can exert influence on their external environment by concentrating their diplomatic activ-

ities on alternative courses of action that contribute to good international governance (Bywaters, Sepúlveda and Villar, 2021:47). Consequently, the deployment of foreign action of this type implies a greater strategic role for the state in identifying and developing areas where there are interests of its own, especially those where there are comparative advantages over other players on the global scene (niche diplomacy).

On the other hand, and as mentioned above, an autonomous agenda also implies the association and diversification of ties with strategic partners. In this case, Euro-Latin American relations represent a potential axis, due to their cultural and political proximity. However, both regions have different challenges.

Regarding Latin America, the priority corresponds to retaking the various regional spaces that have been abandoned in the last decade. In this sense, it is a substantial requirement to overcome what Covarrubias calls a circumstantial regionalism, characterised by repetitive cycles of optimism and creation of institutions, followed by stagnation and negligence on the part of governments that prefer to act unilaterally (Covarrubias, 2019). Thus, the laying of foundations for a serious, pragmatic regionalism should be promoted, that constitutes a source of governance in the region, especially through actions such as the search for minimum consensus.

Regarding the European Union, this constitutes a fundamental point. With Europe, the region shares more than democratic values, economic relations or political contacts, but also cultural, linguistic, and historical ties and common challenges. Thus, faced with an entropic world, the European Union faces the same dilemmas as Latin America at the international level, so a deeper strategic association constitutes an opportunity to broaden horizons both from Brussels and from the different American capitals. Facts such as the commitment to democracy, multilateralism, political dialogue, fair trade and an international system based on rules are shared issues that can be deepened to acquire greater autonomy.

Further readings

1. Nye, J., 2018. La rivalidad cooperativa de las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y China [online] Project Syndicate. Disponible en: <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-america-relationship-cooperative-rivalry-by-joseph-s--nye-2018-11/spanish>
2. Tocci, N., 2021. European Strategic Autonomy: What It Is, Why We Need It, How to Achieve It. [online] Roma: Istituto Affari Internazionali, p.7. Disponible en: <https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/9788893681780.pdf>
3. Molina, M. and Benedicto, M., 2021. Autonomía Estratégica en Seguridad y Defensa: Un Anheló Geopolítico que no se hace realidad en la Unión Europea. Revista UNISCI, [online] n°55, p.10. Disponible en: http://www.unisci.es/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/UNISCIDP_55-1MOLINABENEDICTO.pdf
4. Briceño, J. and Simonoff, A., 2017. La Escuela de la Autonomía, América Latina y la teoría de las relaciones internacionales. Estudios Internacionales, Vol. 49, n°186, pp.39-89. Disponible en: <https://www.scielo.cl/pdf/rei/v49n186/o719-3769-rei-49-186-00039.pdf>
5. Actis, E. and Malacalza, B., 2021. Las políticas exteriores de América Latina en tiempos de autonomía líquida. [online] Nueva Sociedad. Disponible en: <https://nuso.org/articulo/las-politicas-exteriores-de-america-latina-en-tiempos-de-autonomia-liquida/>

Questions for discussion and debate

1. What kind of challenges does a foreign policy of autonomy have to face in today's world - defence alone or others as well?
2. Is the idea of strategic autonomy applicable to the fractured nature of the Latin American region in its international relations?
3. What other measures could enhance bi-regional engagement between Europe and Latin America?

Lecture 3: Desafíos en la vinculación con América Latina para la Unión Europea

Paz Milet

Desafíos en la vinculación con América Latina para la Unión Europea

Paz Milet

Hipervínculo al [vídeo](#)

Hipervínculo a las [diapositivas](#)

Contenido

1. Las tres crisis simultáneas de América Latina
2. Mercosur
3. Unasur
4. Alianza del Pacífico
5. Comunidad Andina
6. CELAC
7. Los procesos de integración
8. Síntesis...América Latina (I)
9. Síntesis...América Latina (II)
10. Relación con la Unión Europea

Las tres crisis simultáneas de América Latina

1. Consecuencias de la crisis económica del 2008
2. Pandemia
3. Consecuencias de la guerra de Ucrania

Marco:

- Cuestionamiento al modelo imperante
- Erosión de los procesos regionales
- Falta de cohesión

1. Las tres crisis simultáneas de América Latina

América Latina experimenta actualmente una de las etapas más difíciles de su historia, por la confluencia de tres crisis simultáneas que han tenido amplias consecuencias en esta región. Primero, la crisis del 2008, que significó la caída del precio de los commodities, importante sustento de las economías latinoamericanas y consecuentemente de las políticas sociales de los países de la región.

Segundo, la pandemia, que profundizó las consecuencias de la crisis anterior e hizo evidente una serie de deficiencias estructurales de la región, como el alto nivel de informalidad en el empleo, el bajo gasto en el área sanitaria y la escasa institucionalidad regional capaz de abordar esta área. Es así como durante la crisis del COVID 19, en general, el enfrentamiento de este desafío de carácter multidimensional se realizó de manera individual.

Tercero, la crisis generada por el conflicto Rusia-Ucrania, que ha tenido amplios costos, especialmente costos económicos para la región, que está experimentando un escenario inflacionario y un difícil cuadro social.

Estas tres crisis confluyen en un marco mayor, con tres condicionantes de amplio alcance y de largo plazo: 1) el descontento del modelo

imperante fundamentalmente desde el retorno a la democracia, tanto del punto de vista político, como económico y social. En algunos países este descontento se expresó en la búsqueda de opciones a los partidos políticos tradicionales y en otros, como en el caso de Chile y Colombia, en estallidos sociales - que más allá de la violencia - demandaban cambios en la agenda de futuro y una mayor participación del Estado, en desmedro del mercado.

2) La erosión de algunas de las principales iniciativas regionales producto fundamentalmente de tensiones internas respecto a la forma de abordar crisis regionales, como la situación venezolana y el incremento sustantivo de la migración de ciudadanos venezolanos hacia los países de la región; asimismo, también se generaron dificultades en relación a cómo vincularse con Estados Unidos y qué nivel de compromiso asumir en los proyectos conjuntos. Es así como en las últimas iniciativas surgidas en América Latina, en general ha primado un regionalismo ligero, es decir, se ha aplicado prioritariamente el consenso como mecanismo de adopción de decisiones y un sistema de solución de controversias muy simple. En la práctica, esto da cuenta de un bajo nivel de compromiso y escasos avances en supranacionalidad.

3) Lo anteriormente expuesto también se relaciona con la falta de cohesión y capacidad para actuar de manera conjunta. Esto se hizo más que evidente durante la pandemia, en la que en general primó el aislacionismo y el unilateralismo. En general no hubo cierres coordinados de fronteras o estos fueron notificados unilateralmente con escasa anticipación y primó la competencia en la búsqueda de insumos sanitarios. No obstante, la falta de cohesión es un fenómeno persistente y que ya antes se ha hecho presente por ejemplo en el diálogo con las potencias, como Estados Unidos y China.

Caso a caso...

MERCOSUR

- Superación rivalidades tradicionales
- Crisis a partir del 2000. Confrontación visiones de futuro, dentro del progresismo.
- Dificultades por la incorporación de Venezuela
- Tensión actual ¿relanzamiento o fin?

2. MERCOSUR

Esta iniciativa surge a partir de un proceso de acercamiento argentino-brasileño que se desarrolla desde mediados de los 80 y que supone la superación de una rivalidad tradicional.

Su tratado constitutivo es de 1991 e incorpora la idea de la creación de un mercado común regional, cuyo objetivo es alcanzar el desarrollo económico con justicia social.

En un primer momento el énfasis estuvo en el aspecto comercial de la integración, y el comercio entre los socios creció exponencialmente. Hasta el 2000, el Mercosur era una de las experiencias de integración más exitosas de la región, con una alta voluntad política, bajo nivel institucional que le permitía actuar con flexibilidad y un sistema de solución de controversias simple, basado fundamentalmente en la compensación.

No obstante, surgieron los problemas. No se pudieron resolver internamente las divergencias y se debió llegar a la Organización Mundial de Comercio y, además, en el año 2001, Argentina experimentó la profundización de su crisis económica y política, con el corralito y la renuncia del Presidente Fernando de la Rúa; afectándose consecuentemente el avance del Mercado Común del Sur.

A partir del 2002 y hasta el 2015 se prioriza un Mercosur social y productivo, marcado por la permanencia en el poder de gobiernos progresistas.

Desde ese último año se incrementaron las dificultades entre los países miembros. Un punto de inflexión dentro de este escenario lo supuso la incorporación de Venezuela, anunciada el 2006 y recién materializada el 2012. El cuestionamiento respecto al carácter democrático de Venezuela dividió al bloque y la convocatoria a una Asamblea Constituyente, que se consideró usurpaba funciones de la Asamblea Nacional significó el congelamiento de la participación de Venezuela en el Mercosur.

Asimismo, se agudizaron las diferencias entre los dos socios más grandes, Argentina y Brasil, acerca de cómo actuar en los organismos internacionales y qué objetivos perseguir. Estas se hicieron presentes en las negociaciones del Acuerdo con la Unión Europea, proceso que empezó en 1999 y fue postergado en dos oportunidades. En 2010 se retomó después de 10 años y se concluyó parcialmente el 2019. Hoy está sometido a los distintos Congresos, pero se ve difícil su concreción.

En los últimos años, en momentos en que se suponía que MERCOSUR adquiriría su madurez - al cumplirse treinta años de su creación - se profundizó la crisis del bloque. Durante la crisis de la pandemia se generó una tardía reacción, los líderes del bloque sólo se reunieron varios meses después de que estallara la crisis y fue evidente la falta de diálogo y empatía entre Jair Bolsonaro y Alberto Fernández. Los dos mandatarios eran representantes además, de las identidades que hoy están en pugna en este bloque, la de los sectores más proteccionistas v/s los que buscan mayor flexibilidad. Actualmente el mayor cuestionamiento es respecto a la permanencia de este proyecto, tal como se ha conocido hasta ahora.

UNASUR

- Idea de repensar los procesos latinoamericanos
- Expresión de mayor autonomía e identidad sudamericana
- Legitimidad interna y externa
- Institucionalidad de cooperación y desarrollo
- Confrontación de distintas narrativas regionales
- Fin de un proyecto
- ¿Renovación?, ¿ Construcción de una nueva etapa?

3. UNASUR

La conformación de esta iniciativa es resultado de un proceso de repensar la integración sudamericana y también de un cuestionamiento al modelo. Se consideraba que la propuesta de acumulación del ciclo neoliberal había fracasado y se había generado deterioro social.

Esta visión estaba acompañada de la noción de que Estados Unidos había abandonado la región y que era necesario fortalecer la autonomía y generar propuestas representativas de la identidad regional.

Dentro de los temas priorizados por esta iniciativa están la convergencia de la Comunidad Andina, con MERCOSUR y Chile, el trabajo en infraestructura y desarrollo descentralizado, medioambiente, integración energética y el tratamiento de las asimetrías.

Desde el inicio hubo claras señales de la importancia que se le asignaba a UNASUR en la región, buscando que se constituyera en un espacio de concertación política de alto nivel; incluso antes de que se constituyera oficialmente. Esto fue evidente al organizarse el primer encuentro de Barack Obama con la región en el marco de UNASUR y, en 2008, ante la tensión entre Evo Morales y las regiones de la Media Luna se buscó la mediación de Unión de Naciones Suramericanas y no de la Organización de Estados Americanos como era tradicional.

UNASUR claramente ha tenido dos etapas en su evolución. Primero de surgimiento y avance, que se desarrolla en condiciones de bonanza y de estabilidad social, y supuso el establecimiento de una agenda multidimensional y la generación de instrumentos institucionales. Dentro de estos destacan distintos Consejos - como por ejemplo el de salud - y el Consejo Sudamericano de Defensa, que inicialmente se pensó como una nueva OTAN, pero que finalmente quedó como una instancia fundamentalmente consultiva.

Segundo, de crisis y estancamiento variaciones profundas en todas estas iniciativas. La caída de los recursos impuso una agenda más acotada y la discontinuidad de los esfuerzos de proyección extrarregional. UNASUR perdió capacidad de agencia y entró en un proceso de deslegitimación - incluso de la Secretaría General, que no pudo renovarse -; pero sin duda el factor más gravitante es el debilitamiento del proyecto compartido y el incremento de la fragmentación.

Esto motivó que 6 países congelaran su participación. Después se retiraron 7 de los 12 fundadores.

Motivados por el retorno de los gobiernos de izquierda al poder en la mayoría de los países de la región, un grupo de ex Presidentes y ex Cancilleres propusieron relanzar la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas, pero con algunas diferencias, enfatizando el tema comercial y eliminando la capacidad de veto en la elección de la Secretaría General.

Alianza del Pacífico

- Iniciativa neoliberal en un marco post liberal
- Centralidad comercial y bajo nivel institucional
- Plataforma hacia el Pacífico
- Estrategia por la ampliación
- Afectada por el cuestionamiento al modelo
- En período de definiciones ... ¿hacia dónde avanzar?

4. Alianza del Pacífico

Inicialmente surge de la búsqueda de un acercamiento entre Perú y Chile, que estaban involucrados en un contencioso por su límite marítimo en la Corte Internacional de Justicia de la Haya. Se invitó a participar a Colombia, y México, con la idea de buscar la libre circulación de bienes, servicios, capitales y personas y fortalecer sus vínculos con Asia Pacífico. El objetivo final era conformar un área de integración profunda en el Arco del Pacífico.

Desde el comienzo se la planteó como una plataforma de articulación política, de integración económica y comercial, una alternativa para los países que tengan un modelo semejante, en la que primaría la flexibilidad y pragmatismo. En este marco se estableció que las decisiones se asumirían por consenso.

Las prioridades esencialmente comerciales fueron cuestionadas desde el comienzo, en una región que se consideraba estaba experimentando, como señala José Antonio Sanahuja, una etapa marcada por el regionalismo post liberal, con énfasis en la integración política.

No obstante, desde el inicio se alcanzaron logros significativos, como eliminación de las visas para ciudadanos y residentes permanentes, la coordinación entre los socios para la captar inversión extranjera en distintos países del mundo, el establecimiento de nueve embajadas

compartidas en África, Asia y Europa, la aplicación de un paquete de medidas comerciales en el acceso a mercado de bienes y, uno de los avances más importantes, la creación de una plataforma de movilidad estudiantil y académica con cuatrocientas becas anuales.

Desde el comienzo esta iniciativa captó atención internacional y se incorporaron países de todos los continentes como observadores. Actualmente hay 62, pero los más activos son 20-25. Se han establecido áreas prioritarias para el trabajo, como por ejemplo PYME, educación, innovación, y creación de comercio.

Algunos temas importantes a considerar y que generan permanentes cuestionamientos en torno a la Alianza son: el limitado comercio de México y sus socios, pero en general se hace referencia al escaso comercio intra Alianza; la conformación de esta iniciativa responde a un interés más ideológico que de apertura comercial. Además se argumenta que es un intento por contrapesar el liderazgo brasileño, que divide a la región entre el Atlántico y el Pacífico, y que además representaría un proyecto neoliberal supeditado a la influencia de Estados Unidos y que distorsionaría los nuevos procesos de integración regional, como UNASUR y CELAC.

La Alianza del Pacífico efectuó un diseño prospectivo de cara al 2030, identificando las áreas potenciales de desarrollo. Este delineamiento se ha visto afectado por la pandemia, pero hay algunas áreas donde claramente ha existido avance, como por ejemplo en la agenda de género y en la ampliación hacia nuevas asociaciones. No obstante, se han evidenciado deficiencias en la articulación política, pues para algunos de los países fundadores - a partir del cuestionamiento al modelo neoliberal - la Alianza no ha sido prioritaria.

Comunidad Andina

- Experiencia más antigua. Evidencia de la evolución de los procesos latinoamericanos
- Alto nivel institucional
- Permanentes tensiones por los tránsitos regionales
- Relanzamiento y nuevos desafíos le permitieron enfrentar mejor la pandemia.

5. Comunidad Andina de Naciones (CAN)

Esta iniciativa surge en 1969, bajo la denominación de Pacto Andino. Los miembros iniciales fueron Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador y Perú. En 1973 se retiró Chile, por desacuerdos con el nivel de apertura propuesto por el Pacto. En 1976 se incorporó Venezuela, quien en la década del 2000 se alejó de este acuerdo por los Tratados de Libre Comercio que Colombia y Perú estaban negociando con Estados Unidos mientras Caracas quería priorizar su vinculación con el MERCOSUR.

En la primera etapa hubo un compromiso con la política de sustitución de importaciones, para después ir asumiendo cada vez una mayor liberalización. Ya en 1993 se había formado una Zona de Libre Comercio.

Con el mayor nivel de supranacionalidad en la región, institucionalmente se buscó replicar la organización de la Unión Europea.

Desde lo comercial, la CAN fue evolucionando y se avanzó hacia una mayor preocupación por lo social y lo ambiental. En un contexto de crisis que se profundizó con la salida de Venezuela, se hizo una refundación, a través de la generación de instancias que abordaran, entre otros, el tema indígena.

Dentro de los logros de la Comunidad Andina destacan la supranacionalidad y el desarrollo a nivel institucional en materias como propiedad intelectual, pero tiene una débil gravitación en la geopolítica global, a pesar de los recursos energéticos con que cuentan algunos de sus socios.

Una de las mayores debilidades de esta iniciativa es la falta de voluntad política que cada cierto tiempo evidencian sus países miembros. Esto se expresa fundamentalmente en las restricciones que tangencialmente se colocan al comercio intracomunitario y que este no ha logrado ser un efectivo motor de desarrollo.

El 2019, en Lima, se celebraron los 50 años de la Comunidad Andina y se establecieron los principales lineamientos futuros, que entre otras áreas, suponen el desarrollo de la agenda digital andina y el fortalecimiento de las relaciones comerciales entre el sector público y privado.

Asimismo se aprobó la Carta Ambiental Andina, que permitirá enfrentar unidos el cambio climático y proteger la biodiversidad regional. También se aprobó el Estatuto Migratorio Andino, el cual regula el derecho comunitario de circulación y establece la residencia temporal y permanente para los ciudadanos andinos. Por último, y se estableció una Agenda Agropecuaria Andina, enfocada en convertir a la CAN en despensa alimentaria del planeta.

Estas decisiones posibilitaron que, al llegar la pandemia, esta iniciativa era una de las mejor preparadas; además de que dentro de su institucionalidad tiene una política sanitaria muy bien evaluada, como el Convenio Hipólito Unanue.

CELAC

- Concertación política y desarrollo
- Mosaico temático
- Contraparte en el diálogo con actores externos
- Dificultades por las crisis regionales
- Nueva etapa post autoevaluación

6. CELAC

La creación de la Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños responde a la idea de potenciar el regionalismo latinoamericano, que se logre una mayor concertación y cooperación intra-región; pero que además a través de esta vía, conjuntamente, se mejore el posicionamiento de América Latina.

Quedó constituida en la llamada Cumbre de la Unidad (Riviera Maya, 2010), con cinco principios rectores: solidaridad, flexibilidad, pluralidad, diversidad, complementariedad de acciones y participación voluntaria. En esencia, se rescata la agenda de concertación política del Grupo de Río y de las Cumbres del Desarrollo, propiciadas por Brasil; con el objetivo de constituirse en un eje de gravedad de las distintas instituciones de integración de la región.

Su plan de acción considera temas tan diversos como complementariedad y cooperación entre los mecanismos regionales y subregionales de integración, energía, infraestructura para la integración, desarrollo social, protección al migrante y cultura.

CELAC intenta agrupar y construir una identidad que represente los intereses conjuntos de los países latinoamericanos y el Caribe, por lo que se consideró inicialmente que asumía roles que antes tenía la

Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA). No obstante, desde sus inicios esta iniciativa deja explícitamente fuera a Estados Unidos y Canadá, por lo que la OEA sigue siendo por tradición el espacio hemisférico.

Uno de los principales roles que rescata del Grupo de Río, es el de ser la contraparte de China, la Unión Europea y otros actores extrarregionales.

A diferencia de otras iniciativas, CELAC no se ha visto afectada mayormente por la crisis económica, sino que su avance ha sido afectado -prioritariamente - por las dificultades para alcanzar consenso respecto a las crisis regionales.

Su objetivo es rescatar los intereses particulares de los Estados miembros y ser un espacio de convergencia entre los distintos organismos, pero en la práctica internamente los países actúan en bloques regionales o subregionales y no puede relevarse la especificidad en lo individual.

Esta iniciativa entró en una fase de reflexión en 2018, de la que se concluyó que se desarrollaría una conducción pragmática, se mantendría la interlocución con socios extra regionales y se sostendría el compromiso de zona de paz y la cooperación, persistiendo en los objetivos fundacionales.

CELAC durante la pandemia, bajo el liderazgo mexicano, buscó desarrollar procesos de cooperación en el ámbito sanitario y en 2023 inició una etapa de revitalización, a partir de la llegada al poder de gobiernos de afinidad de izquierda en la mayoría de los países de la región. Un hito en este proceso sería la renovación de las Cumbres con la UE, esta vez bajo la presidencia española.

Los procesos de integración

- Dificultad de los diferentes procesos regionales para enfrentar las crisis
- Bajos niveles de institucionalidad
- Falta de voluntad política
- Falta de cohesión y posicionamientos conjuntos
- Sistema de solución de controversias simples
- Reticencia a ceder soberanía

7. Los procesos de integración

En general, las distintas iniciativas regionales experimentan actualmente un proceso estancamiento, con escasos avances hace más de un quinquenio y este se ha profundizado a partir de la crisis pandémica. No obstante, las causas son más profundas y dicen relación con un proceso de más largo plazo, condicionado entre otros factores por:

1. Un bajo nivel institucional. En general, existe en los países latinoamericanos falta de voluntad para ceder soberanía en torno a un proyecto común, por eso se ha optado por privilegiar el consenso en la toma de decisiones y se ha optado por una institucionalidad muy elemental, basada esencialmente en las secretarías o Presidencias pro tempore. Esto no permite un adecuado seguimiento ni garantiza continuidad en el tratamiento de los diferentes temas.
2. Sistemas de solución de controversias muy simples, que no resuelven las controversias de fondo y que motivan a elevar los casos a instancias internacionales. Esto en la práctica es señal de una debilidad estructural, de la incapacidad de resolver internamente las disputas y finalmente, a largo plazo, va debilitando el compromiso en torno a un objetivo común.

3. Falta de cohesión y compromisos conjuntos. Esto se ha hecho más evidente durante el desarrollo de la pandemia. Frente a la emergencia, los países de la región en general optaron por el unilateralismo y la competencia, primero por el acceso a insumos médicos y después por las vacunas. Las iniciativas regionales en general no fueron un espacio de acción conjunta.

Sólo después de un tiempo empezaron a actuar, de acuerdo con su especificidad. Mientras CELAC se centró en la concertación para abordar temáticas sanitarias, la Alianza del Pacífico abordó la reactivación a través del emprendimiento.
4. Esta falta de cohesión, tiene una causa profunda: la fragmentación regional y las diferencias respecto a temáticas claves, por ejemplo la posibilidad de establecer tratados comerciales con Estados Unidos o China, el abordaje de la crisis venezolana y el posicionamiento que la región debe tener en el escenario internacional, en las instancias multilaterales.

El tratamiento de la crisis humanitaria de Venezuela, ha tenido un importante costo para la región, sobre todo en lo que respecta a la presión migratoria hacia los países de la región y el tratamiento a los opositores. En MERCOSUR, por ejemplo, se congeló la participación venezolana, pero en el caso de otras iniciativas no se han generado sanaciones, sino que el tema ha generado una escisión que no ha permitido avanzar y ha estancado el trabajo conjunto.

Síntesis...América Latina (I)

- América latina en transición
- Cuestionamiento respecto a su rol internacional
- Reconfiguración escenario político
- Cuestionamiento respecto a la capacidad de recuperación

8. Síntesis...América Latina (I)

Actualmente, existen visiones contrapuestas sobre el rol de América Latina. Mientras algunos autores como Andrés Malamud y Luis Schenoni argumentan que hay una creciente irrelevancia de América Latina a nivel internacional, entre otros motivos por la disminución del conflicto entre países y el tránsito hacia una zona de paz; otros autores como Andrés Serbin y Wolf Grabendorff plantean lo contrario y destacan la importancia geopolítica de esta región.

Esta última visión da cuenta del tensionamiento interno de la región y los riesgos que esta enfrenta. Entre estos destacan:

1. Las dificultades para gestionar la crisis (no sólo la generada por la pandemia, sino la del modelo). Estas hacen referencia a la falta de capacidad política e institucional para captar las necesidades de la población y darle respuesta.
2. El resurgimiento de la tensión en las fronteras por el accionar del crimen organizado, el narcotráfico y la trata de personas.
3. Las dificultades generadas por la migración masiva durante y después de la pandemia
4. La agudización de la atomización regional y la crisis del regionalismo.

Este escenario se ve agravado por la falta de liderazgos. En los últimos años no se ha desarrollado un liderazgo regional. Países que tradicionalmente lideran los procesos en la región, como México y Brasil, han estado más centrados en sus procesos internos.

Existen crecientes expectativas respecto a un posible liderazgo de Lula, quien ha asumido su tercer mandato. Sin embargo, el escenario económico y político es muy distinto a cuando el ejerció por primera vez la presidencia de Brasil.

Más allá posible rol de Luiz Inacio Da Silva, en general existe una visión positiva de lo que puede generarse a partir de las afinidades ideológicas y la reconfiguración del escenario político regional. No obstante, otros sectores hacen referencia al actuar con pragmatismo y flexibilidad frente a desafíos de carácter mayor como el cuestionamiento del modelo, frente a los que se habla incluso de la posibilidad de generar un nuevo contrato social, como lo sugieren organizaciones como la OCDE, CEPAL y Corporación Andina de Fomento.

Síntesis...América Latina (II)

- Dificultad de generar una narrativa propia
- Persistencia desconfianzas históricas
- Deficiencias endémicas
- Zona de paz, pero alta tensión interna

9. Síntesis...América Latina (II)

Dentro de las dificultades que existen para avanzar en esta línea en América Latina, está la incapacidad de generar una narrativa compartida e identitaria. En general, se actúa reactivamente, generando propuestas de contraposición, por ejemplo, a la propuesta estadounidense; pero no se construyen manifestaciones identitarias, de más largo plazo.

En esta falta de narrativa compartida también debe considerarse la influencia de otros dos factores. Primero, que en algunos países de la región existen claras dificultades para alcanzar una identidad nacional, como en el caso de Perú, y segundo, la persistencia de tensiones y desconfianzas históricas, que no se expresan en conflictos armados de carácter interestatales; pero si, por ejemplo, son presentados a través de contenciosos ante La Haya o requerimientos ante otras instancias como la Organización Mundial de Comercio.

Es importante en este marco rescatar que, aunque América Latina está consolidada como zona de paz, existen variadas tensiones internas a nivel regional. Algunos países tienen algunos de los niveles más altos de conflictividad a nivel mundial.

Hay variados caldos de cultivo para esta tensión, que se han profundizado producto de las crisis que experimenta la región. Dentro de estos cabe resaltar:

1. la informalidad, que en general es superior al 50 por ciento.
2. la desigualdad en el acceso a los servicios básicos, que afecta las condiciones de vida y la proyección de futuro. Una de las mayores preocupaciones post pandemia en América Latina es precisamente el incremento de la desigualdad, producto del retroceso en algunos indicadores de desarrollo. La CEPAL argumenta que en algunos de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sustentable la región ha retrocedido en más de una década.
3. La falta de eficiencia de algunos de los proyectos de regionalización desarrollados, ha repercutido en el incremento de las diferencias entre la capital y las regiones. Esto es evidente en el acceso diferenciado a los recursos necesarios para enfrentar las crisis. Durante la pandemia, por ejemplo, en algunos países de la región se generaron marcadas diferencias entre los decesos en las provincias y en las capitales.
4. Estas diferencias pueden agudizarse producto de la presión inflacionaria generada, entre otros factores, por la Guerra de Ucrania; producto de los mayores costos que deben enfrentar las regiones para acceder a los productos.

Relación con la Unión Europea

- Amplia vinculación
- Alternativa frente a las tensiones entre China y EEUU
- Temas claves y de futuro
- Revitalización de la relación bilateral en un escenario de reconfiguración.

10. Relación con la Unión Europea

América Latina es la región con más vínculos institucionalizados con la Unión Europea. No obstante, durante algún tiempo estas relaciones se han visto estancadas y actualmente existirían una serie de condiciones para que adquirieran nuevos bríos.

Primero, desde el 2015 hay nuevos espacios para la modernización de los acuerdos de asociación suscritos, en condiciones que son dos regiones con una serie de afinidades a nivel político y cultural.

Segundo, en un escenario de tensión entre Estados Unidos y China, la Unión Europea ofrece una alternativa, especialmente en el escenario generado por la pugna entre las dos potencias en torno a las narrativas de Asia Pacífico e Indopacífico, frente a las que esperan definiciones por parte de América Latina.

También, la región latinoamericana, frente al actual escenario de la Guerra de Ucrania, ofrece diversas opciones para Europa, fundamentalmente en el camino hacia una mayor autonomía energética respecto de Rusia y en la necesidad de adquirir mayor seguridad alimentaria.

Las diferentes crisis que afectan a América Latina también han tenido importantes consecuencias en Europa, por lo que existen amplios

espacios para la cooperación. La UE tiene distintos niveles de vinculación con las principales iniciativas de integración latinoamericanas.

El año 2019 se generó una declaración conjunta con la Alianza del Pacífico. Dentro de los principales temas abordados están la necesidad de fortalecer la cooperación en materia ambiental, ciencia, tecnología e innovación, así como el apoyo a las pequeñas y medianas empresas.

Con la Comunidad Andina no se ha logrado un acuerdo conjunto, sólo se ha avanzado con algunos de los países.

Las relaciones entre la UE y la CELAC estuvieron estancadas desde 2015. Recién el segundo semestre del 2020 comenzó a revitalizarse la vinculación. Actualmente los organismos han confluído en la Hoja de Ruta Birregional 2022-2023.

El acuerdo con MERCOSUR, que inicialmente generó muchas expectativas, no tiene señales de consolidarse prontamente por diversos motivos. Entre otros, por la competencia que supone para el sector agrícola y ganadero europeo la producción del Cono Sur y por la presión de organizaciones de sociedad civil de Europa frente al tratamiento de algunos países latinoamericanos de temas sensibles como el medioambiente.

No obstante, más allá de las dificultades, existen una serie de espacios para el trabajo conjunto en temas que marcan la agenda de futuro y que otorgan la posibilidad de un trabajo de largo plazo.

Lecturas recomendadas

1. Briceño-Ruiz, J., Prado Lallande, J., Legler, T. (2021). *La Alianza del Pacífico a 10 años: Integración profunda e institucionalización sui generis*, GEMAP PB 01, Fundación Konrad Adenauer-México.
2. Castro Silva, J. & Quiliconi, C. (2022). *Cooperación Regional Latinoamericana: Desafíos y Oportunidades en Pandemia* en Josette Altmann Borbón Francisco Rojas Aravena Editores, *América Latina: ¿Hay voluntad política para construir un futuro diferente?*, 2022, Flacso Secretaría General, Universidad para la Paz, pp. 132-148.
3. Malamud, A. & Schenoni, L. (2021) *Sobre la creciente irrelevancia de América Latina*, revista *Nueva Sociedad* No 291, enero-febrero de 2021, pp. 66-79.
4. Nolte, D. & Mijares, V. (2022). *UNASUR: An Eclectic Analytical Perspective of its Disintegration*. Colombia International, Volumen III, pp. 83-109.
5. Sanahuja, J.A. (2022). *La Unión Europea y América Latina en el interregno: autonomía estratégica, pacto verde y recuperación postpandemia* en Josette Altmann Borbón Francisco Rojas Aravena Editores, *América Latina: ¿Hay voluntad política para construir un futuro diferente?*, 2022, Flacso Secretaría General, Universidad para la Paz, pp 95-110.

Preguntas para el debate

1. ¿Cuáles son los principales desafíos que actualmente enfrenta América Latina?
2. ¿Cómo han evolucionado sus principales iniciativas de cooperación e integración?
3. ¿Qué espacios reales existen para la vinculación con Europa?

Lecture 4: EU-LAC relations in times of US-China competition

Sandra Zapata

EU-LAC relations in times of US-China competition

Sandra Zapata

Hyperlink to [video](#)

Hyperlink to the [slides](#)

Content

1. Introduction: Re-thinking EU-LAC relations
2. The international structure in dispute
3. It is not a new Cold War
4. Foreign policy in a changing world order
5. Wake up calls to strengthen autonomy
6. China in Latin America
7. Responses to China on both sides of the Atlantic
8. EU-LAC bi-regional cooperation to avoid international irrelevance
9. EU-LAC opportunities for cooperation
10. Conclusions

Introduction: Rethinking EU-LAC relations

1. The international structure in dispute: China-US rivalry
2. Geopolitical Europe: new dependencies and autonomy strategies
3. EU-LAC cooperation: opportunities for a renewed bi-regional cooperation

1. Introduction: Rethinking EU-LAC relations

It is hard to escape the feeling that the map of the world is being re-drawn in light of the confrontation between the United States and China. As Beijing positions itself as an economic power, a technological giant, and a military force, it challenges the leadership of the United States. None of the other countries seems to be particularly inclined to take sides between the two powers in a binary logic. For this reason, the European Union (EU) is rethinking its international ties and has gone in search of allies, while Latin America (LAC) is looking to its European partners for a third pole on which to rely.

The analytical framework of power transformation considers that the reconfiguration of power relations conditions the foreign policy orientation of states. There are increasing voices that suggest that the current changes of the international system will give place to a new Cold War scenario where states have to choose between antagonist poles; some others say that in a highly interconnected world opportunity windows open up and countries do have space of manoeuvre in complex multi-scalar geographies. Along with the latter, the position defended here is that in the current scenario, no key international actor can remain on the sidelines and the central question is the role they want to play so as not to fall into a position of strategic subordination.

The argument is that if the EU and LAC regions do not want to make uncomfortable decisions taking sides in geopolitics, a stronger bi-regional relationship can constitute a “third pole” for reshaping the re-emerging bipolarity, especially if Europe wants to regain international leadership in the global arena, and Latin America, not to accentuate its already peripheral situation in the current international system. Autonomy strategies lie at the heart of the foreign policies on both sides of the Atlantic.

In the case of the EU, autonomy ideas arise as a response to its loss of weight in the redistribution of global power due to the pressure exerted by the Chinese landing on the continent. Some recent wake up calls for Europe are its dependencies on Washington in military terms, on technological inputs from China, and on energy from Russia. Dependency and autonomy are two sides of the same coin, also in Latin America. In this region, in its constant search for functional alternatives to boost its development, it has openly embraced alternative alliances with extra-hemispheric actors such as China. The extent to which the Asian country has re-primarised the Latin-American economies and created new dependencies is still debated.

The presentation proceeds in three parts. It first proposes an analysis of the current rivalry context between China and the US, where the EU still is a relevant actor. Then, it analyses how in a more interconnected world, old and new dependencies have given rise to a geopolitical Europe and to “autonomy strategies” in the bloc. Finally, discussion addresses how the EU-LAC bi-regional relationship fits into this changing scenario and how this opens up opportunities for a renewed bi-regional cooperation.

The international structure in dispute

Current world order

- Pax Americana (Cox 1981; Strange 1988; Krasner 1976)

New historical era

- Transatlantic-Asia Pacific (Huntington 1998, Krugman, 2009; Nye, 2005; Ohmae, 2005; Bigsten, 2004; Dicken, 2003; Cox and Sinclair, 2001; Rodrik, 1997)

Material capabilities

- New Cold War: US-China rivalry (Fortin, Heine, Ominami 2021)
- Economy: New commercial war (Kapustina et al. 2020)
- Challenge to the Western model: multilateralism; democracy vs autocracy (Kroenig 2020)
- New zones of influence: (Allison 2017)

2. The international structure in dispute

The international system is facing profound shifts and the US-China rivalry has a prominent role on the international agenda. A starting point to analyse the changes in the international system is to reflect on power, cooperation and conflict in a given historical period. Following Cox's ideas, one way to do this is to ask how such a world order is conceived, who benefits and how the costs and benefits of a determined set of rules are distributed.

The world order under current transformation is the one that emerged as a set of norms, rules, and institutions consolidated by the United States and its allies in the post-World War II period. In economic terms, it was a historical response to the world set up after the Bretton Woods agreements (1944), which institutionalised the international economic order under neoliberal principles of economic openness and financial deregulation. In the political sphere, the visions of the promoters of the liberal order assumed the rapid diffusion of democracy and human rights around the globe. In a broader sense, the hegemonic powers enforced their will on the rest of the world, crafting institutions that served their interests and assured their primacy.

Some elements of this world order are in dispute today. Specialists of diverse orientations and disciplines agree that we face the beginning of

a new historical era, marked by profound changes in the order created by the Pax Americana. The new geo-economic and geo-strategic dynamics are relocating the centers of gravity of world power from the transatlantic axis to the Asia-Pacific axis. Nowadays, China is not only the center of the Asian complex, but it has become the second largest economy on the globe. In macroeconomic terms, this area has become the largest zone of world trade; its patterns of accumulation are linked to extractive industries and it has taken a course oriented towards a market economy but regulated by the State. This sets trends in terms of trade, consumption, resources and capital investments.

The rise of its material power capabilities has emboldened China to increasingly question the western primacy in global politics, prompting new rivalries with other actors, such as the US. This competition among great powers would give rise to what some authors see as a new Cold War, which again confronts the world into a bipolar relationship. This understanding of international relations has economic arguments, as it says that the world is facing a new commercial war; ideological, as there is a direct challenge to the liberal western model in terms of democracies vs. autocracies; and in terms of defence as it suggests that the world is divided into zones of influence.

It is not a new cold war

Economic trends

- International actors have multiplied
- Reciprocal effects of interdependence
- Frenemy-like relationship btw US-China

Ideological terms

- Autocratic vs democratic
- China is a "state capitalist", "party-state capitalism"

Defence area

- No clear zones of influence
- Two distinctive Wests: US-China and EU-China

The role of regions

- The EU is the 3rd major power of the world
- Strategic alliances EU-LAC

3. It is not a new cold war

It is not a foreordained conclusion that we are moving towards a new Cold War and here are some of the reasons.

Regarding economic trends, the emerging nature of the global political economy is increasingly deep and complex, not only as international actors have multiplied but they have also become interdependent of each other on a myriad of issues. The actors in the international arena experience different kinds of relationships simultaneously, as they can cooperate on some issues and compete in others at the same time and they experience the reciprocal effects of interdependence. Between the US and China, a frenemy-like relationship is taking place in an ever compartmentalised structure. For instance, China and the US have been each other's major trading partner for years, their supply chains are increasingly interdependent, debt holdings are intertwined. At the same time, the two countries have conflicts, as portrayed in the technology trade dynamics, which is regarded as the most consequential arena for competition (Kennedy et al 2018). The US targeted major technology companies like Huawei, TikTok, and ByteDance, and China put foreign US firms on a blacklist.

In ideological terms, global powers today are not immersed in ideological competitions as they were in the past. Drawing lines in international relations pushing China to the autocratic side and the US to the democratic side is a fallacy, as China has long integrated into the capitalist world economy and become a powerful economic driving force. China's economic model is commonly described as "state capitalist" or "party-state capitalism" (Pearson, Rithmire, Tsai 2022). Xi Jinping pointed out that "the US has American-style democracy. China has Chinese-style democracy" (Xinhua 2022). With very few exceptions, the world has embraced capitalism as an economic system.

In the area of defence there are no clear zones of influence and neither China nor the US are the uncontested leaders of any particular group of countries gathered around one common ideological purpose or strategic rationale, as was the case with the URSS and the US during Cold War times. There is not a unified West and the idea that there are two distinctive Wests has strengthened over the last thirty years. For instance, when considering NATO, the EU does not want to play a secondary role to the American primacy in the region. Another striking difference is the way Brussels and Washington have approached Beijing. The former tends to engage China at the bilateral level and the latter in the framework of the system of alliances in Asia and the commitment to regional security.

The role of regions: In a more interconnected world, the voices of non-hegemonic actors, middle powers, small countries and regions around the world do matter. Regions can have a "moderation" impact in times of confrontation, as they constitute new geopolitical foundations for the world economy and the construction of a multipolar world system. The EU constitutes the third largest economy in the world and continues to be a major power in the international arena. It has been a political actor and a role leader in many areas, including championing norms, human rights values and democracy. Whether through its absence or its engagement, the EU is a key actor in shaping the current international order.

Foreign policy in a changing world order

- **Changing world order:** Power redistribution, US-China rivalry, the role of regions and countries
- **European Union:** Geopolitical EU, strategic autonomy
- **Latin America:** Strategic non-alignment

Strategic autonomy: as means of resilience to ensure that Europeans take charge of themselves (Borrel 2020). It is the ability to act and cooperate with international and regional partners wherever possible, while being able to operate autonomously when necessary.

Autonomy in LAC: "Freedom of choice" or "margin of manoeuvre" of a foreign policy (Escudé 1992). It encompasses the ideas of self-determination and sovereignty in areas where hegemonic power's economic, political or cultural interferences are expressed (Puig 1980).

Asymmetry: Autonomy strategies have evolved hand in hand with the economic asymmetrical interdependence and the vulnerabilities Europe and LAC face against Beijing's assertiveness.

4. Foreign policy in a changing world order

The EU wants to manage competition responsibly and strengthening alliances with traditional actors constitutes a key feature in not submitting to a bipolar logic. For this aim, the strategy that has gained relevance is strengthening the EU's role as a global geopolitical actor. In the words of the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Affairs, Josep Borrel, "the awakening of geopolitical Europe" means facing the current world challenges from its own point of view, acting to defend the EU's values and interests, and proceeding forward in "its own way" (Borrel 2020). Geopolitics mark the renewed interest to reconnect with international partners such as LAC and the desire to reinforce the existing cooperation ties.

Autonomy in EU and LAC: The step-change in the EU's external action is framed within the bigger narrative of the new bipolarity between China and the US. In Europe, autonomy lies at the heart of foreign policy as a means of resilience to ensure that Europeans take charge of themselves. The concept is usually defined in terms of the "freedom of choice" or "margin of manoeuvre" of a foreign policy (Escudé 1992). In the Latin American tradition, a certain level of autonomy means a set of conditions that allow free decisions to be made by persons and agencies that are part of a national or regional system. It encompasses the ideas of self-determination and sovereignty in areas where hegemonic

power's economic, political or cultural interferences are expressed, as the achievement of a greater autonomy presupposes a previous zero-sum strategic game.

For the EU, autonomy strategies have evolved hand in hand with economic asymmetrical interdependence and the vulnerabilities Europe faces against Beijing's assertiveness. The scholarly literature analysing the triangular Europe-US-China relations is fast growing. A large body of work has examined the US's complex relationship with China from a European perspective, where autonomy for the EU means regaining political space vis-à-vis the US. Other authors have made attempts to compare US and EU policies towards China and Europe's strategic autonomy in relation to Beijing.

In the same vein, in the case of Latin America, the logic of autonomy has been widely practiced, as great powers continue to exert effective control over peripheral economies. With China's assertion on the continent, autonomy was studied as the counter side of new dependencies and the re-primarisation of the economies; other authors highlight the irruption of the Asian country acknowledging the historic and socio-economic relevance of the US in the region. Others account for China's engagement in economic, diplomatic and military activities on the continent.

Wake-up calls to strengthen autonomy: Old and new dependencies

- **Defence and US withdrawal**
 - Nationalist withdrawal of its main ally the US, especially after the arrival of Donald Trump to power
 - Europe continues to depend on the US for its security; however, American attention has increasingly been pulled toward China.
- **Global supply chains**
 - Science, technology, trade, data, investments are becoming sources and instruments of force in international politics.
 - Covid-19: EU's strong external dependencies on Asian countries.
- **Economy and trade**
 - Food processing, autos, pharma/biotech, chemicals and consumer products manufacturing.
 - The European market's importance as a destination for Chinese exports is around double that of the Chinese market for Europeans and China is the EU's largest source of imports since 2011, accounting for 22%
- **Russian invasion of Ukraine**
 - EU imports around 40% of natural gas from Russia. After the outbreak of the war, the European Commission established plans to cut EU dependency on Russian gas by two-thirds in 2022 and end its reliance on Russian supplies of the fuel before 2030.

5. Wake up calls to strengthen autonomy: Old and new dependencies

In Europe: The first wakeup call to opt for autonomy in Europe was the recent nationalist withdrawal of its main ally, the US, especially after the arrival of Donald Trump to power.

In terms of security and defence, Europe continues to depend on the US for its security; however, American attention has increasingly been pulled toward China. For US administrations, the priority is to curb the rise of China and the efforts are concentrated in the Asia and Indo-Pacific, no longer on the European continent. For the US, this is the most strategically important geographical area and China is considered “the most ominous threat to US security”. There is no unified transatlantic strategy to deal with China's assertiveness. While Washington outlines its policies in a confrontative way, the EU's approach with Beijing is one of cooperation not confrontation. As a matter of fact, Trump's nationalistic administration and the strategic shift of US security policy reinforced the idea that Europe's problems are a matter for Europeans. Also, there is no common strategy among the EU members to counterweight Beijing, but there is an increasing belief that their security should not ultimately depend on America. As long as Washington's priorities are in

the Indo Pacific and the country continues to have other global commitments such as those in the Middle East, the EU needs to step up to the challenge of taking its security into its own hands.

Dependencies in global supply chains - science, technology, trade, data, investments - are becoming sources and instruments of force in international politics. The Covid-19 pandemic was another wakeup call that brought this to light. During the first waves of 2020, various countries in Europe recorded shortages in the supply of personal protective equipment, medicine or masks. Subsequently, these shortcomings affected other areas, such as the pharmaceuticals needed to develop the vaccine or in semiconductors used in various industries, like the automotive sector. These events caused a growing consciousness of the EU's strong external dependencies on Asian countries.

In terms of economy and trade, there is wider awareness in the EU of the industrial and technological dependencies on China. The European market's importance as a destination for Chinese exports is around double that of the Chinese market for Europeans and China is the EU's largest source of imports since 2011, accounting for 22%. European investment in China has become more concentrated in five sectors - food processing, autos, pharma/biotech, chemicals and consumer products manufacturing -, which make up nearly 70% of all EU FDI to China (Kratz et al. 2022). As a countermeasure, the EU released an Industrial Strategy in 2021 to cut its dependency from the Asian country in six strategic areas such as raw materials, pharmaceutical ingredients, semiconductors and advanced technologies.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine: The EU imports around 40% of natural gas from Russia. After the outbreak of the war, the European Commission established plans to cut EU dependency on Russian gas by two-thirds in 2022 and end its reliance on Russian supplies of the fuel before 2030.

China in Latin America

- **Financial market**
 - China is an alternative source to the private financial market and the Bretton Woods institutions.
 - The China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China are among the region's main financiers. Between 2005 and 2020, cumulative loans amounted to more than 137 billion, with Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and Argentina being the main recipients
 - China's investments in the region amounted to 140 billion between 2005 and 2021, of which 64 billion correspond to Brazil and 25 billion to Peru (The Inter-American Dialogue 2021).
- **Trade and geopolitics**
 - China has displaced the role of the EU and surpassed that of the US in many cases.
 - It is the leading commercial partner of Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay and Argentina. Total trade between China and LAC increased from almost US\$18 billion in 2002 to US\$318 billion in 2020 (The Inter-American Dialogue 2021).
 - BRI: For instance, 21 of the 33 countries in the region have joined China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

6. China in Latin America

In the case of the triangular relationship between China, the US and LAC, Beijing has become a serious competitor to US hegemony in the region. Since the beginning of the 21st Century, China's presence has been substantial in practically all socioeconomic fields.

In the financial sphere, the Asian giant has become an alternative source to the private financial market and the Bretton Woods institutions. The China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China are among the region's main financiers. Between 2005 and 2020, cumulative loans amounted to more than 137 billion USD, with Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and Argentina being the main recipients (The Inter-American Dialogue 2021). China's investments in the region amounted to 140 billion USD between 2005 and 2021, of which 64 billion correspond to Brazil and 25 billion USD to Peru, according to data from the Inter-American Dialogue.

In terms of trade, China has displaced the role of the EU and surpassed that of the US in many cases; it is the leading commercial partner of Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay and Argentina. Total trade between China and LAC increased from almost US\$18 billion in 2002 to US\$318 billion in 2020 (The Inter-American Dialogue 2021). Despite the fact that the US continues to be the most important historical actor in the region,

nowadays Beijing constitutes an additional point of reference and for negotiations. For instance, 21 of the 33 countries in the region have joined China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The Russian invasion of Ukraine: In LAC, this event made countries start thinking pragmatically about their extra-hemispheric alliance, but partners like Brazil or Peru rely on Moscow for key economic sectors such as agriculture. The former imports 85% of its fertilisers from Russia and the latter 50% (Cross 2022). Russia is essential for fertilisers required for the agribusiness sector.

Geopolitics: LAC's alignment towards the "One China" policy. Currently, only eight countries in the region recognise Taiwan. Panama, the Dominican Republic and El Salvador switched recognition to the People's Republic of China between 2017 and 2018, and Nicaragua did so in December 2021.

Responses to China on both sides of the Atlantic

- **EU responses**
 - In Europe countries such as France and Germany – highly dependent on the Asian country – are betting on a more assertive shift in EU policy. Their main concern is the loss of competitiveness of their companies vis-à-vis strategic managers of high-added value.
 - On the other hand, the countries of Southern and Eastern Europe have been more receptive to closer ties with Beijing. Italy is the first G7 country to sign the BRI agreement, joining other EU countries that have already done so, including Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Greece, and Portugal.
 - The EU sees Latin America as a “natural” partner for its open strategic autonomy.
- **LAC responses**
 - Political fragmentation has become a constant and external events affect every country in a different way. China will continue to increase its presence in the region instigating LAC countries to follow its lead in the international sphere.
 - Active Non-Alignment (ANA): This would allow LAC countries to focus internally without being swept up in confrontations between the U.S. and China.
 - ANA approach refuses to align automatically with one or another of the major powers but does not exclude taking a stance on certain international issues. It means that Latin American governments will make foreign policy decisions mainly based on their own national interests.

7. Responses to China on both sides of the Atlantic

Dependencies are identified on both sides of the Atlantic, but there is no consensus on the best way to address them. Regarding the Chinese assertion, in Europe countries such as France and Germany - highly dependent on the Asian country - are betting on a more assertive shift in EU policy. Their main concern is the loss of competitiveness of their companies vis-à-vis strategic managers of high-added value. On the other hand, the countries of Southern and Eastern Europe have been more receptive to closer ties with Beijing. Italy is the first G7 country to sign the BRI agreement, joining other EU countries that have already done so, including Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Greece, and Portugal.

In the case of Latin America, political fragmentation has become a constant and external event that affects every country in a different way. China will continue to increase its presence in the region, instigating LAC countries to follow its lead in the international sphere. A clear proof is the alignment towards the “One China” policy. Currently, only eight countries in the region recognise Taiwan.

While the EU strives to secure its strategic autonomy, Latin America is seeking to reposition itself in international politics - albeit with the

handicap that it is internally fragmented, and its regional organisations and forums are weak. In Latin America, there is debate on the concept of “active non-alignment” (ANA). Originally conceived with a view to the conflict between the US and China, the positioning on the Ukraine conflict is now also being assessed from this perspective. ANA seems to be increasingly echoed in the foreign policies of Latin American governments. This approach refuses to align automatically with one or another of the major powers but does not exclude taking a stance on certain international issues. It means that Latin American governments will make foreign policy decisions mainly based on their own national interests.

EU-LAC bi-regional cooperation to avoid international irrelevance

1. Association agreements between the EU and LAC
2. Norms and regulatory convergence
3. Energy
4. Dialogue

- **Europe:** In the early 21st Century, the EU's weight in the world has been shrinking, while China is growing as a global power. In the nineties, Europe represented a quarter of the world's wealth. It is foreseen that in twenty years, Europe will not represent more than 11% of world GNP, far behind China, which will represent double it, below 14% for the US and at par with India (Borrell 2020).
- **Latin America:** The same period of time finds LAC an ever heterogeneous, fragmented and increasingly irrelevant region. Latin America has lost positions in all available indicators of relevance: share of the world population, strategic weight, trade volume, military projection and diplomatic capacity (Schenoni and Malamud 2021).

8. EU-LAC bi-regional cooperation to avoid international irrelevance

The narrative that the US is gradually declining and China is emerging facing resistance, conditions the already complex relations between the EU and LAC because it subordinates both regions to be mere rule-takers rather than rule makers. The central question is to avoid this trap. The EU's core strategy is to mitigate the drift towards a zero-sum world by increasingly becoming a global geopolitical power. Brussels intends to achieve greater strategic autonomy and reduce its dependencies. In this scenario, revisiting and strengthening the bi-regional alliance acquire relevance, as it gives the opportunity to promote an innovative partnership to face these challenges.

The EU and LAC relationship should be thought of in light of the power transformations. In the early 21st Century, the EU's weight in the world has been shrinking, while China is growing as a global power. In the nineties, Europe represented a quarter of the world's wealth. It is foreseen that in twenty years, Europe will not represent more than 11% of world GNP, far behind China, which will represent double it, below 14% for the US and at par with India (Borrell 2020). The same period of time finds the LAC an ever heterogeneous, fragmented and increasingly

irrelevant region. Latin America has lost positions in all available indicators of relevance: share of the world population, strategic weight, trade volume, military projection and diplomatic capacity (Schenoni and Malamud 2021).

In this adverse scenario, an EU-LAC alliance is key to avoid irrelevance and to strengthen the autonomy of both regions. For the EU, strategic autonomy refers to the capacity of the EU to act autonomously, “without being dependent on other countries in strategically important policy areas” (European Parliament 2022), which can range from defence policy to the economy, and the capacity to uphold democratic values. It is also the “ability of a state to pursue its national interests and adopt its preferred foreign policy without depending heavily on other foreign states” (Borrel 2020). In the case of Latin America, the region has a long tradition of reflection and experiences that have been oriented towards the search for greater autonomy as a means to pursue economic development, peace, and restriction of influence of great powers. The mechanisms to put this into practice have been regionalism, the appeal to law or the support of international organisations.

EU-LAC opportunities for cooperation

- **Association agreements**
 - Dense networks of association, trade, political and cooperation agreements.
 - Geopolitical character with the potential to open up a shared space for policy dialogue, as well as regulatory convergence for changing production and consumption model.
 - Cooperation emphasising the green transition, digital transformation, human development, inclusive economy and democratic governance (European Commission 2022).
- **Trade**
 - setting international standards, not the “business as usual” FTA
 - Mercosur: set a model of sustainable trade regulations, disseminating norms and promoting sustainable development
 - The EU and LAC are better off as commercial partners
- **Energy**
 - EU’s energy plan – RePowerEU processing.
 - Increasing demand for critical raw materials such as lithium and niobium
 - Challenges: for Europe a new dependency on critical raw materials. The EU imports these materials 78% from Chile and 85% from Brazil.
 - For LAC: industrialisation and adding value to critical goods.
- **Policy dialogue and regulatory convergence**
 - EU diversification of suppliers, not to depend on any country or supplier by more than 33%.
 - Areas: sustainable and resilient food and health system; decarbonised and accessible energy; capacity in the management of data; security and defence capabilities and access to space; working with global partners to promote peace, security and prosperity.

9. EU-LAC opportunities for cooperation

The new cycle of a geopolitical and more autonomous EU has different dimensions. Some of the cross-cutting elements that should be revisited are the association agreements, trade, energy, norms and regulations.

Regarding the association agreements, the EU and LAC have developed one of the densest networks of association, trade, political and cooperation agreements. These tools have the potential to open up a shared space for policy dialogue, as well as regulatory convergence for changing production and consumption models. The central element is to revise the associations in light of the challenging global context, emphasising the green transition, digital transformation, human development, inclusive economy and democratic governance.

In terms of trade, the EU and LAC can cooperate in setting international standards and moving towards agreements which are not the “business as usual” FTA. For instance, the Mercosur agreement, if ratified, can also be about setting up models of sustainable trade regulations, disseminating norms and promoting sustainable development up to today’s challenges. For Latin America, a good negotiation would offer the chance to look for mechanisms to strengthen local industries. Considering the penetration of China into the South American markets and

the possibility of Beijing of signing an FTA with Uruguay, the ratification of the Mercosur agreement becomes strategic. It imprints urgency to develop long-term strategic thinking, as whichever actor moves first into these markets will gain competitive first-mover advantage. The EU and LAC are better off as commercial partners and if they lose the opportunity to strengthen ties, there will be other external actors who will take that place.

In terms of energy, the EU is setting up the global energy plan - RePowerEU, which aims at accelerating the clean energy transition and increasing Europe's energy independence from unreliable suppliers and volatile fossil fuels. For the EU's relationship with LAC, there will be an increasing demand for critical raw materials such as lithium and niobium, which are important components for the production of electric and high-tech batteries. The EU imports 78% of these materials from Chile and 85% from Brazil (European Commission, 2020). For Europe, there is the risk of moving its current dependency on fossil fuels to a dependency on critical raw materials and minerals. LAC will again face the challenge of making steps forward adding value to its goods and not becoming a primary product exporter. The current energy transition can give opportunities to industrialise those areas in LAC.

Regarding policy dialogue and regulatory convergence, the EU has set the goal of diversifying its suppliers in different areas so as not to depend on any country or supplier by more than 33%. This extends to other areas such as: sustainable and resilient food and health systems; decarbonised and accessible energy; capacity in the management of data; security and defence, etc. (European Commission, 2021). This could open up the space to create new norms and deploy the "Brussels Effect" - the ability to influence different regulatory areas on a global scale through the diffusion of regulations by means of market mechanisms (Bradford 2020). EU-LAC relations should be seen as a common space of dialogue to think of innovative policies, setting standards, regulatory convergence, change in production and consumption models in the interest of sustainable development.

Conclusions

1. “Zeitenwende” or an epochal tectonic shift
2. Europe rethinks its international role and alliances
 - Strategic autonomy vs strategic non-alignment
3. Policy implications:
 - Renewed cooperation between the EU and LAC
 - Areas: trade, energy, norms and regulations
 - Mercosur agreement becomes a priority

10. Conclusions

This lecture has argued that a stronger EU-LAC bi-regional relationship can constitute a “third pole” for reshaping the re-emerging international bipolarity, especially if Europe wants to regain international leadership in the global arena, and Latin America, not to accentuate its already peripheral situation in the current international system.

The international system is facing a “Zeitenwende” or an epochal tectonic shift. This critical juncture is characterised by the crisis of globalisation, inequality, the climate emergency, the coronavirus pandemic and the resurgence of the war of aggression and its global socio-economic consequences. China-US rivalry is a significant factor influencing the insertion processes of countries worldwide. Beijing has been gaining influence and political allies in Europe and it has already challenged the traditional EU-Atlantic cooperation in terms of defence. In LAC, China has become a top trading and investment partner for many countries.

These challenging times have prompted some wake up calls for Europe to rethink its international role and alliances. The EU-LAC bi-regional relations cannot escape from the dynamics that challenge the rationale of the relationship. The EU has sought to respond to these convulsive

times by becoming a geopolitical actor and through the search for “strategic autonomy”. A renewed cooperation between the two regions is key in terms of building common spaces for dialogue in areas such as trade, energy, norms and regulations.

In this lecture, I have stressed that some of the policy implications are:

1. The revision of the framework of bi-regional cooperation considering a long-term sight of what the world is moving towards. A stronger cooperation between the EU and LAC can constitute a strategic alternative for the international insertion of both regions in the changing world order.
2. Considering the new cycle of a geopolitical and more autonomous EU, some opportunities of cooperation arise in the areas of trade, energy, norms and regulations.
3. At a moment of crossroads, the Mercosur agreement becomes a priority, as whichever actor moves first in the region will gain a competitive first-mover advantage in the market. The EU and LAC are better off as commercial partners and if they lose the opportunity to strengthen ties, there will be other external actors who will take that place.

Further readings

1. Borrell, J (2020). Why European strategic autonomy matters. The Diplomatic service of the European Union. European Union External Action. In https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/why-european-strategic-autonomy-matters_en
2. Casarini, N (2022). A European strategic “third way?” The European Union between the traditional transatlantic alliance and the pull of the Chinese market. The Institute of International and Strategic Studies (IISS). Peking University. China International Strategy Review. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-022-00095-1>
3. Gallagher, K. P. (2016). The China triangle: Latin America's China boom and the fate of the Washington consensus. Oxford University Press.
4. Heine, J., and Ominami, C. (2021). El no alineamiento activo y América Latina: Una doctrina para el nuevo siglo. Editorial Catalonia.
5. Sanahuja, J. (2022). La Unión Europea y América Latina en el interregno: autonomía estratégica, pacto verde y recuperación pospandemia. Eurosocial.

Questions for discussion and debate

1. How should the EU and LAC relations be thought of in light of the power transformation?
2. What are the driving efforts of the EU to re-establish ties with Latin America?
3. What does Latin America have to gain from closer cooperation with the European Union?

Lecture 5: Política exterior de España hacia América Latina: ¿tiempo para la redefinición?

Sergio Caballero

Política exterior de España hacia América Latina: ¿tiempo para la redefinición?

Sergio Caballero

Hipervínculo al [vídeo](#)

Hipervínculo a las [diapositivas](#)

Contenido

1. Definición Política Exterior
2. Contexto Política Exterior Española
3. La SEGIB y las Cumbres Iberoamericanas
4. Antecedentes Política Exterior Española hacia Latinoamérica (I)
5. Antecedentes Política Exterior Española hacia Latinoamérica (II)
6. Política Exterior de España hacia Latinoamérica (I)
7. Política Exterior de España hacia Latinoamérica (II)
8. Actuales desafíos y potencialidades de la política exterior española hacia la región
9. Conclusiones (I)
10. Conclusiones (II)

Definición Política Exterior

- Concepto controvertido
- Hill (2016: 3): “the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations”
- Beneyto (2011:22-23):
 - el interés nacional, definido en términos más pragmáticos, en el que cabe la oportunidad económica y el análisis del contexto geopolítico en base a elementos estructurales y coyunturales del sistema internacional; y
 - los valores culturales, que apuntan más a elementos identitarios en el sentido de cómo se autopercebe una sociedad o un país en el mundo (democrático, multilateral, pacífico, intervencionista, etc.), reificando así sus políticas y acciones en el ámbito internacional y, en su caso, respondiendo a los giros ideológicos de sus gobernantes que puedan redefinir el papel de un país en su región o en el mundo [Presidencialista]
- Política pública: conformado por una **pluralidad de actores** y con pugnas y tensiones en base a relaciones de poder

1. Definición Política Exterior

La política exterior es por definición un concepto controvertido. Por eso es oportuno clarificar que en este trabajo se abordan las relaciones político-diplomáticas entre España y la región latinoamericana desde un enfoque histórico de política exterior. En este sentido, partimos de una definición de la política exterior como “the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations” (Hill, 2016: 3). Pero vamos más allá al entender la política exterior como una política pública tendente a satisfacer el bienestar de los ciudadanos fomentando un mayor desarrollo, para lo cual se guía por dos variables (Beneyto, 2011:22-23): (i) el interés nacional, definido en términos más pragmáticos, en el que cabe la oportunidad económica y el análisis del contexto geopolítico en base a elementos estructurales y coyunturales del sistema internacional; y (ii) los valores culturales, que apuntan más a elementos identitarios en el sentido de cómo se autopercebe una sociedad o un país en el mundo (democrático, multilateral, pacífico, intervencionista, etc.), reificando así sus políticas y acciones en el ámbito internacional y, en su caso, respondiendo a los giros ideológicos de sus gobernantes que puedan redefinir el papel de un país en su región o en el mundo.

Al igual que en el contexto latinoamericano (Danese, 2017), en la política exterior española también se aprecia ese rasgo presidencialista

Lecture 5: Política exterior de España hacia América Latina: ¿tiempo para la redefinición?

en el diseño, elaboración y ejecución de la política exterior de España (Carnero & Martín, 2011).

Finalmente, al tratarse de una política pública hay que tener en cuenta que está conformado por una pluralidad de actores y con pugnas y tensiones en base a relaciones de poder.

Contexto Política Exterior Española

- Unión Europea:
 - Aspiración histórica
 - Desde adhesión en 1986, **política doméstica de facto**. Máxima prioridad!
- Vecindad sur Mediterráneo:
 - Proceso de Barcelona (1995) + *European Neighbourhood Policy* (2004)
- América Latina y el Caribe:
 - Legado histórico e identidad cultural
 - Proyección política: modelo transición democrática?
 - Expansión económica e inversión: internacionalización empresarial
 - *Soft power*: el español como herramienta diplomática
 - **España como puente entre las dos regiones?** (Río, 1999: Asociación Estratégica Bi-Regional)

2. Contexto Política Exterior Española

Más allá de la obviedad de que, desde una óptica española, la política europea se ha ido transformando en las últimas décadas desde un anhelo inalcanzable a una suerte de destino compartido. Si partimos de un análisis riguroso de política exterior española América Latina ha sido siempre la región prioritaria por antonomasia. Además, dados los lazos históricos, culturales y socioeconómicos, la región latinoamericana se ha configurado como el espacio político donde más margen de maniobra ha tenido la diplomacia española para intentar incorporar un “valor añadido” en los foros internacionales o para aportar un sello propio en la agenda global. En este sentido, a partir de la adhesión española al proyecto europeo en 1986 y una vez interiorizada la política europea, ya no sólo como política exterior sino como una suerte de política doméstica de facto, y aparte del innegable interés estratégico por la vecindad sur (Mediterráneo y Magreb) como área de especial interés - lamentablemente en muchos casos reducido en términos securitarios y migratorios por su proximidad geográfica-, el principal foco de política internacional del Palacio de Santa Cruz, sede del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, ha sido América Latina. Además, la capacidad para “europeizar” las específicas visiones españolas hacia sus dos regiones de máximo interés: Latinoamérica y la vecindad sur del Mediterráneo, se refleja en el establecimiento de las Cumbres

Lecture 5: Política exterior de España hacia América Latina: ¿tiempo para la redefinición?

Iberoamericanas desde 1991, que no sólo permitirán un mayor acercamiento con la región, sino que generarán legitimidad para que Madrid sea un interlocutor privilegiado - y se erija en una suerte de “puente” - entre Europa y Latinoamérica, al menos a lo largo de los años 90’s, que culminará con la Asociación Estratégica Birregional euro-latinoamericana en 1999 (Ayuso & Caballero, 2018; Sanahuja, 2013). Y en relación con la segunda región referida, el lanzamiento del Proceso de Barcelona en 1995 regionalizará y legitimará la mirada española hacia la cuenca mediterránea, al menos hasta la implementación de la European Neighbourhood Policy en 2004 y la posterior iniciativa francesa de la Unión por el Mediterráneo impulsada por el presidente Nicolas Sarkozy en 2007.

La SEGIB y las Cumbres Iberoamericanas

- Comunidad Iberoamericana de Naciones surge desde Madrid, con apoyo de México y Brasil, como fórmula para maximizar los lazos históricos y culturales de España con sus excolonias
- 1991, Guadalajara (México): I Cumbre Iberoamericana
- **Pérdida gradual de importancia:** intento de “latinoamericanización o desespañolización de las cumbres” ?
- **Secretaría General Iberoamericana (SEGIB):** Enrique Iglesias (2005-2014), Rebeca Grynspan (2014-2021) y Andrés Allamand (2021-)
- 2014 Reforma: cumbres bianuales, reparto financiero, *cumbritis...*

3. La SEGIB y las Cumbres Iberoamericanas

La iniciativa de lanzar la Comunidad Iberoamericana de Naciones surge desde Madrid como fórmula para maximizar los lazos históricos y culturales con sus excolonias (Diamint, 2009: 95-96). A pesar de estar mayormente financiada por España y responder a los intereses estratégicos de la antigua metrópoli, se gesta en connivencia con México (que auspiciará en Guadalajara la primera cumbre en 1991) y consigue una importante legitimidad en sus primeros años. Casi desde el origen, la dinámica de estas cumbres será interiorizada por los tres principales países, España, México y Brasil (Cortés Lastra, 2013:141), como denotan las sedes elegidas para albergar las dos cumbres siguientes (Madrid, 1992 y Salvador de Bahía, 1993). Con el paso del tiempo, las cumbres no sólo han ido perdiendo interés por parte de muchos actores latinoamericanos que las percibían como un instrumento de penetración española en la región, sino que asimismo se sometieron a una profunda reflexión para reevaluar la necesidad de “latinoamericanización o desespañolización de las cumbres” (Valle Gálvez, 2013:31). De hecho, es sintomático el hecho de valorar el éxito de las Cumbres por la asistencia de líderes y no por los resultados realmente obtenidos, ya no sólo desde la Academia, sino desde el propio Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores de España.

Lecture 5: Política exterior de España hacia América Latina: ¿tiempo para la redefinición?

En paralelo se crea la Secretaría General Iberoamericana (SEGIB) en 2005 y será reformado en 2014 para intentar dotarle de mayor atractivo para los países latinoamericanos. Finalmente, cabe destacar que la reñida elección del nuevo secretario general de la SEGIB, el excanciller chileno Andrés Allamand, denota tanto la polarización ideológica de la región como el renovado interés por posicionar actores políticos en cargos diplomáticos de primer nivel (El País, 2021), como se deduce por el desmesurado gasto de la candidatura chilena (Infobae, 2022) para un puesto que solía ser fruto del consenso generalizado como en el caso de sus antecesores: Rebeca Grynspan (2014-2021) y Enrique Iglesias (2005-2014).

Antecedentes Política Exterior Española hacia Latinoamérica (I)

- Conquista e Imperio español:
 - Relación jerárquica y **colonial**
- 1898, pérdida de las últimas colonias de ultramar:
 - Crisis identitaria de la metrópoli
 - Penetración de otros actores extrarregionales
- Dictaduras de Primo de Rivera y de Francisco Franco:
 - Paternalismo e **instrumentalización** de la Hispanidad
 - Recreación nostálgica de un pasado inexistente

4. Antecedentes Política Exterior Española hacia Latinoamérica (I)

Las relaciones entre España y América Latina son de larga data, transitando desde el período colonial a los procesos de independencia (acaecidos en el período entre 1810 y 1825 en gran parte de los países de la región).

Con posterioridad, España se sumirá en el desconcierto por la pérdida de las últimas colonias de ultramar en 1898: Cuba, Puerto Rico y Filipinas. Este hecho habilitará también a otros actores extrarregionales, como los Estados Unidos, a penetrar de manera decidida en los asuntos latinoamericanos.

Después, en distintas fases del siglo XX, el legado colonial será instrumentalizado primero por las dictadura de Primo de Rivera (1923-1930) y posteriormente, por la de Francisco Franco (1939-1975) instalando la idea de Hispanidad con la aspiración de retrotraerse, al menos simbólicamente, a los supuestos “good old days” del imperio español (Calduch, 1994).

Antecedentes Política Exterior Española hacia Latinoamérica (II)

- Transición a la democracia (Arenal, 2008):
 - Una suerte de “consenso tácito” (1976-1980), en que se fijan **europa e iberoamérica como prioridades**;
 - Una fase “constituyente en materia de política exterior” (1980-1986), en que se fijan las relaciones con estados unidos vía OTAN y se culmina la adhesión al proyecto europeo;
 - Una fase de “concreción” (1986-1988), en que se consolidan las grandes líneas de política exterior esbozadas y se dan las condiciones de posibilidad para desplegar una política exterior democrática y europea
 - Una “política exterior normalizada”, desde 1988

5. Antecedentes Política Exterior Española hacia Latinoamérica (II)

Seguindo a Celestino del Arenal (2008), hay diversas fases de la política exterior española en los primeros años de transición a la democracia:

1. una suerte de “consenso tácito” (1976-1980), en que se fijan Europa e Iberoamérica como prioridades;
2. una fase “constituyente en materia de política exterior” (1980-1986), en que se fijan las relaciones con Estados Unidos vía OTAN y se culmina la adhesión al proyecto europeo;
3. una fase de “concreción” (1986-1988), en que se consolidan las grandes líneas de política exterior esbozadas y se dan las condiciones de posibilidad para desplegar una política exterior democrática y europea;
4. una fase de “política exterior normalizada”, desde 1988, donde asistimos a poco más de un lustro (1989-1995) donde no sólo prima el consenso general entre los distintos actores que definen y participan en la elaboración y ejecución de la política exterior, sino que de hecho presenciamos lo que se podría considerar como “la etapa dorada de la diplomacia española” coincidiendo con los últimos años de los gobiernos de Felipe González (1982-1996).

Política Exterior de España hacia Latinoamérica (I)

- Felipe González (1982-1996):
 - **1989-1995: etapa dorada de la diplomacia española**
 - Regionalización de la agenda de política exterior española
- José María Aznar (1996-2004):
 - “Posición común” de la UE para Cuba (1996)
 - Renuncia al multilateralismo y **alineamiento con la administración Bush**
- José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (2004-2011):
 - **Vuelta al multilateralismo**: re acercamiento con la región latinoamericana
 - Apuesta por la cooperación internacional

6. Política Exterior de España hacia Latinoamérica (I)

El quiebre de esos años dorados vendrá de la mano del gobierno de José María Aznar (1996-2004), que se verá signado por dos hechos relevantes. En primer lugar, la capacidad española de regionalizar a nivel europeo su política latinoamericana se cristalizará con la “posición común” en virtud de la cual la Unión Europea impuso desde 1996 sanciones a la Cuba de Fidel Castro (Diamint, 2009: 104). Más allá de la creciente presencia económica de las empresas españolas en la región gracias a su importante internacionalización en los 90’s, asistimos a cómo la incorporación de una valoración marcadamente ideológica en lo que se entendía como una política de estado de España para con la región latinoamericana abrirá la espita para que futuros gobiernos adopten visiones reduccionistas que, en cierto modo, mitigaron la ascendencia moral que la transición española había proyectado y cómo España se erigía en la hoja de ruta a imitar por las jóvenes democracias latinoamericanas. Y la segunda característica notable de la política exterior española desplegada en el gobierno Aznar, máxime en el segundo mandato (2000-2004) donde gozaba de mayoría absoluta, responde a la deliberada renuncia al multilateralismo y al alineamiento con la administración Bush (Arenal, 2003: 184-190). En suma, la política exterior española hacia la región se supeditará a una visión ideológica y

Lecture 5: Política exterior de España hacia América Latina: ¿tiempo para la redefinición?

a una priorización de las relaciones con Washington por encima de los tradicionales vínculos con Latinoamérica.

La política exterior durante los dos gobiernos de José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (2004-2011) se vertebrará en torno a la idea de fomentar una vuelta al multilateralismo y para ello, el acercamiento con la región latinoamericana será fundamental. Bajo el liderazgo de Zapatero se producirán dos hitos reseñables en las relaciones España-América Latina. Uno a tener en consideración apunta al relanzamiento de las negociaciones entre la Unión Europea y el Mercosur en mayo de 2010. Y el segundo hito a destacar tiene que ver con la decidida apuesta por la cooperación internacional, que alcanzó su máximo histórico del 0,46% de 2009.

Política Exterior de España hacia Latinoamérica (II)

- Mariano Rajoy (2011-2018):
 - **Ideologización** de la política exterior en clave de política doméstica
 - Visión **pragmática y reduccionista**: impulso a exportaciones para incentivar la economía y fomento de la atracción de inversión extranjera directa (Marca España)
- Pedro Sánchez (2018-):
 - Recuperación del multilateralismo
 - **Potencialidad de relaciones con Latinoamérica**

7. Política Exterior de España hacia Latinoamérica (II)

El gobierno de Mariano Rajoy (2011-2018), en un contexto de crisis económica y de confianza por parte de los mercados internacionales, apostó por el reforzamiento y ensimismamiento con las políticas de austeridad económica que emanaban de Europa y que dejarían a América Latina fuera del radar de prioridades. En consonancia con esta narrativa dominante de la austeridad, la política exterior de Rajoy se supeditó a una visión pragmática y reduccionista en la que primaban dos objetivos marcadamente economicistas: impulsar las exportaciones para incentivar la economía y fomentar la atracción de inversión extranjera directa; cuyo máximo exponente fue la creación de la Marca España.

La llegada a la Moncloa del presidente Pedro Sánchez en junio de 2018 recalibró la brújula de la política exterior española, buscando retomar el multilateralismo y la proyección internacional de España. En ese contexto se reformuló la Marca España en la iniciativa España Global con un cariz que prescindía de los tintes comerciales de su antecesor.

En base a la Estrategia de Acción Exterior que diseña este gobierno en 2021 se realiza un diagnóstico holístico e integral del actual escenario internacional en base a cuatro fracturas (socioeconómica, ecológica y

Lecture 5: Política exterior de España hacia América Latina: ¿tiempo para la redefinición?

ambiental, tecnológica, y política y de gobernanza), se plantean dos posibles respuestas (centrífugas y de desunión, o centrípetas y de inclusión).

Y en paralelo, se apuesta por un “multilateralismo reformado y reforzado”, que se traduce en una potenciación de las relaciones con América Latina y, en última instancia, con las condiciones de posibilidad para un acercamiento a la región latinoamericana.

Política Exterior de España hacia Latinoamérica (I)

- Felipe González (1982-1996):
 - **1989-1995: etapa dorada de la diplomacia española**
 - Regionalización de la agenda de política exterior española
- José María Aznar (1996-2004):
 - “Posición común” de la UE para Cuba (1996)
 - Renuncia al multilateralismo y **alineamiento con la administración Bush**
- José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (2004-2011):
 - **Vuelta al multilateralismo**: re acercamiento con la región latinoamericana
 - Apuesta por la cooperación internacional

8. Actuales desafíos y potencialidades de la política exterior española hacia la región

A raíz de la aprobación de la Estrategia de Acción Exterior 2021-2024 (EAE) el 27 abril 2021, la ministra de Exteriores, Arancha González Laya (2021), vertebró las prioridades de proyección internacional de España en cuatro puntos: (i) la defensa del multilateralismo y la cooperación internacional frente al unilateralismo o el nacionalismo; (ii) la profundización en la construcción europea; (iii) el impulso a las relaciones bilaterales con regiones específicas del mundo (la Estrategia Foco África, el refuerzo de las relaciones con Iberoamérica y la promoción de la vecindad sur de la Unión Europea con los países de la otra orilla del Mediterráneo); y (iv) la apuesta por la modernización de la cooperación al desarrollo. En este contexto, los vínculos con América Latina recobraron un papel preeminente, no sólo en lo económico-empresarial (que también), sino en lo político-cultural.

Además de la apuesta por el “multilateralismo reformado y reforzado”, otro factor que coadyuvó a la actual aspiración de europeizar las relaciones españolas hacia América Latina a través de Bruselas fue la designación del Josep Borrell, otrora ministro de exteriores del primer gabinete de Sánchez, como el nuevo Alto Representante de la UE para Asuntos Exteriores y Política de Seguridad desde diciembre de 2019. Su

Lecture 5: Política exterior de España hacia América Latina: ¿tiempo para la redefinición?

fuerte impronta latinoamericanista ha permitido que el esfuerzo de la diplomacia española de resignificar la relación con América Latina vuelva a ser escuchada en las capitales europeas, máxime en un contexto bélico en el flanco oriental europeo y con la necesidad de aunar socios para la “autonomía estratégica” que propugna la UE en su reciente documento A Strategic Compass for the EU (2022).

Conclusiones: margen para la redefinición (I)

- Factores sistémicos:
 - Crisis de globalización (Sanahuja, 2018)
 - Cambio de era (más que una era de cambios)
 - Triple transición: digital, verde y social (Verdes-Montenegro, 2022).
- Factores regionales:
 - Creciente desinterés mutuo
 - Latinoamérica: problemas estructurales (desigualdades, reprimarización de exportaciones, debilidad institucional, fiscalidad) + prioridad China + creciente irrelevancia
 - UE: ensimismamiento.
 - crisis económica y del euro a raíz de la crisis financiera internacional de 2008,
 - crisis de refugiados y de valores a raíz de la guerra de Siria de 2015,
 - crisis política e institucional de la mano del *Brexit* y el ascenso de la extrema derecha

9. Conclusiones: margen para la redefinición (I)

A nivel sistémico, España y América Latina, afrontan simultáneamente muchos de los desafíos comunes planteados en el contexto internacional: desde la crisis de la globalización, con su consiguiente creciente desafección sociopolítica y la extenuación de los recursos ambientales (Sanahuja, 2018), hasta la crisis sanitaria y la aceleración de tendencias preexistentes, pero agudizadas, por la pandemia de la Covid-19 (Haass, 2020; Rodrik, 2020). Estos desafíos sistémicos se enmarcan además en la percepción de un cambio de era (más que una era de cambios) en la que las tensiones geopolíticas entre China y Estados Unidos resignifican las relaciones para con ellos, pero también entre los demás actores, a la par que el cambio climático cobra mayor relevancia para entender las grandes transformaciones que se avecinan: la digital, la verde y la social (Verdes-Montenegro, 2022).

En segundo lugar, a nivel regional hemos asistido en los últimos años a un creciente desinterés mutuo. Desde Latinoamérica, problemas estructurales han copado la agenda (desigualdades, reprimarización de exportaciones, debilidad institucional, fiscalidad...) a la par que nuevas oportunidades o desafíos han aparecido: de manera notable, el desembarco chino en la región en forma de fortísimas inversiones convirtiéndose en el primer socio comercial de la mayoría de países de la región, pero también en forma de aliado político estratégico como

Lecture 5: Política exterior de España hacia América Latina: ¿tiempo para la redefinición?

demuestra el soft power ejercido de la mano de la “diplomacia de vacunas” (Lee, 2021) y de la apuesta diplomática por el reconocimiento de China en detrimento de Taiwán (BBC, 2021). Recíprocamente, desde el lado español, y europeo por extensión, hemos transitado unos años de marcado ensimismamiento en virtud del cual, lejos de proyectarse hacia fuera como antaño, han primado las prioridades domésticas frente a tres crisis (Caballero, 2019b): crisis económica y del euro a raíz de la crisis financiera internacional de 2008, crisis de refugiados y de valores a raíz de la guerra de Siria de 2015, crisis política e institucional de la mano del Brexit y el ascenso de la extrema derecha. En definitiva, la creciente irrelevancia de América Latina (Malamud & Schenoni, 2020) ha coadyuvado a una mayor desconexión que se evidencia de manera notable en la ausencia de reuniones de alto nivel desde 2015, esto es, después de que se celebraran las dos primeras cumbres UE-CELAC en 2013 en Santiago de Chile y en 2015 en Bruselas.

Conclusiones: margen para la redefinición (II)

- Factores coyunturales:
 - **Ventana de oportunidad para la redefinición:**
 - España, como puente entre la Unión Europea y América Latina, liderado por un gobierno multilateralista y con un decidido foco latinoamericanista busca impulsar y capitalizar la proyección europea hacia América Latina
 - Cumbre de máximo nivel entre la UE y América Latina en Bruselas en la segunda mitad del 2023, cuando España ostente la presidencia temporal del Consejo Europeo
 - Conflicto entre Rusia y Ucrania: para la UE, los socios latinoamericanos cobran mayor importancia geopolítica para aislar a Rusia
 - **A pesar de intereses diferentes en el corto plazo, potencialidad de convergencia en base a valores e ideas compartidas (derechos humanos, respeto a las normas, multilateralismo...)**

10. Conclusiones: margen para la redefinición (II)

Sin embargo, en el plano de los factores de índole más coyuntural, asistimos a unos hechos que nos hacen pensar en una suerte de ventana de oportunidad para la redefinición de estas relaciones. España, como puente entre la Unión Europea y América Latina, liderado por un gobierno multilateralista y con un decidido foco latinoamericanista busca impulsar y capitalizar la proyección europea hacia América Latina. El hecho de que España ostente la presidencia europea en el segundo semestre de 2023 a la par que el Brasil del recientemente electo presidente Lula da Silva hará lo propio en el Mercosur vaticina una fuerte apuesta diplomática para reconducir los vínculos euro-latinoamericanos.

Y, finalmente, el actual conflicto entre Rusia y Ucrania, con el decidido apoyo español (y europeo) a los intereses ucranianos, han modificado el escenario geopolítico. Aunque la European Union Global Strategy de 2016 (Sanahuja, 2021:110) y el Strategic Compass reservara un lugar marginal a América Latina entre las prioridades de la UE, se antoja más necesario que nunca el encolumnar socios y aliados que respeten la legalidad internacional.

En conclusión, aunque en el corto plazo los intereses estratégicos y económicos de España (y la UE) y la región latinoamericana no coincidan plenamente, máxime dada la creciente dependencia de China

Lecture 5: Política exterior de España hacia América Latina: ¿tiempo para la redefinición?

de esta última, en el medio plazo no cabe duda de la potencialidad de converger entre sociedades con valores compartidos. La diplomacia española debe reorientar incuestionablemente su política exterior hacia América Latina, despojándose de paternalismos pasados y reconociendo que a día de hoy la región latinoamericana significa más para España que a la inversa. Y no sólo por la inversión y las relaciones económicas, ni tampoco sólo por la importancia del español en el mundo gracias a los 640 millones de latinoamericanos que lo hablan (más que por los 47 millones de españoles), sino principalmente porque si España tiene algo que decir en el mundo en las grandes ligas de la diplomacia internacional es gracias a sus estrechos vínculos con América Latina. Es ahí donde descansa la potencialidad, y la necesidad, de la actual redefinición de la política exterior española hacia América Latina.

Lecturas recomendadas

1. Arenal, C. (2008) “Consenso y disenso en la política exterior de España”, Documento de Trabajo Real Instituto Elcano, n.25, 2 junio de 2008.
2. Ayuso, A. & Caballero, S. (2018) El interregionalismo de la Unión Europea (UE) con América Latina, Bogotá, Ed. Universidad Cooperativa de Colombia.
DOI: 10.16925/9789587601039
3. Caballero (2021) “Oscilaciones en las relaciones Brasil-España: entre el pragmatismo económico y el desconocimiento mutuo”, *Methados revista de ciencias sociales* 9(1):124-134.
4. Sanahuja, J.A. (2018) “Crisis de globalización, crisis de hegemonía: un escenario de cambio estructural para América Latina y el Caribe”, In: *América Latina y el Caribe frente a un Nuevo Orden Mundial: poder, globalización y respuestas regionales*. Publisher: Icaria / CRIES.
5. Verdes-Montenegro, F. J. (2022): “La autonomía estratégica de la Unión Europea: ¿en qué lugar queda América Latina?”, *Documentos de trabajo nº 65 (2ª época)*, Madrid, Fundación Carolina.

Preguntas para el debate

1. En las últimas décadas hemos experimentado altibajos en las relaciones UE-ALC, ¿en qué medida los periodos más destacados de esta relación han tenido lugar simultáneamente con los periodos más destacados y activos de la política exterior española?
2. ¿Cuáles son las conexiones entre el desinterés mutuo de la UE y ALC desde 2015 y los factores sistémicos que se estaban produciendo en la arena internacional?
3. A pesar de algunos ejemplos fallidos en las relaciones UE-ALC, se han lanzado nuevos intentos de maximizar las sinergias birregionales, ¿por qué? ¿Cuáles son los puntos en común y las principales razones de estos vínculos euro-latinoamericanos?

Lecture 6: Portuguese foreign policy towards Latin America: A yo-yo approach

Carmen Fonseca

Portuguese foreign policy towards Latin America: A yo-yo approach

Carmen Fonseca

Hyperlink to [video](#)

Hyperlink to the [slides](#)

Content

1. Introduction
2. Portuguese foreign policy: Historical framework
3. Portuguese foreign policy towards Latin America (1999-2002)
4. Portuguese foreign policy towards Latin America (2002-2005)
5. Portuguese foreign policy towards Latin America (2005-2011)
6. Portuguese foreign policy towards Latin America (2011-2015)
7. Portuguese foreign policy towards Latin America (2015-2021)
8. Latin America in the Portuguese presidencies of the EU Council
9. Final remarks (I)
10. Final remarks (II)

Introduction

- While it is common to assume that Portugal is a strategic player and a connecting element between Europe and Latin America, is that really the case? We will try to answer this question exploring:
 1. Portuguese foreign policy strategy since the country's democratisation in 1974;
 2. Portuguese foreign policy towards Latin America in the 21st Century and the links between the discourse of the governments and the strategy undertaken;
 3. Portuguese presidencies of the Council of the EU's agendas (1992, 2000, 2007, 2021).

1. Introduction

While it is common to assume that Portugal is a strategic player and a connecting element between Europe and Latin America, is that really the case? What is the weight and place of Latin America in Portuguese foreign policy? Does Portuguese foreign policy encompass a comprehensive and sustained strategy for the region? How does Portugal's relationship with Latin America fit in with the framework of its European orientation? Does Portugal maintain a parallel or a complementary dialogue regarding the one pursued by the EU in Latin America?

With these questions as its point of departure, this chapter sets out to analyse Portuguese foreign policy for Latin America in the 21st Century, exploring the connection between the discourse of the various governments and the strategy undertaken.

In a first moment, the guidelines for Portuguese foreign policy since the country's democratisation in 1974 will be outlined. In this framework, we will then proceed to analyse the importance ascribed to the relationship with Latin America from the XIV Constitutional Government, led by António Guterres, comparing the proposals of each government present in their respective programs and the results obtained. It is undisputable that Brazil is Portugal's chief partner in Latin America. How-

ever, this prominence does not imply a straightforward and fully structured policy (Fonseca, 2010). Venezuela is also a country with which there is a degree of closeness due to the Portuguese community residing there.

A third section will be devoted to the Portuguese agendas during the Portuguese presidencies of the Council of the European Union, the first still in the 20th Century, in 1992, and the others in 2000, 2007 and 2021. Finally, this analysis will hopefully help to understand and explain the place occupied by Latin America in Portuguese foreign policy, ascertaining whether Portuguese diplomacy has exerted pressure on the European agenda and managed to distance itself from Spain in the handling of Latin American affairs within Europe.

Portuguese foreign policy: Historical framework

1974: re-democratisation | 1986: accession to the EEC

Which meant:

- significant changes by shifting its central axis to Europe without, however, relinquishing its “Atlantic vocation”;
- adjustment of its relations with Africa;
- adjustment of its relations with the Ibero-American axis:
 - a focus on relations with Brazil, especially in the 90s,
 - and a search for differentiation vis-a-vis Spain and within the EU.

2. Portuguese foreign policy: Historical framework

Portuguese democratisation will be 50 years old in 2024. In the field of foreign policy, it has been 50 years since Portugal has seen any significant changes, after shifting its central axis to Europe and joining the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986, without, however, relinquishing its “Atlantic vocation”.

At the same time, there has been, on the one hand, an adjustment of some guidelines for external action, namely in relations with Africa and with the Ibero-American axis, in which relations have adapted and expanded. On the other hand, some innovations also have taken place, notably economic diplomacy and cultural diplomacy (with a focus on the Portuguese language), a trend which in Latin America gained ground later, mainly through Brazil.

Portuguese democratisation in 1974 also marked a relaxation of the relationship with Brazil, which was normalised after the end of the African decolonisation processes and the stabilisation of Portuguese political institutions. Until 1985, given that Portugal was largely committed to the EEC accession process, Brazil's presence in Portuguese foreign policy was limited to the official rhetoric, on the one hand, and to the attempt to raise awareness in the European agenda for relations with

Brazil, in particular (Carvalho 2016:347), and with Latin America in general.

Likewise, Portugal was finding support in Spain, but also experiencing difficulty in differentiating itself from its neighbour, which was at the same stage as Portugal with regard to the definition of its international identity, integration into the European Community and the monetisation of the relationship with Latin America.

In 1991 Portugal became the only European country to have high level summits with Brazil. The General Agreement on Cooperation was also concluded, which allowed a new dynamic to the relationship to be built. In that year the Ibero-American Summits were launched, in which Portugal together with Spain share a common forum with the whole region. In practical terms, the results attained were few (Cruz, 2021).

Portugal has sought to differentiate itself in the EU, especially regarding Spain, through its links to Portuguese-speaking countries, in which only Brazil is included in the whole of Latin America.

Portuguese foreign policy towards Latin America (2000-2021)

1999-2002: the “Brazilian option”

- “Brazilian option”:
 - Economic diplomacy strategy put into practice by the government of Prime Minister António Guterres,
 - Clearly oriented to Brazil,
 - The magnitude of the figures made the mid-90’s the golden period of Portuguese-Brazilian relations,
 - Lost steam in the new century because of the inability of Portuguese firms to survive in the hard Brazilian business environment.

3. Portuguese foreign policy towards Latin America (1999-2002)

Guterres and the “Brazilian option”

Regarding Portugal's relationship with Latin America, the 20th century closed with the marks of economic diplomacy and the "Brazilian option", put into practice by the government of Prime Minister António Guterres. This strategy guided Portuguese trade and investments, preferably to Brazil, but also reaching other countries in the region. The magnitude of the figures made this the golden decade of Portuguese-Brazilian relations. In 1997, 1998 and 2000 Brazil stood out as the main target for Portuguese investment (AICEP, 2009:7). Comparatively, trade has always been less important, and although its weight has increased, it has not been possible to achieve high figures or outdo the main partners located in the European Union, with Spain in the lead.

Upon entering the new century, Guterres's second government intended to continue the program underway (Portugal, 1999), which, however, was losing steam. Still, it was possible to breathe new life, politically speaking, into the relationship with Brazil through the joint organisation of the celebrations of the 500th anniversary of Portugal's arrival in Brazil, holding meetings and official visits by Brazilian and Por-

tuguese authorities on each side of the Atlantic. To the traditional narrative of friendship and fraternal bonds were added economic data (Sampaio, 2000). If the symbolical but also the practical dimension of official visits are considered, it is worth noting that during this period, the President of the Republic, Jorge Sampaio, visited Brazil, Panama and Peru (both in the framework of the Ibero-American Summits), and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jaime Gama, only visited Brazil once to prepare the Portuguese-Brazilian Summit.

Portuguese foreign policy towards Latin America (2000-2021)

2002-2005: Spain or Brazil?

- 2002: election of a new government whose programme favoured Spain rather than Brazil or any country in Latin America
- Prime Minister Durão Barroso wanted to diversify external investments simultaneously with the strengthening of the Portugal-Brazil relationship.
- Increase of the Brazilian immigrant community in Portugal (from 22.000 to 47.000 people). A relevant topic in the bilateral agenda.
- Spanish Prime Minister Aznar was not able to put into practice a Spanish strategy to Latin America. Spain lost prestige in LA.
- Paradoxally, in the absence of Spain, Portugal also could not act in Latin America.

4. Portuguese foreign policy towards Latin America (2002-2005)

Barroso and Santana Lopes: Spain or Brazil?

Durão Barroso's election in 2002 changed Guterres's formula. It did not dispense the relationship with Brazil and Latin America, but it favoured Spain (Portugal, 2002), as illustrated by some international trips still considered by some Latin American countries.

At the VI Portuguese-Brazilian Summit, in 2002, which took place in Lisbon, the Portuguese Prime Minister, Barroso, stressed the need for Portugal to diversify its external investments and strengthen its relationship with Brazil in other areas. The Portuguese-Brazilian agenda then began to evolve. The political and economic issues were joined by the question of migration, in view of the exponential increase in Brazilian immigration to Portugal, as well as the cultural dimension.

Barroso's departure for the European Commission in 2004 placed Pedro Santana Lopes in the political leadership of Portugal, followed, however, by the dissolution of Parliament by President Sampaio and the call for early elections. The brief time (from July 2004 to March 2005) in which Santana Lopes served as head of government nevertheless left a

mark on the relationship with Brazil when he chose it as the destination of his first official visit abroad.

Until that time, Jose Maria Aznar was in charge of the Spanish government. Despite the emergence of the idea of the EU-LAC summits in the late 1990s in collaboration with France and Brazil and the creation of an Ibero-American General Secretariat (SEGIB) in 2003, during the Aznar government, Spain lost prestige in Latin America (Ayuso, 2014). Perhaps the hesitation of Portuguese foreign policy towards Brazil and Latin America in that period could find an explanation in the relative absence of Spain.

Portuguese foreign policy towards Latin America (2000-2021)

2005-2011: From Spain to Latin America

- 2005: a new Socialist government was elected with an absolute majority.
- Portuguese foreign policy preserved its main axis, including the need for the internationalisation of the economy
- In the government programmes all the assets were devoted to Spain.
- The severe consequences of the global economic crisis in Spain obliged Portugal to shift its strategy. Relations with some Latin American countries were again restored or reinforced.
- After 2008 Portugal devoted much of its capital in the relationship with Venezuela. 19 cooperation agreements on trade were signed.
- The milestone of EU policy towards Latin America was the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership institutionalised during the Portuguese presidency of the EU Council in 2007.

5. Portuguese foreign policy towards Latin America (2005-2011)

Sócrates: From Spain to Latin America

The 2005 elections gave an absolute majority to José Sócrates's Socialist Party, which would be re-elected in 2009. His government programmes reiterate the same objectives as those of Portuguese foreign policy, including the need for the internationalisation of the Portuguese economy. There is, however, no reference to a strategy of rapprochement with Latin America or Brazil in particular (Portugal, 2002:154).

The global economic and financial crisis that would follow required, however, that some adjustments be made. Spain, understood as the privileged partner, ended up moving down the list of priorities, not least because the effects of the economic crisis were taking a toll. The rapprochement that gradually developed with Latin America is part of this attempt to diversify partners prompted by the context of crisis that was battering Europe and Portugal.

Jorge Sampaio's presidential diplomacy ended with a State visit to Chile and another one to Paraguay in 2005. At that time, Brazil, Mexico and Chile were Portugal's main trading partners in Latin America. Sócrates's Latin American tour, besides Brazil, included only Venezuela, with

which economic and trade relations were strengthened. This economic agenda began to be outlined in 2008 when the Venezuelan president visited Lisbon three times and the Portuguese prime minister, accompanied by a delegation of economic advisors, visited Venezuela on one occasion (El Pais, 2018).

Throughout the six years of Socialist administration, two Portuguese-Brazilian Summits were held (in 2008 and 2010), and seven official visits to Brazil. In this period, the milestone of EU policy towards Latin America, in the framework of the Portuguese presidency of the EU Council, in July 2007, was the institutionalisation of the Strategic Partnership and the EU-Brazil Summits (which, until 2011, were held annually, as planned).

It is important to register this turning point in external strategy towards the end of Socrates's government. If, at the beginning of its first term, Brazil did not stand in the foreground, the same cannot be said five years later, with Portugal presenting a substantially different economic conjuncture.

Portuguese foreign policy towards Latin America (2000-2021)

2011-2015: what else besides the economic crisis?

- The economic crisis entailed an adjustment in Portuguese foreign policy as well as in domestic policies.
- Germany and China were the destination of the first official visits made by the Prime Minister and the MoFA.
- There was a clear intention of reinforcing the relationship with Latin American countries, namely with Brazil, encapsulating the transatlantic relations (both North and South).
- Regarding economic diplomacy strategy, several visits were undertaken to Latin American countries (Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Paraguay, Panama, Mexico) and agreements were signed.

6. Portuguese foreign policy towards Latin America (2011-2015)

Passos Coelho and the management of the economic crisis

As mentioned above, the economic crisis entailed an adjustment in Portuguese foreign policy, but also in domestic policy. Portugal's bailout by the troika meant the resignation of José Sócrates's government and the holding of early elections in 2011, from which the rightwing coalition (PSD-CDS) led by Pedro Passos Coelho emerged victorious. It is therefore unsurprising that the Prime Minister's first official visit was to Germany and that of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paulo Portas, to China.

In the second government of Passos Coelho, the novelty lay in the explicit reference to Latin America and Brazil in the programmatic text, as well as in the vision for the transatlantic relationship, which should equally favour the northern and southern hemisphere (Portugal, 2015a, p. 130). Economic diplomacy with Brazil and other Latin American countries was understood as a way to structure Portuguese external strategy.

With Passos Coelho, Guterres's "Brazilian option" appeared to be gradually replaced and extended to emerging markets, including the Luso-

phone ones. In the government's first eighteen months, five official visits to Brazil were undertaken by the Prime Minister or the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Several visits were also made to other Latin American countries; several agreements were signed with Venezuela, the Portugal-Mexico High-level Economic Dialogue with Mexico was also established, which began in 2014.

If the economic crisis had occasioned an economic rapprochement with Latin America, it meant, on the other hand, a detachment from Spain, since during this period "the Iberian alliance no longer existed" (Gaspar). The Spanish-Portuguese Summits were also put on hold between 2009 and 2011, being resumed in 2012 after Rajoy's visit to Portugal. Once again, a strategic mismatch between Portugal and Spain was shown.

Portuguese foreign policy towards Latin America (2000-2021)

2015-2021: what place for Latin America?

- By 2015 the place of Latin America in Portuguese foreign policy was still not clear.
- The main goal of the newly elected government was the rehabilitation of Portugal's image in the world, and its national identity was defined as "first and foremost, European, Lusophone, Ibero-American and Atlantic".
- In practical terms, the Portuguese alignment with European priorities contrasted with such a narrative.
- The EU-Mercosur agreement still waits for ratification of EU member states, including Portugal.

7. Portuguese foreign policy towards Latin America (2015-2021)

Costa: What place for Latin America?

In 2015, in early elections, the Socialist Party returned to the government, led by Prime Minister António Costa. In the field of foreign policy, the government program prioritised the rehabilitation of Portugal's image in the world (Portugal, 2015b). In addition to the European framework, the promotion of the Portuguese language and Lusophone citizenship would be the tools employed to achieve this goal (Portugal 2015b:246). The national identity was defined as "first and foremost, European, Lusophone, Ibero-American and Atlantic" (Portugal 2015b:247).

However, despite this narrative, the action of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was aligned with European priorities. The Portuguese Minister Augusto Santos Silva rarely referred to Latin America without mentioning the importance of the region in the European context.

The second government of Antonio Costa, re-elected in 2019, presented a continuation of the main lines of the previous one. It highlights the benefits for the Portuguese economy of the agreement EU-Mercosur (Portugal, 2019:38); however, until now, it still awaits ratification by

some of the member states, including Portugal. Perhaps for that reason the government re-elected in 2022 did not make any mention to it (Portugal 2022). Portugal continues to articulate foreign policy with cultural policy, given the emphasis on the promotion of the Portuguese language and culture. Oddly, however, the program of Costa's second government, which was dismissed in 2021 (but would be in office until 2023), did not include any reference whatsoever to the celebrations of the 200th anniversary of Brazil's independence.

Despite several official visits that took place, a clear Portugal-Latin America strategy was not defined and the results obtained are difficult to identify.

It is worth noting that, given the Venezuelan crisis, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and mainly the Secretary of State to the Portuguese Communities, José Luís Carneiro, went to Venezuela several times to follow up with the Portuguese community. Despite this, and the strong European stance in repudiating Maduro's government, it has not been possible to find a way to exert influence on Venezuela's political situation.

Latin America in the Portuguese presidencies of the EU Council

- Despite some progress of the European intentions in LA, some previous works attest that “the EU is losing appeal on the continent” and “the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership is not working”.
- These kinds of conclusions are supported by European and Portuguese authorities.
- Portuguese national identity includes the relationship with Latin American countries as well as a role as a privileged partner of the EU in Latin America.
- How do Portuguese EU Council presidencies articulate its foreign policy with EU interests and priorities?
- The 2007 Portuguese presidency of the EU Council was the one that left a deeper, or at least, symbolic mark on this relationship by establishing the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership, which, however, has evolved in an erratic way.

8. Latin America in the Portuguese presidencies of the EU Council

It is important to look at Portugal's actions upon taking over the presidency of the EU Council, in order to realise how Portugal articulates its foreign policy, namely its desired role as a privileged partner of the EU in Latin America, with EU interests. During the 21st Century, the country has held three presidencies - in 2000, in 2007 and in 2021 - and in 1992 it held its first ever presidency.

In 1992, although some authors assert that Portugal did not pay attention to Portuguese priorities in Africa and Latin America and that external relations were an imposition of the European agenda (apud Hermenegildo 2014), the truth is that, during the first Portuguese presidency, the initiatives developed presented Portugal as a valid interlocutor with the Latin American region. In terms of quantity, the results of the first Portuguese presidency were indeed prolific.

Portugal took over the presidency again in 2000 in quite different Portuguese and European contexts. At the time, Germany paid special attention to the Latin American region (Trueb 2013:83), and perhaps that is why Portugal chose to focus on Africa and India. Latin America was

not fully off the agenda of the Portuguese presidency; ministerial meetings were held with the Rio Group, Mercosur, the San José Group and the Andean Community.

The 2007 presidency left a deeper, or at least symbolic, mark on the relationship with the region by establishing the EU-Brazil strategic partnership and launching the high level summits with Brazil. Portugal advanced its privileged relations with Brazil and Africa and complemented them with the Euro-Mediterranean dimension.

The Portuguese presidency of 2021 was radically different. In the face of a cascade of international events, from the outset of the Covid-19 pandemic to the US-China tensions, external action was not the EU's top priority. Latin America was also somewhat absent from this presidency, even though the Portuguese official speech placed the emphasis on historical ties and trade relations with Latin American countries.

The crises and challenges - social, migratory, economic and political, with the proliferation of extremism - faced by the EU in recent times may partly account for the inability of the EU to become, as it succeeded in doing before, a model to follow in Latin America.

Final remarks (I)

- In recent years, Portuguese foreign policy has been an extension of European foreign policy, adding the centrality of the Portuguese language.
- Portuguese agendas of EU Council presidencies are a reflection of such a stance.
- Portugal's relation with the Latin American region does not rely on an ideological basis.
- Sócrates started to follow the same option as Barroso with a focus on Spain; Sampaio was more focused in Latin America than Cavaco (who, however, changed his stance during his second term), as well as Socrates' MoFA also highlighted the strategic advantage of relations with Brazil.

Final remarks (II)

- An ideological convergence between Portugal and some of the LA countries may have worked as a facilitator (e.g. relations with Venezuela during Sócrates's term).
- Brazil stands out more due to its status as a Portuguese-speaking country than as a Latin American country. Nevertheless, even this relationship has been stagnant in the last years.
- It is when economic diplomacy emerges on the Portuguese foreign policy agenda that the Latin America region jumps to the top list of priorities.
- Consequently, the way Portugal has connected Europe and Latin America has also been irregular and inconstant.
- Portugal-Latin America relations have been characterised by moments of oscillation, in which Portugal reaches out and pulls away due to its interests, governmental perceptions and internal and European conjunctures.

9. Final remarks (I)

10. Final remarks (II)

Final remarks: Portugal and Latin America: diplomacy, economy and culture as needed.

It is when economic diplomacy emerges on the Portuguese foreign policy agenda that Latin America jumps to the fore on the list of priorities. There is not, however, a Portuguese strategy for the region. Its role and

place on the Portuguese agenda are neither straightforward nor constant, nor do they always have the same intensity.

Latin America has never been the priority of Portuguese foreign policy, even if at times that is the official narrative. And even when it is on the list of priorities (or fields of action) of Portugal's external action, it lacks a medium- or long-term guiding strategy.

The place held by Latin America in Portuguese foreign policy derives (and oscillates) from its Atlantic dimension, which views Latin America as an extension of its foreign policy priorities and its European sensitive axis and of its European (and continental) dimension, which drives the Portuguese agenda to adhere to the European agenda for external action. In recent years, this has been a persistent trend. Of course, these oscillations are not only due to ideological or partisan reasons, but also to conjunctural reasons.

The cornerstone of Portuguese foreign policy of the last decade lies in the promotion of the Portuguese language, Portugal's differentiating element in the European Union. In this context, Brazil stands out more due to its status as a Portuguese-speaking than as a Latin American country. Its position in that geographical space is in any case seen as an added value since it makes it possible for each continent to have a Portuguese-speaking country.

However, Portugal-Brazil relations themselves have been stagnant. The historical foundations of the Portuguese-Brazilian relationship dispense, to some extent, a political action, but this trend reduces the possibilities to achieve concrete and long-term results.

Today, as in the past, Latin America has a marginal place in Portuguese foreign policy. Throughout the 21st Century, the relationship has been characterised by moments of oscillation in which Portugal reaches out and pulls away according to its interests, government perceptions and internal and European conjunctures.

Further readings

1. Carvalho, T. (2011) Portugal e as relações Brasil-União Europeia (1986-2007), *Relações Internacionais*, 29, 91-100.
2. Fonseca, C. (2017) Brasil e a União Europeia: a ilusão do excepcionalismo?, In *Iberoamericana*, XVII(65), pp. 223-224.
3. Fonseca, C. (2010) Intenções vs desempenho: o Brasil na política externa portuguesa, 1976-2007, In *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 53(2), pp. 49-69.
4. Gardini, G. L. (2021) The European Union in Latin America. A 'neighbour' of values, In Gardini, G. L. (Eds.), *External Powers in Latin America Geopolitics between Neo-extractivism and South-South Cooperation* (pp. 29-43). London: Routledge.
5. Gaspar, C. (2011) Portugal, a Espanha e o futuro das relações bilaterais. In T. Rodrigues, & R. Perez (Eds.), *Portugal e Espanha. Crise e Convergência na União Europeia* (pp. 145-162), Lisbon: Tribuna da História.

Questions for discussion and debate

1. Does Portugal have the sufficient and necessary capabilities to work as a strategic player and a connecting element between Europe and Latin America?
2. What are the main opportunities and constraints faced by Portuguese foreign policy regarding the relationship with Latin America?
3. To what extent is Spain a relevant player in Portuguese strategy to Latin America?

Lecture 7: América Latina y el Caribe en la Política Exterior Alemana

Jaime León Gonzalez

América Latina y el Caribe en la Política Exterior Alemana

Jaime León González

Hipervínculo al [vídeo](#)

Hipervínculo a las [diapositivas](#)

Contenido

1. El rol de Alemania en el contexto internacional
2. Alemania y América Latina y el Caribe: valores e intereses comunes
3. La política latinoamericana alemana
4. Cooperación al desarrollo
5. Comercio
6. Energías renovables y transición energética
7. Asociaciones Energéticas en la región latinoamericana
8. Educación, ciencia y cultura
9. Desafíos a la asociación de vecindad
10. Conclusiones

El rol de Alemania en el contexto internacional

- Nueva política exterior (PE) fruto final de la Guerra Fría y caída del Muro de Berlín
 - Cambio de enfoque y prioridades
1. PE influenciada por consolidación democracia alemana
 2. Integración de la Unión Europea
 3. Nuevo capítulo en las relaciones con EE.UU.
 4. Participación OTAN
 5. Estrechamiento lazos con ALC

1. El rol de Alemania en el contexto internacional

Desde la caída del Muro de Berlín en 1989, la política exterior (PE) alemana ha experimentado un importante cambio en su enfoque y prioridades, especialmente en términos de relaciones internacionales y alianzas estratégicas. Esta transformación se debe tanto a factores internos como a factores externos, que hacen referencia a fenómenos en el sistema internacional y en la política mundial que inciden en la implicación del país europeo frente a estos acontecimientos internacionales.

En este período la PE alemana estuvo influenciada por la necesidad de consolidar la nueva democracia alemana y de evitar cualquier percepción de dominio alemán en Europa. La PE alemana se centró en gran medida en la promoción de la integración europea y en la construcción de una Europa más fuerte y unida. De ahí que Alemania haya estado fuertemente comprometida con el proceso de integración europea, abogando por una mayor coordinación de las políticas europeas. En este sentido, Berlín ha sido un actor clave en la toma de decisiones en la Unión Europea (UE), especialmente en áreas como la política económica y de seguridad.

Igualmente, la reunificación alemana abrió un nuevo capítulo en las relaciones germano-estadounidenses. Desde entonces, este bloque ha mantenido una estrecha cooperación en materia de política de seguridad y defensa, y han trabajado conjuntamente para abordar los principales desafíos mundiales, como el cambio climático, la proliferación nuclear y el terrorismo.

Esto se encuentra estrechamente vinculado con su participación en la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte (OTAN) para promover la seguridad y la estabilidad internacionales. Alemania ha contribuido activamente a las operaciones de la OTAN en Afganistán y ha trabajado para fortalecer la defensa y la cooperación militar en Europa. Por otro lado, destaca la defensa y promoción de valores que promueve la PE alemana como líder en materia de derechos humanos y democracia, así como la promoción de la libertad.

Del mismo modo, en relación con los factores de naturaleza externa que han alterado y modelado la PE, los cambios en las condiciones globales han dado lugar a la constitución de alianzas con países que tienen interés en participar activamente en la política mundial de manera ordenada y cooperativa. En la búsqueda de nuevos socios, Alemania ha construido alianzas con países del Sur, en donde se pueden identificar a potencias emergentes.

En América Latina y el Caribe, la política exterior alemana ha buscado estrechar las relaciones con los países de la región, especialmente en materia de comercio y cooperación para el desarrollo. La cooperación ha estado enfocada en áreas como el cambio climático, la seguridad alimentaria y la lucha contra la pobreza. Sin embargo, la relación también ha estado influenciada por intereses políticos y económicos.

Posteriormente vamos a abordar como se han desarrollado estas relaciones bilaterales entre la región latinoamericana y Alemania.

Alemania y América Latina y el Caribe: valores e intereses comunes

„Los valores comunes e intereses convergentes, así como la estrecha vinculación cultural de raíces históricas, crean una base única sobre la que desarrollar la cooperación, tanto bilateral, en beneficio mutuo, como multilateral, en tanto que responsabilidad compartida“ (Ministerio Federal de Asuntos Exteriores de Alemania, 2010)

¿A qué vínculos se hace referencia?

- Alemania cuenta con una imagen positiva en la región
- Relación centrada en los vínculos económicos, intercambios comerciales y flujos de inversión
- En las últimas década foco alemán ha estado puesto la región de Asia
- ALC proyecta una imagen que no fomentan la cooperación con terceros aliados

2. Alemania y América Latina y el Caribe: valores e intereses comunes

Las relaciones entre Alemania y los países que conforman la región latinoamericana descansa sobre una base firme e históricamente cultivada. Esto fue puesto de manifiesto por el Ministerio Federal de Asuntos Exteriores de Alemania (2010): “Los valores comunes e intereses convergentes, así como la estrecha vinculación cultural de raíces históricas, crean una base única sobre la que desarrollar la cooperación, tanto bilateral, en beneficio mutuo, como multilateral, en tanto que responsabilidad compartida”.

A través de los valores e intereses comunes repetidamente pregonados, América Latina y el Caribe (ALC) se presenta como un aliado natural. Entre estos valores comunes a los que se hace referencia se encuentran los aspectos culturales y científicos, democracia, multilateralismo, libre comercio y el pacifismo.

Alemania cuenta con una imagen positiva en la región, la cual está sustentada principalmente por los vínculos económicos, intercambios comerciales y flujos de inversión. Sin embargo, en los últimos 20 años, ALC ha cambiado enormemente, mientras que la PE alemana hacia la región no lo ha hecho a la misma velocidad. Observándose una falta de

orientación europea y alemana en procesos de decisión y planificación exterior en la región.

Hoy en día nos encontramos con cambios de poder a nivel internacional, pérdidas de influencia de posiciones occidentales, crecimiento

autoritarismo, debilitamiento, instituciones multilaterales o cambio climático. El actual orden mundial se encuentra en un proceso de reorganización, mientras que si observamos al subcontinente nos encontramos con un proceso de fragmentación regional.

La región latinoamericana actualmente no ofrece una imagen de prometedoras oportunidades, pues se observan dinámicas políticas que dilapidan una cooperación duradera entre el subcontinente y Alemania, así como entre los bloques UE-ALC. De sur a norte se observan problemas. Argentina con un gran problema de deuda estatal y que alientan a paros nacionales. La situación en Chile no parece tan halagüeña como se esperaba con la llegada del nuevo presidente Gabriel Boric. A esto le han seguido diversas protestas en Colombia, Perú o Ecuador, fruto del malestar social y el descontento con la clase política. En el gigante sudamericano, se está registrando un clima de polarización de la población, acompañado de manifestaciones y cortes de carretera, tras la derrota en las elecciones nacionales del actual presidente Jair Bolsonaro, y la vuelta al poder de Lula da Silva. En Centroamérica, la democracia y el Estado de derecho se encuentran constantemente socavados. Cuba se enfrenta a una crisis en el Partido Comunista. Por su parte, México ha dejado de un lado su papel en la política internacional, siguiendo el modelo de crecimiento de los años setenta.

La política latinoamericana alemana

- *Lateinamerikapolitik*: establecimiento de políticas más estrechas con la región
- Cuatro son sus áreas de actuación:
 1. Cooperación al desarrollo
 2. Comercio
 3. Educación, ciencia y cultura
 4. Energías renovables y transición energética
- Brasil: único país de la región con una asociación estratégica con Alemania
- México: en la UE, Alemania es el socio comercial más importante (20.000 mil. € en 2021)

3. La política latinoamericana alemana

La política latinoamericana alemana (*Lateinamerikapolitik*) tiene sus orígenes en la década de 1990, cuando Alemania empezó a establecer relaciones más estrechas con los países latinoamericanos y a desarrollar una serie de estrategias (ministeriales) específicas para la región.

El objetivo principal de la política latinoamericana alemana es establecer relaciones políticas, económicas y culturales más estrechas con los países de América Latina, así como el fomento de los denominados intereses nacionales para Alemania, como son la seguridad y la economía. De igual forma, la temática energética, dentro de la cual se enmarcan tanto la lucha contra el cambio climático como la seguridad en el suministro energético, ha ido adquiriendo paulatinamente una mayor relevancia en la agenda política exterior.

Identificamos, por lo tanto, cuatro áreas que conforman esta política exterior hacia la región:

1. la cooperación al desarrollo,
2. el comercio,
3. la educación, ciencia y cultura,
4. y la Energías renovables y transición energética,

áreas que serán abordados en profundidad en los siguientes apartados.

Entre los países que conforman la región, Brasil y México son los principales socios para Alemania, tanto a nivel comercial, como en materia de cooperación, ciencia y energía. No obstante, también existen relaciones importantes con otros países como Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Perú y Uruguay.

1. Brasil: es el único país de ALC con el que Alemania tiene una asociación estratégica desde 2008. La preocupación central de esta asociación estratégica, que Alemania y Brasil quisieran profundizar en los próximos años (entre otras cosas, en el marco de las consultas gubernamentales), es la mayor expansión de la cooperación en temas bilaterales y multilaterales.

Esta cooperación aborda temas como la energía, el medio ambiente, el clima, la ciencia, los negocios y el comercio, la defensa, los asuntos laborales y sociales, y la cooperación en las Naciones Unidas y en materia de derechos humanos.

2. México: es el segundo socio comercial más importante de Alemania en América Latina. De los países de la Unión Europea, Alemania es el socio comercial más importante de México, el volumen comercial ascendió a más de 20 mil millones de euros en 2021 (2020: 19 mil millones de euros).

Las exportaciones alemanas a México ascendieron a 13.200 millones de euros. Las exportaciones mexicanas a Alemania ascendieron a 7.700 millones de euros. Sobre todo, la industria automotriz y la industria proveedora, la ingeniería mecánica, la logística, pero también los sectores químico, farmacéutico y electrónico son puntos focales de las relaciones económicas bilaterales. Casi 2.100 empresas con participación alemana están registradas en la Secretaría de Economía de México, y en torno a un tercio también tiene sus propias instalaciones de producción en el país.

Cooperación al desarrollo

- **Política estructural global cuyo objetivo es mejorar las condiciones económicas, sociales, ecológicas y políticas de los países en desarrollo**
 - Proteger las selvas tropicales, biología marina y combatir el cambio climático
 - Movilizar los esfuerzos de la sociedad alemana para el desarrollo
 - Eliminar la violencia y fortalecer los derechos humanos
- **Cooperación técnica**
 - Reside en la GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit)
 - LA GIZ ejecutó en 2019 un total de 221 proyectos en América Latina (1.090 millones de €)
- **Cooperación financiera**
 - KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau) como principal institución
 - Inversiones a empresas que operan en el país
 - En 2018, inversión en torno a 2.500 millones €
- **Cooperación triangular**
 - Proyectos planificados, financiados e implementados conjuntamente



4. Cooperación al desarrollo

La política de cooperación al desarrollo alemana ha sido definida como "una política estructural global cuyo objetivo es mejorar las condiciones económicas, sociales, ecológicas y políticas de los países en desarrollo" (SPD/Bündnis/Die Grünen, 1998 p. 48). Esta perspectiva va más allá de la reducción de la pobreza como sistema objetivo de la política de desarrollo y, en su lugar, se entiende también la cooperación con los países en desarrollo como una contribución a la (co)configuración de la globalización, así como a la consolidación de la paz internacional. La política de desarrollo se describe como un "subsistema multifuncional" de la ciencia, cuyo potencial se utiliza en función de la percepción de las situaciones de interés. Los ciclos económicos, así como las situaciones y cambios políticos mundiales, han influido en estas percepciones de intereses en la historia de la política alemana de desarrollo. Algunos ejemplos son el final del conflicto Este-Oeste o los atentados terroristas del 11 de septiembre de 2001.

El Ministerio Federal de Cooperación Económica y Desarrollo (BMZ), desde su fundación en 1961 ha sido considerado el ministerio central de la cooperación alemana al desarrollo. En 1964 se le asignaron las competencias de Cooperación Técnica (CT) desde el Ministerio Federal de Asuntos Exteriores (AA), y en 1972 las de Cooperación Financiera (CF) desde el Ministerio de Economía. A diferencia de las

administraciones de desarrollo de otros países de la OCDE, el BMZ no dispone de una subestructura oficial, por lo que utiliza unidades administrativas semigubernamentales, así como las denominadas agencias independientes, para la ejecución de sus proyectos. En particular, cabe mencionar aquí las fundaciones políticas, que ocupan un lugar firme en la estructura plural de la cooperación alemana al desarrollo. Sin embargo, el BMZ lleva a cabo la mayor parte de su cooperación bilateral al desarrollo a través del Banco de Crédito para la Reconstrucción (KfW - Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau), responsable de la CF, y de la Sociedad Alemana de Cooperación Internacional (GIZ - Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit), encargada principalmente de la CT.

En lo que a las ayudas oficiales al desarrollo se refiere, Alemania es el segundo mayor donante a nivel mundial, lo que a su vez va acompañado de la participación y aportaciones de actores privados, que han ido incrementando en los últimos años, la cual complementa la ayuda pública a través de un esquema de asociaciones público-privadas.

Por parte del Ejecutivo alemán se han venido persiguiendo diferentes objetivos enmarcados dentro de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible, entre los que destacan proteger las selvas tropicales, biología marina y combatir el cambio climático, movilizar los esfuerzos de la sociedad alemana para el desarrollo, eliminar la violencia y fortalecer los derechos humanos. Por un lado, si observamos el desembolso neto por país en Ayuda Oficial al Desarrollo (AOD), se aprecia un aumento constante año tras año el 2010, llegando Alemania a situarse en el 2014 como el segundo donante a nivel mundial por detrás de los EE.UU. hasta la fecha. Por otro lado, si nos fijamos en el desembolso neto de AOD por parte de Alemania, se observa un claro cambio en los países receptores en la región. Por un parte, Brasil, con 1.800 millones de euros y México, con 1000 millones de euros entre los años 2013 y 2019, les sitúan entre los mayores receptores de AOD en ALC. Por otra parte, destaca Colombia, en donde se observa un incremento desde 2013, lo que se justifica por el papel que Alemania ha jugado en el proceso colombiano de negociación de la paz, y que ha llevado al país sudamericano a convertirse en el mayor receptor de AOD alemana en la región.

Comercio

- Fomento del comercio exterior como piedra angular de la política exterior → recae en el Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores
- Concepto de los tres pilares: consulados y embajadas, Cámaras de Comercio y GTAI
- A pensar de los más 100 años de antiguadas con la que cuentan estas relaciones, constantes vaivenes
- Intensificación entre 2003 - 2008, recaída entre 2009 y 2010, recuperación en 2011-2013
- Socios claves en la región los países ABC + México
- Brasil y México como los dos principales socios comerciales, muy por encima del resto

5. Comercio

A nivel internacional, los intereses de Alemania se centran en la promoción del comercio libre y justo. Para ello ha estado trabajando en fortalecer la cooperación económica y comercial con ALC a través de la promoción de acuerdos de libre comercio. Además, Alemania ha fomentado la inversión en la región y ha sido un importante proveedor de financiamiento para proyectos de desarrollo en América Latina.

El Gobierno Federal dispone de instrumentos para alcanzar estos objetivos. Aquí se identifican, los denominados tres pilares de la promoción del comercio exterior:

1. las Cámaras de Comercio Alemanas en el Extranjero (Auslandshandelskammer - AHK),
2. las embajadas y consulados alemanes en el extranjero,
3. y la Oficina de Promoción del Comercio e Inversiones (German Trade and Invest - GTAI).

Las relaciones económicas bilaterales con ALC cuentan con una larga tradición. Buena muestra de ello es que las empresas alemanas están presentes en la región desde hace más de cien años a través de filiales y gozan de una excelente reputación. A lo largo de las décadas, la

intensificación de su relación económica se ha producido en oleadas, debido, por un lado, a las crisis y al desarrollo económico de las dos áreas económicas y, por otro, a los cambios en el entorno económico mundial. Se puede observar que ha habido un claro cambio en los centros de crecimiento mundial; los países emergentes y en desarrollo, sobre todo en Asia, se han desarrollado de forma mucho más dinámica que los países industrializados tradicionales. Del mismo modo, ALC también ha experimentado un enorme crecimiento económico en las últimas décadas. En el periodo comprendido entre 2004 y 2015, su producto interior bruto creció un 130%, por lo que se ha más que duplicado, según datos del Fondo Monetario Internacional. Gracias a la presencia que ha adquirido, los mercados de América Latina siguen siendo atractivos para Alemania.

En términos macro de exportaciones e importaciones con la región se sitúa en el quinto lugar, apreciándose un aumento de tan solo un 0,2 % en 15 años en los que a las exportaciones se refiere, mientras que las importaciones se han reducido un 0,1 % en este periodo. En contrapartida con otras regiones, en donde Asia, encabezada por China, ha registrado el mayor incremento, especialmente en lo que a las exportaciones se refiere, superior a un 6 %.

En general, el comercio entre Alemania y ALC se ha centrado en tres países principales: Brasil, México y Argentina. El propio Gobierno Federal indica que “Brasil y México en particular son socios atractivos para Alemania”. Estos tres países representan más del 70% del comercio total entre Alemania y América Latina, situándose las importaciones desde Alemania hacia Brasil en 2021 en 5,1 %, mientras que para México supusieron un 3,4%.

Energías renovables y transición energética

- **Alemania**
 - Jugador internacional de la Energiewende y lucha contra cambio climático
 - Elevado consumo de energía y déficit de materias primas
 - Necesidad de buscar aliados energéticos
 - Asociaciones energéticas → ofrece *know-how*
- **América Latina y el Caribe**
 - Representa uno de los mercados de energías renovables más dinámicos
 - Gran potencial para el mercado interno de la región
 - Sin embargo, son necesarios un marco democrático sólido y estado de derecho estable

6. Energías renovables y transición energética

A través de la política energética, Alemania busca dos propósitos, por un lado, la protección climática y, por otro lado, la seguridad de suministro energético.

Alemania es un importante actor internacional en lo que a la transición energética (Energiewende) se refiere. El país ha sido uno de los primeros en adaptar nuevas tecnologías en materia de energía renovable, a la vez que cuenta con un alto reconocimiento mundial en esta materia. A pesar de esto, el país presenta una gran dependencia de combustibles fósiles y se enfrenta al gran reto de transformar su matriz energética.

En referencia a la promoción de las energías renovables y la eficiencia energética mediante la cooperación internacional, Alemania cuenta con una sólida trayectoria, siendo el segundo mayor proveedor a nivel mundial, hecho que le ha llevado a convertirse en un actor importante en el terreno de la política energética exterior.

Con el objetivo de ganar imitadores de su propio enfoque de la política energética en el exterior, Alemania está siguiendo una estrategia de “soft power”, en donde las Alianzas Energéticas (AE) son el instrumento central de esta política energética exterior, que es diseñada por el Ministerio Federal de Economía y Tecnología (BMW).

ALC es una importante región para su estrategia de política internacional de energías sostenibles, algo que no solo tiene un gran potencial en el mercado interno latinoamericano, sino que a su vez contribuye a abordar ciertos problemas que afronta el subcontinente. Aquí se encuentran algunos de los mercados de energía renovable más dinámicos del mundo, con más de una cuarta parte de energías de fuentes renovables. Sin embargo, a pesar de estos avances tan positivos, aspectos como la seguridad energética, un marco democrático sólido y un estado de derecho estable son requisitos fundamentales para la expansión de las energías renovables

Los intereses comunes en la producción y consumo de energía renovable han llevado a la creación de programas de cooperación técnica entre Alemania y América Latina. Estos programas proporcionan oportunidades para la transferencia de conocimiento y tecnología en áreas como la energía solar, la energía eólica y la energía hidroeléctrica. La cooperación técnica también ha llevado a la creación de proyectos conjuntos de investigación y desarrollo en energía renovable.

Asociaciones energéticas

- Las AE son el instrumento diplomático más importante de la política energética exterior alemana
- Como objetivos principales:
 - expansión de las energías renovables,
 - promoción de la eficiencia energética,
 - difusión de tecnologías energéticas modernas.



7. Asociaciones energéticas

Como se mencionó anteriormente, la región latinoamericana cuenta con un mercado de energía renovable muy dinámico. Es por ello que, Alemania ha establecido una serie de asociaciones energéticas con países de la región.

Las Energiepartnerschaften o asociaciones energéticas tienen como objetivo principal apoyar al país socio en la expansión de las energías renovables, en la promoción de la eficiencia energética y en la difusión de tecnologías energéticas modernas. Del mismo modo, se persigue el "Business to Government" (B2G) entre las empresas alemanas especializadas en el sector energético (maquinaria / producción) y el gobierno del tercer país.

1. Brasil: La AE entre Alemania y Brasil es un aspecto importante de los esfuerzos de los dos países para promover el uso de energía sostenible y combatir el cambio climático. Sin embargo, esta AE ha sufrido tensiones debido a las diferentes posturas de los gobiernos nacionales en lo que a las energías renovables a promover respecta. Es por ello que, a pesar de que esta asociación fue constituida en 2008, se ha encontrado paralizada hasta 2017, año de su refundación.


Alemania ha apoyado varios proyectos de energía renovable en Brasil a través de la asociación energética. Por ejemplo, Alemania ha brindado asistencia técnica y apoyo financiero para el desarrollo de proyectos de energía eólica y solar en Brasil. Las empresas alemanas también han invertido en proyectos de energía renovable en el país, incluida la construcción de parques eólicos y plantas de energía solar.

2. México: Una de las principales áreas de trabajo de la asociación de energía mexicano-alemana, firmada en 2016, es la promoción de las fuentes de energía solares y eólicas. México tiene un potencial significativo para la energía renovable, particularmente la eólica y la solar, y la asociación tiene como objetivo apoyar el desarrollo de estas fuentes en el país. Alemania ha brindado asistencia técnica y apoyo financiero para el desarrollo de proyectos de energía eólica y solar en México, y empresas alemanas han invertido en proyectos de energía renovable en el país.
3. Chile: Establecida en 2019, la asociación energética entre Alemania y Chile está explorando activamente el desarrollo del hidrógeno verde como una fuente de energía limpia y renovable. El hidrógeno verde se produce a partir de agua y electricidad renovable, y puede ser utilizado como una fuente de energía limpia en una amplia gama de aplicaciones, desde el transporte hasta la industria.

Por último, se puede identificar el interés existente entre Alemania y Argentina por establecer una cuarta AE. De esta forma, se persigue fortalecer la estrategia energética y contribuir a la seguridad energética, impulsando de este modo las energías renovables. Argentina cuenta con capacidad productivas y una base científica reconocida internacionalmente, lo que la convierte en un aspirante a ser productor y exportador de hidrógeno, para lo cual Alemania estaría dispuesta a contribuir.

Educación, ciencia y cultura

- Amplia y dilatada trayectoria, convirtiéndose de “política cultural” a la “política cultural y científica exterior”
- Integrada en la política exterior de Alemania y comprometida con los objetivos e intereses generales
- Entre sus objetivos principales se encuentra:
 - Preservación y fortalecimiento del alemán
 - Cooperación en el sistema educativo
 - Crear perspectivas científicas y académicas en terceros países.



8. Educación, ciencia y cultura

La política cultural y científica exterior de Alemania hace referencia a la promoción y el fomento de la cultura y la ciencia alemana en la región, así como la cooperación en proyectos culturales y científicos entre la región latinoamericana y Alemania. A su vez, se han establecido canales para un intercambio de conocimiento. Desde 1989, la política cultural y científica exterior hacia ALC ha experimentado un desarrollo significativo. Se puede destacar aspectos como el establecimiento de diferentes instituciones culturales y científicas alemanas en la región. Los aspectos fundamentales de estas son:

1. En primer lugar, el fomento de la cultura alemana en la región es una parte importante de esta política. Esto se logra a través de la promoción de la literatura, el cine, la música, las artes visuales y otras manifestaciones culturales alemanas en América Latina.
2. En segundo lugar, la cooperación en proyectos científicos es otro aspecto importante de la política cultural y científica exterior de Alemania hacia América Latina. Esto se lleva a cabo a través de la financiación de proyectos de investigación conjuntos, el intercambio de estudiantes y científicos, y la organización de conferencias y seminarios.

3. Por último, la política cultural y científica exterior de Alemania hacia América Latina también se basa en el fomento del diálogo y la comprensión mutua entre ambos países. Esto se alcanza mediante la organización de eventos culturales y científicos conjuntos, así como la promoción de la lengua y la cultura españolas y portuguesas en Alemania.

La relación alemana con ALC en lo que a la ciencia, educación y cultura se refiere cuenta igualmente con una antigua y amplia trayectoria. La política cultural exterior es una parte integral de la política exterior de Alemania, la cual se encuentra comprometida con intereses y objetivos generales de la política exterior. Esta área de la política exterior tiene por consiguiente la preservación y el fortalecimiento del idioma alemán como llave para acceder a la cultura alemana, la cooperación en el sistema educativo, así como los intercambios culturales y científicos.

Su delineamiento recae en el Ministerio Federal de Educación e Investigación (BMBF) así como en el Ministerio Federal de Relaciones Exteriores (AA). A su vez, el Ejecutivo Federal cuenta con una serie de actores implementadores de dicha política, como son el Instituto Goethe, el Servicio Alemán de Intercambio Académico (DAAD), la Fundación Alexander von Humbolt o la Fundación Alemana para la investigación científica.

En esta área destaca el gran interés manifestado por parte de la región, muestra de ello son las inversiones de instituciones públicas y privadas en formar en Alemania a personas cualificadas e investigadores, con el objetivo de que estos al volver a su país de origen aporten un valor agregado al mismo. Esto se observa en las cifras de becas impartidas por el DAAD en el año 2021, que alcanzaron las 7.077, destacando un aumento importante de Colombia, como el mayor receptor de becas por parte de Alemania, llegando a superar a Brasil, el que fuera hasta la fecha el receptor principal.

La importancia de la colaboración científico-académica cuenta también con una gran relevancia, la cual involucra a las empresas alemanas con presencia en la región. Permitido que un desarrollo económico y científico de algunos países en la región, así como una estrategia de internacionalización en materia de ciencia e investigación por parte del Ejecutivo alemán.

Desafíos de esta asociación de vecindad

“Si queremos tener voz, necesitamos aliados. Eso se aplica sobre todo a fenómenos mundiales centrales tales como el cambio climático, la digitalización y la migración. [...] Por eso necesitamos acercarnos más. Debemos convertirnos en vecinos en este nuevo mundo” (Heiko Maas, 2019).

- A pesar de los valores a los que se ha hecho referencia, la asociación de vecindad presenta una serie de retos como son:
 - Inestabilidad Política y buen gobierno
 - Compromiso con promoción de los DD.HH.
 - Protección del medioambiente y climática
 - Desigualdad económica

9. Desafíos de estas asociaciones de vecindad

“Si queremos tener voz, necesitamos aliados. Eso se aplica sobre todo a fenómenos mundiales centrales tales como el cambio climático, la digitalización y la migración. [...] Por eso necesitamos acercarnos más. Debemos convertirnos en vecinos en este nuevo mundo” (Heiko Maas, 2019).

Estas palabras, que forman parte del discurso inaugural de la Iniciativa para América Latina y el Caribe que, presentada por el Gobierno de Alemania en 2019, ponen de manifiesto cuán importante es esta asociación.

Sin embargo, existen una serie de retos a los que debe hacer frente la asociación de vecindad entre ALC y Alemania:

Inestabilidad Política y buen gobierno: ALC es considerada una región pacífica según los estándares internacionales. En el pasado reciente, los conflictos interestatales podían moderarse en gran medida a través de mecanismos internacionales. La política de desarrollo alemana apoya estos procesos de paz y contribuye a la reconciliación y la reparación. Por lo tanto, se apoyan las medidas para prevenir la violencia juvenil. También se ha de seguir fortaleciendo las instituciones y mecanismos regionales en las áreas de resolución de conflictos, acceso a la justicia y

derechos humanos. Una política fiscal y tributaria equilibrada que apunte a la paz social y el fortalecimiento de la democracia.

1. Compromiso con promoción de los DD.HH.: el compromiso con los derechos humanos e indivisibles forma parte de esta asociación. Sin embargo, la lucha por alcanzar estos en la totalidad de los países de ALC supone una gran tarea y reto. El Gobierno Federal alemán mantiene un diálogo activo con la sociedad civil y las organizaciones gubernamentales de los países latinoamericanos.
2. Protección del medioambiente y climática: Alemania participa activamente en la cooperación climática y ambiental en ALC. Áreas importantes de cooperación son la gestión del agua, las energías renovables, la eficiencia energética, la gestión de las reservas naturales y el fortalecimiento de las autoridades ambientales. A pesar de esto, el auge económico de los países de ALC se basa en gran medida en la demanda mundial de estas materias primas, cuya extracción a su vez tiene consecuencias considerables para el medio ambiente.
3. Desigualdad económica: La desigualdad económica es otro gran reto al que se enfrenta ALC y tiene un impacto significativo en las relaciones de la región con Alemania. El gobierno y las empresas alemanas están interesados en invertir en ALC, pero la desigualdad económica puede crear inestabilidad e incertidumbre en el entorno empresarial.

Conclusiones

- ALC ha sido y es un aliado natural, pero esta alianza debe ser definida y cuidada
- Sólida y definida política exterior hacia la región, que sufre en ocasiones solapamientos ministeriales
- Importante señal por parte de Alemania en la ratificación de su ayuda en materia de cooperación al desarrollo
- Los intercambios comerciales se localizan en los países ABC + México, aunque se observan oleadas
- Promoción energía verde + seguridad energética a través de las AE = intercambio de conocimiento
- Aspecto educación-científico-cultural es un aspecto central de estas relaciones bilaterales
- Tanto Alemania como ALC deben sumar sinergias para fortalecer esta relación forjada en valores

10. Conclusiones

Después de haber analizado las relaciones bilaterales entre Alemania y América Latina y el Caribe, así como la política exterior que desde Alemania se ejecuta hacia la región, podemos concluir que:

1. Alemania y ALC cuentan con una relación sólida y con una larga trayectoria. Alemania ha visto la necesidad de relanzar antiguas asociaciones en momentos de reconfiguración global, es por ello que ha mostrado su interés en la región latinoamericana.
2. La cooperación al desarrollo y la ayuda humanitaria son un gran apartado de estas relaciones. Muestra de ello es el aumento de las AOD por parte de Alemania hacia la región.
3. La región apuesta por el libre comercio y esta representa un mercado muy importante para las empresas alemanas, ofreciendo oportunidades de inversión.
4. Los intercambios educativos y científicos han adquirido una gran importancia, ejemplo de ello es el creciente número de estudiantes y académicos que van a Alemania para realizar programas de intercambio.
5. La cooperación climática y ambiental es también una piedra angular importante para una cooperación para el desarrollo orientada a la sostenibilidad, la cual va tomando un mayor peso en la política exterior de los países y en donde Alemania se ha

fijado en la región desde hace más de diez años para establecer asociaciones, con el objetivo de compartir experiencias en la lucha contra el cambio climático y la promoción de las energías renovables.

6. Sin embargo, también nos encontramos con una serie de desafíos a los que deben de hacer frente, como es el fortalecimiento de los derechos humanos en los países de la región, la lucha contra la desigualdad económica o el reforzamiento de las instituciones estatales.

Lecturas recomendadas

1. Esch, F. L. and Maihold, G. (2019). II. 3. Deutschlands Rolle und Interessen in Lateinamerika Felix L. Esch / Günther Maihold. In: Günther Maihold, Hartmut Sangmeister und Nikolaus Werz (Hg.): Lateinamerika: Handbuch für Wissenschaft und Studium. 1. Aufl. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, S. 117-128.
2. Gardini, G. L. (2020). Europe and Germany on the Relaunch of EU-LAC Relations. *Latin America in the New Multipolar World Order*. Milan: The Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 31-50.
3. Karthaus, N. (2014) "Lateinamerika als Bezugsfeld der (bundes-)deutschen Außenpolitik." *Deutschland-Lateinamerika: Geschichte, Gegenwart und Perspektiven*. Frankfurt am Main, Vervuert : 51-78.
4. Maihold, G., Mair, S., Müller, M., Vorrath, J., & Wagner, C. (2021). German foreign policy in transition: Volatile conditions, new momentum (No. 10/2021). SWP Research Paper.
5. Mols, M. (2007). Lateinamerika. In: Schmidt, S., Hellmann, G., Wolf, R. (eds) *Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik*. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Preguntas para el debate

1. ¿Cuáles son las áreas de actuación de la política exterior alemana hacia ALC?
2. ¿De qué forma ha identificado Alemania a ALC como un socio estratégico en materia energética y protección del medio ambiente?
3. ¿Se puede afirmar que la política latinoamericana de Alemania hacia América Latina sigue una estructura homogénea hacia el conjunto de la región?

Lecture 8: América Latina: inmigración y política exterior italiana

Luis Beneduzi

América Latina: inmigración y política exterior italiana

Luis Beneduzi

Hipervínculo al [vídeo](#)

Hipervínculo a las [diapositivas](#)

Contenido

1. Introducción
2. Identidad y Relaciones Internacionales
3. Política Italiana: siglos XIX-XX
4. Política Fascista en América Latina
5. Después de la Guerra: de la pereza a la acción
6. Siglo XIX: América Latina reserva estratégica
7. Conferencia Italia-América Latina y Caribe: primeros pasos
8. Desde 2012: políticas de la Conferencia
9. 2018-2020: informe CeSPI y nuevas prioridades
10. Consideraciones finales

Introducción

- Inmigración y política exterior: marco institucional movimiento de personas;
- Siglo XIX-XX: colonización comercial;
- 1920-1930: política fascista;
- Inmigración - capital común: dinamiza relaciones bilaterales;
- Construcción de una cultura italo-latinoamericana;
- Objetivo: el proceso de construcción de la cooperación entre Italia y América Latina, considerando la presencia de inmigrantes italianos y sus descendientes en una doble perspectiva

1. Introducción

Los estudiosos de Historia y Relaciones Internacionales han destacado, en América Latina y, en particular, en Brasil, la importancia de la relación entre identidad étnica y política exterior en relación con el caso italiano. Desde los primeros años posteriores al Risorgimento, en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX, Italia tuvo que gestionar un importante flujo migratorio que se dirigió principalmente hacia América Latina. La mayor concentración se produjo en Argentina, Brasil y Uruguay. Así, los primeros acuerdos y relaciones trataron de crear un marco institucional para este movimiento de personas.

A principios del siglo XX, la discusión política italiana también hablaba de una "colonización comercial", intentando explotar a la comunidad inmigrante para el desarrollo nacional y, al mismo tiempo, justificar la hemorragia nacional de mano de obra. En las décadas de 1920 y 1930 se puede observar el clímax de este proceso, cuando el proyecto fascista para las comunidades de inmigrantes en América Latina produjo un conjunto articulado de acciones a favor de la difusión de la cultura italiana, pero en asociación con la propaganda política y la grandeur italiana.

La contribución italiana a la identidad nacional brasileña, a través del largo proceso histórico basado en la inmigración, es el capital común

acumulado a lo largo del tiempo, que dinamiza las relaciones bilaterales entre Brasil e Italia. El mismo argumento podría aplicarse a Uruguay o Argentina, cuya "huella" de la presencia italiana puede encontrarse en su vida cotidiana y en su concepción de sí mismos como nación.

De hecho, las características culturales traídas por los inmigrantes italianos, como la religiosidad, la preocupación por la gastronomía, la cultura del trabajo y del ahorro, el culto a la familia y el espíritu empresarial, como parte de la construcción de un espíritu italiano brasileño, es una conexión que ha producido diferentes tipos de intercambios a lo largo del tiempo.

Partiendo de estas premisas, el objetivo de esta clase es pensar, desde una perspectiva histórica, el proceso de construcción de la cooperación entre Italia y América Latina, considerando la presencia de inmigrantes italianos y sus descendientes en una doble perspectiva. Por un lado, la presencia de una comunidad de descendientes de italianos en Brasil ha facilitado las relaciones bilaterales; ha creado una idea de comunión de valores compartidos. Por otro, esta proximidad imaginada ha identificado el subcontinente con una reserva estratégica, entrelazada naturalmente con la civilización occidental, un recurso al que recurrir en tiempos de "necesidad".

Identidad y Relaciones Internacionales

- Procesos identitarios: interacciones con diferentes alteridades
- Pertenencias plurales: corresponden a diferentes etapas de la experiencia personal
- Identidad como un proceso dinámico en el tiempo y en el espacio
- Perspectiva disruptiva del impacto de la globalización: cuestionado lectura lineal que superponía identidad nacional y territorialidad
- Lealtades y sentimientos de pertenencia múltiples: diferentes experiencias de sujetos, colectividades nacionales y grupos étnicos

2. Identidad y Relaciones Internacionales

Antes de iniciar el análisis, es necesario hacer una breve aclaración sobre el concepto de identidad y sus interacciones con las dinámicas de la política internacional en una sociedad global. En este sentido, tanto los procesos identitarios contemporáneos como los del siglo XX están marcados por interacciones con diferentes alteridades que refuerzan sus características de transformación constante, interseccionalidad y agency, ya sea por parte de individuos, comunidades o Estados-nación. En realidad, las pertenencias son plurales y corresponden a diferentes etapas de la experiencia personal, el pasado histórico y las lógicas de poder y opresión, dentro de los intereses que se juegan entre las comunidades étnicas y los Estados.

Entender la identidad como un proceso dinámico en el tiempo y en el espacio y, en consecuencia, marcado por las relaciones sociales y la transformación, es esencial para comprender: a) la relación entre identidad italiana y comunidad de origen italiano en América Latina; b) las políticas bilaterales latinoamericanas e italiana. La identidad no es esencial y fija, sino que debe asociarse a pertenencias reelaboradas a lo largo del tiempo.

Jill Krause y Neil Renwick asocian esta percepción dinámica de la identidad a los estudios específicos de las relaciones internacionales.

Tratan de entender el concepto desde una perspectiva global, en una realidad internacional en la que los procesos de identificación no se reducen al ámbito del Estado-nación como procesos homogéneos y estables. Los autores se detienen en la perspectiva disruptiva del impacto de la globalización, que ha cuestionado una lectura lineal que superponía identidad nacional y territorialidad. Así, se refuerza una idea de lealtades y sentimientos de pertenencia múltiples, basados en las diferentes experiencias de sujetos, colectividades nacionales e incluso grupos étnicos.

Este marco conceptual puede aplicarse al caso de las comunidades de inmigrantes italianos en América Latina y a la dificultad de la eficacia de una perspectiva subcontinental como "reserva estratégica". Por un lado, la lealtad de los ítalo-latinoamericanos en relación con una pertenencia nacional ha cambiado a lo largo del tiempo, dirigiéndose más al país de nacimiento que al de los antepasados; o en el sentido del país de acogida, dependiendo de los diferentes momentos históricos y contextuales. Por otra parte, la proximidad entre América Latina, como "Extremo Occidente", y Europa no puede entenderse como homogénea y atemporal, sobre todo teniendo en cuenta los desafíos contemporáneos y las políticas, como las agresivas de China, en los ámbitos comercial, cultural y político: si Europa sigue siendo hoy un modelo, esta realidad podría cambiar en el futuro.

Política Italiana: siglos XIX-XX

- Siglo XIX - flujos anuales y constantes de inmigrantes italianos: construcción de ciudades metropolitanas y pequeñas comunidades rurales
- Principios del siglo XX: “colonización comercial”
- Espacios migratorios como mejores que los africanos para los negocios italianos

3. Política Italiana: siglos XIX-XX

A lo largo del siglo XX, la diversidad de las intensidades de la atención italiana en relación con el mundo latinoamericano está marcada por los cambios en la sociedad internacional y en la política interior, como las políticas fascistas de los años veinte y treinta. O por el auge económico del subcontinente, con el fuerte aumento del valor de las materias primas en el mercado internacional, en el siglo XXI, y el nacimiento de la Conferencia Italia-América Latina.

El fenómeno migratorio italiano ha sido el elemento central de las relaciones entre Italia y América Latina, desde la segunda mitad del siglo XIX. Flujos anuales y constantes de inmigrantes italianos han colaborado fuertemente en la construcción de ciudades metropolitanas como Buenos Aires y São Paulo, donde representaban una parte importante de la población en las primeras décadas del siglo XX. Aunque no se pueden ignorar otros espacios urbanos como Lima y Guayaquil, o Santiago de Chile, a pesar de que su representatividad es mucho menor. También formaron pequeñas comunidades rurales en los estados del sur de Brasil, como en Río Grande do Sul o Santa Catarina, o en la provincia de Santa Fe (Argentina), retomando aspectos culturales, arquitectónicos y sociales del país de origen.

A principios del siglo XX, se prestó mucha atención al lugar que ocupaban los debates sobre la conexión entre Italia y las comunidades de inmigrantes en América Latina y también en el mundo de la política en los periódicos; y en relación con la idea de una “colonización comercial”, en una distinción a la que acababa de fracasar en el contexto africano, con la derrota italiana en Adua, en 1896. Por ejemplo, el periódico "L'Italia coloniale" destacaba entre sus objetivos el análisis de las ventajas y oportunidades de los lugares de inmigración para el desarrollo de la producción nacional italiana.

Incluso el diputado italiano Vittorio Buccelli, defensor de la idea de la inmigración como sinónimo de desarrollo económico, de creación de nuevos mercados, en el relato de un viaje al sur de Brasil, al estado de Rio Grande do Sul, hace apología de los espacios migratorios como mejores que los africanos para los negocios italianos. Su texto es también una acusación a los capitalistas italianos que no ven los beneficios de estas realidades latinoamericanas: a pesar del énfasis que pone en el éxito de la empresa migratoria, subraya que podría ser aún mayor si hubiera un grupo directivo - y se refiere a la política del Reino de Italia - que proporcionara los conocimientos adecuados a los inmigrantes.

Política Fascista en América Latina

- Posterior Primera Guerra Mundial: gobierno de Roma - revitalizar movimiento migratorio y restablecer vínculos con comunidades inmigrantes;
- Fascismo: expansión italiana economía y la cultura, construcción mundo latino ligado culturalmente a Italia;
- *Nave Italia* (1924): proyecto de propaganda del régimen;
- Expansión diferente del imperialismo clásico: italianos en el extranjero instrumentos política estatal

4. Política Fascista en América Latina

En un antecedente de lo que sería la política exterior fascista, entre las décadas de 1920 y 1930, en el periodo posterior a la Primera Guerra Mundial, se observa una preocupación italiana por ampliar las relaciones con los países del continente americano en el norte y en el sur. En este proyecto, y estamos hablando de Brasil, Argentina, Chile y Uruguay, el vínculo a soldar entre las dos orillas del Atlántico estaba constituido por las comunidades de inmigrantes: la esperanza del gobierno de Roma era revitalizar el movimiento migratorio; restablecer vínculos con las comunidades de inmigrantes, para que fueran vehículos eficaces de entendimiento entre Italia y el continente americano.

Con el ascenso del fascismo, se observa un reforzamiento de esta política en relación con los espacios migratorios latinoamericanos. Los primeros años de la política del Duce se caracterizaron por la expansión italiana a través de la economía y la cultura, en la construcción de un mundo latino ligado culturalmente a Italia. De hecho, no faltarán acciones por parte del gobierno italiano: *Nave Italia* en 1924 circunnavegará América del Sur en un proyecto de propaganda del régimen. Se detendría en los principales centros latinoamericanos, abriéndose a la comunidad inmigrante y a los ciudadanos locales, para que pudieran ver la grandeza tecnológica del país. Sería el primer paso

en la mejora de las relaciones entre Italia y los Estados latinoamericanos. Daría lugar a tratados mercantiles multinacionales; fomentaría la migración y la colonización italianas; pondría en marcha nuevas concesiones agrícolas, mineras y operativas; desarrollaría nuevas comunicaciones marítimas con la región; crearía nuevos acuerdos y redefiniría las tarifas aduaneras. No se trataba sólo de aumentar la exportación de productos italianos o el establecimiento de nuevas empresas italianas en América Latina, sino de desarrollar un programa de expansión comercial a gran escala y bien planificado que reforzara el potencial económico de Italia, creando importantes acuerdos comerciales con la región.

La estrategia de la Italia fascista se basó en la construcción de una expansión diferente en relación con la del imperialismo clásico, lo que hubiera sido imposible dada la realidad italiana. En este sentido, fueron muchos los actos organizados por el régimen que destacaban a los italianos que vivían fuera de sus fronteras nacionales, señalándolos como parte de una misma comunidad. En 1926, las palabras del Duce se convirtieron en hechos, correspondiendo a la transformación en nombre de la comunidad italiana en el extranjero: de inmigrantes pasaron a ser italianos en el extranjero. Se trataba de una política destinada a crear un vínculo étnico-nacional, en la que los italianos actuaban como instrumentos de la política estatal.

Después de la Guerra: de la pereza a la acción

- Años 50: opción por Europa;
- Años 80: constatación del poco interés y de la importancia de la persistencia;
- Años 90: políticas neoliberales, privatizaciones Mercosur – nuevo interés italiano;
- Mercados comunes palanca para políticas bilaterales.

5. Después de la Guerra: de la pereza a la acción

En la posguerra, Italia vivió una situación de debilidad, durante el proceso de reconstrucción, y no retomó los proyectos latinoamericanos del periodo anterior. Por el contrario, se concentró en la dimensión europea de su política exterior, participando en la creación de la Comunidad Europea del Carbón y del Acero en 1951; y en 1955, participó en el Tratado de Roma, en la Comunidad Económica Europea. En relación con América Latina, así como con Brasil, observa un momento menos dinámico en las relaciones entre los gobiernos, asociándolo al adjetivo negativo de "pereza". Sin embargo, el empresariado italiano estaba en expansión en el subcontinente, también a través de la consolidación de grandes marcas, como Fiat y Pirelli; aunque no se puede poner énfasis en las relaciones culturales o los intercambios universitarios, que eran mucho menores que en el periodo fascista, y diferentes de las relaciones entre otros estados europeos.

En 1989, quedó claro cómo esta fase, iniciada en la posguerra, produjo avances limitados en las relaciones bilaterales Italia-América Latina, aunque, mientras tanto, la comunidad empresarial fue capaz de construir relaciones estables. Ese mismo año, mientras Romano Prodi, entonces presidente del Instituto para la Reconstrucción Industrial, en una conferencia en São Paulo, lamentaba una presencia italiana mucho

menor en relación con las posibilidades reales de cooperación; en Milán, en una reunión entre empresarios brasileños e italianos, Piero Sierra, entonces presidente del Grupo Pirelli en Brasil, destacaba la persistencia y la continuidad del diseño de la empresa, desde 1929, como aspectos fundamentales de su éxito en América Latina.

Hacia finales del siglo XX, comenzó una ola de políticas neoliberales que cambió la realidad económica y social latinoamericana, con privatizaciones y aperturas de mercados, pero también con el nacimiento del Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur), en 1991, un acuerdo entre Argentina, Brasil, Paraguay y Uruguay. Se puede observar un resurgimiento del interés italiano por el subcontinente, especialmente a través de las interacciones llevadas a cabo y apoyadas por Italia a nivel de la Unión Europea. Si en los años noventa el interés por la construcción e interacción de mercados comunes actuó como palanca para la dinámica de las políticas bilaterales, en el siglo XXI ha sido el importante crecimiento internacional de los precios de las materias primas y el consiguiente aumento del PIB de los Estados latinoamericanos, lo que ha creado las condiciones para un fuerte impulso de las relaciones bilaterales.

Siglo XIX: América Latina reserva estratégica

- Fuerte crecimiento económico en América Latina: crisis y estancamiento mundo desarrollado (la UE después 2008);
- Rasgos positivos relevantes de la región: sofisticación de sus proyectos de integración, ausencia de conflictos desde 1936 y importantes recursos naturales;
- PIB regional: 5,7% (2007) y 4,6% (2008); inflación baja, cuentas públicas mejores, deuda pública disminuida; balanza de excedentaria;
- Reserva estratégica de la que la UE e Italia podían echar mano;
- Proyectos bilaterales: un nuevo enfoque hacia la región.

6. Siglo XIX: América Latina reserva estratégica

En un contexto de fuerte crecimiento económico en América Latina acompañado de crisis y estancamiento en la mayor parte del mundo desarrollado y en particular en la UE después de 2008, se observan algunos rasgos positivos relevantes de la región, como la sofisticación de sus proyectos de integración, la larga ausencia de conflictos desde 1936 y la presencia de importantes recursos naturales.

Desde principios del siglo XXI, América Latina ha vivido un momento económico positivo, con una tasa de crecimiento del PIB robusta y una mejora macroeconómica sustancial: en el quinquenio 2004-08, el crecimiento fue elevado, la inflación baja, las cuentas públicas mejoraron, la deuda pública disminuyó y la balanza de pagos pasó a ser excedentaria. En 2008, casi todos los grandes países sudamericanos registraron altas tasas de crecimiento: Argentina 6,8%, Brasil 5,9%, Perú 9,4% y Venezuela 4,8%.

Con un aumento medio del PIB regional del 5,7% en 2007 y del 4,6% en 2008, según datos de la Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), diversos recursos primarios ganaban importancia en la sociedad internacional, los gobiernos apuntaban a políticas de redistribución de renta e inversiones en infraestructuras, como en el caso del PAC (Plan de Aceleración del Crecimiento), en el Brasil de Lula.

El subcontinente, una vez más, se convertía en esa reserva estratégica de la que la UE e Italia podían echar mano. En este sentido, los primeros quince años del nuevo milenio estuvieron marcados por las manifestaciones de interés de Italia por los Estados latinoamericanos; proyectos bilaterales que marcaron un nuevo enfoque, al menos retórico, hacia la región.

Así, Brasil y México, dos países de fuerte relevancia económica en América Latina, captaron la atención de las instituciones europeas en 2007 y 2008, con la construcción de "asociaciones estratégicas". Mientras que en el caso de México, observamos la profundización de relaciones ya consolidadas, con la que entonces se había convertido en la décima potencia económica mundial; en el caso brasileño, tenemos una mayor complejidad, no sólo en el reconocimiento de Brasil como actor político global, dado el peso económico ganado durante el gobierno Lula (entonces la sexta economía), sino también la actuación en política exterior y la inclusión en los BRICS, así como el papel de puente en relación con el África lusófona y el Mercosur.

Conferencia Italia-América Latina y Caribe: primeros pasos

- 2003, Milán: primero encuentro - MAECI-IILA - nivel de cancilleres;
- 2003-2005: colaboración Cámara de Comercio de la Región de Lombardía, enfoque más económico y empresarial, espacio no estrictamente intergubernamental;
- 2007, Roma: Gobierno Prodi (agenda estratégica dirigida a América Latina), enfoque más político e intergubernamental, participación de todo el sistema país;
- Desde 2012: Estados latinoamericanos comenzaron a participar en la organización, reforzó su carácter intergubernamental y la afirmación de la relevancia del evento;
- 2015: primer foro parlamentario; una herramienta que propone acciones a los gobiernos y monitorea su desarrollo; propone una agenda de desarrollo - promoción y apoyo Pequeñas y Medianas Empresas (PME), infraestructuras y las energías renovables, acuerdos bilaterales protección de los migrantes o lucha contra el crimen organizado.

7. Conferencia Italia-América Latina y Caribe: primeros pasos

En el ámbito italiano, el siglo XXI está marcado por la creación de la Conferencia Italia-América Latina y Caribe, que, desde 2003 en Milán, cada dos años, ha promovido encuentros entre Italia y los gobiernos de la región, a nivel de cancilleres, organizados por el Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación (MAECI), con la colaboración del Instituto Ítalo-Latinoamericano (IILA).

Las primeras reuniones - en 2003 y 2005 -, con la importante colaboración de la Cámara de Comercio de la Región de Lombardía, tuvieron un enfoque más económico y empresarial, en busca del entendimiento mutuo, en un espacio que aún no era estrictamente intergubernamental. Fue en 2007, con el Gobierno Prodi y la agenda estratégica dirigida a América Latina (crecimiento económico, BRICS y restablecimiento de la prioridad del subcontinente en la política exterior italiana) cuando el evento adoptó un enfoque más político e intergubernamental. A este evento en Roma asistió la Presidenta de Chile, Michele Bachelet, con varios representantes de gobiernos latinoamericanos. Por parte italiana, contó con la participación de todo el sistema país (líderes institucionales del gobierno, empresariales, sindicales, académicos y de la sociedad civil).

Desde 2012 los Estados latinoamericanos comenzaron a participar en la organización de la Conferencia, lo que reforzó aún más su carácter intergubernamental y la afirmación de la relevancia del evento. Su importancia se puso de manifiesto en dos puntos clave: en la declaración final de 2013, con la creación del Foro Ítalo-Latinoamericano de Parlamentarios; y, en 2014, con la Ley 173/2014, que dotó de carácter formal a la convocatoria.

El primer foro parlamentario tuvo lugar en 2015, y se constituyó como una herramienta que, por un lado, propone acciones a los gobiernos, considerando los temas entendidos como prioritarios en las relaciones entre Italia y América Latina; y, por otro, monitorea su desarrollo. Como primer objetivo, también presente en los debates de todas las Conferencias Italia-América Latina, propone una agenda de desarrollo basada principalmente en la promoción y el apoyo a las Pequeñas y Medianas Empresas (PME). Otros temas considerados de importancia en el foro son las infraestructuras y las energías renovables, que deberían funcionar como vínculo para una cooperación más estrecha entre los gobiernos, los acuerdos bilaterales destinados a la protección de los migrantes, o la lucha contra el crimen organizado.

Desde 2012: políticas de la Conferencia

- IILA interlocutor privilegiado (relaciones entre la UE y AL) – garantizar a Italia un papel protagonista en la apertura de la política exterior italiana al Atlántico Sur;
- CeSPI: recomienda profundización del diálogo con América Latina, actor crucial en relación con los nuevos desafíos comunes: económicos, sociales, medioambientales, energéticos;
- Necesidad de que Italia sitúe a la región en una centralidad sin precedentes en su política exterior: importante incremento porcentual de las exportaciones nacionales, en la facturación de las empresas italianas en América Latina; primer mercado extranjero para las constructoras italianas

8. Desde 2012: políticas de la Conferencia

Un último punto en las prioridades del foro se refirió directamente al IILA. Esta organización fue entendida como un organismo internacional único en el contexto europeo, por sus características, y debía ser apoyada por el foro para el relanzamiento de las relaciones entre la UE y AL. Esta iniciativa de reforzar el IILA como interlocutor privilegiado en las relaciones entre las dos orillas del océano pretendía garantizar a Italia un papel protagonista en la apertura de la política exterior italiana al Atlántico Sur.

Es destacable la concomitancia temporal entre el interés de la UE por AL y el de Italia, así como la construcción de espacios de diálogo interregional e intergubernamental, en ambos casos, coincidiendo con el momento de crecimiento de la relevancia del subcontinente en la economía mundial y la política internacional.

De hecho, en 2012, un estudio realizado por el CeSPI (Centro de Estudios de Política Internacional), think-tank que asesora a la Cámara de Diputados, al Senado y al MAECI en cuestiones relativas a la política exterior italiana, recomienda - en un marco de altas tasas de crecimiento económico de los países latinoamericanos, en un escenario internacional de creciente interdependencia - la profundización del diálogo con América Latina, a la que se consideraba un actor crucial en

relación con los nuevos desafíos comunes: económicos, sociales, medioambientales, energéticos.

El estudio del CeSPI va más allá e indica la necesidad de que Italia sitúe a la región en una centralidad sin precedentes en su política exterior, dado el rico potencial de los mercados internos latinoamericanos. A pesar de la debilidad de los datos relativos a los intercambios comerciales en términos de interacción, que marcaron en su momento un noveno lugar para Italia, en relación con el subcontinente, y una incidencia de este último de alrededor del 2% en las relaciones italianas, la riqueza se encuentra en el importante incremento porcentual de las exportaciones nacionales, en la facturación de las empresas italianas en América Latina (el 34% de la facturación de Pirelli se genera en América Latina y el 36% de Fiat.), segunda a nivel mundial, y en la condición de la región como primer mercado extranjero para las constructoras italianas. Estos datos sobre las relaciones bilaterales entre Italia y América Latina ofrecen una imagen importante de la relevancia de la región en el proceso de internacionalización del Sistema País.

De hecho, un estudio anterior del CeSPI, en 2010, mostraba el papel del empresariado italiano - como modelo y como empuje - en una reanudación de la atención de las instituciones gubernamentales italianas en relación con el subcontinente.

2018-2020: informe CeSPI y nuevas prioridades

- 2018: la mayoría de las indicaciones se refieren a proyectos de intención - desarrollo sostenible, igualdad de género, lucha contra el cambio climático, fortalecimiento Estado de Derecho, colaboración procesos de paz, promoción derechos humanos, desarrollo redes e infraestructuras energéticas;
- 2020: necesidad de Italia - papel protagonista - interlocutor entre la UE y América Latina (volumen de negocios de las empresas italianas en el extranjero: 54.200 millones, América Latina; 38.000 millones, Asia; 20.000 millones, Europa del Este);
- Italianos en los países latinoamericanos (diciembre 2018): 1.651.278; numerosas asociaciones italo-latinoamericanas circunscripciones en el extranjero desde 1998, voto por correo desde 2001; parlamentarios de Estados latinoamericanos de origen italiano (350);
- Italia tendría todas las cartas para ser protagonista: no se expresa en una proyección política y económica.

9. 2018-2020: informe CeSPI y nuevas prioridades

En noviembre de 2018, un nuevo informe del CeSPI hace un de las prioridades surgidas en las diferentes conferencias Italia-AL celebradas hasta 2017. Aunque es posible observar algunos intereses más concretos, como acuerdos de cooperación energética con Colombia y oportunidades en el sector de la minería del carbón y del petróleo, o en infraestructuras, agua, transporte y telecomunicaciones en Perú, la mayoría de las indicaciones se refieren a proyectos de intención. El documento hace referencia a la promoción del desarrollo sostenible, la igualdad de género, la lucha contra el cambio climático, el fortalecimiento del Estado de Derecho, la colaboración en procesos de paz y la promoción de los derechos humanos, y el desarrollo de redes e infraestructuras energéticas. Sin embargo, las propuestas formuladas no se traducen en acciones. Incluso el interés afirmado por la Alianza del Pacífico se queda en un vago "fortalecimiento de la participación de nuestro sistema económico en un mercado muy amplio".

Por último, el informe del CeSPI de marzo de 2020 destacaba la importancia y la necesidad de que Italia reafirmara su papel protagonista como interlocutor entre la UE y América Latina. De hecho, hablaba del avance de la España de Sánchez en el subcontinente, que requería una postura urgente por parte del país y el consiguiente

contra-movimiento. En este sentido, se refirió a la importancia del subcontinente en la política exterior española y a la necesidad de que el país adopte una posición más firme en la política exterior de la UE. En apoyo de la relevancia del subcontinente, el documento informa del volumen de negocios de las empresas italianas en el extranjero, que muestra un volumen de 54.200 millones en América Latina, frente a 38.000 millones en Asia o 20.000 millones en Europa del Este. Se detiene de nuevo en el número de italianos en los países latinoamericanos, en diciembre de 2018 eran 1.651.278, de los cuales 842.615 residían en Argentina y 447.067 en Brasil, y en los vínculos entre esta comunidad e Italia: las numerosas asociaciones ítalo-latinoamericanas, las circunscripciones en el extranjero desde 1998 y el voto por correo desde 2001. Así, se muestran los vínculos concretos que unen a los ítalo-descendientes y a la comunidad nacional residente en Italia; en este sentido, el informe menciona la reunión de parlamentarios de Estados latinoamericanos de origen italiano (350), de los cuales 166 procedían de Argentina, Brasil y Uruguay. En resumen, Italia tendría todas las cartas para ser protagonista en las relaciones entre la UE y América Latina, atractivo de producto, presencia humana y afinidades culturales; sin embargo, este potencial no se expresa en una proyección política y económica hacia el subcontinente.

Consideraciones Finales

- Relación ondulatoria entre Italia y América Latina: interés en el periodo del fascismo y en el siglo XXI – importancia de las empresas italianas;
- Vínculo de las comunidades de inmigrantes: lecturas romantizadas de una italianidad inalterada en los espacios migratorios;
- Política italiana contemporánea para América Latina; baja inversión en profesionales cualificados y "circulación de cerebros" académicos; falta de continuidad en su relación a lo largo del tiempo (fuerte intermitencia); escasa acción institucional; informes indican repetición de los mismos problemas y potencialidades;
- Oportunidades desaprovechadas
- Necesario: política más pragmática hacia las comunidades de inmigrantes, comprender los términos de esta identidad italo-latinoamericana; redes efectivas de apoyo a los emprendedores, a la difusión de la cultura italiana y al sistema universitario nacional.

10. Consideraciones Finales

Esta clase muestra una relación ondulatoria entre Italia y América Latina, con algunos momentos en los que el interés italiano se volvió hacia el subcontinente. De hecho, en ambos periodos de mayor atención a los países latinoamericanos - durante el fascismo y en el siglo XXI - el impulso lo dieron las empresas italianas. Por un lado, las comunidades de inmigrantes se entienden como un importante vínculo entre las dos orillas del Atlántico, y un recurso. Sin embargo, no se tiene en cuenta el aspecto fluido y cambiante de la identidad, lo que a menudo produce lecturas romantizadas de una italianidad inalterada en los espacios migratorios, hoy como en los años treinta. Además, la política italiana contemporánea, en relación con América Latina, se caracteriza por una baja inversión en profesionales cualificados y "circulación de cerebros" académicos, así como por la falta de cualquier programa de investigación o movilidad vinculado a los países latinoamericanos.

El director de Pirelli Brasil, en 1989, destacó un punto fuerte para el éxito de la empresa: la continuidad de su relación a lo largo del tiempo. En el caso de la política exterior italiana, se observa una falta de esta persistencia y en su lugar una fuerte intermitencia. Además, los momentos de reactivación del interés italiano también se caracterizan por una escasa acción institucional. Siguiendo los debates de las

Conferencias Italia-América Latina, y los informes proporcionados por expertos para el Observatorio de Política Internacional, se observa una repetición de los mismos problemas y potencialidades, con indicaciones que se repiten sobre el papel que debe desempeñar la política exterior de la península. Todo ello sugiere oportunidades desaprovechadas, falta de acción de las instituciones y una ausente política económica orgánica dirigida a América Latina.

También sería de gran relevancia una política más pragmática hacia las comunidades de inmigrantes, que realmente buscara comprender los términos de esta identidad ítalo-latinoamericana. El desarrollo de redes efectivas de apoyo no sólo a los emprendedores, sino también a la difusión de la cultura italiana y al sistema universitario nacional, tal como lo hacen otros estados europeos, como Alemania, Francia, Inglaterra o incluso España, permitiría un nuevo enfoque de política exterior, donde la diplomacia cultural y económica se asociarían en la construcción de nuevos lazos con las comunidades de inmigrantes. Por último, romper con la asunción de América Latina como el "Extremo Occidente", algo lejano, pero cercano al mismo tiempo, permitiría una comprensión real de la cultura política y económica de la región, que falsamente se cree comprender.

Lecturas recomendadas

1. Cervo, Amado Luiz. *Le relazioni diplomatiche fra Italia e Brasile dal 1861 ad oggi*. Torino, Edizioni della Fondazione Agnelli, 1991.
2. Cespi. *América Latina: nuove tendenze in atto, vecchia e nuova emigrazione italiana*. Osservatorio di Politica Internazionale, *Approfondimenti*, n. 155, marzo 2020.
3. *L'Italia e l'America Latina. Insieme verso il futuro*. Osservatorio di Politica Internazionale, *Approfondimenti*, n. 46, gennaio 2012.
4. Krause, Jill; Renwick, Neil. *Identities in International Relations*. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 1996.
5. Mugnaini, Marco. *L'America Latina e Mussolini. Brasile e Argentina nella politica estera dell'Italia (1919-1943)*. Milano, Franco Angeli, 2008.

Preguntas para el debate

1. ¿Cómo pueden influir las identidades, el sentido de pertenencia, en las relaciones internacionales?
2. ¿Cuáles son las características transversales e históricas de la relación de Italia con América Latina?
3. ¿Qué perspectivas de futuro se observan en la política exterior italiana en relación con América Latina y cuál es el papel de los italo-latinoamericanos?

Lecture 9: The UK and Latin America. Policy continuity in a post-Brexit era or waning relevance?

Maria Garcia

UK and Latin America: Policy continuity in a post-Brexit era or waning relevance?

Maria Garcia

Hyperlink to [video](#)

Hyperlink to the [slides](#)

Content

1. Introduction: Key questions and topic
2. Key characteristics of UK-Latin American policy whilst it was in the EU
3. Canning House Agenda: What the UK could do independently whilst an EU member
4. How effective was the Canning House Agenda?
5. LAC's trade significance for the UK remains small
6. Brexit and Latin America priorities
7. Preferential Trade Agreements
8. Canning House Agenda meets Brexit
9. Conclusions: UK foreign policy post-Brexit

Introduction: Key questions & topics

- What characterised relations between the UK and Latin America whilst the UK was an EU member?
- What was the Canning House Agenda and how successful was it?
- What are the implications of Brexit for Latin America?
- What are the post -Brexit priorities in UK foreign policy and where does Latin America fit into this?
- What are the priorities in the UK's post -Brexit Latin American policy?
- Re-negotiation of trade agreements

1. Introduction: Key questions & topics

In this session you will be introduced to the UK's current policy priorities towards Latin America, and we will consider whether these are different from or a continuation of UK policies towards Latin America before Brexit. We will be guided by the following questions:

What characterised UK-Latin American relations whilst the UK was a member of the EU?

What was the Canning House Agenda that the UK government introduced in 2010, and why did they promote this? How successful has this agenda been?

How have UK priorities in Latin American policy changed since Brexit?

Where does Latin America fit into UK post-Brexit priorities?

We'll see how the relationship is a positive and pragmatic one, focused upon trade and investment. Nonetheless, although trade has increased between the parties since 2010, the increase has been modest compared to rising trade with China and other European states, and they each represent a very small percentage of overall trade and investment. Brexit forced the UK to engage with Latin America, in the first instance to secure the negotiation of trade agreements to continue preferential trade between the UK and Latin American countries that have preferential

trade agreements with the EU, and which ceased to apply to the UK on Brexit day. Beyond this, and the inclusion of a trade representative for Latin America in the newly created Department for International Trade (DIT), little has changed in the relationship. The UK's foreign policy has focused, of necessity, on the EU and the negotiation of Brexit, the US, and the anglosphere. The Integrated Review of 2021 signaled the future significance of the Indo-Pacific region, and barely mentioned Latin America. Although a number of Latin American states are Pacific countries and some are members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Transpacific Partnership (CPTPP), which the UK hopes to accede to, it seems unlikely that the relationship between the UK and Latin America will change dramatically in the near and medium term. If anything with the desire to focus on other parts of the world, there is a risk that Latin America might slip further down the list of UK foreign policy priorities.

What characterised UK-LAC policy whilst in the EU?

- Despite 19th Century British economic predominance in LAC, importance of relations wanes in 20th Century
- UK remains important trade and investment partner for LAC, but lags behind US, and in recent decades behind other EU states (Germany, Spain)
- Since 2008 crisis, China's economic presence in LAC on the rise, diminishing that of EU as a whole
- As EU member, UK has supported EU various agendas for engagement with Latin America
- Bi-regional summits, dialogues, cooperation partnerships in a web of 'complex interregionalism' (Alan Hardacre)
- Negotiation of PTAs with more liberal and advanced economies (Mexico, Chile, Andean States, Central America, Caribbean, negotiations with Mercosur over 20 years)

2. What characterised UK-LAC policy whilst in the EU?

The UK was a member of the EU (and European Economic Community) between 1973 and 2021. As an EU member the UK maintained an independent foreign policy and also participated in joint EU foreign policy initiatives (e.g. Common Foreign and Security Policy). With respect to Latin America, this meant active participation in the many structured and institutionalised dialogues that the EU has set up with Latin America.

Susanne Gratius (2022) has divided these dialogues into 3 types:

1. a global governance based inter-regional Celac-EU and Brazil-EU dialogue;
2. a democratic conditionality-driven dialogue as part of the trade, cooperation and association agreements (Chile, Mexico, Colombia-Ecuador-Peru, and Central America);
3. a shared problem focused sector dialogue on concrete issues (drugs, migration, social cohesion, environment, etc.)

The UK was a supporter and active participant in these EU-level initiatives. EU members cannot conduct independent trade policies. Tariffs and regulations and rules relating to products, services, government

contracts, etc. are EU policy that is run by the European Commission's Directorate General for Trade (DG Trade). Member states do, however, shape trade policy, as the Commission's proposed measures and any negotiation with other states need to be ratified by the member states in the Council (as well as the European Parliament, which is made up of directly elected representatives from all the states).

The UK lobbied for a liberal EU trade policy, focused on facilitating business opportunities and access to other markets. The UK was a proponent of negotiating comprehensive trade agreements with other countries, although its priorities lay in growing economies of Asia.

In the 2000s the EU commenced negotiations for preferential trade agreements with various Latin American countries, and the UK was always a supporter of these.

The first agreement was with Mexico and was negotiated in the late 1990s. This followed Mexico's accession to NAFTA and the subsequent loss by EU companies of 20% of their market share in Mexico. Negotiations with Chile and Mercosur followed. The EU reached a PTA with Chile in 2002.

The EU also negotiated PTAs with Central America and Andean states in the 2010s, as these countries had also signed PTAs with the USA. It has, therefore, been suggested that these agreements are a response to competitive challenges from the USA rather than necessarily a reflection of strategic policies towards Latin America (Garcia 2013, 2015; Meissner 2018).

Negotiations between the EU and Mercosur were very complicated, not least given economic crises and internal problems in Mercosur, and lasted 20 years. A deal was reached in the summer of 2019, but concerns over agriculture and the environment have meant it has not yet been ratified (Spring 2022). Mercosur countries have no PTAs with the USA, so the absence of a deal does not put EU firms at a disadvantage in those markets. The UK supported these negotiations, but did not undertake any extraordinary efforts to unblock negotiations when these entered difficulties. By the time the deal was reached, the UK was preparing for Brexit, so it was in no position to work towards ratification or convincing others, in particular the French government, to soften their stance.

What was the Canning House Agenda?

- William Hague (Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition 2010-15) (Nov. 2010) launched it with aims:
 - Halt decline of Britain's diplomatic presence in LAC – re-open embassies, increase ministerial visits
 - Encourage more business visits (2015 UK-Brazil Economic & Financial Dialogue set-up)
- Challenges to agenda (Mills 2018):
 - Decline in UK economic competitiveness
 - Increased significance of other international powers in LAC region
 - Low priority granted to LAC in UK global strategy priorities
 - UK business relative lack of interest in LAC

3. What was the Canning House Agenda?

Although trade negotiations and policy were set at the EU level, as a member the UK could conduct its own trade promotion activities (trade fairs, diplomatic missions, business encounters....), and it could also have independent foreign policy and cooperation initiatives.

In terms of Latin America, the UK Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government (2010-2015) decided to try to reinvigorate the relationship with Latin America.

It did this through the Canning House Agenda (so called because it was launched in a speech by the then Foreign Secretary William Hague, at the Canning House think tank), an institute devoted to the study and promotion of UK-Latin American relations.

Canning House Agenda

The aim was to halt the decline of UK relevance in Latin America. The agenda focused on increasing diplomatic and cultural contacts, but above all it talked about increasing trade and investment. It mentioned how UK exports to Latin America accounted for just 1.1% of all imports to Latin America. The agenda failed to consider genuine partnerships or the Latin American perspective.

Some of the outcomes of the agenda include:

1. Increase in ministerial visits to Latin America
2. More support for businesses wanting to trade with or invest in Latin America
3. Increases in tourism between 2010 and 2018
4. New economic and finance dialogue with Brazil started in 2015
5. Increases in trade, particularly with countries with which the EU PTAs facilitated trade (e.g Colombia) and Brazil, the largest regional economy.

How effective was the Canning House Agenda?

- Trade increases in 10 years but very modest growth – UK goods exports to LAC grow 11.2% vs 39% growth to all markets – UK service exports to LAC increase by 43% in terms of value
- In 2018 UK accounted for 0.88% of LAC's exports, vs. 1.71% for Germany, 2.27% for Canada and 12.34% for China
- Increases in ministerial visits
- Increases in tourism (2010-2018)
- But no breakthroughs


4. How effective was the Canning House Agenda?

However, there are important caveats to the outcomes of the Canning House agenda:


1. Trade increases in absolute terms did not translate into increased trade relevance. In fact, the UK's share of the Latin American import market at this time decreased slightly from 1.1% to 0.8% in 2018.
2. UK goods exports to LAC grow 11.2% vs 39% growth to all markets. UK service exports to LAC increased by 43% in terms of value, but in 2018 UK accounted for 0.88% of LAC's exports, vs. 1.71% for Germany, 2.27% for Canada and 12.34% for China.
3. The UK continued to be an important investor in Latin America (reflecting historical trends), but far behind the USA and EU.
4. Moreover, there were no breakthroughs in the relationship. Even economically Latin America remains an area that is not a key UK priority, as the UK relies far more on trade and investment with other regions of the world, especially Europe.

Lecture 9: The UK and Latin America. Policy continuity in a post-Brexit era or waning relevance?

Despite Canning House Agenda, LAC's trade significance for UK relatively small



Despite Canning House Agenda, significance of UK as trade partner relatively low



5. LAC's trade significance for the UK remains small

The main obstacles preventing the Canning House Agenda from being more successful have been summarised by Mills (2018) as follows:

1. Decline in UK economic competitiveness, making it difficult for the UK to increase its exports.
2. Increased significance of other international powers in the LAC region, particularly China's growing role in the region as a supplier of manufactured goods and as a buyer of minerals, natural resources and agricultural products (especially throughout the 2010s).
3. Low priority granted to LAC in UK global strategy priorities.
4. UK business relative lack of interest in LAC.

Brexit and LAC – key priorities

- Brexit referendum (& negotiation) was dominated by domestic agenda
- Impacts rest of world
- UK's trade relations with some key LAC economies managed through EU PTAs
- 'Rolling over' existing PTAs became priority of DIT
- Successful negotiation of 'rolling over' of PTAs with LAC:
 - Chile 2019
 - Central America 2019
 - Cariforum 2019
 - Andean Countries 2019
 - Mexico 2020

6. Brexit and Latin America priorities

Brexit created important challenges for the UK's government and foreign policy. First and foremost was the challenge of determining what exactly Brexit meant and how to go about achieving this. In the years between the referendum (2016) and the national election of late 2019 which gave a Conservative government led by Boris Johnson an absolute majority, it was especially challenging to advance on a concept for Brexit as there were strong and very different views in a hung parliament, and even within the ruling Conservative Party under Theresa May. Once May's government determined that Brexit would be interpreted as a full departure from the EU and its single market, in order to realise the Brexiteers' ambitions for regaining sovereignty over migration and other policies, the next urgent challenge became negotiating the terms of departure from the EU. This was done via the Withdrawal Agreement. This was followed by the need to negotiate a comprehensive trade agreement with the EU to underpin the legal basis of the relationship between the parties post-Brexit. This Trade and Cooperation Agreement was negotiated after the Withdrawal Agreement (between 2019 and 2021).

But Brexit was a process that did not just affect the UK and EU. It affected business around the globe that traded with the EU and UK, and it especially affected business in countries that had preferential trade

agreements in place with the EU. Those Latin American countries that had negotiated PTAs with the EU now found that post Brexit these agreements would no longer apply to UK territory. The UK government realised that, whilst negotiating with the EU, it would simultaneously have to negotiate trade agreements with all the countries that had PTAs with the EU, including Mexico, Chile, Central America, Cariforum states, Peru, Colombia and Ecuador.

Continuing on from the Canning House Agenda, and in order to start discussions on these negotiations, high level visits to Latin America continued, including then-Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson's trip to the region in 2018, which marked the first visit in 25 years of a Foreign Secretary. Also in 2018, the newly established Department for International Trade (DIT) created nine Trade Commissioners to support and promote trade with the rest of the world, as the UK sought to establish itself as a global free-trader and to seek business opportunities to attempt to mitigate some of the projected economic losses from Brexit. One of these posts was given the remit of Latin America, helping to improve the visibility of the region in UK foreign policies.

Negotiations for the agreements, given the time pressures, consisted of agreeing to 'roll over' the texts of the PTAs with the EU and continue to apply these between the UK and Latin American countries.

PTA continuation agreements

- Ensure continuity of trading terms & avoid serious disturbances to businesses
- Remove references to EU
- Changes to Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) and some tariffs to adapt to volumes of UK-LAC trade rather than EU-LAC trade
- Rules of Origin
 - Extended cumulation: materials from EU can be used in UK or LAC products provided certain transformations are performed or the value added in UK or LAC country exceeds EU value
 - However, this does not apply to UK or LAC exports to EU, so some exporters could be worse off

7. Preferential trade agreements continuation

PTAs with Latin American states were successfully rolled over ahead of the 31 December 2020 deadline, when the EU agreements would cease to apply to the UK. These agreements change references to the EU and EU agencies to references to the UK and its relevant agencies. The biggest changes relate to tariff-rate-quotas (TRQs) for goods. When states do not fully liberalise imports of certain goods, they sometimes choose to allow for a certain amount of imports of the good (quota) to enter the country at a reduced in-quota tariff. Additional imports above the quota accrue the higher standard tariff for the good. TRQs had to be renegotiated, as the UK is a smaller market than the EU. Negotiations for rolled-over agreements started in 2017 and the UK had a self-imposed deadline of two years to complete these (to coincide with the initial estimated time of Brexit).

Chile was the first country to agree to a rolled-over agreement in February 2019. In the negotiations, new UK TRQs of 16.66% of the EU quota were agreed upon, except for poultry, where Chile managed to extract a TRQ of 55.6% of the EU quota (Gobierno de Chile 2022). They also agreed to roll over the agreement on organic products between the EU and Chile. The UK also signed rolled-over agreements with the countries of the Andean Community and Central American states. These

agreements maintained the rights and obligations and the timelines for tariff reduction established in the agreements with the EU and adapted TRQs in a proportional manner. More complicated was the case of Mexico, which at the time of Brexit was itself negotiating a modernisation of the 1997 Global Trade Agreement with the EU. As the first Latin American country to negotiate a PTA with the EU, Mexico's agreement is less encompassing in scope than other later PTAs, e.g. chapters on investment, labour and environment were absent at the time. In August 2019, the UK and Mexico signed a UK-Mexico Alliance for Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, agreeing that their economic cooperation and negotiations should be guided by these principles. This agreement was rolled over in extremis in December 2020 to avoid a disruption in terms of trade, and was accompanied by a simultaneous compromise to begin negotiations for a new and modernised PTA as soon as possible in 2021, with an aim of finalising it no later than in three years, and agreeing that the new agreement would be at least as liberalising as the EU-Mexico modernised agreement, if not more (Gobierno de Mexico 2020). At the end of March 2022 it was expected that negotiations would commence soon (House of Commons Library 2022).

An important element of the 'rolled-over' agreements, is that there are some small but significant changes. Under the Rules of Origin (RoO), which determine what percentage of the content or value of a product or what processes and transformations must be undertaken on the product in the country in order to qualify as originating in that country, and thus eligible to benefit from the reduced tariffs and TRQs in a PTA, cumulation of EU inputs into UK products allows for EU components to not count as non-originating content, provided the final transformation is carried out in the UK. This is beneficial to UK producers and exporters. However, as the EU in its RoO with the UK has tighter conditions for products to count as originating in the UK, UK manufacturers who previously could use content from countries with PTAs with the EU without affecting the origin will no longer be able to do so (Vines et al. 2019, 25). These changes will affect companies in different ways depending on their supply chains and availability of alternative suppliers, and will become apparent over the longer term, as businesses adjust to the new rules, and especially the new rules for trading with the EU.

Canning House Agenda encounters Brexit

- **Continuation of supportive rhetoric:**
 - 2018 Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson visits Chile, Peru, Argentina (first in 25 years)
 - Department for International Trade includes a trade commissioner for LAC
- **In practice:**
 - More constrained resources (2017 FCO plans to reallocate resources from Asia, Africa and Americas to rebuild bilateral relations with European states)
 - Prolonged nature of Brexit negotiations & aftermath
 - Business focus on Europe (CBI post-Brexit focus on Europe and Asia)
 - Emphasis on Asia and growth markets (to make up for Brexit losses)
 - Integrated Review focuses on Indo-Pacific region
 - Application to join CPTPP

8. Canning House Agenda meets Brexit: Brexit foreign policy beyond trade

The UK has tried to respond to the challenges of Brexit through the 'Global Britain' agenda.

This was a signal that Britain 'continue[d] to be open, inclusive and outward facing; free trading; assertive in standing up for British interests and values; and resolute in boosting our international standing and influence. It is a Britain with global presence, active in every region; global interests, working with our allies and partners to deliver the global security and prosperity that ensures our own; and global perspectives, engaging with the world in every area, influencing and being influenced' (FCO 2018 (7)).

Although the agenda refers to a global presence, in practice the UK's ability to operationalise this is compromised. In the particular case of Latin America, the following practicalities have prevented an increased diplomatic presence and active and strategic policy:

1. Resource constraints and the need to enhance a diplomatic presence in Europe meant that in 2017 the Foreign and Commonwealth Office drew up plans to reallocate resources from

- missions in Asia, Africa and the Americas to rebuild bilateral relations with European states.
2. The prolonged nature of Brexit negotiations meant that UK resources and time had to be prioritised in Europe.
 3. UK businesses, which had not historically lobbied for closer relations with Latin America, were now understandably extremely focussed on Europe. The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) expended its resources on Europe and Asia as a potential large market.
 4. The government's emphasis on Asia and growth markets to make up for Brexit losses and deliver on the promises of the Brexit referendum.

UK foreign policy post-Brexit - Conclusion

- LAC not an immediate priority (like pre-Brexit)
- UK key immediate concerns to limit economic fallout of Brexit
- Looking forward, prioritising Asia, and also 'anglosphere' (Nick Pearce)
 - Focus on anglosphere (Aus/NZ, then CPTPP) also helps prepare ground for eventual US PTA
 - 2021 Integrated Review – US as top strategic partner, then EU, Indo-Pacific tilt
 - LAC focus on Brazil/Mexico – climate change, then Chile, Colombia, Argentina
 - Chile, Mexico, Peru are CPTPP members – opportunity for greater cooperation via accession process and trade
- Significant short-term changes in prioritisation and relations unlikely

9. UK foreign policy post-Brexit conclusions

It is understandable that in the immediate aftermath of the referendum and Brexit, the UK has devoted its energies to its relationship with Europe, but what about the prospects for the future, and what can the 2021 Integrated Review of foreign, security and development policy tell us about that?

From a fundamental and strategic perspective, Latin America barely gets a mention in the 2021 Integrated Review of defence, development, security and foreign policy, which sets out the direction and objectives of the next phase of UK post-Brexit foreign policy.

The Integrated Review, a document of 110 pages, mentions Latin America on just four occasions:

1. One mention appears alongside Asia in reference to fighting poverty globally (UK Government 2021, 27).
2. There is a paragraph specifically on Latin America which reaffirms existing policies towards the region, namely, work in partnerships on issues like biodiversity and sustainable growth.
3. A few lines on fostering ties with Brazil and Mexico on trade, innovation, climate change, security and development as well

- as working with Argentina, Chile and Colombia (UK Government 2021, 64).
4. There is also a mention of defending the UK's interests in the Falklands and South Georgia (UK Government 2021, 64).

By contrast, the Integrated Review clearly signals the Indo-Pacific as an area of interest and increased activity, including through the UK's accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Transpacific Partnership (CPTPP), as well as the alliance with the USA, collaboration with the EU and the Commonwealth. In practice, once again, Latin America, as a region, emerges at the bottom of UK foreign policy priorities.

Like before Brexit, Latin America is not a top priority for the UK's foreign policy.

The UK's initial concerns have revolved around trying to limit the economic fallout from Brexit, through negotiations of an orderly exit from the EU with the EU, a PTA with the EU, ensuring continuity of existing trade agreements, including with Latin American countries, and seeking business opportunities.

Looking forward, the trend appears to be towards prioritising Asia in search of new business opportunities, the USA, and also the 'anglosphere' (Kenny & Pearce 2016), for instance through the new independent trade agreements with Australia and New Zealand. Despite limited economic potential these are seen as paving the way for the UK to join the CPTPP and for an eventual PTA with the USA.

The 2021 Integrated Review made it clear that in the future the UK sees the USA as its top strategic partner in foreign policy, then the EU, and then it proposes a focus on the Indo-Pacific region, a part of which is the accession to CPTPP.

The scant mention of Latin America is relegated to broader initiatives of sustainable development, climate change, and the dialogues with Brazil and Mexico on economy and sustainability, and also working with Chile, Colombia and Argentina. In light of all this, significant short-term changes in prioritisation and in the relationship are unlikely.

Further readings

1. García, M. (2015). The European Union and Latin America: 'Transformative power Europe' versus the realities of economic interests. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 28(4), 621-640.
2. Miller, R. (2014) *Britain and Latin America in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, Routledge.
3. Mills, T. C. (2018). British foreign policy towards Latin America in the twenty-first century: assessing the 'Canning Agenda'. *International Affairs*, 94(6), 1391-1408.
4. Oppermann, K., Beasley, R., & Kaarbo, J. (2020). British foreign policy after Brexit: Losing Europe and finding a role. *International Relations*, 34(2), 133-156.
5. UK Government (2021). The Integrated Review 2021, <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/the-integrated-review-2021>

Questions for discussion and debate

1. What were the aims of the Canning House Agenda and to what extent were they achieved?
2. Why is Latin America as a region not a priority for the UK?
3. How have Latin American countries been affected by Brexit?

Lecture 10: EU-Brazil relations

Elena Lazarou and Diego Ponce

EU-Brazil relations

Elena Lazarou
Diego Ponce

Hyperlink to [video](#)

Hyperlink to the [slides](#)

Content

1. Introduction: Timeline of EU-Brazil relations
2. Strategic partnership and rising Brazil
3. Contents and aims of the strategic partnership
4. The foreign policy of Brazilian presidents
5. Stagnation of the strategic partnership
6. Sectoral issues: Human rights
7. Sectoral issues: Climate change
8. Sectoral issues: International security
9. EU-Mercosur Association Agreement

Introduction: Timeline of EU-Brazil relations

- Initially, a low EC priority
- Interregional approach through Mercosur (1992)
- Establishment of EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership (2007) after deadlock in association agreement negotiations
- Stall in strategic partnership with final EU-Brazil Summit (2014)
- Accession Agreement signed in 2019 and 2020 still pending ratification

1. Introduction: Timeline of EU-Brazil relations

Despite historically strong bilateral ties with individual EU member states, Brazil did not harbour strong ties with the EEC. Since the 1960s, diplomatic relations have been maintained between the European Communities and Brazil. Examples include the cooperation agreement between EURATOM and Brazil, a diplomatic mission to Brussels and commercial agreements throughout the 1970s; however, during this time, Brazil ranked a low priority on the European agenda. During the same period, both parties negotiated an economic and commercial cooperation agreement which governed economic relations between the parties. In general, until Brazil's democratisation in 1985, which coincides with the Iberian enlargement of the EC in 1986, Euro-Brazilian relations have been marked by "relative indifference". (Ferreira-Pereira, 2015)

During this time, the European Community was preoccupied with post-Cold War issues (such as German reunification and the dissolution of the Soviet Union), internal deepening and the enlargement process. As the European Union gained autonomy and sought to position itself as a global actor after 1992, activity with Brazil intensified, first through interregionalism (via the 1995 EU-Mercosur Interregional Cooperation Framework Agreement), then through bilateralism.

Gradually, as the European Union consolidated formal competencies and began to shape its foreign policy following the Treaty of Maastricht, the EU's focus turned to interregionalism. There is a consensus in the literature that EU-Brazil relations initially were carried out through interregionalism, with competing explanations as to why this happened. Engaging in interregionalism (in this case, collaboration predominantly between Mercosur and the EU) is seen as a way through which the EU diffuses its own model, norms and values. Primarily, these include rule of law, democracy, diplomacy, and peace, but also strengthening global governance. As the EU perceived itself as an example of effective and legitimate governance, the more it sought to "export" or "diffuse" its model and norms with its external relations policy by promoting regional integration and cooperation worldwide. (Lazarou 2013, Torrent 2002)

The EU prioritised interregional relations for four reasons. First, the EU believed in its ability to become a global actor on the basis of its own model. Second, the EU was optimistic with regard to future interregional negotiations. Third, Brazil was politically and economically insatiable up to the early 2000s. Fourth, there was a lack of foresight regarding the future of the global order. Analogously, Meissner (2018) points to the fact that the EU consciously chose the Mercosur venue given Mercosur's high degree of cohesion from 1997-2003.

The EU's choice to deal with Mercosur happened in tandem with Brazil's investment in Mercosur during the Lula era. During the first decade of the 21st Century, Mercosur integration was increasingly seen in Brazil as a means to bolster Brazilian regional leadership. Brazil sought not only an economic relationship in a common market and customs union, but also to emulate EU institutions, including a Mercosur parliament, as voiced by Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, who in 2010 stated that "Mercosur integration is our utmost priority". In 2004, however, negotiations in the EU-Mercosur agreement stalled, and the 2007 Strategic Partnership between the EU and Brazil marked a shift to bilateralism.

Strategic partnership and rising Brazil

Why was Brazil engaged by the EU?

- Multipolar international setting
- Brazil as an emerging power
- Deepened integration project places EU as international actor
- Deadlocked negotiations at interregional level
- Shared values

2. The Strategic Partnership (2007) and rising Brazil: Why did the EU seek a strategic partnership with Brazil?

A series of reasons have been enumerated, which all go hand in hand. First, the international setting, in which the world was seen to be increasingly multipolar, with the main threats being transnational, as laid out in the 2003 European Security Strategy. The second is owing to Brazil being seen as an emerging power, especially in light of Lula's activist foreign policy. The third is due to stalled negotiations in the EU-Mercosur Accession Agreement and general division inside Mercosur. The fourth has to do with stated 'shared values', namely, multilateralism, democracy, and human rights. (The literature will show that, in practice, EU and Brazilian positions rarely converged). Fifth, the strategic partnership served to project Brazil and the EU as international actors. Lastly, many authors refer to the presidency of the EU Commission of José Manuel Durao Barroso, combined with the Portuguese presidency of the Council of the EU, as having aided the establishment of links with Brazil. All reasons are interlinked.

Internationally, Brazil was in vogue, as an economic boom attributed Brazil international recognition. Under Lula (2003-2010), Brazil renewed its foreign policy as a champion and spokesperson of the Global South, marked by activism and self-esteem. During this period, Brazil garnered responsibilities as an intermediary of the Global South, as a leader at WTO negotiations, as a regional power (Unasur, Celac and Mercosur, and MINUSTAH Peacekeeping in Haiti) and as a candidate for permanent membership at the UNSC. Furthermore, increased dialogue with the EU was also in Brazil's interest, as, collectively, the EU was Brazil's largest trade partner and investor.

The EU was also undergoing changes, not least in its emerging foreign policy. In 2003 it had produced its first security strategy (EU Security Strategy). The Lisbon Treaty, signed in 2007, held significant potential for the EU to become a stronger global actor. By establishing strategic partnerships, Brazil and the EU projected themselves as international actors with global recognition. The European Security Strategy itself called for the establishment of SPs.

To the EU, the SP was a means through which to compete with geo-economic rivals and other global actors (China and the US), engage an emerging power with "shared values", promote "effective multilateralism", and pragmatically respond to the balance of power in a changing world order; it also was seen as a vehicle to use Brazilian influence in the region in order to potentially re-ignite the Mercosur negotiations, which had stalled in 2004.

Contents and aims of the strategic partnership

- Brazil praised for its diplomatic heft
- Shared EU-Brazil values
- Aimed to set a common agenda to strengthen multilateralism
 - Alignment of positions, cooperation on peacekeeping, nonproliferation, environmental policy, trade, energy, intellectual property, transnational threats
- Deepen Mercosur integration
- Increase of bilateral EU-Brazil dialogue

3. Contents and aims of the strategic partnership

What were the aims of the strategic partnership? The founding document of the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership begins by commending Brazil's global role and citing the limitations of the EU-Mercosur venue as a vector for EU-Brazil dialogue. To the EU, Brazil is an "increasingly significant global player" and "key interlocutor". The EU recognises Brazil's "emerging economic and political role" in Brazil's activism of the Global South, Brazil's role in the UN and at the WTO. The document sees Brazil and the EU as allies with aligned interests, sharing core values with respect to human rights, rule of law, climate change, the pursuit of economic growth, and justice. Regionally, the document identifies Brazil as a "natural leader in South America", stressing Brazil's geographic, economic and diplomatic heft.

The document then lays out the aims of the SP. First, the strategic partnership aims to set a common agenda between Brazil and the EU in order to strengthen multilateralism. This would include checking in ahead of UN meetings to converge positions, cooperating in peacekeeping efforts (Haiti), developing the non-proliferation regime, and engaging in the WTO. Thereafter came provisions with respect to human rights, democracy, and governance, according to which Brazil and the EU would jointly advocate human rights initiatives at UN bodies. In or-

der to achieve the millennium development goals, the SP calls on triangulating development assistance to Lusophone African countries and exchanging best practices in policy fields. The environmental clauses call for increased dialogue on environmental policy, including in international fora. Regarding energy, the SP calls attention to Brazil's use of biofuels vis-à-vis the EU's renewable energy priorities, mentioning the EC-Brazil Energy Policy Dialogue, which had started in 2007.

The SP once again recognises Brazil's regional impact in its section regarding Latin America's stability, calling on continued engagement with Brazil in the EU-LAC Forum on Social Cohesion and in international organisations. Concerning Mercosur, the EU expects to exchange its experiences of regional integration with Brazil and expects Brazil to aid in the completion of the ongoing EU-Mercosur agreement. The section on trade and economic relations requests Brazil to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers and promote economic reform and sees the SP as an opportunity for dialogue on intellectual property, industrial policy and regulatory issues, including a regular macro-economic dialogue.

The increase of bilateral dialogue seems to be the defining mechanism of the SP, which proposes it on a variety of themes, such as social issues, regional policy, employment, environmental protection, energy, human rights, trade and economic relations, financial issues, information and communication technologies, maritime governance, and, lastly, science and technology. Transnational threats (namely, crime, corruption, drug trafficking, and migration) are the SP's main security-related threats. To meet them, the SP suggests the promotion of "regional multidisciplinary law enforcement cooperation". The last section of the SP concerns "bringing people together" through the cultivation of civil society links, funds for bilateral scholarships, youth exchanges and business links.

Foreign policy of Brazilian presidents

Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva (2003-2010):

- Economic boom
- Activist and autonomist foreign policy

Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016):

- Domestic economic and political crisis
- Foreign policy not a priority
- Rollback of Brazil's international footprint

Michel Temer (2016-2018):

- Western-oriented
- Domestic struggles continue to hinder Brazilian foreign policy
- International and domestic legitimacy issues

Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2022):

- Rejection of multilateral norms and institutions
- Lack of regional initiatives
- Anti-globalism

4. The foreign policy of Brazilian presidents

The evolution of Brazil-EU relations cannot be fully understood without taking into account the aims, ideological premises and conduct of successive Brazilian presidents in the past two decades.

Lula (2003-2010): Brazil's increased international activism under Lula is identified as a conduit for the strategic partnership. Internationally, the main achievements of the Lula era include the institutionalised coordination of Global South countries in international fora such as the WTO, BRIC and IBSA dialogues, peacekeeping in Haiti, UNSC ambitions, and a mediator role in the Iran nuclear crisis. Lula signed strategic partnerships with Japan, China, India, South Africa, and the EU. Brazil also increased humanitarian assistance to entities such as the UNDP, UNHCR, the WFP, the World Bank, and bilaterally, with Lusophone African countries, through Brazil's cooperation agency, the ABC, thus branding itself as a serious actor in development cooperation. Brazil forged close ties with regional countries and deepened Mercosur integration.

Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016): Lula's successor, Dilma Rousseff, oversaw the rollback of Brazilian foreign policy. Rousseff was notoriously uninterested in foreign policy and unwilling to articulate visions of global leadership. But economic considerations forced Rousseff to look in-

wards. Lower commodity prices battered the Brazilian economy; afterwards, a debt crisis would ensue in part attributed to Rousseff's ill-advised economic policy. By 2013, nationwide protests began to reveal a crack in the political establishment which would eventually lead to Rousseff's impeachment in August 2016. BRICS cooperation deepened, Brazil brought forth *RwP*, and lessened regional initiatives. During this period, the *SP* hypertrophied.

Michel Temer (2016-2018): The most pronounced change in Temer's foreign policy was a pivot to the West while retaining principles emanating from Brazil's constitution. Regionally, the Temer government marked the return of "open regionalism", associated with free markets, globalisation, and the Washington consensus. The Temer government thus focused on trade policy, such as increasing ties between Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance, seeking bilateral trade deals, reigniting the EU-Mercosur agreement and applying for OECD membership. However, Temer was seen as illegitimate domestically and abroad, which stymied his efforts.

Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2022): Bolsonaro, a right-wing illiberal populist who took office after campaigning against establishment politics, provoked a re-orientation of Brazilian foreign policy by using foreign policy as a platform for conservative and religious discourse. Bolsonaro's foreign policy is characterised by the rejection of multilateral institutions and Brazil's commitment to them, an alliance with transnational right-wing populist groups and governments, anti-globalism, anti-communism and religious nativism. An uptick in deforestation, attacks on Brazil's election system, a degrading human rights situation and his disastrous response to the Covid pandemic attracted criticism from prominent EU leaders, civil society and Left and Green members of the European parliament. Bolsonaro's environmental policy - characterised by the hollowing-out of environmental institutions, dismissal of prominent scientists, non-enforcement of environmental crimes and protection of land-grabbers - largely contributed to halting the ratification of the EU-Mercosur Trade Agreement.

Stagnation of the SP

- Domestic political issues overtook the agenda in both Brazil and the EU and severed the strategic partnership
- Brazil: fiscal crisis, domestic turbulence, impeachment of Dilma Rousseff
- EU: Terrorist attacks, migration crisis, populism, Brexit, transatlantic relationship

5. Stagnation of the SP

As domestic political issues overtook the agenda in both Brazil and the EU, following the seventh and last EU-Brazil Summit of 2014, a period of less profound engagement emerged.

Domestic and international forces contributed to the Strategic Partnership's stagnation before the last EU-Brazil Summit in 2014, after which no new summits were organised. On the Brazilian side, the financial crisis had belatedly reached Brazil, which was followed by a fiscal crisis. Domestic turbulence and corruption scandals, which started picking up pace in 2013, culminated in the impeachment of Lula's successor, Dilma Rousseff, in 2016. Rousseff's disinterest in foreign policy stagnated Brazil's presidentially-led diplomacy, as she preferred to (and was forced to) focus on domestic issues instead. Temer, who spent less than two years in office after coming to power in 2014, suffered from domestic legitimacy issues at home and abroad. Thereafter, the Bolsonaro presidency (2019-2022) oversaw Brazil's rejection of multilateral institutions and declining regional leadership.

During this period, the European Union was confronted with terrorist attacks, a migration crisis, the rise of populism, Brexit, intra-block disagreements, the 2014 annexation of Crimea with a rise in Russian aggression, and finally, a crisis in the transatlantic relationship under US

President Donald Trump. These forces distracted from the strategic partnership and lowered its priority. Crises stemming from inside and outside of the EU required the Union to focus on continuous crisis management and refrain from looking outside of the EU. These included terrorist attacks which resulted in a "protectionist security community" (Gratius, 2018), Brexit, the rise of right-wing nationalists, modest growth rates, the erosion of the EU's external influence and the deterioration of democracy inside the EU, inter-block disagreements regarding the financial crisis, the migration crisis, the situation in Georgia and Ukraine, and, finally, the Trump Administration (Gratius 2017, Ferreira-Pereira 2021). These crises tarnished the EU's brand and image in Brazil, (Gratius 2016, p. 77) and were often sensationalised by the Brazilian media, seeing the EU as a power in decline. (Ferreira-Pereira, 2021).

The signature in principle of the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement in 2019 and the controversial environmental and human rights policies of the Bolsonaro government, which have functioned as a roadblock to ratification, have characterised EU level debates about Brazil after 2019, especially within the parliamentary spaces.

The emphasis as of 2019 on the double green and digital transition, prioritised by the von der Leyen Commission and made more urgent by the Covid pandemic, may offer new options for EU-Brazil relations, should certain conditions be met.

Sectoral issues: Human rights

- Despite SP's emphasis on shared values, Brazil and the EU disagree on precise definitions
 - Historically low UNHRC convergence
 - No joint resolutions
 - Different normative conceptions on humanitarian interventions (Libya, Syria and Venezuela)
- Disagreements with EU on human rights grew under Bolsonaro
 - Attack on Brazilian democratic institutions, civil society, minorities
 - Criticism by MEPs
 - Diplomatic emphasis against abortion and gender norms

6. Sectoral issues: Human rights

Despite stated shared values of democracy, rule of law and human rights, Brazil and the EU tend to disagree with each other as to what these concepts precisely mean. Historically, Brazilian and EU positions have rarely converged at the UN's Human Rights Council. They tend to vote against each other. According to one study, the two did not introduce any joint resolutions from 2006 to 2013 (Pavese, 2013). Weary of foreign military intervention and violations of sovereignty, Brazil abstained from the 2011 UNSC Resolution 1973, which, invoking Responsibility to Protect, established a no-fly zone over Libya. In response, Brazil developed a contesting norm, Responsibility while Protecting, which it worked to promote diplomatically within the UN.

Human rights became a matter of contention in the bilateral relationship after Bolsonaro's downgrading of human rights in Brazil. Bolsonaro's government oversaw the uptick in deforestation, the weakening of democracy, and the erosion of indigenous rights. In response, Left-wing and Green Party Members of the European Parliament, allied with indigenous civil society groups, criticised Bolsonaro's mishandling of the pandemic and persecution of indigenous populations. They highlighted three particular pieces of legislation that they argue would

loosen environmental regulation and ease the seizure of lands and illegal activity, concerning land occupation, environmental licensing and mineral extraction requisites.

Under Bolsonaro, Brazil positioned itself against abortion and gender norms multilaterally, emphasising religion. In September 2020, the UN's Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Toxics proposed a debate in the Human Rights Council to start an investigation in Brazil.

Despite these shortcomings, human rights cooperation is still held through bilateral EU-Brazil High-Level Human Rights Dialogues (the latest being held in Nov. 2021) and Sector Dialogues between private civil society actors, some of which are outlined in the strategic partnership.

Sectoral issues: Climate change

- Multilaterally, Brazil and the EU vote in disagreement at the UNFCCC
 - Brazil follows BASIC group and G77 countries
 - Current v. historical responsibility in curbing emissions
 - Amazonian sovereignty
- A rise in deforestation after 2019 put climate considerations at the centre of the EU-Brazil relationship
 - Public spats with European leaders, freezing of Amazon Fund, EU proposal of trade barriers, Brazilian cheating of environmental commitments at COP26
- However, Brazil and the EU still cooperate bilaterally to combat climate change
 - EU finances 54 projects (166m euros worth) in the Amazon; joint initiatives at monitoring climate change

7. Sectoral issues: Climate change

Multilaterally, Brazil and the European Union vote in disagreement with each other in the UNFCCC, as Brazil follows the Global South BASIC group and G-77 countries. Normatively, whereas European representatives point to Brazil's current responsibility to curb emissions and protect the Amazon, Brazilians defend their right to economic development.

The rise of Amazonian deforestation in 2019 put climate considerations at the centre of the EU-Brazil relationship. In response, French President Emmanuel Macron called for a stop in Amazonian deforestation, which was ill-received by Bolsonaro. Ratcheting up of deforestation led Germany and Norway to pull out of the Amazon Fund the same year. The EU-Mercosur Association Agreement, signed in 2019 and 2020, has been seriously obstructed: France rallies against the deal, citing environmental concerns which are echoed by Green Party and Left-wing MEPs.

Climate issues are also present in the text of the EU-Mercosur Accession Agreement, which includes a reference to increased climate dialogue. Were the agreement to come into force, civil society in the EU and Mercosur will have a specific role in following up on and monitoring the

agreement on environmental and labour commitments, since both parties established consultation mechanisms. The AA also includes a commitment to implement the Paris Accord on issues such as biodiversity, circular economy, waste management and corporate social responsibility, alongside the encouragement of green public procurement practices, intellectual property, and green technology transfers.

Nonetheless, the association agreement has been described as "flimsy" by environmental activists. They argue climate pledges are not considered an "essential element" in the association agreement. If climate were considered an "essential element", the party in violation could be subject to sanctions. In the current state of the Accession Agreement, the implementation of sanctions is mainly dependent on the political will of the parties. Furthermore, despite listing cooperation in the areas of biodiversity, circular economy, waste management, corporate social responsibility, green public procurement practices and green technology transfers, activists criticise the lack of concrete initiatives in these areas. Likewise, the agreement's commitment to the Paris Agreement appears stated as non-binding according to Greenpeace. The agreement has also been criticised for not having conducted a timely sustainability impact assessment.

In November 2021, as part of the European Green Deal, the European Commission proposed a regulation to ban the import of commodities stemming from deforestation. Brussels targeted six agricultural products (beef, soy, palm oil, coffee, cacao and timber) which are responsible for the most deforestation. In order to enter the EU common market, companies have to prove that their products do not contribute to legal and illegal deforestation. Before proposing the regulation, the Commission launched an open public consultation which showed "overwhelming support" for the proposal, being one of the most popular in the EU.

In addition to this, a benchmarking system will be implemented, classifying each country with respect to its deforestation risk, which will be onerous to Brazilian producers. The benchmarking system will define how onerous the due diligence procedures will be for each producer. In order to export to the EU, companies must provide geolocation data plots to relevant authorities. This policy is considered as putting Brazil on the path of "pre-sanctions".

Sectoral issues: International security

- Brazil weary of violations of sovereignty and views human rights in a limited scope
- Brazil has been lukewarm to directly criticise Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and is weary of economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation imposed on Russia
- Brazil member of BRICS grouping
- Brazil as a norm entrepreneur in Libya and Syria (RwP)
- Iran: Brazilian mediator role in drafting a nuclear fuel swap

8. Sectoral issues: International security

Brazil and the EU often do not hold the same interests and views in matters of international security and often see themselves at opposing ends of the table. For instance, Brazil is much more weary of violations of national sovereignty and takes a more limited view of human rights than the EU does. Brazil is also more reluctant to employ sanctions regimes, which it sees as discriminatory. Furthermore, Brazil is more likely to emphasise dialogue instead of military action, while it is openly in close partnership with BRICS countries.

Only recently (in 2022), for instance, Brazil voted to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine. From 2014 to 2022, Brazil abstained from UNGA resolutions criticising Russia's annexation of Crimea. After 2022, the posture changed: Brazil voted with the EU in favour of both UNGA and UNSC resolutions condemning Russia's invasion. Unlike the European Union, however, Brazil's position at the UN has been lukewarm to directly criticise Russia and seemed equally eager to criticise economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation imposed on Russia. Whereas the EU has sought to isolate Russia multilaterally, Brazil abstained on removing Russia's observer status in the OEA and positioned itself against the removal of Russia from the G20.

Various factors explain this posture. For one, Brazil and Russia are BRICS members and strategic partners, eager to embrace multipolarity in order to contest a Western-led world order which both view as hypocritical. Second, Ukraine is distant from Brazil's national interest: Recent polls suggest the majority of the Brazilian population agree that Brazil should uphold its long-standing principle of neutrality in response to the conflict. However, some interests are very real: Russia is the foremost supplier of Brazilian fertiliser, responsible for around a fourth of Brazilian use. In dire need of international support, Bolsonaro saw Putin as a "partner" in defending the Amazon from foreign encroachment. A week before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, whereas no European country (aside from Hungary) was willing to receive Bolsonaro, Putin greeted him with open arms. Meanwhile, European diplomats expressed consternation over Bolsonaro's "authoritarian sympathy" vis-à-vis Putin. Neutrality towards the conflict was expressed on both sides of the Brazilian aisle: In a May 2022 interview with Time magazine, presidential candidate Lula attributed equal blame to Ukraine and Russia for the war.

In the Middle East, Brazil opted to carve itself a distinct and unique diplomatic path apart from its European peers. Brazil abstained from UNSC Resolution 1973, which imposed a no-fly zone over Libya, and acted as a norm entrepreneur by introducing the concept of "Responsibility while Protecting" (RwP) in response to Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Despite being more receptive to civilian protection measures than Russia or China, which defended strict non-interference in Syrian affairs, to the disappointment of European diplomats, Brazil rejected applying sanctions on the Assad regime.

Brazil and EU member states also have differing views on the global nuclear order. Historically, whereas European countries emphasise safeguards in order to protect the Non-proliferation Treaty, Brazil emphasises access to technology and the right to the development of nuclear technology, including enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. Brazil's divergent nuclear posture is noteworthy in its contribution to the 2010 Tehran Declaration, when Brazil, Turkey and Iran proposed a joint declaration in which Iran acquiesced to swapping its low-enriched uranium for highly enriched uranium, which would then be used for medical research.

EU-Mercosur Association Agreement: Trade and political

Trade:

- Biggest priority to Mercosur states
- FTA envisions elimination of tariff and nontariff borders for the majority of Mercosur and European exports, "cash for cows"
- Disparate backing among EU member states and civil society reflecting competing commercial interests

Political:

- Includes commitment to Paris Accords; environmental, corporate, cyber, labour, privacy protections and security cooperation
- EU aims to foster sustainable development, labour rights and liberal values
- Inter-ministerial summit configuration
- Civil society platform
- Not enough environmental sanctions

9. EU-Mercosur AA provisions: Trade and political

Trade is the most 'interregionalised' area of EU-Brazil relations, mostly centred on the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement, reached in principle in 2019. The EU is Brazil's number one trade partner. If implemented, the trade pillar of the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement would eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers for the large majority of EU-Mercosur trade. The EU would gradually remove tariffs on 92% of Mercosur exports in ten years, whereas Mercosur would remove tariffs on 91% of EU exports in 15 years. The treaty favours EU industrial exports (cars, car parts, machinery, chemicals, clothing, pharmaceuticals) and agricultural exports (such as chocolate, spirits, biscuits, alongside zero-duty quotas for EU dairy products). It also reduces non-tariff barriers, of which Brazil boasts more than 18, ranging from administrative delays, technical barriers, sanitary requirements, and tax exemption. Politically, the EU aims to foster sustainable development and environmental standards, implement labour rights, and shape global trade rules in accordance with liberal and multilateral values. However, critics on the EU side point out that the trade agreement lacks provisions on anti-corruption and gender equality, nor does it have a chapter on investment, investment protection standards and investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms. Mercosur nations, on the other hand, aim to

increase access to the EU market. The main objective is to lower import tariffs for agricultural products, such as beef, poultry, ethanol, rice, and orange juice. Aiming to only gradually expose their highly protected manufacturing industries to European competition, Mercosur has negotiated a phase-in period of its tariff cuts. Nonetheless, the agreement has faced controversy in the EU regarding its implications for deforestation, sustainable development, unfair competition (EU producers comply with higher, costlier production standards than Mercosur), the future of EU farmers, and the imperilment of indigenous rights. In the EU, the main backers of the Mercosur agreement are Portugal and Spain. Despite the overwhelming opposition to the deal, manufacturing societies alongside European farmers with offensive trade interests support the agreement. A coalition of economic nationalists, environmental activists, and farmers form the main opposition to the deal. To Mercosur, the main priority is trade. The agreement also hosts political provisions. Currently, the 1995 Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement (IFCA), which followed from the Inter-Institutional Cooperation Agreement (1992), structures the relations between Mercosur and the EU. However, the AA will replace this framework with its two components: (1) the Trade Matters and (2) the Cooperation (read: political) Part. The political pillar of the Accession Agreement, signed in 2020, is still secret. But according to a recent report by Andrés Malamud (2022), an EEAS source reveals that "the AA contains a more ambitious political dialogue and cooperation chapter, with a significantly bigger weight on areas such as (a) environment, climate change and biodiversity; (b) digital development, including cyber security, personal data protection, digital economy; (c) labor rights and corporate social responsibility; and (d) international cooperation on security and organized crime." (Malamud, 2022, p. 7) The agreement also pushes for more interministerial summits. Civil society is expected to take a larger role than previously. However, even in EU politics, Malamud and others concede that domestic advisory groups have not been very influential.

EU-Brazil relations: Looking forward

- **Global determinants:**
 - Ukraine: Geopolitical shifts and alliances
 - Post-Covid global economic interdependencies
- **Bilateral determinants**
 - Progress of EU-Mercosur FTA
 - Deforestation/climate politics
 - Supply chain complementarities
- **Domestic determinants**
 - State of democracy and human rights in Brazil
 - New Brazilian government post 2022
 - Role of democracy in EU choice of new and renewed partnership (strategic compass)
 - Future of digital issues in foreign and international policy

10. EU-Brazil relations: Looking forward

The future of EU-Brazil relations will be shaped by a wide set of factors. Geopolitically, the EU and Brazil are both facing a changing global order, as the war in Ukraine and the rise of China will re-shape Europe's geostrategic priority. Whereas Brazil will almost certainly maintain a policy of non-alignment towards the war due to economic interdependencies, political identities and microfoundations, the Lula government will at least attempt to take an active role by seeking to mediate peace. Analogously, post-Covid global economic interdependencies and a shifting geopolitical environment will play a crucial role in the EU's geostrategic competition as it seeks to diversify its mineral resource supply chains. A possible China-Mercosur trade deal may push the EU leadership to double its efforts.

Despite goodwill between EU leaders and the current Lula government, supporters of the implementation of the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement face an uphill battle. The main argument used by EU leaders and civil society opposed to the ratification of the EU-Mercosur Agreement rests on its environmental implications. Protectionist constituencies in the EU will delay the deal's ratification, and Brazil will face starker environmental legislation stemming from the EU. Whether the Brazilian government will attempt to renegotiate the deal, or how the

additional protocol will be implemented, is yet to be seen. The evolution of deforestation in the Amazon, coupled with Brazil's domestic institutions and human rights policies will pivot the bilateral relationship.

Similar questions can be posed to Brazil's domestic institutional arena. After attacks on Brazil's election system on behalf of Jair Bolsonaro culminated in a coup attempt in early 2023, how Brazil will shore up its human rights and democracy will be a point of contention in EU-Brazil relations. While there are challenges and tensions in these areas, there are also opportunities for the EU and Brazil to deepen their cooperation and work together to address common challenges.

Further readings

1. Amorim, Celso. "Brazilian Foreign Policy under President Lula (2003-2010): an overview" *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, vol. 53, 2010, pp. 214-240.
2. Blanco, Luis Fernando. "The functions of 'strategic partnership' in European Union foreign policy discourse." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, vol. 29, no. 3, 2016, pp. 35-54.
3. Ferreira-Pereira, Laura C. "The European Union's partnership policy towards Brazil: more than meets the eye." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, vol. 29, no. 3, 2015, pp. 55-77.
4. Ferreira-Perreira, Laura C. "European Union-Brazil Relations: A Strategic Partnership in Suspended Animation." *The European Union's Strategic Partnerships. Global diplomacy in a contested world.* edited by Michael Smith, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2021, pp. 151-175.
5. Meissner, Katharina. "Resorting to bilateralism: the EU, MERCOSUR, and the Strategic Partnership with Brazil." *Journal of European Integration*, vol. 40, issue 1, 2018, pp. 51-61.

Questions for discussion and debate

1. Why are the environment and climate change such a crucial issue in EU-Brazil relations?
2. Why have the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement negotiations lasted so long? Who opposes the agreement?
3. What are the advantages, limits and actual results of the EU-Brazil strategic partnership?

Lecture 11: A technical EU-LAC agenda

Gian Luca Gardini

Proposals for a functional EU-LAC agenda, with an underpinning political design

Gian Luca Gardini

Hyperlink to [video](#)

Hyperlink to the [slides](#)

Content

1. Introduction: The challenges of bi-regional relations and agendas
2. Three options to overcome these problems in EU-LAC relations
3. Digitalisation and its challenges
4. Five proposals for an EU-LAC digital agenda
5. Energy systems
6. The importance of entrepreneurship for economic and social development in the EU and LAC
7. Five proposals for EU-LAC cooperation in entrepreneurship and SMEs
8. The transversal role of education
9. The underpinning political design and political initiatives
10. Conclusion

Introduction: The challenges of bi-regional relations and agendas

Interregionalism, bi-regionalism and their summits generate various challenges:

1. Mega-summits, swollen and diluted agendas
2. Clarity of aims and purposes
3. Time
4. Opportunity cost
5. Costs and expenses
6. Limited capacity of producing concrete and tangible results

1. Introduction: The challenges of bi-regional relations

The European Union (EU) and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) have a dense, very articulated and comprehensive agenda. This intense interaction spans across a multitude of sectors and actors. Yet, overcrowded and over-ambitious agendas (especially without a proper political lead) are often perceived by policy-makers and scholars alike as a major limitation of interregional regimes and summits (Gardini and Malamud, 2018). This in turn leads to little real commitment and even less compliance.

Bi-regional relations, or their most evident manifestation, often result in bi-regional summits or mega-summits, involving a large number of countries and officials and diplomats, stakeholders across civil society and considerable financial resources. These mechanisms generate various doubts and problems:

1. Agendas are often swollen and diluted. The EU-LAC agenda is no exception. Declarations of countless points are hardly a credible commitment and doubtfully a selection of real priorities. This certainly presents significant challenges for follow-up and implementation. As an example, the 2013 final declaration of the EU-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (Celac) Summit was

composed of 48 points, a significant reduction when compared to the record 104 points of the 2004 Guadalajara Declaration concluding the EU-LAC summit.

2. Another challenge is the clarity of aims and purposes. This refers to the expectations and the benefits interregionalism generates. This in turn leads to a discussion of the parameters used to assess success or failure. What are interregional summits for? What outcomes is it legitimate and realistic to expect? Whose expectations count most?
3. A third question is time. The organisation of such high-profile events requires a large amount of time and dedicated teams. This is true for the host country, of which a massive logistical and organisational effort is required. It is also true for participant countries, which have to contribute to the drafting of the final declaration, discuss and agree on the agenda of the summit itself. There is also the issue of timing in the calendar year to avoid congested periods or clashes with other international or national events.
4. A related problem is the opportunity cost. Participation in interregional meetings and summits means that leaders and key state officials, as well as civil society delegations, cannot deal with other issues. With the increasing density of international commitments, the decision to send top leaders or high-level representatives to interregional summits is a delicate one.
5. Interregionalism is expensive. The organisation, logistics, communication, transportation and accommodation involved are a burden for taxpayers and state finances. The high cost of interregional summits is particularly evident when measured against the uncertainty or even the paucity of the results and benefits produced.
6. The most problematic aspect of interregionalism is its limited capacity to produce practical results. There seems to be a quite widespread dissatisfaction at policy decision and implementation as well as at the paucity of common actions undertaken as a direct result of interregional summits. A first difficulty is the limited capacity of follow-up. A second concerns the inability of interregionalism to advance the international position of the participants.

Three options to overcome these problems in EU-LAC relations

1. Renewed political will and commitments
2. Mini-lateralism and multi-bilateralism
3. Decoupling functional and political agenda

Focus of this lecture is on point 3: Proposals for a reinvigorated EU-LAC technical agenda: limited investment and potentially high returns

2. Three options to overcome these problems in EU-LAC relations

Is there a way to overcome these problems, while at the same time pursue a meaningful and ambitious, but not chimeric, agenda? Are there ways to bypass very sensitive political issues that jeopardise more specific and relatively uncontroversial cooperation? Conversely, is a focus on a circumscribed and mainly technical agenda without discarding broader political issues possible? There seem to be three possibilities, ideally complementary and certainly not mutually exclusive, at least in principle.

The first option is a renewed political commitment to EU-LAC relations with a significant investment at the technical level. This would imply that politicians on the two shores of the Atlantic conduct a serious reflection, including on the political and financial costs, about a self-contained and widely shared bi-regional agenda for the medium and long term. This agenda should be multi-partisan and reach a consensus among states, parties, opposition and civil society with strong support from the business sector both in Europe and Latin America. Accordingly, this venture should also include a major refinancing and staffing of the ministries and other technical bodies entrusted with the monitoring and implementation of this agenda. Considering the current

structural problems at the global and regional levels both in the EU and LAC and the hurdles and vested interests that such a process would have to tackle domestically, this option remains relatively unlikely.

The second possibility is the recourse to “minilateralism” and “multi-bilateralism” and “differentiated integration” and “variable geometry” at the bi-regional level. These make multilateral events, summits and commitments - such as the bi-regional ones - convenient to take forward bilateral (and/or minilateral) affairs and agendas. Differentiated integration and cooperation are in fact used within the EU to allow those members who wish to cooperate more deeply to do so. The latest Joint Communication of the European Commission (2019) on EU-LAC relations provides a combination of traditional instruments and innovative solutions to foster EU-LAC cooperation. This opens the way to going beyond the established summit system of political dialogues. It invites EU and LAC states who want closer cooperation to experiment with new formats. On the one hand, this has the advantage to allow willing countries to move forward without major opposition. On the other hand, though, this procedure further fragments and divides participants, making it hardly practicable for region-to-region relations.

There is a third solution: emphasis on functional cooperation as a non-exclusive starting point that decouples the political and the functional agendas. This type of cooperation focuses on a self-contained agenda centred on specific issues of common interest, low controversy, limited political and economic investment, and potentially big and non-conflictive returns. A functional and technical agenda does not exclude a political one. Yet, a decoupling of political and functional cooperation may ease international deals. Emphasis on technical issues avoids major politically sensitive topics. Success in functional and technical cooperation may provide tangible material and political incentives for political cooperation.

This lecture focuses on a functional, mainly technical agenda for EU-LAC relations. It addresses three areas for stronger cooperation: digitalisation, energy systems, and entrepreneurship and small and medium size enterprises (SMEs).

Digitalisation and its challenges

- Digitalisation is already the present not just the future
- Digitalisation as a transversal issue to virtually any field
- Two preliminary warnings:
 1. Don't take the positive effects of digitalisation for granted (the dark side of digitalisation)
 2. Inclusion, democracy and the impact of digitalisation on the community at large
- Education and digital skills

3. Digitalisation and its challenges

The digital agenda at the national, regional and international levels is key to the present and future development of any community, especially those that seek a better and more effective international insertion in regional and global value chains. The digital agenda however comes with both opportunities and challenges. An EU-LAC agenda for digital cooperation has to consider both aspects: how to maximise opportunities and how to minimise or at least diffuse risks and challenges.

Two preliminary warnings previous to any discussion on content have to be addressed. First, there is a tendency to assume that digitalisation is good and has positive effects on society and the economy. This is only one side of the story. Much less attention has been devoted to the negative effects of digitalisation. Only recently has a significant scholarly debate on the topic emerged. This focuses on the potentially dark and unexpected sides of digitalisation for workers, consumers, activists and democracy. Accordingly, the proposals for an EU-LAC digital agenda discussed below are not enthusiastically or uncritically embraced. They are only a part of a broader reflection on a functional and technical agenda and they remain subject to further scrutiny.

Second, one of the key challenges to developing an effective and inclusive EU-LAC digital agenda is the awareness - and the ensuing policies

- of the impact that government decisions on digital matters may have on the community at large. Governments and civil society have different but equally important roles in the definition and implementation of a digital agenda. While it is mostly companies and civil society that have a prominent role in the development and use of digital technologies, it is for governments to identify priorities for cooperation, commercial deals and regulatory frameworks. Yet, whose task is it to evaluate moral and democratic risks such as overt or stealthy control of citizens? The interaction between citizens and public officials raises questions and ethical concerns regarding accountability and reskilling of both citizens and public officials. A preliminary point to any EU-LAC digital agenda ought to be a serious reflection on ethical issues that such an agenda implies.

That said, the possible topics on a bi-regional digital agenda are of course as numerous as they are diverse. Digitalisation itself is a universe of issues that increasingly pervades every aspect of daily life and has implications for connected agendas, such as innovation and sustainability. In the impossibility of addressing all these issues, this section focuses on five areas which are relevant to a variety of actors. These proposals invariably make reference to education and digital skills as these are the basis for any digitalisation strategy for development, which is not possible without digital competence. Likewise, digitalisation has a lot to do with business development, the opportunities to access regional and global value chains, employment and therefore wellbeing.

5 proposals for an EU-LAC digital agenda

1. Digital transformation as a mindset: a joint campaign
2. Advance towards a single bi-regional digital market
3. Creation of EU-LAC Search Engine Advertising Manager (SEA Manager)
4. Skills-for-tasks approach in digital training and education
5. Inclusiveness, disadvantaged audiences, peripheral communities and remote geographical areas

4. Five proposals for an EU-LAC digital agenda

1. A first issue is an understanding of what a digital transformation actually is and entails. The digital transformation is not only about technology but mostly about a mindset. People, from students to employees, from the young generations to the elderly, must be motivated to acquire and use digital skills. They need to see how data, algorithms, and artificial intelligence are useful in their daily lives, which will be ever more technology-intensive. This concept has to be widely disseminated. Digitalisation is neither good nor bad per se, but digitalisation is what we make of it. This concept and the appropriate campaigns could be jointly organised, coordinated and disseminated as a bi-regional effort.
2. A second proposal is to gradually advance in a single bi-regional digital market, or at least in areas of it. This would include sectors such as telecom regulation, cybersecurity, media, copyright, platforms and eCommerce. Regulatory frameworks and their capacity of attraction (or imposition) become more and more important for global competition and competitiveness. If the EU and LAC do not want to remain passive takers of technical regulations, this is another key item for a functional bi-regional agenda. This is particularly important for the EU and its capacity of both attraction and projection globally. A joint effort in this matter would be a timely and potentially very fruitful initiative.

3. The creation of a specific EU-LAC Search Engine Advertising Manager (SEA Manager) for the digital job market is a third idea. This is meant to match the skills on offer in the digital job market and the demand of companies and public institutions. Evidence shows that job search has largely moved online, mainly via general search engines or specialised platforms. Research also shows that the credibility and reputation of the digital marketing tools, in particular those owned or managed by the company itself (such as LinkedIn), are seen as very relevant for the job application decision. An EU-LAC SEA Manager platform would reach a very wide audience on two continents and would enjoy the credibility that an EU and Celac seal can grant.
4. A fourth proposal concerns the pursuit of a skills-for-tasks approach in digital training and education. Empirical research shows that task-based learning in the social sciences develops new ways of learning by integrating knowledge, practice and critical reflection. This concept can be applied to learning digital skills. For instance, an ambitious but feasible EU-LAC technical project could aim to develop and include a skills-for-tasks approach to the teaching of digital skills and digital transformation(s) in the STEM areas in curricula at schools and universities.
5. The fifth proposal addresses inclusiveness and the ability to reach disadvantaged audiences and peripheral communities and remote geographical areas. That is, to provide digital skills and training through technology itself. The use of technological devices allows us to reach a wide audience, including those with little time or just rudimentary competences to acquire new digital skills, such as workers in the informal sector and senior citizens. The development and use of appropriate mobile applications would facilitate participation in and consultation of training and certification systems in other regions. Successful examples already exist, such as the experience of the company SAP in Africa. This could be a benchmark for a joint EU-LAC project.

Energy systems

- Energy as a complex issue: impact on the environment, the economy and lifestyles.
- Changing the matrix of energy source, production and distribution is imperative BUT the investments required to change sources and suppliers of energy are huge.
- There are smaller complementary measures that can significantly help too:
 1. Algorithms can now save on energy consumption and distribution by optimising transportation timetables and velocity (ex: railway, gas pipelines)
 2. Not all renewables are equally suitable and mutually beneficial to EU-LAC relations. Wind power certainly is.
 3. Monitor energy production prices and fight against speculation

5. Energy systems

The energy crisis that struck Europe and other regions in the aftermath of Russia's invasion of Ukraine is only the tip of the iceberg. The energy systems question is much older and much broader. The need to save energy and produce it more efficiently, at lower costs and in a sustainable way, is as old as the debate on the environment and dates back at least to the early 1970s. The question has an impact on the environment, the economy and lifestyles at large. To change the matrix of energy source, production and distribution is imperative. However, the investments required to change sources and suppliers of energy are huge. Yet, to use investments in renewables and grid is not the only solution, although it remains the crucial one. There are smaller complementary measures that can help significantly too:

1. Firstly, algorithms can now save on energy consumption and distribution by optimising transportation timetables and velocity. A project on timetabling efficiency carried out by the Friedrich-Alexander University in Germany in partnership with the train operator Deutsche Bahn aimed to decrease peak power consumption to bring down electricity costs. Results estimated possible cost savings of 5%, which would be five million euros per year. A similar modelling approach can be used for other modes of transport, such as the underground, and also for gas pipelines and networks. This kind of

project does not require expensive infrastructure but capable, even small, teams of researchers. Relatively modest investments can result in huge savings. The EU-LAC technical agenda could promote and disseminate this kind of research.

2. Secondly, not all renewables are equally suitable and mutually beneficial to EU-LAC relations. Wind power certainly is. One should assess the market before choosing which kind of renewables to promote. China is a leader in manufacturing for both wind and solar equipment. However, while seven of the top ten solar manufacturers are Chinese, the wind turbine market is far more dispersed and competitive, with top-10 manufacturers in Europe, the US, China and India. Considering the favourable climate in Latin America and Europe's competitiveness in the sector, cooperation in wind power should feature high on the EU-LAC agenda.
3. Thirdly, a joint EU-LAC effort at monitoring energy and commodities prices along with a clear and truthful joint EU-LAC communication strategy could help avoid speculation and malpractices. This would protect consumers on the two shores of the Atlantic and maintain a levelled playing field in the energy sector. The record high profits of energy and fuel companies in 2022 are partly the result of rising demand, scarcity, and increased prices, but there is a significant component of speculation. As an example, in October 2022, the average price of a barrel of Brent oil was 93.4 USD, compared to over 132 USD in June and July 2008 or 125 USD in March 2012. Yet, gas and gasoline prices in Europe reached an all-time peak in that period. In August 2022, the Henry Hub price of liquid gas on the New York exchange market reached 8,81 USD per million Btu, compared to 12,69 in June 2008 and 13,42 USD in October 2005. Some public mechanism to guarantee fairness for producers and consumers is needed. Perhaps a bi-regional forum would be the right place at least to initiate such a discussion.

The importance of entrepreneurship for economic and social development in the EU and LAC

- Stimulate the talent and initiative of its own people is fundamental to any society
- SMEs represent 99% of all business in both the EU and LAC
- Entrepreneurship, digitalisation, energy systems and vocational education and training (VET) are strictly interconnected
- Useful traditional measures to support SMEs:
 - Domestic agencies for trade and investment
 - Trade missions
 - Simplification of requirements
 - Reducing red-tape through digital platforms
- The potential for EU-LAC cooperation in entrepreneurship is still largely untapped: creative reflection needed

6. The importance of entrepreneurship for economic and social development in the EU and LAC

The ability to stimulate the talent and initiative of its people is fundamental to any society. This includes the ability of a community to provide opportunities to operationalise and reward those talents appropriately. This is a key factor for economic and social development. According to the OECD, in Latin America, SMEs comprise 99.5% of firms in the region (with almost nine out of ten classified as micro-enterprises) and generate 60% of formal productive employment. In Europe, small and medium-sized companies represent 99% of all businesses in the EU, employ around 100 million people, and account for more than half of Europe's GDP, according to the European Commission. It is therefore crucial to provide these actors with the instruments to foster their entrepreneurship and their ability to be present and compete in ever larger markets, be it at the regional or global level.

Entrepreneurship, digitalisation and vocational training are strictly interconnected. This is the approach taken in this chapter, especially in its policy proposals. Regional integration processes, but also inter-regional mechanisms, may be a valuable engine to develop these sectors. It is vital to integrate SMEs in trade agreements, trade strategies towards

fast growing markets and to take their needs into account when designing production repatriation strategies and effective industrial policies. Regional and interregional development strategies are needed to promote entrepreneurship and a better insertion of SMEs in global value chains. This is even more important in the light of recent studies stressing that we are far from de-globalising, even after the Covid-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine or the hardening of the US-China competition. In fact, the challenge is to harness the benefits of a still growing interconnection while managing the risks and downsides of dependency, particularly where products are concentrated in their places of origin.

There are some traditional and very useful measures to support entrepreneurship, especially SMEs. These include domestic agencies for trade and investment, trade missions to increase the visibility and presence of SMEs at the international level, and the simplification of requirements and red-tape procedures through digital platforms. The potential for further cooperation between the EU and LAC in the area of SMEs and entrepreneurship is still largely untapped and worth a profound and creative reflection. Innovative financing systems for SMEs, stimulating the green transition and creating connected jobs, helping SMES navigating crises, the promotion of the tourist sector, and developing entrepreneurial educational programmes for young people are all suitable areas for bi-regional collaboration.

5 proposals for EU-LAC cooperation in entrepreneurship and SMEs

1. Improve the financing system for SMEs (ex: German KfW-Bank)
2. Increase the political will to take the green transition forward
3. Push for further internationalisation and R&D of SMEs, especially in times of crisis
4. Improve the soft, language, and technical skills available within SMEs
5. Invest in the tourism sector

7. Five proposals for EU-LAC cooperation in entrepreneurship and SMEs

The first proposal concerns the financing system for SMEs. The German KfW-Bank could be a good basis for reflection on how EU-LAC technical cooperation could help in this respect. KfW was established in 1948 under public law and is owned 80% by the federal government of Germany and 20% by its states. It supports individuals, businesses and public organisations with promotional loans and grants. Public funding represents a minimal part of the KfW resources, which come by over 90% from the capital markets. Priority areas are climate change and the environment, innovation and education projects. The EU and LAC could put in place a similar bi-regional body and scheme to complement the initiatives already in place or to streamline them.

A second proposal or, more appropriately, a crucial precondition for entrepreneurship connected with the green transition is the political will to take change forward. A study by the Inter-American Development Bank and the International Labour Organization concluded that Latin America could create up to 15 million new jobs by 2030 if countries in the region seriously committed themselves to cutting carbon emissions. In fact, 22,5 million jobs could be created mainly in plant-based agricul-

ture, green transport and renewable energy. However, in the transitional phase, around 7,5 million jobs could be lost in fossil-fuel extraction and livestock farming, which are among the most politically sensitive sectors on the continent. Bi-regional dialogue and support can be key to a successful green entrepreneurship.

A third suggestion concerns a further push towards the internationalisation of, and research and development by SMEs. A study by the University of Valencia in Spain shows that in times of crisis companies tend to adopt retrenchment strategies. The same study demonstrates that the most apt strategies for companies to survive crises are an increase in international presence and an enhanced research and development activity. Yet businesses experience financial constraints in both fields. In this sense, EU-LAC functional cooperation could address both awareness and training campaigns as well as a robust financing system, in connection with point 1.

A fourth proposal is to improve the soft, language, and technical skills available within SMEs. This would facilitate their insertion into international value chains. “In-company training” is a possibility, but informality and lack of resources and time make it a complex issue, especially for SMEs. The German apprenticeship scheme may constitute an initial basis for discussion. Yet it is not easily transferable to other realities due to its high costs, the role of an efficient state, and cultural attitudes and traditions. EU-LAC functional cooperation could look at ways to make a similar scheme applicable to other countries.

A fifth idea is to invest further in the tourist sector to promote entrepreneurship and SMEs. Improvement of the offerings as well as accommodation capacity is crucial. So is the promotion of the natural, architectural and cultural heritage. Still, tourism has by now become a very complex industry. Tourism has to deal with transportation, energy, supply chains, ecological setting and impact, culture and lifestyles. EU-LAC technical cooperation could go a long way to stimulate responsible tourism and propose a joint integrated policy for the preservation and promotion of natural and cultural heritage.

The transversal role of education

- Higher education and VET
- Transversal significance of VET: digitalisation, energy systems, entrepreneurship and SMEs
- Three proposals to enhance VET and the bi-regional level:
 1. Improve the quality of teachers
 2. Improve the quality of teaching and learning materials
 3. Invest in language proficiency

8. The transversal role of education

A key issue is transversal to all these topics: education. Education is not only about higher education. It has a lot to do with the generation and dissemination of technical skills. Vocational education and training (VET) is essential to promote trade, international insertion, and inclusive development. A major challenge for both the EU and Latin America is to achieve better and more targeted technical training to reduce the skills mismatch that both regions face. Technical training can facilitate inclusion in value chains, the grasp of opportunities offered by digitalisation and new technologies, and the reduction of gender and ethnic gaps, along with the strengthening of the SME sector.

Accordingly, VET is crucial in the three areas discussed. First, digitalisation: Training in digital technologies is essential to benefit from the new opportunities that information and knowledge-based economies and societies offer. The digital gap must be reduced to achieve inclusive and sustainable development. Second, energy systems: Technical expertise in this field is fundamental to grasp the opportunities offered by “at-the-edge” innovation, such as green technology and renewable energies. Third, entrepreneurship and SMEs: Effective technical training is paramount for SMEs to be able to join regional and global value chains, and more broadly to interact internationally and command

technological development and devices. This is not the future but the present.

Three additional policy proposals can be made to improve VET at the bi-regional level.

1. First, to improve teacher quality. Providing training to the trainers is fundamental to the success of any education system. Precise surveys about the quality of the trainers are a pre-condition to design new programs for the training of the trainers in collaboration with students and companies and to invest in the development of soft skills for trainers.
2. Second, to improve the quality of teaching materials. Companies specialising in advanced training material exist (i.e. Pearson), including content, test and certification in different areas of knowledge. Specific packages can be designed and produced to meet the needs identified by a bi-regional body.
3. Third, to invest in the proficiency of English and other languages.

The underpinning political design and political initiatives

- The political dimension of any technical agenda
- Decoupling the technical and political agenda: Is it possible?
- Three policy proposals in the area of political dialogue:
 1. Support for democracy and a summit of democracies
 2. EU-LAC framework agreement on China's investments
 3. EU-LAC migration scheme prioritising Latin Americans

9. The underpinning political design and political initiatives

This brings us to the final point. Is it possible and useful to separate technical from more comprehensive education? Similarly, is it possible to separate entirely the functional from the political agenda? The answer is no in both cases. It is one thing to place more emphasis on or give priority to one or the other at certain times, under given circumstances, and for specific purposes. This is what this lecture has tried to indicate. A completely different matter would be to maintain that a bi-regional technical agenda has no political dimension or underpinning political design. Of course, the identification of the three fields discussed here - digitalisation, energy systems, and entrepreneurship - is in itself a political choice. It is ultimately for politics to determine technical and functional priorities and guidelines.

Accordingly, this lecture cannot avoid making three proposals also in the sphere of EU-LAC political cooperation.

First, full support for US President Joe Biden's proposal of a summit of democracies (Biden, 2020). In a phase of strain for democratic institutions at the national and international levels, this would be an opportunity to reaffirm shared values. In the wake of Russia's war in Ukraine, Latin America's support for democracy, respect for human rights and

non-interference seems to be wavering and subject to different political and economic interests. This was evidenced by the split vote of Latin American countries both at the United Nations and the Organisation of American States. An EU-LAC political dialogue and cooperation need clarity about the values actually shared and the extent to which LAC countries are willing to take common action to defend the values that they profess.

Second, elaboration of a joint EU-LAC agreement on China's investments. This would give visibility to the EU and LAC globally, more negotiating power to both vis-à-vis China, and facilitate the regulation of needed but potentially problematic foreign investments. Some sort of regulations of foreign investments are needed everywhere, at least to protect crucial national economic and strategic assets. Weak countries may not be in a position to do this effectively. An EU-LAC bi-regional partnership on the matter would greatly benefit both regions.

Third, a new EU-LAC migration scheme prioritising Latin Americans who want to work in the EU. This would promote legal, safe and dignified migration according to the United Nations Global Compact on Migration. On the EU side, it would respond to the needs of the EU labour market and attract people more likely to adapt to the social and cultural tissue of the receiving countries. On the LAC side, this would provide a certain and legal outlet for Latin American migrants who want a better life elsewhere. Selective migration schemes exist in several democratic and tolerant countries such as Canada and Australia, have nothing ethically reproachable and serve social and economic peace and prosperity for all those involved. An EU-LAC initiative in this sense might be controversial but would certainly be a timely and useful one.

Conclusion

- The decoupling of the functional and the political agenda can facilitate EU-LAC relations, but is it really possible?
- Three areas of functional cooperation with very concrete proposals
 1. Digitalisation
 2. Energy systems
 3. Entrepreneurship & SMEs
- Education as a transversal issue but a cultural change is needed: from STEM to STEAM
- A blend of bold political initiatives and modest but highly rewarding functional measures to enhance an already solid EU-LAC relationship

10. Conclusion

This lecture has argued that a decoupling of the political and the functional agenda could help relaunch EU-LAC relations and foster bi-regional cooperation. It has also provided a number of policy proposals in three key areas.

1. In the field of digitalisation, awareness of what digitalisation is and entails, a single bi-regional digital market, a specific EU-LAC Search Engine Advertising Manager, a skills-for-tasks approach to digital training and education, and inclusiveness through digital training with digital technology were discussed.
2. Regarding energy systems, the huge investments that a change of the energy production and consumption matrix would require can be accompanied by more modest but potentially highly rewarding measures, such as algorithms optimising the use and distribution of energy, the emphasis on wind power, and the monitoring of prices to alert on, and avoid speculation.
3. In the area of entrepreneurship and SMEs, EU-LAC cooperation could provide new financing mechanisms, political and material support for the green transition, incentives to companies to overcome crises, innovative forms of training via apprenticeship, and an élan to sustainable tourism.

Education in its broad meaning, including higher education and vocational training, is a crucial transversal issue to all the three areas. Still, a cultural change is also needed about our approach to education and the acritical emphasis on the technical and scientific disciplines as a solution to the current problems that education systems face in both the EU and LAC. To insist on technical education only is not enough and is certainly not the approach supported here. On the contrary, a move from a STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics) to a STEAM (where A stands for art and humanities) approach is highly recommended. Technical training produces good professionals, but thorough education produces good citizens. STEM disciplines are important, but the inclusion of the Arts and Humanities in technical curricula is fundamental too, hence the acronym STEAM, which also means power, drive, and determination. A citizen who is able to think logically and independently, who knows where he/she comes from, who is aware of realities and challenges will be more creative and innovative. The Arts and Humanities stimulate these assets.

This lecture has also stressed the political underpinning design of any technical agenda. It has also suggested three areas for possible EU-LAC political dialogue and cooperation: reaffirmation of democratic values, regulation of Chinese investments, and migration. These may be bold proposals. If they are too bold for the current political climate, this lecture has also discussed at length a number of less conflictive functional and technical proposals which are easier to implement. Their potential impact would be very significant anyway.

Further readings

1. Gardini, Gian Luca (2023), “Proposals for a functional EU-LAC agenda, with an underpinning political design”, in Gardini, Gian Luca (Ed.), *The Redefinition of the European Union Presence in Latin America and the Caribbean*, Peter Lang.
2. European Commission (2019), “European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean: joining forces for a common future”. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. Strasbourg, 16.4.2019: JOIN(2019) 6 final. Online: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52019JC0006&from=en>
3. McKinsey Global Institute (2022), “Global flows: The ties that bind in an interconnected world”. Discussion Paper 15 November 2022. Online: <https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/global-flows-the-ties-that-bind-in-an-interconnected-world>
4. Torres, Mario, Gian Luca Gardini and Jacobo Ramirez (2018), “Pacific Alliance & Observer Countries. An Agenda for cooperation”. OECD Global Policy Perspective Report. <https://www.oecd.org/latin-america/home/Global-Policy-Perspective-Report-Pacific-Alliance-and-Observer-Countries.pdf>
5. Sanahuja, José Antonio (Ed.) (2022), “Relanzar las relaciones entre América Latina y la Unión Europea. Autonomía estratégica, cooperación avanzada y recuperación digital, verde y social”. Madrid: Fundación Carolina. Online: <https://www.fundacioncarolina.es/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/LibroRelanzarRelacionesALyUE.pdf>

Questions for discussion and debate

1. Is it really possible to decouple the functional and the political agenda?
2. Are the practical proposals outlined in the lecture feasible?
3. Discuss the importance of education and VET in particular.

Lecture 12: Decentralising cooperation through regional policy dialogues

Jeanne Simon

Decentralising EU cooperation through regional policy dialogues with high- and middle-income Latin American countries

Jeanne W. Simon

Hyperlink to [video](#)

Hyperlink to the [slides](#)

Content

1. Introduction
2. Promotion of the European Smart Specialisation Strategy
3. Regional policy dialogues
4. European Smart Specialisation Strategy
5. Stage 1: Transfer of S₃ to Latin American countries
6. RIS₃ platform
7. Stage 2: Decentralised cooperation
8. Stage 3: Principal programmes
9. Exportation of the European Smart Specialisation Strategy
10. Conclusions

Introduction

- Within the complex web of EU-LAC relations:
 - The regional policy dialogue (RPD) is a new mechanism that has developed over time
 - Decentralised cooperation strategy that evolves from bilateral relations to a priority of bi-regional cooperation
 - Based in the European Smart Specialisation Strategy that emphasises dialogue and policy learning between sub-national territories, facilitating internationalisation of private enterprises and sub-national territories

1. Introduction

European Union (EU) cooperation with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) continues to evolve and can be characterised as a network of overlapping dialogues, negotiations and cooperation initiatives. Without a doubt, for at least a decade, the European Union (EU) has adopted a more pragmatic relationship with LAC, creating a complex network of interrelations. Indeed, this network of EU-LAC cooperation probably emerged as a strategy to face the important asymmetries in socioeconomic development and institutional capacities between these two regions as well as between the EU countries and their multiple Latin American counterparts.

Between 2007 and 2015, a new modality of decentralised cooperation, regional policy dialogues (RPD), emerged first through bilateral agreements between the EU and several upper- and middle-income countries. It is important to note that the RPDs are a distinctive mechanism established principally with high- and middle-income Latin American countries which are no longer eligible for overseas development assistance. During this period, the EU established formal agreements for RPDs with Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Peru, Mexico, Colombia and the Central American intergovernmental organisation SICA. At present, the RPDs have become part of the priorities of the EU and the Community of Latin America and Caribbean States (Celac).

RPDs, as a mechanism of decentralised EU-LAC cooperation, adapted to different national contexts and evolved over time. Countries like Mexico and Brazil both had strategic partnerships with the EU, while the other countries have association agreements and/or were negotiating free trade agreements. Led by the Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy (DG REGIO) of the European Commission (EC), these RPDs promoted the policy transfer of the European Smart Specialisation Strategy (S₃) to connect the economic objectives of innovation and competitiveness with the social objectives of sustainability and equity.

A central component of the RPDs is the European S₃ promoted by the DG REGIO in numerous regions in the EU as part of the cohesion policy. The European S₃ has also become a main component of cooperation in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Originally an economic development strategy, S₃ has evolved over time into a place-based intersectoral policy that helps regions identify territorial resources in research and innovation and prioritise actions to build critical mass in economic sectors in which there is comparative advantage. Its methodology emphasises dialogue and policy learning between sub-national territories. From the EU perspective, the diffusion of S₃ beyond its borders allows other countries to benefit from this innovative approach and methodology that is adaptable to distinct territorial contexts and can contribute to strengthening regional innovation systems throughout the world.

The objective of our class today is to analyse the regional policy dialogues (RPDs) as a mechanism of decentralised EU-LAC cooperation with six Latin American countries, analysing the principal patterns and differences between the countries. How did this decentralised bilateral cooperation strategy become an important component in bi-regional EU-LAC relations?

It is important to note that the term “regional” can be used in different ways. Due to the decentralised nature of S₃, the terms “region” and “regional” are preferentially used to refer to a sub-national territory (city or region). However, in some cases, these terms are used to refer to cooperation between the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean, for example “regional organisations” or “interregional cooperation”.

Promotion of the European Smart Specialisation Strategy

- 2007 – 2012: diverse strategies
 - Testing different strategies. RPD established with Chile
 - Celac becomes the official counterpart of the the EU
- 2013-2016: consolidation
 - RPDs established with Peru, Mexico, Colombia, Argentina and SICA
- 2016-Present: decentralised cooperation
 - Consolidated offer of city-to-city / region-to-region programs.

2. Promotion of the European Smart Specialisation Strategy

EU efforts to strengthen bi-regional relations with multilateral organisations in Latin America are often parallel to their efforts to develop mutually beneficial bilateral trade agreements, which also contemplate collaboration on political and social issues. The EU used RPDs to develop a new approach with several Latin American countries that could no longer receive official development assistance (ODA) because they are upper- and middle-income countries. This decentralisation of EU cooperation builds on and/or is formalised through a bilateral RPD in which each country defines its collaboration priorities in science, technology and innovation for sustainable development, seeking to improve sub-national innovation policy and governance.

Cooperation in the RPDs centres around S₃, facilitating internationalisation of private enterprises and sub-national territories. It promotes a bottom-up methodology based on the entrepreneurial discovery process that involves stakeholders in the definition of strategic priorities at the sub-national level. Further, due to the EC's rapid appropriation of S₃ as a European policy instrument, the limited orientation for its implementation at first allowed for different interpretations and flexibility in its adaptation to existing institutional planning contexts.

The RPDs developed first through bilateral relations, although two regional organisations that include the 33 Latin American and Caribbean states have played roles in facilitating EU cooperation: the Community of Latin America and Caribbean States (Celac) and the Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (Eclac). In 2012, Celac became the Latin American counterpart of the EU for bi-regional relations, although its limited financial and human resources do not provide a large-scale interregional platform for cooperation. In turn, Eclac, which is an organisation of the United Nations, can only manage and provide technical support to cooperation projects in different LAC countries, especially with respect to the sustainable development goals (SDGs).

The transformation from bilateral decentralised cooperation to bi-regional cooperation based on city-to-city and region-to-region partnerships occurred in three stages.

1. The first stage (2007-2012) was experimental with the testing of different strategies. The first RPD was established with Brazil in 2007, while the RED Initiative (“Supporting the Development of a Regional Innovation System that Promotes Innovative Regions”) provided technical support to the Chilean government to train sub-national governments to design and establish regional innovation strategies based on the European Smart Specialisation Strategy.
2. During the second stage (2013-2016), the RPDs established with Peru, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia and the Central American association SICA are characterised by a clear strategy to transfer the European smart Specialisation Strategy (S₃).
3. The third stage (2016-present) is a consolidation of this methodology through partnership programs such as the International Urban and Regional Cooperation, INNOVACT and INNOV-AL. These programmes build on the already mentioned URBELAC network that was active between 2011 and 2017. Further, RPDs became part of the priorities of bi-regional collaboration established in the EU-Celac Action Plan in 2015.

Regional policy dialogues

- Organised by the Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy and implemented throughout the world with upper- and middle-income countries.
- Complements association agreements and strategic partnerships with middle- and high-income LA countries
- Mechanism to transfer European regional innovation policy through exchange of information and practices on policies that connect innovation to territorial cohesion.
- Seeks to establish horizontal and triangular collaboration based on earlier cooperation programs in science, technology and innovation

3. Regional policy dialogues

As a bilateral dialogue, RPDs are established at the national level and seek to create mutually beneficial relations between sub-national territories, establishing partnerships and providing access to EU policy platforms. For the EU, these RPDs are a mechanism to transfer European policy ideas and practices to non-EU partners interested in emulating the EU regional development model. In this way, an RPD institutionalises decentralised cooperation, complementing strategic partnerships or association agreements that open national markets to facilitate trade and investment. As a dialogue with middle- and high-income countries, it seeks to establish horizontal cooperation and eventually triangular cooperation. RPDs were also established with countries outside Latin American, including China.

Within the EU, regional development policy is a central component of the cohesion policy that seeks to reduce disparities between sub-national territories, targeting investment to create dynamic knowledge-based economies. Since many regional governments were not acting (or investing these funds) strategically, the European Commission (EC) drew on the concept “smart specialisation” that had recently been developed by the Knowledge for Growth advisory committee to orient regional authorities. Later, in 2012, the EC established the regional inno-

vation and smart specialisation strategy (RIS₃) as an ex-ante conditionality to receive the European Regional Development Funds (ERDF) for research and innovation initiatives, focusing on recently incorporated countries (EU-13). In this way, the application of S₃ in the EU builds on their earlier regional innovation strategy (RIS) and seeks to strengthen the connections between actors of the regional innovation system and promote the internationalisation of sub-national territories.

Its introduction in Latin America first built on the bilateral relations that the EU had already developed with several countries since 1990 in the four priority sectors of economic development and trade; human resources (science cooperation) and mutual understanding; social cohesion; and the environment. It also connected with prior EU-LAC cooperation programmes in science, technology and innovation (STI), which originally focused on private enterprises and academic exchange. In this way, the transfer of the S₃ approach complements traditional cooperation programmes with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), such as the AL-INVEST programme offered from 1994 to 2018. AL-INVEST provided financing to improve the productivity and competitiveness of micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises and fostered economic relations within LAC and with the EU through the sharing of experience and knowledge in the area of innovation. It also facilitated relationships between LAC and European companies through an internationalisation strategy. Further, Eclac's promotion of the social cohesion concept in Latin America surely contributed to a growing interest in RIS, especially in Chile.

Key terms:

1. Horizontal cooperation refers to international partnership between a traditional bilateral or multilateral source and another country that involves co-financing and mutual benefits.
2. Triangular cooperation refers to a partnership between a traditional bilateral or multilateral source and another country with a certain level of development, capable of granting horizontal cooperation. Together they carry out actions in favour of a third beneficiary country (usually less developed).

European Smart Specialisation Strategy (S₃)

Requirement for cohesion funds

- **Vision: Transformation of socio-economic system:**
 - Place-based Innovation
 - Internationalization through integration into transnational global chains
- **Regional innovation strategy:**
 - Data-driven identification of a limited number of sectors for investment
 - Monitoring and evaluation of advances
- **Entrepreneurial discovery process:**
 - A collaborative knowledge-based process with public and private stakeholders
 - Analysis of the regional innovation system and its endogenous economic potential
- **Multi-level governance:**
 - Knowledge integration between entrepreneurs, researchers and citizens
 - Stakeholder involvement and bottom-up process in design and implementation

4. The European Smart Specialisation Strategy

It is especially interesting that it is the European Smart Specialisation Strategy, originally developed in and for the EU institutional context, that is being promoted at the same time on different continents with upper- and middle-income countries in the Global South. The European S₃ future vision seeks to transform the socioeconomic system through place-based innovation and integration into global value chains. The different political and institutional contexts should result in distinctive interpretations of the European S₃.

In 2012, the EC established the regional innovation and smart specialisation strategy (RIS₃) as an ex-ante conditionality to receive European Regional Development Funds (ERDF) for research and innovation initiatives, focusing on recently incorporated countries (EU-13). In this way, the application of S₃ in the EU builds on their earlier regional innovation strategy (RIS) and seeks to strengthen the connections between actors of the regional innovation system and promote the internationalisation of sub-national territories.

The focus of an RIS₃ has evolved over time, but it essentially consists of the prioritisation of a few competitive economic activities, scientific fields and technological domains that have potential market opportunities for the territory in a global context. A central element of the RIS₃

methodology is the entrepreneurial discovery process (EDP), which is data driven and based in collaboration among the actors of the regional innovation system. Indeed, the EDP should be based on “a structured, inclusive dialogue with local actors” that creates territorial identity and empowerment of local agents representing the public sector, business organisations, research and academy institutions and the civil society. In this way, it seeks to connect investment in science and technology to economic activities.

To achieve place-based economic transformation, the RIS₃ should be bottom-up and integrate different types of explicit and tacit knowledge in the shared vision, analysis of endogenous economic potential, define strategic priorities and policy instruments to maximise innovation and economic progress. Finally, the RIS₃ strategy should include a public-private governance structure and have an effective monitoring and evaluation system.

Indeed, since 2019, there is growing recognition that S₃ is beneficial for both European and Latin American countries, according to different EU reports that highlight its contributions to:

1. More robust regional innovation ecosystems;
2. Learning and new cooperation and business for participating countries, thereby facilitating integration in global value chains;
3. Greater effectivity of EU collaboration due to mutual knowledge and earlier partnerships; and
4. New opportunities for inter-regional and international synergies, complementarities and collaboration.

Stage 1: Transfer of S₃ to Brazil and Chile

- S₃ is transferred to many countries but has been most positively received by Latin American countries.
- Many Latin American countries need to identify new opportunities and reduce the traditional dependence on primary products and extractive industries.
- Learning from European experience that prioritises certain economic sectors to target public and private investment.

5. Stage 1: Transfer of S₃ to Chile and Brazil

The DG REGIO played a key role in establishing decentralised cooperation with Latin American countries through regional policy dialogues. These dialogues promoted learning from EU experiences at the sub-national level. Collaborative projects in areas of interest in several Latin American regions have been implemented, enabling actions toward innovative and added-value sectorial specialisation in order to reduce traditional dependency on primary products and extractive industries.

The first stage (2007–2012) began with the establishment of a strategic partnership with Brazil in 2007. This strategic partnership included an RPD that defined bilateral collaboration priorities at the sub-national level. The principal objectives of this RPD were to reduce regional inequalities and encourage the exploitation of endogenous potential. Brazil prioritised learning from the European experience and then adapting the most adequate examples and ideas to the Brazilian context. The principal instruments were study visits, conferences, training events and studies. Although important advances were made in S₃ implementation, the change of government at the national level weakened relations with the EU, affecting its continuity. Despite this setback, there are other agreements that continue to promote S₃ in specific states, such as Pernambuco.

In 2008, the Chilean government and the EC established a cooperation framework in innovation and competitiveness, signing an RPD in 2010. Within this framework, the EC provided support for the RED project, which is considered a milestone in the introduction of S₃ in Latin America. With EC support, the Undersecretary of Regional Development (SUBDERE), in collaboration with the Chilean Council of Science and Technology (CONICYT), worked with the 11 regional governments and stakeholders (universities and industry) in the elaboration of an RIS₃ that would orient public spending for a 10-year period. This programme resulted in policy learning, even when only a few regions established RISs. In particular, Chile's interest in and adaptation of EU innovation policy paved the way for RPDs with Peru, Mexico, Colombia, Argentina and SICA. Within the same period, the EU-Celac also prioritised research and innovation in sub-national territories in their Action Plans, further facilitating S₃ strategies.

In 2010, the EU and Celac established the Joint Initiative for Research and Innovation (JIRI) and a two-year Action Plan that emphasises “science, research, innovation and technology” to consolidate bi-regional cooperation through policy learning. That same year, DG REGIO and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) created the URBELAC network to support national, regional and local governments in Latin America for the 2011-2017 period. Drawing on European policy, this programme understood urban development as an integrated process, addressing social development, productivity, and environmental protection in urban areas. Although the network did not explicitly include S₃, its financing of partnerships between cities facing similar challenges contributed to relation building through the exchange of knowledge, experiences, good practices, and lessons learned. In 2012, Celac was recognised as the official counterpart of the EU in Latin America.

Regional Innovation Smart Specialisation Strategy Platform



<https://s3platform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/>

6. RIS₃ Platform

In the study of the effects of international cooperation, there is a growing body of literature that analyses the diffusion of policy ideas between countries. The literature on policy diffusion and transfer analyses the process and the role that actors play in exporting a policy idea, such as the smart specialisation strategy. Within the policy transfer literature, the concept of policy translation emphasises the selective adoption of global/transnational policy ideas by actors in the target contexts. In this case, the policy idea is the European S₃ and the Latin American governments are the actors in the target contexts. This perspective analyses the role actors play in debating and creating meaning, drawing on both technical and political discourses.

This perspective conceptualises policy translation as a communicative process between different social worlds. Successful translation requires mutual points of understanding (“words in common”) and then a reinterpretation that can be understood in and adapted to the receiving context. In this sense, the successful exportation of a policy idea requires mutual points of understanding between different cultural and institutional contexts, where transnational and domestic policy entrepreneurs interpret and adapt the policy idea. In this way, translation in-

volves a dynamic back-and-forth circulation of ideas, although not necessarily a mutual learning process. This perspective is used to explain differences in policy application between contexts.

To promote the policy idea, development cooperation projects, training and conferences provide opportunities for transnational actors to share language and concepts with domestic actors. Transnational policy entrepreneurs provide generic storylines and normative guidelines to achieve policy goals at national and sub-national levels, while domestic actors can collaborate, transform, or block their introduction.

Within this framework, the DG REGIO can be considered a transnational policy entrepreneur because it has developed numerous materials to better orient policy makers, providing methodological support and advice through the Smart Specialisation Platform (<https://s3platform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/>) that can be used by both EU and non-EU authorities for collaboration and mutual learning.

In this way, the S3 also connects to EC cooperation on research and innovation as contemplated in the Strategic Plan 2020-2024 of the Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (DG Research and Innovation, 2020).

Decentralised cooperation and international expertise

- **City-to-city / Region-to-region partnering:**
 - International urban (and regional) cooperation
 - Global Covenant of Mayors
 - **Principal cooperation activities:**
 - High level visits
 - Technical support through training and interregional conferences and workshops
 - Strengthening of city -to-city or region-to-region partnerships through visits
 - Incorporation into thematic networks to share experiences and knowledge
 - **Principal results:**
 - Dissemination of European experiences in S3
 - Development of pilot initiatives to adapt the approach to different contexts.
 - Establishment of strategic alliances with EU regions to develop joint projects
- <https://www.jurc.eu/2021/11/24/bilateralmeetingsand-partnershipsagreementsbetweenjurc-latin-america-cities-and-regions/>

7. Stage 2: Decentralised cooperation and international expertise

In the second stage (2013-2016), the DG REGIO established five more RPDs in Latin America, consolidating an approach that recognised different national needs within a common methodology. Based on city-to-city and region-to-region partnerships, each RPD drew on similar cooperation activities: high level visits, technical support through training and interregional conferences and workshops and incorporation into thematic networks to share experiences and knowledge.

The RPD established in 2013 with the Ministry of External Relations of the Republic of Peru included S3 and introduced border integration. This programme financed capacity building, exchange of information and good practices for an integrated approach to sub-national development. As part of this RPD, the DG REGIO highlights that the focus on regional innovation enables decentralised cooperation between Europe and Latin American sub-national authorities, contributing to collaboration and exchanges between private actors. In short, “regional innovation is good business”. Granda et al. (2015) and Esparza & Ipanaqué (2021) analyse the development of S3 in different sub-national territories in Peru, highlighting the challenges facing an effective adaptation to the institutional and political context. Despite the differences with

European sub-national regions, both authors highlight that the S₃ methodology, and especially the EPD, favoured a more inclusive process. However, the business sector's limited interest in innovation remains an important challenge (Barroeta et al., 2017).

In 2014, building on the already existing strategic partnership, the DG REGIO signed the RPD with Mexico, cooperating with the Secretary for Agricultural, Territorial and Urban Development (SEDATU) to develop regional and urban policies. Among the areas of cooperation are the reduction of internal economic and social disparities, multi-level governance and decentralisation issues, including transborder regional cooperation. The focus is on the exchange of information and capacity building, resulting in the application of the S₃ methodology in several sub-national territories.

In 2015, the EU and Colombia established an RPD. Among the priorities are the promotion of economic, social and territorial cohesion, innovation and technological development; cross-border, transnational and interregional cooperation; development policies in post-conflict situations; the setting up and implementation of regional and cross-border development and integration policies, including the strengthening of administrative capacity, in particular at regional and local level; issues relating to decentralisation and multi-level governance; issues relating to sustainable economic development and to corporate social responsibility at a territorial level.

Subsequently, the DG REGIO established an RPD with the multilateral organisation Central American Integration System (SICA) in 2015 and with Argentina in 2016. Even when these letters of intent maintain a standard format that emphasises the exchange of knowledge and experiences in the areas of urban and regional policy, there is weak incorporation of S₃. The RPD with SICA addresses regional integration in Central America; the RPD with Argentina did not apply the S₃ methodology to define its innovation strategies that remain highly national in their focus.

Principal DG REGIO programmes

International urban (and regional) cooperation

- Global network in decentralised urban and regional cooperation in the fields of sustainable urban development and innovation.

INNOVACT

- Promotion of EU regional policy experience and good practices in Latin America with respect to cross-border cooperation, innovation systems, clusters and competitiveness.

INNOVA-AL

- Promotes the exchange of experiences and good practices between the European Union and non-EU countries in territorial development with special emphasis on urban development, urban-rural partnership and cross-border urban cooperation.

8. Stage 3: Principal programmes

In the third stage (2017-present), three programmes were established to transfer S₃ to Latin American countries with RPDs: International Urban and Regional Cooperation, INNOVACT and INNOV-AL. These programmes build on the already mentioned URBELAC network that was active between 2011 and 2017.

In 2016, the establishment of the International Urban Cooperation (IUC) Programme facilitated 20 city-to-city partnerships between the EU and LAC, with a focus on local and regional development, contributing to the globalisation of the Covenant of Mayors. Further, this programme “stimulated the development of mutual business opportunities and the strengthening of regional strategies”. In the second phase that began in 2017, the International Urban and Regional Cooperation (IURC) expanded its coverage, organising around thematic networks and strengthening its coherence with the SDGs.

In 2017, the INNOVACT programme was established to share European cross-border experiences with similar Latin American counterparts. Working within an S₃ framework, this programme provided technical assistance and training for cross-border cooperation, innovation systems, clusters and competitiveness in seven cross-border areas in Latin America, where Peru participates with four cross-border areas. This

programme builds on an earlier triangular cooperation programme between Chile and Peru with European financing and technical assistance.

The subsequent INNOV-AL programme developed in two phases from 2018 to 2020. In the first stage, this programme collaborated with national authorities to facilitate cooperation between specialised agencies and regional authorities. The objective was to develop further cooperation between national and regional authorities and specialised agencies in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Mexico (only Phase II). The programme specifically focused on the decentralised definition and implementation of RIS₃, facilitating knowledge exchange through region-to-region partnerships, where the EU partners are defined according to the innovation needs of the participating regions in Latin America. A subsequent evaluation of this process concludes that “the path of European competitiveness and innovation policy towards a model with a multi-sectoral and systematic approach for the economy (national and regional) forms a point of reference and a starting point for Latin American countries in the process of articulating decentralised innovation policies” (EU-Celac, 2021).

Indeed, S₃ has become a key concept orienting EU-LAC cooperation in regional innovation and increasingly in science and technology. In this stage, the strategy of city-to-city / region-to-region cooperation has become the principal component of bilateral cooperation expressed in RPDs. An increasing number of sub-national partnerships throughout Latin America will be a likely outcome of these EU-LAC bi-regional cooperation programmes, such as INNOVACT and INNOVAL, such as in Peru.

Exportation of the European Smart Specialisation Strategy

Decentralised cooperation created mutually beneficial relations even when it did not result in a bi-directional learning process:

- Process transferred knowledge on European S₃ to most of the participating countries.
- Participating countries adapted (translated) S₃ to their priorities and institutional contexts following different patterns that tended to concentrate at the national level.
- Public-private coordination and monitoring of the advances are weak in the six Latin American countries, limiting the generation of collective knowledge
- The more horizontal process, and especially the partnering mechanism, generated interest in the EU and in LAC.
- Institutional differences limit effective exportation of the European model.

9. Exportation of the European Smart Specialisation Strategy

In the EU, the multi-level governance structure results in a top-down translation process of S₃ policy ideas. Based on the goals set at the supranational level, national and regional governments set specific objectives that are coherent with the European S₃ framework: Policy makers design policy instruments coherent with the territorial context; monitor and assess their advances, reporting their advances to the EU; and revise their objectives when necessary. Additionally, due to its rapid implementation, the framework was relatively flexible and the regions could consider territorial specificities in the definition of priority sectors. Further, the inclusion of stakeholders and their knowledge in monitoring was fundamental for collective learning and S₃ effectivity.

In contrast with the EU, the DG REGIO did not promote S₃ emulation in Latin America, but rather focused on consolidating a shared understanding of the S₃ methodology through a learning process between different territories and different continents. However, the principal indicators used to measure success are limited to analysing the growing importance of territorial dimension in competitiveness strategies, greater relevance of innovation policies as complementary to science and higher education policies, greater availability of data for initial

characterisation, the establishment of social dialogues and monitoring mechanisms.

The application of the S₃ methodology at the sub-national level also varied between countries. The coordination of the entrepreneurial discovery process was led by a university in Peru, by a municipal government in Colombia and by the regional government in Chile. While the involvement of non-governmental actors in the EU favoured the identification of emerging sectors such as creative and cultural industries, social innovation and blue economy, among many others, the objective of LAC innovation strategies tended not to support new initiatives but rather to add value to traditional sectors, such as food and tourism.

Still, the process did transfer knowledge on European S₃ to most of the participating countries, except Argentina which did not use the RIS methodology. Most participating countries adapted (translated) S₃ to their priorities and institutional contexts following different patterns.

Decentralised cooperation did create mutually beneficial relations even when it did not result in a bi-directional learning process. The more horizontal process, and especially the partnering mechanism, generated interest for more cooperation in the EU and LAC. Due to the policy learning by these Latin American countries, triangular cooperation with Central American countries appears as a real opportunity.

Conclusion

- This decentralised cooperation emerged incrementally as both a strategic and pragmatic response within the multiple levels of EU-LAC cooperation.
- Since 2017, decentralised cooperation is more structured to transfer S3 more effectively through the EU-Celac INNOVA-AL programme, while the IURC programme facilitates partnering.
- The combination of these programmes has favoured multiplier effects in scientific and business collaboration in innovative sectors.
- There is no mutual knowledge exchange on S3 as a policy idea because European experts teach their LA counterparts.
- The next stage contemplates triangular cooperation in which LA experts will teach their counterparts in LAC, effectively translating the European version of S3.

10. Conclusion

Different institutional contexts produce different results. In contrast with European experiences, the cooperation priorities for sub-national development were negotiated at the national level in the six Latin American countries with RPDs. Consequently, they present differences with the European S3 model.

First, despite certain advances in bottom-up formulation, the national level continues to be central in the definition of innovation strategies. In Mexico and Brazil, innovation strategies were concentrated at the national level and there was good participation of large companies in cluster strategies. Chile combined centralised funding with decentralised innovation strategies; however, there was weak participation of large companies. In Colombia, the central government defined sectoral priorities, favouring the principal cities. Argentina did not use the RIS methodology to define their innovation strategies. Second, even when an important number of stakeholders participated in the process, public-private coordination and monitoring of advances are weak in the six Latin American countries, limiting the generation of collective knowledge. Third, the more horizontal process, and especially the partnering mechanism, generated interest in the EU and in LAC. As EU-LAC cooperation evolves, new issues emerge. For example, both Peru

and Colombia have expressed a growing interest in learning from European experiences of trans-border cooperation at the sub-national level.

Still, important barriers remain within Latin American countries that have limited an effective learning and translation process. In contrast with most European sub-national territories, public institutions at the sub-national level are weaker and less efficient in Latin America; there is limited financing and they have limited experience in innovation policy. A further complication is when new political authorities are not interested in decentralised development strategies that involve public-private decision-making. Despite these challenges, S₃ remains an attractive policy idea and there is a strong interest in European technical support as well as learning from the experiences of similar territories in the EU. Consequently, the cooperation is principally one-way because sub-national territories in Latin America principally learn from their European counterparts and adapt S₃ to their priorities and institutional contexts.

Even when the RPDs provided a framework for decentralised cooperation between sub-national territories, DG REGIO supervision and financing did not establish specific mechanisms for mutual knowledge exchange. Further, since 2017, decentralised cooperation is more structured to transfer S₃ more effectively through the EU-Celac INNOVA-AL programme, while the IURC programme facilitates partnering. The combination of these programmes has favoured multiplier effects in scientific and business collaboration in innovative sectors. However, there is no mutual knowledge exchange on S₃ as a policy idea because European experts teach their LA counterparts. Still, the next stage contemplates triangular cooperation in which LA experts will teach their counterparts in LAC, effectively translating the European version of S₃.

In conclusion, the RPD provided a new bilateral cooperation mechanism that sought to establish a more horizontal relationship at the sub-national level with high- and middle-income countries in LAC. Even when it maintained a one-way knowledge transfer from the EU to LAC, its flexible approach resulted in cooperation in mutually beneficial areas. It also laid the groundwork for triangular cooperation through the agreement with the Central American intergovernmental system (SICA) and bi-regional agreement with Celac.

Further readings

1. ECLAC, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (2018), *The European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean: convergent and sustainable strategies in the current global environment (LC/TS.2018/56/Rev.1)*, Santiago: ECLAC.
2. Gomez Prieto, J., Demblans, A., Palazuelos Martínez, M., (2019) *Smart Specialisation in the world, an EU policy approach helping to discover innovation globally*, European Union, Luxembourg, doi:10.2760/962643, JRC117005
3. Simon, Jeanne (2023) *Decentralising cooperation through Regional Policy Dialogues: Exportation of the European Smart Specialization Strategy to high- and middle-income Latin American countries*. In Gardini, Gian Luca (Ed.), *The Redefinition of the European Union Presence in Latin America and the Caribbean*, Peter Lang.
4. Stone, D., Porto de Oliveira, O., Pal, L. (2020) *Transnational policy transfer: the circulation of ideas, power and development models*, *Policy and Society* 39(1): 1-18, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14494035.2019.1619325>
5. Uyarra, E. (2019) *Smart specialization as a place-based policy. Lessons learnt? In Regional Insights: A selection of articles providing a fresh take on Regional Studies*. 10.1080/13673882.2018.00001022

Questions for discussion and debate

1. Explain why the EU decided to develop regional policy dialogues with Brazil, Mexico and Chile.
2. Analyse if decentralised cooperation can be considered horizontal cooperation.
3. Identify three benefits for the EU generated with the actual cooperation programmes.

Lecture 13: Acción por el clima y vida en ecosistemas terrestres

Mauricio Rondanelli

Acción por el Clima y Vida en Ecosistemas terrestres

Mauricio Rondanelli Reyes

Hipervínculo al [vídeo](#)

Hipervínculo a las [diapositivas](#)

Contenido

1. Cambio global
2. Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible (ODS)
3. El cambio climático
4. El efecto invernadero
5. Acción por el clima
6. Vida De Ecosistemas Terrestres (I)
7. Vida De Ecosistemas Terrestres (II)
8. La UE y ALC Frente a ODS 13 y ODS 15
9. Prioridades Comunes UE-ALC frente a ODS 13 Y 15
10. El Futuro

Cambio global

- Incremento de la población humana
- Alteración de los ciclos biogeoquímicos
- Cambios en el uso de los territorios
- Pérdida de biodiversidad
- Cambio climático
- Cambios geopolíticos/conflictos sociales

1. Cambio Global

Cambio Global es el conjunto de cambios ambientales que se derivan de las actividades humanas ejercidas sobre el planeta; hace referencia a los cambios registrados en los procesos que determinan el funcionamiento de los ecosistemas en el planeta Tierra.

Producto de este cambio global los ecosistemas naturales colapsan y la sociedad humana se ve afectada. Las causas de este cambio global son, entre otros, el incremento de la población humana, la alteración en los ciclos biogeoquímicos, los cambios en el uso del territorio, el uso de energías convencionales, la contaminación de los ecosistemas, las alteraciones en la biodiversidad y el cambio climático actualmente imperante en nuestro planeta.

A través del último siglo y desde fines del siglo 18, los componentes biofísicos de la atmósfera, los océanos, los recursos hídricos, los suelos, la biodiversidad, entre otros, se han visto afectados producto de las actividades antrópicas, las cuales de manera sostenida e intensificadas en el tiempo han generado efectos acumulativos irreversibles en la dinámica geológica del planeta, de manera tal que entre otras consecuencias, se ha venido en instaurar (y reconocer) oficialmente una nueva era geológica, la Era del Antropoceno.

Grandes cambios producto de este cambio global son el cambio climático y la pérdida de la biodiversidad, lo que impacta directamente en la degradación de ecosistemas terrestres; contaminación de los océanos y ecosistemas costeros; genera eventos meteorológicos extremos; pone en riesgo la seguridad alimentaria, lo que afecta nocivamente la salud humana y propicia fenómenos masivos de migraciones poblacionales lo que genera a su vez, entre otros conflictos, aquellos de índole social que inestabilizan sistemas políticos y geopolíticos.

Respecto del Cambio Global se hace necesario y urgente primero, educar al respecto para que desde la infancia hasta las generaciones mayores logren tener conciencia de que el problema existe, y en donde la terminología “cambio climático” es parte de un problema global mayor que nos afecta; segundo, quienes tienen la responsabilidad de tomar decisiones, a nivel de los estados, deberán ser capaces de establecer políticas públicas adecuadas y ajustadas a la realidad actual del planeta en relación a energía, industria, alimento y economía para consensuar con los propósitos establecidos y acordados en relación a mitigación y adaptación al cambio global.

Objetivos de desarrollo sostenibles (ONU)

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Fin de la pobreza | 10. Reducción de las desigualdades |
| 2. Hambre cero | 11. Ciudades y comunidades sostenibles |
| 3. Salud y bienestar | 12. Producción y consumo saludables |
| 4. Educación de calidad | 13. Acción por el clima |
| 5. Igualdad de género | 14. Vida submarina |
| 6. Agua limpia y saneamiento | 15. Vida de ecosistemas terrestres |
| 7. Energía asequible y no contaminante | 16. Paz, justicia e instituciones sólidas |
| 8. Trabajo decente y crecimiento económico | 17. Alianzas para lograr los objetivos |
| 9. Industria, innovación e infraestructura | |

2. ODS (ONU)

Los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenibles (ODS), establecidos por la Organización de las Naciones Unidas (ONU) en 2015, constituyen un grupo de 17 metas a alcanzar por los estados miembros de la organización para erradicar la pobreza, proteger el planeta y asegurar una mayor y responsable prosperidad ecosistémica. Estos objetivos se constituyeron como parte de una nueva agenda de desarrollo sostenible (Agenda 2030) en donde cada uno de ellos tiene metas específicas a alcanzar al año 2030.

ODS 1. Fin de la Pobreza. Poner fin a la pobreza en todas sus formas en todo el mundo.

ODS 2. Hambre Cero. Poner fin al hambre, lograr la seguridad alimentaria y la mejora de la nutrición y promover la agricultura sostenible.

ODS 3. Salud y Bienestar. Garantizar una vida sana y promover el bienestar para todos y todas, en todas las edades.

ODS 4. Educación de Calidad. Garantizar una educación inclusiva, equitativa y de calidad y promover oportunidades de aprendizaje durante toda la vida para todos y todas.

ODS 5. Igualdad de Género. Lograr la igualdad entre los géneros y empoderar a todas las mujeres y las niñas.

ODS 6. Agua Limpia y Saneamiento. Garantizar la disponibilidad de agua y su gestión sostenible y el saneamiento para todos.

ODS 7. Energía Asequible y No Contaminante. Garantizar el acceso a una energía asequible, segura, sostenible y moderna para todos y todas.

ODS 8. Trabajo Decente y Crecimiento Económico. Promover el crecimiento económico sostenido, inclusivo y sostenible, el empleo pleno y productivo y el trabajo decente para todos y todas.

ODS 9. Industria, Innovación e Infraestructura. Construir infraestructuras resilientes, promover la industrialización inclusiva y sostenible y fomentar la innovación.

ODS 10. Reducción de las Desigualdades. Reducir la desigualdad en y entre los países.

ODS 11. Ciudades y Comunidades Sostenibles. Lograr que las ciudades y los asentamientos humanos sean inclusivos, seguros, resilientes y sostenibles.

ODS 12. Producción y Consumo Responsables. Garantizar modalidades de consumo y producción sostenibles.

ODS 13. Acción por el Clima. Adoptar medidas urgentes para combatir el cambio climático y sus efectos.

ODS 14. Vida Submarina. Conservar y utilizar en forma sostenible los océanos, los mares y los recursos marinos para el desarrollo sostenible.

ODS 15. Vida de Ecosistemas Terrestres. Proteger, restablecer y promover el uso sostenible de los ecosistemas terrestres, gestionar los bosques de forma sostenible, luchar contra la desertificación, detener e invertir la degradación de las tierras y poner freno a la pérdida de la diversidad biológica.

ODS 16. Paz, Justicia e Instituciones Sólidas. Promover sociedades pacíficas e inclusivas para el desarrollo sostenible, proporcionar acceso a la justicia para todos y construir instituciones eficaces, responsables e inclusivas en todos los niveles.

ODS 17. Alianzas para los Objetivos. Fortalecer los medios de implementación y revitalizar la asociación mundial para el desarrollo sostenible.

El cambio climático

Variación que experimenta el clima del planeta Tierra atribuible directa o indirectamente a la acción antrópica, ya sea por el aumento en el uso de combustibles fósiles y otros procesos industriales, que resulta en la alteración de la composición de la atmósfera, con mayor presencia de dióxido de carbono y otros gases de efecto invernadero (GEI), lo que se traduce en un aumento de las temperaturas medias del planeta y conlleva a una alteración del clima mundial con la presencia de mayores y recurrentes eventos extremos, entre los que caben las mega inundaciones y las mega sequías.

3. El cambio climático

El Cambio Climático es la variación que experimenta el clima del planeta Tierra atribuible directa o indirectamente a la acción antrópica, ya sea por el aumento en el uso de combustibles fósiles u otros procesos industriales, que resulta en la alteración de la composición de la atmósfera, con mayor presencia de dióxido de carbono y otros gases de efecto invernadero (GEI), lo que se traduce en un aumento de las temperaturas medias del planeta y conlleva a una alteración del clima mundial con la presencia de mayores y recurrentes eventos extremos, entre los que caben las mega inundaciones y las mega sequías, entre otros.

Los principales gases de efecto invernadero (GEI) son el dióxido de carbono (CO_2), que se genera a través de la quema de combustibles fósiles tales como el carbón, el gas natural y el petróleo; por la quema de residuos sólidos orgánicos (árboles) y como resultado de reacciones químicas. El metano (CH_4), liberado a la atmósfera a través de prácticas ganaderas, agrícolas y por descomposición de residuos orgánicos. El óxido nitroso (N_2O), por las actividades agrícolas e industriales, por combustión de combustibles fósiles y residuos sólidos y por el tratamiento de aguas residuales. Los gases fluorados: hidrofluorocarbonos, perfluorocarbonos, hexafluoruro de azufre,

trifluoruro de nitrógeno son todos GEI de tipo sintético que se emiten a través de variados procesos industriales y poseen un alto potencial de calentamiento de la atmósfera terrestre. Súmanse a estos, el vapor de agua y el ozono.

De esta manera, la energía, la industria, el transporte, la construcción urbana, la agricultura y el uso del suelo se encuentran entre las principales causas de emisión de GEI a la atmósfera terrestre y como la Tierra es un sistema, y actúa como tal, todos los cambios que ocurran en una determinada zona o área del planeta terminan repercutiendo en todas las demás zonas de este.

Los acuerdos globales y los convenios marco que se han instaurado en el planeta, con el consenso y compromiso de la gran mayoría de las naciones, tienen como finalidad guiar el progreso en el contexto de este cambio global que enfrenta la Tierra. Los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenibles, la Convención Marco de la Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático y el Acuerdo de París buscan en su conjunto, reducir las emisiones de GEI, adaptarse a los impactos climáticos, mitigar su efecto y financiar todos los ajustes que sean necesarios para el cumplimiento de estos objetivos.

El efecto invernadero

- El efecto invernadero es un fenómeno que permite la vida en el planeta Tierra.
- La radiación solar llega a nuestro planeta siendo absorbida, en parte, por las superficies terrestres y acuáticas de la Tierra; otra parte, es devuelta a la atmósfera quien debido a su composición gaseosa diversa impide la salida total de esta energía de rebote y vuelve a lanzarla sobre la superficie del planeta, permitiendo que las temperaturas sostenidas favorezcan el desarrollo de la vida

4. El efecto invernadero

El efecto invernadero es un fenómeno que permite la vida en el planeta Tierra. La radiación solar llega a nuestro planeta siendo absorbida, en parte, por las superficies terrestres y acuáticas de la Tierra; otra parte, es devuelta a la atmósfera quien debido a su composición gaseosa diversa impide la salida total de esta energía de rebote y vuelve a lanzarla sobre la superficie del planeta, permitiendo que las temperaturas sostenidas favorezcan el desarrollo de la vida.

Es importante enfatizar que el efecto invernadero que se presenta en nuestro planeta es un fenómeno natural que permite mantener un nivel medio de temperatura, en la superficie de este, que favorece el desarrollo de la vida en la Tierra y que ha perdurado como tal desde el comienzo de la actividad biológica en el planeta hace ya aproximadamente 4.500 millones de años. La presencia de este efecto de invernadero resulta esencial para mantener la vida tal y como la conocemos hoy, puesto que en su ausencia nuestro planeta alcanzaría una temperatura media de aproximadamente 20°C bajo cero.

El problema asociado a este efecto natural se denomina calentamiento global y es la consecuencia de la acumulación de gases de efecto invernadero (GEI), alguno de ellos de carácter sintético (producidos por el hombre), en la atmósfera terrestre producto de la actividad industrial

y de avance tecnológico sostenidos que ha experimentado el desarrollo de la sociedad humana a partir de mediados del siglo 18.

La acumulación de GEI en la atmósfera terrestre, producto de la actividad antrópica, ha llevado a la aparición de un efecto invernadero adicional al natural y propio del planeta, lo que ha provocado que la temperatura media de la Tierra suba por sobre su media histórica de aproximadamente 1.5°C afectando a los ecosistemas y modificando las condiciones del clima terrestre. La temperatura promedio de nuestro planeta ya ha subido en un grado Celsius con respecto a la era industrial y resulta imperativo, por lo tanto, hacer los esfuerzos necesarios y conjuntos para evitar que ésta siga aumentando. Un aumento de la temperatura media terrestre en más de 1,5°C generaría un aumento de fenómenos climáticos extremos que tendrían un impacto directo, entre otros, en el derretimiento de los hielos, el aumento del nivel del mar y consecuentemente, la inundación de ciudades costeras, una mayor presencia de huracanes devastadores, migración forzada de las poblaciones, desertificación y la pérdida de biodiversidad.

Acción por el clima: Metas del ODS 13

1. Fortalecer la resiliencia y la capacidad de adaptación a los riesgos relacionados con el clima y los desastres naturales en todos los países.
2. Incorporar medidas relativas al cambio climático en las políticas, estrategias y planes nacionales.
3. Mejorar la educación, la sensibilización y la capacidad humana e institucional respecto de la mitigación del cambio climático, la adaptación a él, la reducción de sus efectos y la alerta temprana.
4. Cumplir el compromiso de los países desarrollados que son partes en la Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático de lograr para el año 2020 el objetivo de movilizar conjuntamente 100.000 millones de dólares anuales a fin de atender las necesidades de los países desarrollados.

5. Acción por el clima: Metas del ODS 13

Las metas del Objetivo de Desarrollo Sostenible “Acción por el Clima” (ODS 13) son:

1. Fortalecer la resiliencia y la capacidad de adaptación a los riesgos relacionados con el clima y los desastres naturales en todos los países.
2. Incorporar medidas relativas al cambio climático en las políticas, estrategias y planes nacionales.
3. Mejorar la educación, la sensibilización y la capacidad humana e institucional respecto de la mitigación del cambio climático, la adaptación a él, la reducción de sus efectos y la alerta temprana.
4. Cumplir el compromiso de los países desarrollados que son partes en la Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático de lograr para el año 2020 el objetivo de movilizar conjuntamente 100.000 millones de dólares anuales a fin de atender las necesidades de los países desarrollados.

Estas metas no han tenido los avances que se esperaban respecto de los compromisos y la buena voluntad manifestada de los 193 estados

firmantes del Acuerdo de París en la 21ª Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático (COP21). La desaceleración económica mundial producto de la pandemia, cuyos efectos están siendo visualizados recién ahora, ha significado que la crisis climática continúe sin grandes variaciones en cuanto al cumplimiento de las metas propuestas. Resulta por tanto imprescindible proseguir con mayores esfuerzos hacia el objetivo de reducir las emisiones de los GEI y fortalecer la resiliencia al cambio climático. Las economías deben orientarse hacia la neutralidad del carbono y adaptarse a los efectos del cambio climático, lo que los estados comprometidos con el Acuerdo de París realizan voluntariamente a través de sus Contribuciones Determinadas a nivel Nacional (CDN) en donde cada estado prepara, comunica y mantiene las CDN que espera alcanzar. En mayo de 2021, 192 firmantes habían enviado sus primeras CDN a la Secretaría de la Convención Marco sobre el Cambio Climático, y en las cuales las áreas prioritarias identificadas en los componentes de adaptación de las CDN fueron ecosistemas terrestres y de humedales; Seguridad alimentaria y Producción de alimentos.

Vida de ecosistemas terrestres: Metas del ODS 15 (I)

1. Para 2020, velar por la conservación, el restablecimiento y el uso sostenible de los ecosistemas terrestres.
2. Para 2020, promover la gestión sostenible de todos los tipos de bosques y poner fin a la deforestación.
3. Para 2030, luchar contra la desertificación, rehabilitar las tierras y los suelos degradados.
4. Para 2030, velar por la conservación de los ecosistemas montañosos, incluida su diversidad biológica.
5. Adoptar medidas urgentes y significativas para reducir la degradación de los hábitats naturales.
6. Promover la participación justa y equitativa en los beneficios que se deriven de la utilización de los recursos genéticos.
7. Adoptar medidas urgentes para poner fin a la caza furtiva y el tráfico de especies protegidas de flora y fauna y abordar la demanda y la oferta ilegales de productos silvestres.
8. Para 2020, adoptar medidas para prevenir la introducción de especies exóticas invasoras.
9. Para 2020, integrar los valores de los ecosistemas y la diversidad biológica en la planificación nacional y local.

6. Vida de ecosistemas terrestres: Metas del ODS 15 (I)

Las metas del Objetivo de Desarrollo Sostenible “Vida de Ecosistemas Terrestres” (ODS 15) son:

1. Para 2020, velar por la conservación, el restablecimiento y el uso sostenible de los ecosistemas terrestres y los ecosistemas interiores de agua dulce y los servicios que proporcionan, en particular los bosques, los humedales, las montañas y las zonas áridas, en consonancia con las obligaciones contraídas en virtud de acuerdos internacionales.
2. Para 2020, promover la gestión sostenible de todos los tipos de bosques, poner fin a la deforestación, recuperar los bosques degradados e incrementar la forestación y la reforestación a nivel mundial.
3. Para 2030, luchar contra la desertificación, rehabilitar las tierras y los suelos degradados, incluidas las tierras afectadas por la desertificación, la sequía y las inundaciones, y procurar lograr un mundo con una degradación neutra del suelo.
4. Para 2030, velar por la conservación de los ecosistemas montañosos, incluida su diversidad biológica, a fin de mejorar su capacidad de proporcionar beneficios esenciales para el desarrollo sostenible.

5. Adoptar medidas urgentes y significativas para reducir la degradación de los hábitats naturales, detener la pérdida de diversidad biológica y, para 2020, proteger las especies amenazadas y evitar su extinción.
6. Promover la participación justa y equitativa en los beneficios que se deriven de la utilización de los recursos genéticos y promover el acceso adecuado a esos recursos, como se ha convenido internacionalmente.
7. Adoptar medidas urgentes para poner fin a la caza furtiva y el tráfico de especies protegidas de flora y fauna y abordar la demanda y la oferta ilegales de productos silvestres.
8. Para 2020, adoptar medidas para prevenir la introducción de especies exóticas invasoras y reducir de forma significativa sus efectos en los ecosistemas terrestres y acuáticos y controlar o erradicar las especies prioritarias.
9. Para 2020, integrar los valores de los ecosistemas y la diversidad biológica en la planificación nacional y local, los procesos de desarrollo, las estrategias de reducción de la pobreza y la contabilidad.

Vida de ecosistemas terrestres: Metas del ODS 15 (II)

- Las actividades humanas están provocando el deterioro de la biodiversidad más acelerado de la historia
- El 28% de las especies evaluadas por la Unión Internacional para la Conservación de la Naturaleza (UICN) están en peligro de extinción.
- La protección de áreas clave de biodiversidad (ACB) resulta vital para la conservación de los ecosistemas terrestres
- Los bosques albergan la mayor cantidad de la biodiversidad mundial
- Para Europa y América Latina y el Caribe tenemos niveles de cambio positivo con relación a reserva de biomasa forestal sobre el suelo y proporción de superficie forestal en zonas protegidas
- El ODS 15 es sin duda alguna de vital importancia para la Agenda 2030.

7. Vida de ecosistemas terrestres: Metas del ODS 15 (II)

Como lo señala el Informe de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenibles de la ONU, del año 2021, las actividades humanas están provocando el deterioro de la biodiversidad más acelerado de la historia de la humanidad. El 28% de las especies evaluadas (más de 37.400 especies) por la Unión Internacional para la Conservación de la Naturaleza (UICN), para su lista roja, están en peligro de extinción. Entre éstas, 41% de anfibios, 34% de coníferas, 33% de arrecifes de coral, 26% de mamíferos y un 14% de aves; las principales causas son el desarrollo agrícola y el urbano; la caza y la pesca no fiscalizada, la tala y las especies exóticas invasoras.

La protección de áreas clave de biodiversidad (ACB) resulta vital para la conservación de los ecosistemas terrestres, de agua dulce y de montaña. Al 2020 no más del 45% de las ACB estaban al interior de áreas protegidas. Los bosques albergan la mayor cantidad de la biodiversidad mundial. Son ecosistemas vitales para regular el ciclo del agua, los procesos de evapotranspiración, los ciclos de los nutrientes edáficos; regulan el cambio climático y forman parte de todas las interacciones bióticas y abióticas de los ecosistemas terrestres.

Sin embargo, la ordenación forestal sostenible se mantiene y avanza como medio de mantener y aumentar el valor económico, social y ambiental de los bosques y de esta forma, protegerles. Al año 2021 los indicadores de la gestión forestal sostenible a nivel mundial indicaban para Europa y América Latina y el Caribe una concordancia en cuanto a niveles de cambio positivo con relación a, reserva de biomasa forestal sobre el suelo, proporción de superficie forestal en zonas protegidas y legalmente establecidas, proporción de superficie forestal bajo planes de protección a largo plazo y en superficie forestal certificada.

El ODS 15 es ciertamente, un Objetivo de Desarrollo Sostenible ambicioso, pero sin duda alguna, de vital importancia para la Agenda 2030, transformándose en un eje sostenedor fundamental para la sobrevivencia del planeta.

La UE y ALC frente a la situación mundial del clima y los ecosistemas terrestres

Revertir tendencias en relación a:

- Deforestación
- Biodiversidad
- Políticas de Cambio climático**

Avance modesto en las metas trazadas para los ODS.

Principal causa:

Grado de pobreza de países de la región, principalmente, el Caribe

Principales desafíos:

- Reducir emisiones de GEI de los países en desarrollo
- Generación y tratamiento de residuos
- Uso sostenible de los recursos naturales
- Conservación de los ecosistemas**
- Aumento de datos para cuantificación efectiva

Principales (y urgentes) desafíos:

- ODS 9 industria, innovación e infraestructura
- ODS 10 reducción de las desigualdades
- ODS 15 vida en ecosistemas terrestres**
- ODS 16 paz, justicia e instituciones sólidas

8. La UE y ALC frente a ODS 13 y ODS 15

El informe de la Comisión Europea de 2022 sobre el estado de avance en el logro de las metas para el desarrollo sostenible, indica que la región deberá hacer un gran esfuerzo si quiere alcanzar los objetivos propuestos al 2030. En términos generales, con respecto a los temas de clima y ambiente, la UE debe revertir urgentemente las tendencias en torno a la deforestación, la biodiversidad y las políticas de cambio climático. En esta última, las emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero (GEI) de los estados en desarrollo siguen aumentando a pesar del esfuerzo de los países en desarrollo de la UE en donde estas concentraciones de GEI efectivamente si están disminuyendo. En las otras áreas los principales desafíos se concentran en las áreas críticas relacionadas con generación y tratamiento de residuos, uso sostenible de los recursos naturales y la conservación de los ecosistemas. Se destaca también en el informe, que al menos un 40% de las metas no pueden medirse debido a la falta de datos de varias regiones de la UE y esto causa un grave problema para el progreso en la consecución de las metas de la Agenda.

La región de América Latina y el Caribe (ALC) evidencia tendencias a un estancamiento en el cumplimiento de la mayoría de los ODS y existe una alta probabilidad de no alcanzar el cumplimiento de metas al 2030.

En términos globales se alcanza un avance modesto en las metas trazadas, con un rezago significativo principalmente en las naciones del Caribe. Estos resultados están asociados, en la mayoría de los casos, al grado de pobreza de los países de la región. Los tres ODS con peor desempeño promedio en ALC, que se constituyen a su vez en los principales (y urgentes) desafíos para la región, son el ODS 9, industria, innovación e infraestructura; el ODS 10, reducción de las desigualdades; el ODS 15, vida en ecosistemas terrestres; y el ODS 16, paz, justicia e instituciones sólidas. El mejor resultado, a la fecha, en cuanto a avances en las metas establecidas en la Agenda 2030 lo alcanza el ODS 13, Acción por el Clima.

ODS 13 y ODS 15 en la Cooperación Birregional UE-ALC: Prioridades Comunes

Biodiversidad - Cambio Climático - Contaminación y Gestión De Residuos + Economía Circular

Biodiversidad:

1. Gestión integrada de paisajes terrestres y marinos
2. Implementación de soluciones basadas en la naturaleza
3. Gestión integrada de paisajes terrestres y marinos
4. Implementación de soluciones basadas en la naturaleza
5. Finanzas públicas y privadas con fines ecológicos
6. Justicia ambiental y turismo sostenible
7. Gestión del conocimiento y la información científica (monitoreo sobre biodiversidad)

Cambio climático:

1. Fortalecer financiamiento público y privado para mitigar y adaptarse al cambio climático
2. Implementación de soluciones basadas en la naturaleza
3. Transición a cero emisiones de carbono en energía, transporte y la construcción
4. ALC deberán incorporar tecnologías para alcanzar carbono neutralidad (uso de hidrógeno verde)

9. Prioridades Comunes UE-ALC frente a ODS 13 y 15

El marco internacional de trabajo conjunto y colaborativo entre la UE y ALC, al alero del Acuerdo de París y de la Agenda 2030, está constituido por los ODS 7 (energía asequible y sostenible), ODS 11 (ciudades y comunidades sostenibles), ODS 12 (producción y consumo responsable), ODS 13 (acción por el clima), ODS 14 (vida submarina) y el ODS 15 (vida de ecosistemas terrestres). Entre las materias que ha establecido recientemente la UE se deben profundizar con sus socios de ALC está el de impulsar la transformación hacia una economía verde. En el documento emanado de las partes se señala que ambas regiones deben caminar hacia una producción y consumo más sostenibles. En marzo de 2021, la Dirección General de Asociaciones Internacionales de la Comisión Europea y el Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Medio Ambiente (PNUMA) anunciaron las prioridades comunes para la cooperación ambiental entre la UE y ALC para los próximos cinco años. Las tres áreas principales serán: biodiversidad, cambio climático, y contaminación y gestión de residuos y economía circular. Para el ámbito de la biodiversidad, fortalecer una gestión integrada de los paisajes terrestres y marinos, con especial énfasis en la planificación del uso del suelo y la restauración de los ecosistemas; la inclusión de la biodiversidad en todas las políticas mediante la implementación de

soluciones basadas en la naturaleza, las finanzas públicas y privadas con fines ecológicos, la justicia ambiental y el desarrollo de un turismo sostenible; y el mejoramiento en la gestión del conocimiento y la información científica para hacerse parte de la formulación de políticas ad-hoc, con especial referencia al monitoreo y verificación de la información sobre biodiversidad. En el ámbito de la acción climática figuran como relevantes, el fortalecimiento del financiamiento público y privado para la mitigación y adaptación al cambio climático; implementación de soluciones basadas en la naturaleza, crucial para alcanzar los objetivos climáticos al mismo tiempo que permiten conservar la biodiversidad; y una transición hacia cero emisiones de carbono en energía, el transporte y la construcción. En este último aspecto, ALC deberán desarrollar políticas más ambiciosas, aumentar las inversiones para este fin e incorporar tecnologías que apunten a carbono neutralidad, como, por ejemplo, tecnología para el uso de hidrógeno verde.



10. El Futuro

En la edición 2021 del Informe de Desarrollo Sostenible de Naciones Unidas se presentan los avances y retrocesos de 165 países en materias relacionadas con la implementación de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenibles (ODS) comprometidos para el período 2020-2030. Los avances significativos de muchas regiones previos a la pandemia se han visto limitados en su avance por el Covid 19, haciendo en muchos casos, inviable su concreción al año 2030, algo que estaba totalmente fuera de cualquier planificación en 2015 cuando surgen los ODS al alero del Acuerdo de París. Se necesitará entonces, reforzar la cooperación birregional entre la UE y ALC fortaleciendo los mecanismos multilaterales de colaboración, que potencien (y aceleren, en lo posible) las metas propuestas en relación con el cumplimiento de los ODS, los cuales serán clave para una gobernanza global sólida de la mano de la Agenda 2030.

Con un territorio que es rico y abundante en recursos naturales, que posee ecosistemas únicos en el planeta, que cobija una biodiversidad de gran riqueza genética y cuya taxonomía es aun incompletamente conocida, ALC es un socio valioso y estratégico para el trabajo multilateral de cooperación con otras regiones del planeta en el ámbito del Cambio Global. La UE así lo ha entendido y ha puesto a disposición

de esta cooperación su propia experiencia en los temas ambientales, colaborando con tecnologías de alto impacto y su enorme experiencia en la obtención de financiamiento para proyectos asociados a la sostenibilidad ambiental, lo que incluye la elaboración y difusión de iniciativas gubernamentales y no gubernamentales desarrolladas con la propia ciudadanía en temas de educación ambiental para fortalecer una gobernanza más empoderada en la participación de los temas ambientales.

En relación con el futuro inmediato, las concentraciones de los GEI en la atmósfera siguen aumentando y la pérdida de biodiversidad es acelerada e insuficientemente posible de cuantificar. De esta manera, la reconfiguración de la cooperación birregional UE-ALC post pandemia, en el tema ambiental, es incierta. Sin embargo; los esfuerzos, los compromisos y las buenas intenciones de ambas regiones están, y la Agenda 2030 sigue en curso.

Lecturas recomendadas

1. Ayuso, A. (2019). The EU and LAC: united by the commitment to sustainable development. Why should the European Union be relevant to Latin America and the Caribbean? And why should Latin America and the Caribbean be relevant to the European Union? (EULAC Bulletin 07/2019), 10-12. https://eu-lacfoundation.org/sites/default/files/documents/ESP_IMP_d.pdf
2. Pajín, L. (2021). Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean face the challenge of a just, inclusive, and sustainable recovery. Pensamiento Iberoamericano, ISSN 0212-0208 (11), 31-41. <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=8157318>
3. United Nations. (2021). Report on the Sustainable Development Goals 2021. <https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2021/The-Sustainable-Development-Goals-Report-2021.pdf>
4. United Nations. (n.d.-a). SDG 13: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its effects. <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/es/climate-change-2/>
5. United Nations. (n.d.-b). SDG 15: Sustainably manage forests, fight desertification, halt and reverse land degradation, halt biodiversity loss. <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/es/biodiversity/>

Preguntas para el debate

1. ¿Por qué se hace necesario comprender que el cambio climático es sólo una de las causas que contribuyen al cambio global?
2. Respecto de Acción por el Clima, ¿por qué las metas del ODS 13 no han tenido los avances que se esperaban?
3. Respecto de Vida en Ecosistemas Terrestres, ¿por qué se señala que las actividades humanas están provocando el deterioro de la biodiversidad más acelerado de la historia de la humanidad?

Lecture 14: Migraciones y Global Compact en la relación UE-América Latina

Millán Requena Casanova

Migraciones y Global Compact en la relación UE – ALC

Millán Requena Casanova

Hipervínculo al [vídeo](#)

Hipervínculo a las [diapositivas](#)

Contenido

1. Crisis de desplazamiento forzado
2. ¿Qué Significa una Migración Segura, Ordenada y Regular?
3. Gobernanza Mundial de la Migración y la “Agenda 2030”
4. El Pacto Migratorio Mundial: Origen y adopción
5. El Pacto Migratorio Mundial: Principios y Objetivos
6. Posición de la UE en relación con el Pacto Mundial
7. Implementación del Pacto en la UE
8. Aplicación del Pacto Mundial en ALC
9. Seguimiento del Pacto Mundial en América Latina y el Caribe
10. Conclusiones

Crisis de desplazamiento forzado

- En 2021, según el Departamento de Asuntos Económicos y Sociales de las NN.UU., la cifra de migrantes internacionales sigue en aumento: 272 millones de personas migrantes (incluidos refugiados y desplazados).
- En 2022, la mayor crisis de desplazamientos forzados desde la 2ª Guerra Mundial: en Europa (guerra en Ucrania) y en ALC (crisis en Venezuela; en Haití, etc.)
- Se trata de flujos migratorios, “mixtos”: migrantes y refugiados (incluidos “desplazados de guerra” y “climáticos”).
- La crisis sanitaria de la COVID-19 ha exacerbado las desigualdades y las situaciones de vulnerabilidad de los migrantes (libre circulación, trabajo decente, falta de acceso a la atención sanitaria, xenofobia, discriminación, etc.)

1. Crisis de desplazamiento forzado

1. Crisis de desplazamiento forzado. Estamos ante la mayor crisis de desplazamiento forzado desde la 2ª Guerra Mundial, caracterizada por estar integrada por flujos migratorios “mixtos”. Se trata de “migrantes de supervivencia” - personas que no pueden vivir en sus países de origen bien por causa de violencia grave, por conflictos armados, desastres naturales o por efecto del cambio climático -, que transitan por las mismas rutas migratorias que los solicitantes de asilo/refugio o protección internacional.
2. Se trata de flujos migratorios “mixtos”: migrantes económicos y refugiados (bien en la categoría jurídica de refugiado/asilado o de “refugiados de guerra”). En Europa, la guerra en Ucrania, provocada por la agresión de la Federación Rusa el 24 de febrero de 2022, ha provocado un éxodo sin precedentes desde la 2ª GM. Según ACNUR, se registran más de 8 millones desplazados procedentes de Ucrania en países de la UE; así como más de 6 millones de desplazados internos en otras partes de Ucrania. En la región de Latinoamérica y el Caribe, se constatan tendencias y patrones migratorios consolidados; en particular, en esta región los foros consultivos de cooperación migratoria reflejan un constante flujo de personas procedentes de ciertos países como; Venezuela, ante la

grave situación de violación de los derechos humanos (casi 6 millones de venezolanos se han desplazado hacia países de América del Sur); Haití, cuya persistente crisis humanitaria genera desplazamientos a gran escala hacia esta misma subregión; o el denominado “Triángulo Norte de Centroamérica” (formado por El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras), que manifiesta un constante movimiento migratorio hacia EE.UU., muy condicionado por motivos laborales.

3. La crisis sanitaria de la COVID-19. La pandemia de la COVID ha exacerbado las desigualdades y las situaciones de vulnerabilidad de los migrantes y refugiados: libre circulación, trabajo decente, atención sanitaria, xenofobia, discriminación racial, etc.

¿Que significa una migración segura, ordenada y regular?

- La OIM definió estas categorías para ayudar en las negociaciones conducentes al Pacto Mundial, y plantea que:
 1. Migración “segura”: bienestar y seguridad de los migrantes **Seguridad humana**.
 2. Migración “ordenada”: derecho del Estado a regular la entrada de nacionales de otros países. Perspectiva de **seguridad nacional**.
 3. Migración “regular”: que la migración se haga a través de **canales reconocidos y autorizados**
- En el Pacto Migratorio Mundial y en los ODS vamos a encontrar un equilibrio entre esas tres ideas:
 - Seguridad humana
 - Seguridad nacional
 - Canales reconocidos y autorizados

2. ¿Qué significa una migración segura, ordenada y regular?

La Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM) definió estas categorías para ayudar en las negociaciones conducentes al Pacto Migratorio Mundial. La OIM entiende que:

1. Migración “segura”: se refiere a bienestar y seguridad de los migrantes. Se plantea desde una concepción de seguridad humana. Ahora bien, se advierte una deliberada política de contención de las migraciones que en las últimas décadas ha hecho que la migración se plantee desde una perspectiva de seguridad (“globalismo fronterizo”). Prueba de ello es el reciente debate en el seno del Consejo Europeo sobre la financiación con fondos europeos de muros y alambradas para proteger las fronteras externas de la Unión (Conclusiones del Consejo Europeo, de 9 de febrero de 2023), lo que tiene implicaciones directas en el respeto de los derechos de los migrantes y en su capacidad para pedir asilo.
2. Migración “ordenada”: se refiere al desplazamiento de una persona de acuerdo a las leyes y reglamentos que rigen la entrada y el tránsito al país de acogida. Se relaciona con el derecho del Estado a regular la entrada de nacionales de otros países (perspectiva de seguridad nacional).

3. Migración “regular”: se refiere a que la migración se lleve a cabo a través de canales reconocidos y autorizados.

Tanto en el Pacto Migratorio Mundial como en los Objetivos de Desarrollo sostenible (ODS) existe un equilibrio entre estas tres ideas. Sin embargo, instrumentos regionales de cooperación migratoria, como el Pacto Europeo sobre Migración y Asilo, adoptado en 2020 por la Comisión Europea, se advierte una clara preferencia por la perspectiva de seguridad frente a los derechos de los migrantes.

Gobernanza mundial de la migración y la “Agenda 2030”

- **¿Qué es la gobernanza mundial de la migración?** Se define como “normas y estructuras organizativas que regulan el trabajo colectivo de los Estados de forma que les permitan cumplir sus **objetivos migratorios**”.
- Con la **Agenda 2030** y los **ODS** se inicia la “gobernanza mundial de la migración”. Los **ODS** integran una concepción común de la migración (párr. 29 de la Resolución)
- Se reconoce la positiva contribución de los migrantes al desarrollo inclusivo del **desarrollo sostenible**, se considera la migración internacional como una realidad **pluridimensional** de gran pertinencia para el desarrollo de los países de origen, tránsito y destino, respetando los derechos humanos y dispensando un trato humanitario a los migrantes, sea cual sea su estatus migratorio
- La meta 10.7 especifica este objetivo, en virtud del cual los Estados se comprometen a facilitar la migración y la movilidad ordenada, segura y regular, incluso mediante la aplicación de políticas migratorias planificadas y bien gestionadas
- La meta 10.7 es la piedra angular del componente migratorio de los ODS. Aunque las Metas 8.7 (erradicar el trabajo forzoso) y 8.8. (derechos laborales) tienen un componente migratorio

3. Gobernanza mundial de la migración y la “Agenda 2030”

Se advierte una tendencia entre los Estados a favorecer un marco multilateral de la migración, capaz de abordar este fenómeno multidimensional con un enfoque mundial.

La gobernanza mundial de la migración se puede definir como “normas y estructuras organizativas que regulan el trabajo colectivo de los Estados de forma que les permitan cumplir sus objetivos migratorios mejor de lo que lo harían actuando solos”.

Con la adopción de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible (“Agenda 2030”) se inicia la gobernanza mundial de la migración; sin embargo, la principal objeción a esta gobernanza mundial es la dificultad para establecer límites a la soberanía de los Estados. Además, plantea la división entre países emisores y receptores en un contexto más amplio de lo que es la división Norte/Sur, con perspectivas encontradas entre estos grupos de Estados. Desde 2015, los diálogos “informales” de los Estados miembros de las NN.UU. van a permitir que la migración se vincule por primera vez a los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible (ODS). La Agenda 2030 articula una concepción común de la migración, en torno a varios elementos; reconoce la positiva contribución de los migrantes al desarrollo sostenible; considera que las migraciones

internacionales son una realidad pluridimensional, de gran pertinencia para el desarrollo de los países de origen, tránsito y destino; pero siempre respetando los derechos humanos de los migrantes, dispensando un trato humanitario a las personas que emigran, sea cual sea su estatus migratorio, así como a los refugiados y desplazados. En concreto, la Meta 10.7 de los ODS especifica que los Estados se comprometen a:

“facilitar la migración y la movilidad ordenada, segura y regular, incluso mediante la aplicación de políticas migratorias planificadas y bien gestionadas”.

Esta Meta 10.7 es la piedra angular del componente migratorio de los ODS, aunque también hay otras metas (8.7; 8.8) que se refieren a la gestión de la migración. En todo caso, los ODS suponen un cambio de paradigma, pues conllevan el reconocimiento del papel de la migración como factor acelerador del desarrollo sostenible.

El Pacto Migratorio Mundial (Global Compact): Origen y Adopción

- **Declaración de Nueva York para los Migrantes y Refugiados (2016)**. Apoyo de la UE y del bloque latinoamericano
- Para alcanzar los compromisos adoptados en la Declaración de Nueva York, en su Anexo II se fija el inicio de un proceso de negociación para adoptar un Pacto mundial para la migración segura, ordenada y regular
- Como resultado de las negociaciones intergubernamentales, el Proyecto de Documento final del Pacto Mundial se aprobó en Marrakech, siendo ratificado por la AG de las NN.UU. el 19 de diciembre de 2018 con el voto favorable de la gran mayoría de los EM y de ALC (salvo Chile).

4. El Pacto Migratorio Mundial (Global Compact): Origen y Adopción

Origen: En 2016, bajo los auspicios de las NN.UU., se iniciaron dos procesos de consultas intergubernamentales que condujeron a la adopción de un Pacto Mundial sobre Refugiados; así como al Pacto Mundial para la Migración Segura, Ordenada y Regular, respectivamente. El marco jurídico internacional de los derechos de los refugiados está mejor definido que el de los migrantes. Este marco normativo se ancla en la Convención sobre el Estatuto de los Refugiados, de 1951, que garantiza un núcleo básico de derechos para los refugiados y vincula una Organización Internacional - el Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados (ACNUR) -, a la supervisión de dicho régimen. Por el contrario, los migrantes no disponen de un marco convencional sólido.

La Declaración de Nueva York, adoptada en septiembre de 2016, proporciona un punto de partida sólido para los dos Pactos, porque reafirma el compromiso de los pactos con la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos y los tratados multilaterales de derechos humanos. Si bien la Declaración de Nueva York señala que los refugiados y los migrantes tienen los mismos derechos humanos universales y libertades (párrafo 6), se mantuvo una distinción clara entre ambas

categorías jurídicas, que en el Pacto Migratorio Mundial se expresa en los siguientes términos:

“Los migrantes y los refugiados constituyen dos grupos distintos que se rigen por marcos jurídicos separados. Solo los refugiados tienen derecho a una protección internacional específica, definida en el derecho internacional de los refugiados”.

Como resultado de las negociaciones intergubernamentales, el Proyecto de Documento final del Pacto Migratorio Mundial se aprobó en la ciudad de Marrakech (Marruecos), siendo adoptado por la AG de las Naciones Unidas el 19 de diciembre de 2018. El Pacto Mundial contó con el voto favorable de una mayoría de Estados de la UE (salvo 9) y también de los países de ALC (salvo Chile).

Principios y objetivos

- El **Pacto Mundial sobre Migración** se basa en diez Principios Rectores, entre ellos: centrarse en las personas; cooperación internacional; respeto de la soberanía nacional; Estado de Derecho y garantías procesales; desarrollo sostenible; derechos humanos; perspectiva de género; perspectiva infantil; enfoque pangubernamental.
- 1. El Pacto no es jurídicamente vinculante (instrumento soft law), pero tiene eficacia jurídica.
- 2. El Pacto Mundial aspira a la consecución de **23 objetivos concretos y medibles**.
- 3. Implementación: corresponde a los Estados, con mecanismos de apoyo (Red de Naciones Unidas sobre Migración).
- 4. Seguimiento y examen: cada 4 años en la AGNU, a través del Foro de Examen de la Migración Internacional (el primero, en junio de 2022).

5. El Pacto Migratorio Mundial: Principios y objetivos

El Pacto Mundial para la Migración Segura, Ordenada y Regular se basa en diez Principios Rectores, entre otros: centrarse en las personas, cooperación internacional, soberanía nacional, Estado de Derecho y garantías procesales, desarrollo sostenible, derechos humanos, perspectiva de género, perspectiva infantil, y un enfoque pansocial.

1. El primer elemento del Pacto Mundial incluye el principio de cooperación multilateral en el ámbito de las NN.UU. El Pacto es un instrumento “jurídicamente no vinculante” (soft law): una resolución de la Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas (AGNU). Por tanto, el Pacto no crea obligaciones jurídicas para los Estados (por ejemplo, la obligación de admitir a los migrantes) ni tampoco derechos para las personas migrantes en los países receptores.
2. El segundo elemento del Pacto lo componen 23 objetivos, que ofrecen un enfoque muy completo de la cooperación internacional en materia migratoria. Cada objetivo se acompaña de varios compromisos, que los países signatarios pueden aplicar, siempre que lo consideren oportuno, para alcanzar el objetivo declarado. Por tanto, el Pacto se concibe como un marco de cooperación que establece reglas comunes, concretado en 23 objetivos, y cubre todas

las etapas de los movimientos migratorios: la etapa de preparación (objetivos 3, 13, 12, 14); la etapa actual de los movimientos, con énfasis en la idea de fronteras estables y bien gestionadas (objetivo 11) y una clara distinción entre migración regular e irregular (objetivos 7, 8, 9, 10 y 13); la etapa de integración de los migrantes (objetivos 15 a 18); y, finalmente, la etapa del retorno, es decir, la posibilidad de que los flujos migratorios sean realmente reversibles (objetivos 20 a 22).

3. El tercer elemento del Pacto se refiere a la implementación, cuya responsabilidad corresponde a los Estados. Para respaldar sus esfuerzos, se previó un “mecanismo de creación de capacidad” que consiste en una plataforma de conocimientos, un centro de enlace y un fondo para la puesta en marcha de proyectos. También se torna relevante en este aspecto la Red de las Naciones Unidas sobre la Migración, coordinada por la OIM. Esta Red debe preparar un informe bienal, que será presentado a la Asamblea General sobre las medidas concretas en aplicación del Pacto Mundial.
4. El cuarto elemento del Pacto se refiere a su seguimiento y examen. Los progresos realizados se deben examinar, cada cuatro años, en la Asamblea General y, a partir del año 2022, en el marco específico del “Foro de Examen de la Migración Internacional”.

Esta división entre diferentes bloques de Estados miembros respecto al Pacto Mundial pone de relieve cómo la gestión de la migración ha socavado el papel de la UE a nivel internacional, así como su narrativa como actor normativo.

Posición de la UE en relación con el Pacto Mundial

- La UE planteó que el **Pacto Mundial** sea un instrumento no vinculante, y la importancia de diferenciar entre migrantes regulares e irregulares
- El Pacto Mundial **desarrolla plenamente los principios y valores de la UE**
- Sin embargo, el **Pacto Mundial** no ha sido aceptado por todos los EM:
 - Tres Estados miembros votaron en contra: Hungría, R. Checa y Polonia.
 - Seis Estados miembros se abstuvieron: Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Italia, Letonia y Eslovaquia.
 - No hay una posición uniforme entre la UE (sus Instituciones) y los Estados miembros.

6. Posición de la UE en relación con el Pacto Mundial

La Unión Europea sostuvo claramente que el Pacto Mundial es un instrumento no vinculante, subrayando la distinción jurídica entre migrantes “regulares” e “irregulares”. En cuanto a sus Instituciones de la UE, el Consejo Europeo acogió con satisfacción la adopción de la Declaración de Nueva York adoptada en 2016, mientras que el Parlamento Europeo destacó la relevancia de los avances conducentes al Pacto Mundial (resolución de 18 de abril de 2018). En suma, la UE mantuvo la unidad de acción durante las negociaciones que culminaron con la adopción del Pacto Migratorio Mundial. Por ejemplo, la Comisión Europea (“en nombre de los Estados miembros”) recordó “que los Estados deben proteger plenamente los derechos humanos de todos los migrantes, independientemente de su situación migratoria”.

Sin embargo, en la Conferencia de Marrakesh, en 2018, el Pacto Migratorio Mundial encontró el rechazo frontal de algunos Estados miembros (Hungría, R. Checa y Polonia), a lo que se agregó la abstención de Bulgaria, Italia, Letonia, Rumania y Austria. En consecuencia, la Comisión Europea no pudo comprometerse con el Pacto Mundial en nombre de la UE, lo que evidencia la ausencia de una

posición uniforme entre los Estados miembros respecto a dicho instrumento. Este repentino cambio de posición se debe a un viraje hacia la política exterior de Estados Unidos durante la Administración Trump, país que decidió abandonar el Pacto en diciembre de 2017. Algunos Estados de la UE (Hungría) siguieron la misma posición que Estados Unidos.

En total, nueve Estados miembros no asistieron a la Conferencia Intergubernamental de Marrakesh y, por tanto, no aprobaron el Pacto Mundial: Austria, Bulgaria, República Checa, Estonia, Hungría, Italia, Letonia, Polonia y Eslovaquia. Es verdad que todos los Estados de la UE apoyaron la Declaración de Nueva York, que puso en marcha el proceso del Pacto; y también apoyaron sin ambages la posición común de la UE, al menos hasta 2017. No obstante, en el otoño de 2018, un grupo significativo de Estados de la UE se opusieron claramente al Pacto Migratorio Mundial.

Implementación del Pacto en la UE

- El **Pacto Europeo sobre Migración y Asilo**, adoptado en septiembre de 2020 por la Comisión Europea, es el instrumento regional que implementa el Pacto Mundial.
- El Pacto Europeo se estructura en **9 partes**; si bien privilegia las “vías legales de entrada” a la UE y a los migrantes mejor “cualificados” laboralmente (con “tarjeta azul”).
- El Pacto Europeo se basa en la “seguridad” y en la idea de retorno; y no en los derechos humanos de los migrantes.
- El Pacto Europeo refuerza la gestión de las fronteras exteriores, propone un sistema de “cribado en frontera”, y retomó el concepto de “puntos críticos” de la Agenda Migratoria Europea, de 2016.
- Pero hay aspectos positivos
 1. Refuerza los mecanismos de asilo ad intra, con la nueva “Agencia de Asilo de la UE” (creada en 2022).
 2. Se aplica la Directiva Protección Temporal a los desplazados procedentes del conflicto de Ucrania en 2022.

7. Implementación del Pacto en la UE

El Pacto Europeo sobre Migración y Asilo, adoptado el 23 de septiembre de 2020 por la Comisión Europea, es el documento que promueve la implementación del Pacto Mundial, si bien hay diferentes posiciones entre los Estados miembros.

El Pacto Europeo se estructura en 9 partes, entre las que podemos destacar a) procedimientos en frontera; b) reparto equitativo de responsabilidad entre los Estados miembros; c) cambio de paradigma de la cooperación con los Estados vecinos; d) un sistema europeo en materia de retornos; y f) gestión reforzada de las fronteras exteriores. Este documento contiene una serie de propuestas legislativas; si bien, las medidas adoptadas hasta la fecha se centran en reforzar las “vías legales de entrada” a la UE, privilegiando especialmente a los migrantes cualificados.

En relación con la soberanía nacional, el Pacto Europeo alude en repetidas ocasiones a “seguridad nacional” y a “estrategias nacionales”; en cuanto al “Estado de Derecho y garantías procesales” (objetivo del Pacto Mundial), sorprende que sólo se plantean en relación al principio de no devolución. En relación a la gestión eficaz de las fronteras, se refuerza el enfoque de los “puntos críticos”; pero instaura un sistema de

“cribado en frontera” que no garantiza el respeto de los derechos humanos de los solicitantes de asilo.

En el lado positivo, se refuerzan ad intra las garantías de los solicitantes de asilo gracias a la nueva “Agencia de Asilo de la UE”. Pero, sobre todo, destaca la reacción solidaria de la UE ante la afluencia masiva de personas desplazadas provenientes de Ucrania, debido a la agresión militar causada por Rusia a partir de febrero de 2022. Este conflicto ha provocado una crisis humanitaria en Europa sin precedentes desde la 2ª Guerra Mundial, generando más de 8 millones de desplazados ucranianos. Esta crisis migratoria sí se ha resuelto conforme a los valores europeos de solidaridad y responsabilidad compartida, y ha permitido la aplicación, por vez primera, de la “Directiva Protección Temporal”, garantizando la protección temporal de todas las personas nacionales o residentes en Ucrania en el Estado miembro de su elección, al menos mientras dure el conflicto.

Aplicación del Pacto en ALC

- El Pacto Mundial reconoce la importancia de **“los procesos y plataformas regionales”** para la consecución de sus Objetivos.
- Importancia de los **procesos consultivos regionales** para la cooperación migratoria entre los países de la región.
- Tendencias y patrones migratorios en ALC: migración venezolana hacia América del Sur; migración haitiana; incremento movilidad de los países del “Triángulo Norte de Centroamérica” hacia EEUU.
- Importancia de “los procesos consultivos regionales”, entre los más relevantes a) “Conferencia Suramericana de Migraciones” (CSM); b) “Comisión Económica para América Latina” (CEPAL).
- **“Cumbre de las Américas”** (junio 2022): La región de ALC se posiciona como un actor imprescindible frente a desafíos globales como la gestión de los flujos migratorios o cambio climático.

8. Aplicación del Pacto Mundial en ALC

En América Latina y el Caribe (ALC) se han producido avances reseñables en la implementación del Pacto Migratorio Mundial, principalmente a través de los denominados procesos consultivos regionales. Estos procesos consultivos son plataformas flexibles, no institucionalizadas, que articulan mecanismos de cooperación migratoria entre los países de ALC, y que se revelan útiles para señalar tendencias migratorias en la región y fomentar la cooperación.

Estos foros regionales de cooperación migratoria son básicos para crear sinergias entre la “Agenda 2030” - y su componente migratorio -, y el Pacto Mundial. Ahora bien, estos procesos consultivos regionales no crean compromisos vinculantes para los países de la región, si bien de ellos se pueden extraer resultados concretos y medibles. Entre los procesos consultivos regionales más relevantes, destacan: a) La Conferencia Suramericana de Migraciones, que integra a los países de esa subregión: su principal objetivo es coordinar políticas migratorias entre los países de la subregión; b) La Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), que se concibe como un foro para el análisis de datos y seguimiento de los avances de la región en la consecución de los objetivos del Pacto Mundial; y c) El Consenso de Montevideo sobre Población y Desarrollo, adoptado en 2013, como

documento-marco precursor del enfoque de derechos humanos de los migrantes presente en el Pacto Mundial.

Los procesos consultivos regionales, aun carentes de institucionalidad, se han convertido en foros para definir un enfoque migratorio propio de ALC; pero siempre en el respeto de la soberanía de los países de la región para definir sus propias políticas migratorias nacionales.

En la “Cumbre de las Américas”, celebrada en Los Ángeles en junio de 2022, ALC se ha posicionado como un actor imprescindible para hacer frente a desafíos globales como el cambio climático o la gestión las migraciones, a través de la cooperación.

Seguimiento del Pacto en ALC

- **CEPAL: Chile, Abril 2021: Reunión de Revisión regional de implementación del Pacto Mundial para la Migración Segura, Ordenada y Regular.**
 - Los países de ALC deben aprovechar el seguimiento del Pacto Mundial para cumplir los ODS, desde un enfoque de derechos humanos.
- **Conferencia Regional sobre Migración (CRM):**
 - Declaración extraordinaria ante el FORO DE EXAMEN DE LA MIGRACIÓN INTERNACIONAL, México, Abril de 2022.
 - Coordinación estratégica para presentar medidas comunes ante el Foro de Examen de la Migración Internacional (Junio 2022).
 - Aprobó Plan de Acción Regional para una Migración Segura, Ordenada y Regular (para la región de Mesoamérica).

9. Seguimiento del Pacto Mundial en América Latina y el Caribe

Entre los mecanismos de seguimiento del Pacto Mundial en la región destacan: La Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL). En particular, la Reunión de Revisión Regional de implementación del Pacto Mundial para la Migración Segura, Ordenada y Regular en ALC, celebrada en Chile (2021). La CEPAL señaló que los países de la región deben aprovechar la oportunidad que representa el Pacto para cumplir los ODS, desde un enfoque de derechos humanos, priorizando los objetivos que tienen especial interés para la región (proteger las vías legales y la migración temporal; remesas). Así mismo, se destacó la fuerte protección para los trabajadores migrantes a través de los acuerdos comerciales regionales, en consonancia con el Objetivo 22 del Pacto (la inclusión de cláusulas laborales en los acuerdos comerciales podría contribuir a “promover la protección social y la portabilidad de los derechos” de los migrantes). A tal efecto, se destacó la importancia del “Convenio Multilateral Iberoamericano de Seguridad Social” (ratificado por 13 países); o del “Acuerdo de Residencia para nacionales de los Estados Parte del MERCOSUR” (2002), que facilita la circulación y residencia de los nacionales de los Estados Partes.

Conferencia Regional sobre Migración (CRM); En Abril de 2022, tuvo lugar la “Declaración extraordinaria ante el Foro de Examen de la Migración Internacional”, en Ciudad de México, con el objetivo de coordinar medidas para su consideración ante el “Foro de Examen de la Migración Internacional” (junio 2022). En esta Declaración extraordinaria ante el “Primer Foro de Revisión” del Pacto Mundial, se insta a adoptar un “enfoque de responsabilidad compartida” respecto a la migración, con el fin de fortalecer la cooperación internacional, optimizar los beneficios de la migración y contribuir a mejorar la vida de los migrantes, sus familias y las comunidades de los países de origen, tránsito, destino y retorno (“enfoque migración y desarrollo sostenible”). Además, se aprobó un Plan de Acción Regional para una Migración Segura, Ordenada y Regular, para la región de Mesoamérica, en el que se identifican como prioritarios para esta región los siguientes objetivos del Pacto (“Pilar temático 2”): a) “Incrementar las vías migratorias regulares” (objetivo 5); b) “Aumentar la certeza y previsibilidad de los procedimientos migratorios” (objetivo 12); y c) “Fortalecer la respuesta transnacional al tráfico ilícito de migrantes” (objetivo 9).

Conclusiones

- El **Pacto Migratorio Mundial** se presenta como instrumento adecuado para una gestión eficiente de la gobernanza migratoria y fortalecer así las contribuciones de los migrantes y la migración al “desarrollo sostenible”, mediante la cooperación internacional, en coherencia con los ODS.
- El **Pacto Mundial** aspira a hacer que la migración “funcione para todos”. Es una gran aportación del multilateralismo a la *gobernanza global de la migración*.
- La **UE** ha perdido una oportunidad para demostrar una posición común en un ejercicio de *multilateralismo pragmático*; así como reforzar su narrativa como actor normativo en un ámbito de interés global como las migraciones.
- **ALC** implementa el Pacto a través de los *procesos consultivos regionales*, si bien estas plataformas y foros regionales no están coordinados entre sí.

10. Conclusiones

En primer lugar, el Pacto Migratorio Mundial es un éxito sin precedentes del multilateralismo y supone el inicio de la gobernanza global de la migración, en consonancia con la “Agenda 2030”. El Pacto Mundial es una acción normativa de soft law, que contiene unas reglas comunes para la gestión de la migración entre los Estados. La ausencia de efectos vinculantes no le resta eficacia para provocar efectos transformadores en las políticas nacionales de los Estados. Así, el Pacto Mundial aspira a que la migración “funcione para todos”. Si lo consigue, será una gran aportación del multilateralismo a la gobernanza mundial de la migración.

En segundo lugar, el Pacto Mundial establece 23 Objetivos, para cuya consecución reconoce el papel esencial de los “mecanismos regionales” de cooperación. En el ámbito europeo, la Unión Europea ha perdido una oportunidad para manifestar una posición común en un ejercicio de multilateralismo pragmático, y reforzar así su narrativa como actor normativo en un ámbito de interés global como las migraciones. En América Latina y el Caribe, los países están implementando el Pacto Mundial a través de los denominados procesos consultivos regionales, tales como la Conferencia Suramericana de Migraciones o la Comisión

Económica para América Latina y el Caribe. No obstante, sería recomendable que estas plataformas y foros regionales estuvieran coordinados entre sí. La región de ALC se ha posicionado recientemente en la “Cumbre de las Américas”, celebrada en junio 2022, como un actor imprescindible frente a desafíos globales como la gestión de los flujos migratorios o el cambio climático. Así lo refleja la Declaración del encuentro celebrado en Los Ángeles, que impulsa las vías legales y la migración temporal, con el compromiso de EE.UU. de reforzar la cooperación económica con la región para contener la migración irregular.

Por último, se debería relanzar la cooperación migratoria UE-ALC en el segundo semestre de 2023. Coincidiendo con la Presidencia española de la UE, sería conveniente la celebración de una “Cumbre UE/Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños (CELAC)”, en la que una de las prioridades de la “agenda birregional” debe ser coordinar medidas comunes entre ambas regiones para la consecución de los Objetivos del Pacto Migratorio Mundial.

Lecturas recomendadas

1. Abrisketa Uriarte, J., “El Pacto Europeo sobre Migración y Asilo: hacia un marco jurídico aún más complejo”, en ABRISKETA URIARTE, J., Políticas de Asilo de la UE: Convergencias entre las dimensiones interna y externa, Thomson Reuters/Aranzadi, Pamplona, 2021, pp. 307-335.
2. Newland, K., “The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration: An Unlikely Achievement”, *International Journal of Refugee Law*, vol. 30, núm. 4 (2018), pp. 657-660.
3. Fajardo del Castillo, T., “El Pacto Mundial por una Migración Segura, Ordenada y Regular: un instrumento de soft law para una gestión de la migración que respete los derechos fundamentales”, *Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales*, 38 (2019), pp. 1-34.
4. Requena Casanova, M., “La contribución de la Unión Europea a la gobernanza migratoria mundial: la implementación del Pacto Mundial para la Migración Segura, Ordenada y Regular”, en FERRER LLORET, J. (Dir.) y SOLER GARCÍA, C., (Coord.), *La Unión Europea y el Mediterráneo: entre la cooperación y el conflicto*, Ed. Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia, 2021, pp. 141-177.
5. Pérez González, C., “El papel de la Unión Europea en la implementación de los Pactos Mundiales sobre migraciones y para los refugiados”, en ABRISKETA URIARTE, J., Políticas de Asilo de la UE: Convergencias entre las dimensiones interna y externa, Thomson Reuters/Aranzadi, Pamplona, 2021, pp. 127-160.

Preguntas para el debate

1. ¿Es necesaria una respuesta coordinada, a nivel regional, frente a los retos que plantea el cambio climático sobre las migraciones?
2. ¿Es necesario fortalecer los mecanismos multilaterales para que la cooperación migratoria birregional ayude a la consecución de los ODS?
3. ¿Es conveniente incluir un capítulo migratorio en la agenda social birregional EU/LAC, en particular, en la Cumbre UE-CELAC?'

Lecture 15: La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) y la Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos (CEDH)

Beatriz Larraín

La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) y la Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos (CEDH)

Beatrice Larrain

Hipervínculo al [vídeo](#)

Hipervínculo a las [diapositivas](#)

Contenido

1. Experiencias Europeas y Americanas en Materia de Justicia
2. ¿Porque los tribunales son sujetos importantes de estudio?
3. Esto causa graves problemas
4. La CEDH y la CIDH ...una visión comparada
5. Historia y origen
6. Cumplimiento y Supervisión
7. Método de trabajo
8. Presupuesto
9. Funcionamiento
10. Conclusiones

Experiencias Europeas y Americanas en Materia de Justicia

- La Corte Europea de Derecho Humanos y la Corte Interamericana de Derecho Humanos
- ¿Lo que funciona bien en el continente Europeo ¿necesariamente funcionará bien en Latinoamérica?
- ¿Toda experiencia trasplantada desde Europea es exitosa?
- ¿Por qué los tribunales son importantes sujetos de estudio y como nos ayudan a responder las primeras dos preguntas?
- ¿Cómo se comparan estas dos Cortes en diversos aspectos?
- ¿Que importancia tiene todo esto en un contexto de los llamados a la “de-colonización” por un lado y la integración o globalización por otro?

1. Experiencias Europeas y Americanas en Materia de Justicia

Los materiales de enseñanza presentarán una comparación entre la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) y la Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos (CEDH) de manera de resaltar sus similitudes, diferencias e influencias.

Esto es particularmente relevante ya que la CIDH ha usado las sentencias de la CEDH hace ya varias décadas, transformándolas en especie de tribunales “hermanos” en muchos sentidos. Sin embargo, los resultados y productos de ambas Cortes son muy distintas como podremos observar. Para ello compararemos diversos elementos que difieren en ambos tribunales y que hace su labor diferente, para luego reflexionar sobre la posibilidad de trasplantar experiencias foráneas de modo exitoso.

Además, planteamos las preguntas que nos guiarán en este ejercicio que tiene por objeto plantear una serie de interrogantes relacionadas con la influencia de Europa en Latinoamérica, sobre todo en materia de estructuras institucionales.

En primer lugar, cabe preguntarse si lo que funciona bien en el continente europeo ¿necesariamente funcionará bien en

Latinoamérica? ¿Toda experiencia trasplantada desde Europa es exitosa?

¿Por qué los tribunales son importantes sujetos de estudio y como nos ayudan a responder estas preguntas?

¿Cómo se comparan estas dos Cortes en diversos aspectos?

¿Qué importancia tiene todo esto en un contexto de los llamados a la “de-colonización” por un lado y la integración o globalización por otro?

Partiremos por este último aspecto. En el ámbito Latinoamericano hemos asistido en el último tiempo a diversos planteamientos que llaman a la de-colonización, entendiendo por esta última el liberar a los países de su base o raíz eurocéntrica y pensar, diseñar y crear estructuras propias, que no provengan del pasado y que no respondan a la lógica depredadora y abusadora con el poder. Implica dejar atrás la idea del choque cultural en que una cultura impone y la otra simplemente se somete.

Por otro lado, los llamados a integrarnos tanto como Continente, como con otros Continentes a través de tratados de libre comercio, de uniones aduaneras, de reglas de inmigración comunes de instituciones comunes, hasta de normas jurídicas comunes, parecen chocar directamente con esta idea de la de-colonización.

Luego cabe preguntarnos, qué tan bien nos ha ido como continente latinoamericano tomando para nosotros o “copiando” instituciones extranjeras. Podemos hacer eco de los llamados a desechar toda institución que proviene desde Europa por el solo hecho de su origen. O por el contrario, ¿debemos insistir en seguir reproduciendo aquellas experiencias que han sido exitosas en el extranjero, a pesar de que no lo hayan sido del todo en el continente americano?

No pretendemos responder plenamente estas preguntas, quizás solo rozar su superficie. Y para ello hemos elegido este breve estudio comparado de dos instituciones supranacionales. Con ello pretendemos más bien abrir el debate que dar respuestas en blanco y negro, para lo cual dejaremos planteado al alumno los hechos.

¿Porque los tribunales son sujetos importantes de estudio?

- La actualidad marcada por fenómenos políticos importantes: el gran poder que tienen los jueces.
- Si se trata de tribunales internacionales se agrega una capa más de complejidad.
- Existen fenómenos importantes de estudiar que impactan en nuestra convivencia democrática
 - **La judicialización** implica que los jueces resuelven todo tipo de problemas sociales, políticos y económicos, mucho más allá de lo que tradicionalmente hacían. No hay asunto social disputado hoy en día que no termine eventualmente frente a un juez.
 - **El activismo judicial** o los jueces activistas son jueces que van más allá de la norma jurídica establecida con el objeto de proteger los derechos de los individuos. En este caso los jueces suelen "interpretar" las normas jurídicas de manera amplia para dar cabida a situaciones que no necesariamente estaban incluidas originalmente en la norma.
 - **Los diálogos judiciales** implican que jueces de tribunales distintos, incluso jueces de tribunales supra nacionales como la CEDH y la CIDH "dialogan", citándose mutuamente sus resoluciones e influenciándose mutuamente en sus decisiones.
 - Ejemplos hay muchos: la pandemia hizo que jueces se involucraran en todos los aspectos como las vacunas, uso de mascararas, cuarentenas, etc.
 - En Europa el Brexit hizo campaña sobre la base de eliminar el control de la Corte Europea de Justicia sobre el Reino Unido
 - En Polonia cuando asume el PIS, lanza una guerra en contra de los jueces bajo el pretexto de modernizar la administración de justicia
 - Todos estos casos nos muestran lo poderoso que se han tornado hoy los jueces

2. ¿Porque los tribunales son sujetos importantes de estudio?

Esta lámina dice relación con situaciones políticas contemporáneas que hacen que los tribunales sean sujetos importantes de estudio. Estos fenómenos han tenido su auge en los últimos 40 años y se tornan aún más importantes si se trata de tribunales internacionales puesto que se agrega una capa más a lo que sucede a nivel nacional.

La judicialización implica que los jueces resuelven todo tipo de problemas sociales, políticos y económicos, mucho más allá de lo que tradicionalmente hacían. No hay asunto social disputado hoy en día que no termine eventualmente frente a un juez.

El activismo judicial o los jueces activistas son jueces que van más allá de la norma jurídica establecida con el objeto de proteger los derechos de los individuos. En este caso los jueces suelen "interpretar" las normas jurídicas de manera amplia para dar cabida a situaciones que no necesariamente estaban incluidas originalmente en la norma.

Los diálogos judiciales implican que jueces de tribunales distintos, incluso jueces de tribunales supra nacionales como la CEDH y la CIDH "dialogan", citándose mutuamente sus resoluciones e influenciándose mutuamente en sus decisiones.

Prácticamente no hay controversia actual en que no haya intervenido un tribunal de justicia. Si pensamos en la pandemia, por ejemplo, los tribunales han tenido que ver con todo tipo de asuntos, desde las vacunas, hasta las mascarillas, los estados de excepción, las cuarentenas, etc. Partidos políticos e incluso individuos presentaron querellas criminales ante los tribunales con el objeto de que estos sancionaran penalmente a los jefes de estado, ministros de estado, médicos etc., por la supuesta negligencia que habían tenido durante la pandemia y que resultó en la muerte de muchos ciudadanos.

Si pensamos ejemplos en Europa, en la campaña por el Brexit, uno de los grandes eslóganes era “Retomar el Control”, es decir liberarse de la Unión Europea en general y en particular liberarse expresamente de la legislación comunitaria y de la Corte Europea de Justicia. En marzo de 2018, Theresa May señaló “Los futuros tratados de la Unión Europea y por ende el Derecho de la Unión Europea no se aplicarán más en el Reino Unido. Por ende, cesará la influencia de la Corte Europea de Justicia en nuestro país.”

Otro ejemplo ilustrativo es el caso de Polonia. En el año 2015, asume Andrzej Duda, del PiS, (Partido Ley y Justicia). Llegando al poder se niega a tomar juramento a los nuevos jueces del Tribunal Constitucional designados por el Gobierno anterior. En cambio, nombra a sus propios partidarios en el Tribunal. Luego de aquello, propone una ley que obliga a los jueces a jubilar en forma anticipada, lo cual causó un rechazo generalizado tanto en la ciudadanía como en los jueces mismos.

¿Qué es lo que nos muestran estos dos casos? Nos muestran lo tremendamente importante que son los jueces hoy como actores políticos. En el caso del Brexit, tanto que llegan a ser parte de un eslogan de campaña, un foco de poder contra el cual luchar. En el caso de Polonia, sucede lo mismo. Uno de los primeros actos de gobierno no se dirige contra el partido de oposición sino contra un enemigo poco frecuente: los jueces.

Esto causa graves problemas

- Nos remontamos a la época de la Ilustración y de la Revolución Francesa cuando surge el principio de la separación de los poderes: en cada estado hay tres poderes: el legislativo, el ejecutivo y el judicial.
- El más importante es el legislativo puesto que en él radica la soberanía, solo él está facultado para imponer reglas generales como las leyes. El ejecutivo es el encargado de administrar el estado y realizar la conducción política del mismo pero sujeto a los límites impuestos por el legislativo. Luego, en último lugar encontramos al judicial, quien es el encargado de resolver disputas entre partes, pero siguiendo u obedeciendo las leyes que para ello dicta el poder legislativo. En palabras de Montesquieu, el rol del juez es que éste es la "boca muerta" que sólo repite las palabras de la ley, aplicándolas al caso concreto, lo cual es un trabajo "neutro", "no-político". El juez es un servidor del poder legislativo.
- Se crea una verdadera transgresión a este principio del juez "boca muerta" cuando éste actúa de un modo político. Se produce un déficit de legitimidad democrática ya que no es el juez quien detenta el verdadero poder político sino que el legislativo.
- Existe transgresión a los principios democráticos ya que al no ser los jueces elegidos democráticamente, no hay manera de someterlos al control ciudadano. Esto es contrario a la esencia de la democracia, que exige que todo poder tenga un límite y un control.
- Los tribunales que así actúan arriesgan las bases mismas de nuestra democracia al erigirse en supra poderes.
- Los ejemplos abundan. En los Estados Unidos en 2000 cuando se enfrentaron los candidatos a la presidencia George Bush y Al Gore, fue un tribunal quien finalmente decidió que el presidente de los EEUU sería Bush y no Gore.
- En el año 2022 la Corte Suprema de los EEUU decidió abolir el caso Roe V. Wade que hasta el momento permitía el aborto en todos los estados.
- En estos dos ejemplos vemos a los tribunales decidiendo asuntos políticos que en último término debieron decidirse por los poderes políticos donde radica la soberanía y cuyos miembros puedan ser controlados democráticamente.

3. Esto causa graves problemas

En el mundo hay muchos detractores de este gran poder que han adquirido hoy los tribunales de justicia.

Para entender el grave problema que esto causa, hay que remontarse a la época de la Ilustración y de la Revolución Francesa cuando surge el principio de la separación de los poderes, considerado aún uno de los pilares fundamentales de la organización política de los países de occidente y de la democracia misma. Según esta teoría encontramos en cada estado tres poderes: el legislativo, el ejecutivo y el judicial. El más importante de todos ellos es el poder legislativo puesto que en él radica la soberanía. Luego, solo el poder legislativo está facultado en principio para imponernos reglas de carácter generales tales como las leyes. El ejecutivo es el encargado de administrar el Estado y realizar la conducción política del mismo pero siempre sujeto a los límites impuestos por el poder legislativo. Luego, en último lugar encontramos al poder judicial, que es el encargado de resolver disputas entre partes, pero siguiendo u obedeciendo las leyes que para ello dicta el poder legislativo. En palabras de Montesquieu, el rol del juez es que éste es la "boca muerta" que sólo repite las palabras de la ley, aplicándolas al caso concreto, lo cual es un trabajo "neutro", "no-político". El juez es un servidor del poder legislativo, quien es el detentador del "verdadero" poder político.

Se crea aquí una verdadera transgresión a este principio del juez “boca muerta” cuando éste actúa de un modo político. Se produce un déficit o una falta de legitimidad democrática ya que no es el juez quien detenta el verdadero poder político, sino que el poder legislativo.

Tenemos luego una transgresión a los principios democráticos ya que al no ser los jueces elegidos democráticamente, no hay manera de someterlos al control ciudadano. Esto es contrario a la esencia de la democracia, que exige que todo poder tenga un límite y un control. En el caso del ejecutivo y legislativo se produce principalmente el control a través de las elecciones periódicas.

Los tribunales se terminan inmiscuyendo en asuntos tradicionalmente reservados a los poderes políticos como el legislativo y ejecutivo son órganos que arriesgan las bases mismas de nuestra democracia al erigirse en supra poderes.

Los ejemplos de los conflictos que esto ha causado en el mundo abundan. En los Estados Unidos por ejemplo, en el año 2000 cuando se enfrentaron los candidatos a la presidencia George Bush y Al Gore, fue tan disputado el resultado de la elección que los partidos políticos decidieron pelearlos frente a los tribunales. Fue así como, tras meses de disputa judicial, fue un tribunal quien finalmente decidió que el presidente de los EEUU sería George W. Bush y no Al Gore. Algo similar ocurrió en el año 2022 cuando la Corte Suprema de los EEUU decidió abolir el caso Roe V. Wade que hasta el momento permitía el aborto en todos los estados. En estos dos ejemplos vemos a los tribunales decidiendo asuntos políticos que en último término debieron decidirse por los poderes políticos donde radica la soberanía y cuyos miembros puedan ser controlados democráticamente.

La CEDH y la CIDH...una visión comparada

- Diálogos judiciales: cuando jueces de tribunales distintos, como la CEDH y la CIDH “dialogan”, se citan mutuamente sus resoluciones, e influenciándose mutuamente en sus decisiones.
- CIDH creada a imagen y semejanza de la CEDH: más de la mitad de los casos decididos por la Corte en cualquier año específico se refieren a la CEDH.
- En que tipo de casos se producen las citas:
 - Casos que involucran el derecho a la vida y a la integridad física y síquica (38%)
 - Poderes de la Corte (22%)
 - Obligaciones impuestas a los tribunales nacionales (16%) y obligaciones generales impuestas a los estados (7%)
 - Desarrolla el concepto y contenido de otro tipo de derechos (10%)
 - Reparaciones y compensaciones (16%)
- En todas estas categorías podemos observar un tribunal que busca apoyarse en la autoridad de otro mas poderoso para respaldar sus decisiones.

4. La CEDH y la CIDH...una visión comparada

Entraremos ahora a la comparación de estos dos tribunales para intentar responder algunas de las preguntas planteadas.

Para ello es importante saber porque decimos que estas dos cortes operan de algún modo como cortes hermanas y por ende son propicias para la comparación. Uno de los fenómenos a que apuntamos fue el de los diálogos judiciales. Recordemos que ello se produce cuando jueces de tribunales distintos, incluso jueces de tribunales supra nacionales como la CEDH y la CIDH “dialogan”, esto es, citándose mutuamente sus resoluciones e influenciándose mutuamente en sus decisiones.

Pues bien, la CIDH, creada a imagen y semejanza de la CEDH “dialoga con su hermana mayor”. Desde que la CIDH existe, en la mayor parte de los años más de la mitad de los casos decididos por la Corte en cualquier año específico se refieren a la CEDH. Existen años peaks incluso (2003), en que hasta en un 86% de los casos decididos por la CIDH se citan las decisiones de la CEDH. Otro ejemplo es el año 2001, en que en el 75% de los casos decididos por la CIDH cita a la CEDH. Esto es notable, ya que significa que en una gran mayoría de casos la CIDH se apoya en las resoluciones de su “hermana”, la CEDH.

En qué tipo de casos se producen las citas:

Lecture 15: La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) y la Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos (CEDH)

Casos que involucran el derecho a la vida y a la integridad física y síquica (28%): muestra una Corte que trata con las transgresiones más básicas a los derechos humanos, y es a este nivel en el que se involucra con la CEDH. Como señala el juez Sergio García Ramírez “el desarrollo de las democracias americanas y la emergente cultura de protección a los derechos humanos debe abolir para siempre el uso de la violencia (...) Cuando se haya logrado este objetivo, la Corte IDH estará en una posición de dedicarse exclusivamente a otros asuntos, lo cual será una fase diferente, tal como lo hace hoy la CEDH”

Poderes de la Corte (22%): trata de los poderes que la Corte ha creado para sí misma. Implica un activismo judicial importante.

Obligaciones impuestas a los tribunales nacionales (16%) y obligaciones generales impuestas a los estados (7%): estas dos categorías implican mandar al Estado, para lo cual requiere fuerza política.

Desarrolla el concepto y contenido de otro tipo de derechos (10%): aquí también la Corte ha sido activista creando o expandiendo el alcance de algunos derechos tales como la libertad de expresión, derecho al nombre, derecho al disfrute en familia, entre otros.

Reparaciones y compensaciones (16%) es el aspecto más complejo ya que involucra imponer a los estados el pago de dinero. De cierto modo aquí la Corte intenta “meter la mano al bolsillo” de las arcas fiscales de los Estados, lo que ha resultado ser complejo ya que los Estados no suelen acatar estos mandatos.

En todas estas categorías podemos observar un tribunal que busca apoyarse en la autoridad de otro más poderoso para respaldar sus decisiones.

Veamos ahora los factores de comparación para resaltar las diferencias de ambos tribunales y hacer la comparación que buscamos.

Historia y origen

CEDH

- Creada para proteger la democracia y los derechos humanos post II GM
- Gran número de países ratificaron
- Europa estaba en un momento crucial, y había un gran consenso político en torno a la defensa de los derechos humanos: no podían volver a ocurrir las atrocidades que habían ocurrido.
- Hoy se exige formalmente que todos los países que ingresen al Consejo Europeo reconozcan y ratifiquen la competencia de la CEDH.

CIDH

- Los estados miembros de la (OEA) se mostraron reacios a unirse al sistema.
- América no estaba en un momento crucial, ni había consenso político en torno a los derechos humanos ni la democracia.
- Reina el Principio de "no intervención", como un modo de evitar la intervención estadounidense. Esto contradice los principios de la Corte.
- Proceso de ratificación de su estatuto tomó aproximadamente 30 años.
- Cuando ratifican la Convención, no había verdadera intención de cumplir con las sentencias.
- Hay países que hoy, pese a haber ratificado el Estatuto, siguen luchado en su contra. "Esquizofrenia congénita"

5. Historia y origen

Primer elemento: En cuanto a la historia y origen de ambas Cortes:

La Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos:

- Fue creada para proteger la democracia y los derechos humanos post II GM
- Un gran número de países ratificaron su creación de forma inmediata
- Nace en un momento crucial de la historia de Europa en el que había un gran consenso político en torno a la necesidad de establecer órganos que protegieran los derechos humanos: no podían volver a ocurrir las atrocidades que habían ocurrido.
- Hoy en día se exige formalmente que todos los países que ingresen al Consejo de Europa reconozcan y ratifiquen expresamente la competencia de la CEDH.

La Corte Interamericana:

- Los estados miembros de la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA) de la cual depende la Corte, se mostraron reacios a unirse al sistema desde el comienzo.

Lecture 15: La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) y la Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos (CEDH)

- América en general no estaba en un momento crucial de su historia, ni había gran consenso político en torno a los derechos humanos ni la democracia.
- Reinaba en ese momento en América el Principio de "No Intervención", en gran parte como una forma de rechazar la intervención de los EEUU. Esto es evidentemente contrario a los principios que animan el funcionamiento de la Corte.
- El proceso de ratificación de la Convención de la Corte tomó aproximadamente 30 años.
- Cuando los países ratifican la Convención, no había verdadera intención de cumplir con las sentencias, sino que muchos sintieron la presión internacional y terminan ratificando el estatuto.
- Hay países que hoy en día, pese a haber ratificado, siguen luchado en contra de la Corte, no obedeciendo sus sentencias, según veremos. Aceptaron la Convención como meras "declaraciones de buenas intenciones", sin intención de ceder soberanía a la CIDH. Evidentemente este sistema basado en el principio de la no intervención entra en contradicción con la idea de un tribunal creado para controlar la vida socio-política de los países miembros. Es lo que Viana Garcés llama la "esquizofrenia congénita" del sistema americano.

Con el tiempo, los estados europeos, aprovechando la avalancha de países que esperan entrar al sistema europeo, han exigido formalmente que todos los países que ingresen al Consejo Europeo reconozcan y ratifiquen la competencia de la CEDH. El sistema interamericano ni siquiera sueña con algo similar. De hecho, aún hay países que, pese a haber ratificado el Estatuto de la Corte, siguen luchado en su contra, argumentado que ésta es incompetente para juzgarlos.

Cumplimiento y supervisión

CEDH

- Estudios sitúan el cumplimiento de las sentencias del tribunal por parte de los Estados en torno al 88%.
- Órgano específico de supervisión: Comité de Ministros del Consejo de Europa.
- Los informes anuales hacen hincapié en la buena relación entre la Corte y los Estados miembros.
- Incluso las multas e indemnizaciones monetarias que deben pagar los países lo cumplen.

CIDH

- Estudios sitúan el cumplimiento entre el 2% y el 40%.
- En otras palabras los estados de Latinoamérica cumplen menos de la mitad de las veces los mandatos de la Corte.
- Corte no poseía un órgano encargado de la supervisión
- La propia Corte creó para sí el poder de supervisar el cumplimiento.
 - Es fortaleza por un lado.
 - Debilidad por otro lado ya que la obliga a cumplir múltiples funciones.

6. Cumplimiento y supervisión

Segundo elemento: en cuanto al cumplimiento de sus decisiones y su supervisión:

La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos:

1. Los países de América violan sistemáticamente los mandatos de la CIDH.
2. Un estudio reciente sitúa el cumplimiento entre el 2% y el 44%, dependiendo del organismo del estado a quien se refiera la sentencia. En otras palabras, los Estados cumplen menos de la mitad de las veces con las sentencias de la Corte IDH.

La Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos:

1. El acatamiento a sus sentencias se estima en un 88%
2. Los países europeos normalmente cumplen con las decisiones de la CEDH. El Informe Anual del Comité de Ministros sobre el cumplimiento por parte de los estados de las sentencias de la CEDH, está redactado en un lenguaje que hace hincapié en que el cumplimiento de los estados es efectivo y que existe una relación "positiva" entre los estados y la Corte. Por ejemplo, el cumplimiento en el pago de indemnizaciones ordenadas por la Corte a las víctimas se sitúa en torno al 81%, en contraste con

las cifras estimadas para el cumplimiento por los estados americanos.

En estrecha relación con este punto se encuentra la cuestión de la supervisión del cumplimiento de las sentencias:

En el caso de la CEDH hay un órgano específico, cuya tarea es velar porque los estados cumplan con los mandatos del tribunal: el Comité de Ministros del Consejo de Europa. Este cuerpo tiene amplios poderes y lleva a cabo una impresionante cantidad de acciones a lo largo de toda Europa.

En cuanto a la CIDH, no existe órgano específico encargado de supervisar el cumplimiento de sus sentencias. De hecho, el Estatuto de la Corte ni siquiera menciona este punto. Fue el propio tribunal, a través de sus sentencias, que se erigió a sí mismo como el órgano competente para la supervisión del cumplimiento de sus sentencias. En efecto, la Corte afirmó en 2003 que "La vigilancia del cumplimiento de las sentencias es uno de los elementos que comprende la jurisdicción. Sostener lo contrario significaría afirmar que las sentencias emitidas por la Corte son meramente declarativas y no efectivas". Más tarde, en 2009, el nuevo Reglamento de la CIDH, estableció la forma en que ésta tendría que llevar a cabo esta supervisión.

El hecho que la CIDH supervise el cumplimiento de sus propias decisiones puede ser considerado una fortaleza, pero también puede ser considerado una debilidad. En efecto, la Corte, además de preocuparse de juzgar, también debe supervisar el cumplimiento de sus fallos. En otras palabras, tiene una doble tarea que es aún más compleja en América si se considera el pobre historial de cumplimiento de parte de los estados.

Método de trabajo

CEDH:

- Es un tribunal permanente desde 1998.
- Trabaja todo el año resolviendo causas.
- En consecuencia, posee jueces de tiempo completo.

CIDH:

- Funciona en periodos específicos que la propia Corte fija en cada temporada.
- Por ejemplo para este año 2023 fijó el periodo de sesiones entre el 23 de enero y el 9 de febrero.
- Los jueces no son de tiempo completo, dedicándose a otras labores el resto del tiempo.

7. Método de trabajo

Tercer elemento: el método de trabajo

Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos:

1. Es un tribunal permanente desde 1998.
2. En virtud del llamado protocolo 11, cambió el método de trabajo de la Corte, transformándola de un tribunal que funcionaba sólo algunos días al mes, a un tribunal de tiempo completo que trabaja continuamente durante el año.
3. En efecto, los jueces cumplen su tarea a tiempo completo, debiendo renunciar a cualquier otro tipo de actividad profesional, política o administrativa al momento en que ingresan al servicio de la Corte.

Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos

1. Funciona solo en periodos específicos que la propia Corte designa. De acuerdo con su Reglamento (artículo 11), la Corte establece en cada periodo las fechas específicas en que se celebrarán sus sesiones ordinarias para el período siguiente.

Lecture 15: La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) y la Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos (CEDH)

2. Por ejemplo, para el año 2023, la CIDH ya fijó su 155° periodo de sesiones entre el 23 de enero y el 9 de febrero.
3. Por lo tanto los jueces que la integran pueden y de hecho se dedican muchas veces a otras labores durante el resto del tiempo en que la Corte no está en funciones.

Así por ejemplo, en el caso de la jueza Patricia Pérez Goldberg, quien representa a Chile, se puede ver en su curriculum que a la fecha sigue siendo Conservador de Bienes Raíces de la localidad de Villa Alemana (funcionario encargado de llevar los registros de propiedad inmueble en Chile) y además Miembro del Consejo Directivo del Centro de Estudios de la Justicia de América (CEJA).

Nuevamente, esto puede ser leído como una ventaja en el sentido que los jueces vienen de la vida profesional y siguen teniendo contacto con ella a través de sus actividades fuera de la Corte, y por tanto se “nutren” de la realidad al momento de emitir sus sentencias.

Sin embargo, también es una desventaja el tener que alternar el trabajo como juez de una Corte Internacional con otras actividades que normalmente tiene que llevar a cabo el juez para poder tener un ingreso en los meses en que no está funcionando la Corte. Evidentemente que eso causa un desgaste y quita tiempo de dedicación a una labor tan delicada y compleja como es el juzgar.

Presupuesto

CEDH

- Todas las operaciones de la Corte son financiadas plenamente por el Consejo de Europa.
- Su presupuesto anual para el año 2023 es de \$ 71.670.500 Euros.

CIDH

- La OEA sólo financia el 55% del presupuesto de la Corte. Esto implica que el otro 45% proviene de otras fuentes, tales como contribuciones voluntarias internacionales y proyectos internacionales.
- Su presupuesto anual para el año 2022 es de \$ 5.024.000 USD
- Tribunal internacional con el presupuesto más bajo.

8. Presupuesto

Cuarto elemento: el presupuesto

La Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos:

1. Es financiada por el Consejo de Europa, un órgano políticamente importantísimo que posee un presupuesto anual relevante.
2. El presupuesto de la Corte para el año 2023 es de 71.670.500 euros.

La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos:

1. Por su parte, ésta se esfuerza por funcionar con recursos muy escasos. La OEA sólo financia el 55% del presupuesto de la Corte. Esto implica que el otro 45% proviene de otras fuentes, tales como contribuciones voluntarias internacionales y proyectos internacionales. Un informe entregado a la OEA por el secretario de la Corte, Pablo Saavedra el año 2013, afirma claramente que la CIDH es el tribunal internacional con el presupuesto más bajo de todos los tribunales internacionales

Lecture 15: La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) y la Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos (CEDH)

del mundo. En efecto, según el Presupuesto de la OEA, ese mismo año que se elaboró el informe la Corte recibió US \$ 2.661.000 para financiar sus operaciones, en marcado contraste con el presupuesto de su contraparte europea. Esta falta de recursos ha llevado a la Corte IDH a un verdadero estado de “asfixia”, según sostienen algunos.

2. Para el año 2022 tiene un presupuesto de 5.024.000 dólares.
3. La diferencia de presupuesto de ambos tribunales es abismante.

Funcionamiento

CEDH:

- Funcionamiento flexible en un solo nivel.
- Esto significa que el individuo puede recurrir directamente a la Corte cuando se han violado sus derechos humanos.
- Antiguamente se debía recurrir primero a la Comisión Europea de Derechos Humanos. Solo si en esa instancia no se resolvía el asunto, se podía recurrir a la Corte.
- En 1998 se elimina Comisión y se amplía la Corte.
- El proceso es hoy más breve.

CIDH:

- Este sistema es mucho más engorroso. Es un sistema de dos niveles en que el individuo debe recurrir primero a la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (Con sede en Washington DC).
- Solo si en esa instancia no se resuelve el asunto puede acudir a la Corte.
- Sistema más largo, engorroso y costoso para el individuo.
- Difícilmente se ve la eliminación de la Comisión en el futuro.

9. Funcionamiento

Quinto elemento: el funcionamiento:

La Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos:

1. La operación de la CEDH, por otro lado, es más flexible.
2. El individuo ahora puede recurrir directamente al Tribunal, sin necesidad de pasar por el filtro previo que hacía la Comisión y que implicaba procesos mucho más largos.
3. En el año 1998 se eliminó la primera parte del proceso que estaba a cargo de la Comisión de Derechos Humanos.
4. El individuo agraviado recurre ahora directamente a la Corte, haciendo el proceso más simple y expedito.

La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos:

1. El sistema interamericano funciona en dos niveles distintos. Esto significa que la persona que busca reparación debe acudir primero a la llamada Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, (con asiento en Washington DC) antes de recurrir a la CIDH.

2. Sólo si la Comisión no logra resolver el asunto, podrá el individuo dirigirse a la Corte. Esto significa que el proceso es largo, engorroso y poco atractivo. Las personas cuyos derechos han sido violados requieren una solución rápida a sus problemas no solo por razones económicas sino también por razones psicológicas o emocionales.
3. A pesar de que se ha criticado mucho esta circunstancia, no parece probable la futura eliminación del sistema doble, ya que significaría la eliminación de la Comisión, la que ha jugado un papel fundamental como una especie de "perro guardián" en materia de derechos humanos. Dada la larga trayectoria de dictaduras y violaciones a los derechos humanos en los países Latinoamericanos, la Comisión tiene más amigos que detractores en el campo de los derechos humanos.
4. En efecto, la Comisión comenzó a trabajar mucho antes que la misma Corte y ha influido con sus visitas in loco (o in situ) y con sus informes sobre las violaciones a los derechos humanos en los estados americanos, produciendo lo que se ha llamado la movilización internacional de la vergüenza, una estrategia que consiste en exponer a un régimen violador de los derechos humanos ante el mundo, de modo de hacer sentir la vergüenza de lo hecho a sus dirigentes. En muchas ocasiones esto ha demostrado ser beneficioso para todos los actores involucrados, incluso a veces más que las propias sentencias dictadas por la CIDH.

Conclusiones

- Como anticipábamos en la primera lámina, creemos haber dejado planteadas una serie de interrogantes más que contestarlas derechamente.
- No cabe duda de que el Continente Americano aún está fuertemente anclado a sus raíces europeas que están vivas y que implica que copiamos o tomamos de modelo las instituciones europeas. Sin embargo, como hemos podido ver, no todo modelo Europeo trasplantado a Latino América es necesariamente exitoso. Las diferencias económicas, políticas, históricas y culturales pueden crear un resultado muy distinto aunque la estructura de la institución trasplantada sea similar.
- Esto nos devuelve a algunas de las preguntas iniciales relativas a si frente a esta situación ¿podemos considerar que la CIDH ha fracasado en su intento de obtener cumplimiento de sus resoluciones por parte de los estados miembros?
- El cuadro que nos aparece pintado es el de una Corte débil (CIDH) vis a vis los estados miembros, con poco financiamiento y poder y que busca en su Corte hermana (CEDH) algún tipo de apoyo jurídico político al apoyarse tan fuertemente en sus resoluciones.
- Luego, ¿cual es la respuesta frente a aquellos que llaman a dejar de lado las “instituciones copiadas” o de raíz Europa? ¿Debe Latinoamérica en casos como este intentar armar sus propias instituciones? ¿Un tribunal Latinoamericano con otra estructura u otro vínculo con los Estados miembros?
- O bien ¿esto se soluciona con mayor globalización en el sentido de seguir “copiando” los modelos de Europa con la esperanza de que algún día podremos ponernos al día en materia de cultura de protección a los derechos humanos?
- Dejamos planteadas las preguntas motivando la reflexión del estudiante.

10. Conclusiones

Como anticipábamos en la primera lámina, creemos haber dejado planteadas una serie de interrogantes más que contestarlas derechamente

No cabe duda de que el Continente Americano aún está fuertemente anclado a sus raíces europeas que están vivas y que implica que copiamos o tomamos de modelo las instituciones europeas. Sin embargo, como hemos podido ver, no todo modelo Europeo trasplantado a Latinoamérica es necesariamente exitoso. Las diferencias económicas, políticas, históricas y culturales pueden crear un resultado muy distinto aunque la estructura de la institución trasplantada sea similar.

Esto nos devuelve a algunas de las preguntas iniciales relativas a si frente a esta situación ¿podemos considerar que la CIDH ha fracasado en su intento de obtener cumplimiento de sus resoluciones por parte de los estados miembros?

El cuadro que nos aparece pintado es el de una Corte débil (CIDH) vis a vis los estados miembros, con poco financiamiento y poder y que busca en su Corte hermana (CEDH) algún tipo de apoyo jurídico político al apoyarse tan fuertemente en sus resoluciones.

Lecture 15: La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) y la Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos (CEDH)

Luego, ¿cuál es la respuesta frente a aquellos que llaman a dejar de lado las “instituciones copiadas” o de raíz Europa? ¿Debe Latinoamérica en casos como este intentar armar sus propias instituciones? ¿Un tribunal Latinoamericano con otra estructura u otro vínculo con los Estados miembros?

O bien ¿esto se soluciona con mayor globalización en el sentido de seguir “copiando” los modelos de Europa con la esperanza de que algún día podremos ponernos al día en materia de cultura de protección a los derechos humanos?

Dejamos planteadas las preguntas, motivando la reflexión del estudiante.

Lecturas recomendadas

1. Larrain Beatriz, “Judicial Globalization: The Dialogues Between the Interamerican and European Courts of Human Rights”, capítulo en *Regional Integration and Modernity: Cross Atlantic Perspectives*, Natalee Doyle y Lorenza Sebesta editoras, Lexington Books, páginas 115-134, 2014.
2. Slaughter Anne-Marie, “Judicial Globalization,” *Virginia Journal of International Law* 40, (1999-2000): 1103-1124.
3. Slaughter Anne-Marie, “A Global Community of Courts,” *Harvard International Law Journal* 44 1, (2003): 191-220.
4. Tate, C. Neal y Torbjörn Vallinder, eds., *The Global Expansion of Judicial Power* (New York: New York University Press, 1995).
5. CIDH: <https://www.corteidh.or.cr/>
6. CEDH: <https://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=home>

Preguntas para el debate

1. Identifique y explique una diferencia entre la CIDH y la CEDH que impacta el funcionamiento de ambas.
2. ¿Qué modificaciones podrían hacerse al funcionamiento de la CIDH que la hicieran más efectiva en su funcionamiento?
3. ¿Cómo impacta el ambiente político al funcionamiento de ambas Cortes?

Lecture 16: Regional institutions in Latin America

Juan Carlos Aguirre

Regional institutions in Latin American

Juan Carlos Aguirre

Hyperlink to [video](#)

Hyperlink to the [slides](#)

Content

1. Introduction: A conceptual relationship between identity and regional institutions
2. The emergent flexibility: Mechanisms
3. Guiding question
4. Main regional institutions in Latin America
5. The problems in the election of a Secretary General in SICA
6. CAN: Between excess bureaucracy and flexibility
7. Flexibility in the Mercosur agenda
8. Unasur: When flexibility is not enough
9. The Pacific Alliance and over-flexibility
10. Conclusions

Introduction: A conceptual relationship between identity and regional institutions

- **REGIONALISM**: “Is the expression of a common sense of identity and purpose combined with the creation and implementation of institutions that express a particular identity and shape collective action within a geographical region” (Pietrangeli, 2009: 10)
- It is important to study **collective identity** in regionalism because it affects the construction of **regional institutions** and their performance (Wendt, 1994; Checkel, 2020).

1. Introduction: A conceptual relationship between identity and regional institutions

In this session we will study the relationship between identity and regional institutions in Latin America. This relationship is framed within the phenomenon of regionalism from the perspective of international relations theory. Thus, a comprehensive definition about regionalism points out that it “is the expression of a common sense of identity and purpose combined with the creation and implementation of institutions that express a particular identity and shape collective action within a geographical region” (Pietrangeli, 2009: 10). If we consider that definition, then analysing the case of Latin American regionalism, this implies studying its degree of institutionalisation derived from the construction of collective entities in each project and its crisis.

Traditionally, it has been pointed out that Latin American regionalism demonstrates a low level of institutionalisation, at least in comparison with that of the European Union (EU). Overall, much of the literature has focused on assessing the effectiveness and soundness of regional institutional design, mainly in terms of the results obtained in comparison with institutional efforts and objectives. However, there is a socio-logical-political dimension that has often been absent in these evalua-

tions, namely the socialisation processes triggered by regional institutions, which can to a greater or lesser extent enable the construction of collective identities (Wendt, 1994; Checkel 2020).

Regional integration in Latin America has had its ups and downs. However, there are integration experiences that have tended to remain in place over time, despite the problems of functioning and political and economic ups and downs. Thus, the transversal variable to explain the maintenance of the different projects is a collective identity, which is expressed through two institutional mechanisms: The first of these is called institutional inertia and the second one is called institutional flexibility.

Both mechanisms can be found in the same organisation (especially in its treaties or foundations agreements) and their effect on the progress or setback of projects depends on the interaction of regional actors in decision-making within these organisations.

The emergent flexibility: Mechanisms

- Latin American regionalism is fragmented and although some initiatives have tended to emulate the European experience, other projects have preferred to innovate and seek more “Latin American” forms of organisation.
- Overall, the progress or setback of projects depends on the interaction of regional actors in decision-making within these organisations because they build collective identity, which affects the institutional design of an organisation. This can be seen through an institutional mechanism called “emergent flexibility”. This mechanism can also be observed in times of institutional crisis.
- “**Emergent flexibility**” can be defined as “a property of international agreements (that generate international and regional institutions) that is not intentionally crafted by rule-makers when a rule is formally established, but rather is subsequently discovered, activated, and accessed by creative rule-users to change agreements in ways unintended by design” (Búzás & Graham, 2020: 2).

2. The emergent flexibility: Mechanisms

This can be seen through an institutional sub-mechanism called “emergent flexibility”, which can be defined as “a property of international agreements (that generate international and regional institutions) that is not intentionally crafted by rule-makers when a rule is formally established, but rather is subsequently discovered, activated, and accessed by creative rule-users to change agreements in ways unintended by design” (Búzás & Graham, 2020: 2). This sub-mechanism can also be observed in times of institutional crisis.

Thus, it is key to analyse the relationship between identity and regional institutions in Latin America, focusing on the processes of socialisation in times of institutional crisis. In particular, in order to explain the plethora of Latin American regional projects, it is useful to focus on the moments of institutional crisis where emergent flexibility precisely emerges.

Guiding Question

Can emerging flexibility mechanisms help to improve the performance of regional institutions in Latin America?



3. Guiding question

Thus, the question guiding this presentation is:

Can emerging flexibility mechanisms help to improve the performance of regional institutions in Latin America?

In the following, I will show some examples of this, focusing on their institutional structure and the main crises faced by the Central American integration system, the Andean Community, the Common Market of the South, the Union of South American Nations and the Pacific Alliance.

Main regional institutions in Latin America

- Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana (**SICA**) (Central American Integration System)
- Comunidad Andina (**CAN**) (Andean Community)
- Mercado Común del Sur (**Mercosur**) (Southern Common Market)
- Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (**Unasur**) (Union of South American Nations)
- **Alianza del Pacífico** (The Pacific Alliance)

4. Main regional institutions in Latin America

With the exception of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, in general, the countries of this region of the world have tended to create and group themselves into sub-regional institutions, either for geographical continuity or for reasons of identity.

These regional or rather sub-regional institutions are:

1. The Central American Integration System (SICA).
2. The Andean Community.
3. The Southern Common Market (Mercosur).
4. The Union of South American Nations (Unasur).
5. The Pacific Alliance.

In this presentation, I will analyse the different ways in which each of these institutions has faced political-institutional crises.

The problems in the election of a Secretary General in SICA

- Foundation: 1966 (Central American International Court) 1969 (Central American Common Market) 1993 (The Central American Integration System).
- Members: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Belize and Dominican Republic.
- Decision-making mechanism: consensus. In the absence of consensus the Pro Tempore Presidency of the Security Commission can refer the issue to the Council of Foreign Ministers for resolution.
- Example of institutional crisis: lack of consensus on the choice of a Secretary General.
- **Solution:** The problems and criticisms of the management of the SICA General Secretariat have been going on for years.
- In fact, former Secretary General Vinicio Cerezo (former president of Guatemala) was the target of criticism from SICA member countries that he and his chief of staff supported the Ortega regime.
- For this reason, Ortega initially proposed the extension of Cerezo's position in SICA (as it served his purposes), but this proposal was rejected by the other member states.
- To resolve the situation, with the mediation of Honduras, the Ortega regime nominated a career diplomat, SICA Executive Director Werner Vargas, as a candidate for the General Secretariat.
- The above case shows how member states of a regional organisation prefer to use mechanisms of emergent flexibility to overcome crises and not to make the organisation disappear or stagnate for too long.

5. The problems in the election of a Secretary General in SICA

This process began in December 1960, when representatives of four countries signed the General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration in Managua. Today, SICA is dynamic and has reasonable future prospects. Central American integration is considered one of the oldest in Latin America. The Central American integration process is also characterised by the existence of a rather evident variable geometry, depending on its essentially intergovernmental nature. This means that the governments of SICA member countries are empowered to realise and decide the pace or speed at which they wish to participate in the community experience. From an institutional point of view, SICA is a classic regional integration organisation, dealing with general issues with the objective of generating common regional policies for the member states, with a dense bureaucratic structure and a decision-making process in which the Council of Presidents and the General Secretariat stand out, where decisions are made by consensus. However, although SICA presents a strong collective identity, based on its long history and relationship with extra-Central American actors such as the United States, SICA has recently undergone a profound moment of crisis derived from previous institutional arrangements. Over the last few years, it has been impossible to agree on a person to lead the organisation,

with member states blocking proposals from Nicaragua, the country that (by rotation) should nominate a candidate. It should be noted that the appointment of the Secretary General of SICA is carried out in accordance with the Tegucigalpa Protocol to the Charter of the Organisation of Central American States (ODECA), which established that the leaders of each country that makes up the system elect a Central American to hold the post for a period of four years. Since July 2021, SICA has been without a Secretary General, as El Salvador and Panama did not support the Nicaraguan proposals due to their criticism of the Ortega regime, which they describe as a "violator of human rights". At the same time, Honduras, which played a mediating role, avoided referring to Nicaragua's "internal affairs". In this context, Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Denis Moncada sent a note of protest in August 2021 to his Salvadoran counterpart, accusing her of intervening in the internal affairs of other states and putting pressure on other SICA member countries, which is also a violation of the Treaty of Tegucigalpa.

The problems and criticisms of the management of the SICA General Secretariat have been going on for years. In fact, former Secretary General Vinicio Cerezo (former president of Guatemala) was the target of criticism from SICA member countries that he and his chief of staff supported the Ortega regime and even faced legal action in the Central American Court of Justice. For this reason, Ortega initially proposed the extension of Cerezo's position in SICA (as it served his purposes), but this proposal was rejected by the other member states. But this situation generated an institutional crisis in SICA, and Ortega even went so far as to say that SICA "was in an illegitimate situation". This situation, which was only resolved in August 2022, strained the organisation, which already has enough problems due to its slowness and excessive bureaucracy. In April 2022, Ortega presented a shortlist that included the names of a former Sandinista, an incumbent minister and an indigenous leader. Each shortlist was also rejected. This situation generated a serious internal crisis in SICA, as projects derived from international cooperation could not be executed. At the same time, there have been situations of dismissal of SICA officials, a matter that some countries are celebrating, especially Costa Rica, which has often insisted that SICA must be reviewed and that it is very costly, since the personnel costs of almost 400 workers are very high.

CAN: Between excess bureaucracy and flexibility

- Foundation: 1969 (Andean Pact)
- Members: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru
- Decision-making mechanism: consensus
- Example of institutional crisis: Peru's critique of common tariffs and the signing of a Free Trade Agreement with the EU
- **Solution:** The four AC members (as Venezuela had left the regionalist project in 2006) began negotiating that FTA with the EU as a group in 2008 (AC members saw collective negotiation as an opportunity to strengthen the regionalist project).
- Since the first negotiating rounds it was clear that Ecuador and Bolivia had profound differences from Colombia and Peru. Crucially, a collective FTA with the EU was the last chance for the AC to partially recover its customs union.
- Emergent flexibility can be appreciated in the disposition of the Andean normative to allow (by D-598) to negotiate bilaterally was something highly valued by AC member countries' negotiators, and furthermore, besides these normative dispositions, emergent flexibility must also be acknowledged by the fact that allowing the multi-party agreement implied in practice giving up the project's main institutional historical goal, namely constituting a common market.

6. CAN: Between excess bureaucracy and flexibility

The Andean Community is one of the older regional organisations in Latin America, founded in 1969 after the signing of the Andean Pact. Its founder members were Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru (Venezuela was added to the Andean Pact in 1973). Seven years after its foundation, the Community of Andean Nations (the original name of the institution) lost its first member, Chile (under Pinochet's dictatorship). However, in 1990, faced with the evident stagnation of the AC, the system of coordination of the Andean integration institutions was established by order of the presidents in office. This institutional "re-foundation" was long and fraught with problems. One example related to the problems of the Andean Community happened when Peru and Colombia decided to negotiate an FTA with the European Union. In this event, institutional flexibility can be observed in the AC members' decision to allow Bolivia and Ecuador to disengage the signing of an FTA with the EU while enabling Colombia and Peru to do it by establishing a multi-party agreement with their European counterpart.

The four AC members (as Venezuela had left the regionalist project in 2006) began negotiating that FTA with the EU as a group in 2008 and looked at the association agreement between Chile and the EU as a

benchmark. The above, not only because bloc-to-bloc negotiations were a condition the EU demanded in trade negotiations with countries belonging to regional blocs, but mainly because AC members saw collective negotiation as an opportunity to strengthen the regionalist project after Venezuela's withdrawal. However, it was clear since the first negotiating rounds that Ecuador and Bolivia had profound differences from Colombia and Peru. Especially clear is when Bolivia and Ecuador announced their marginalisation from the negotiating process, there were no suggestions that the AC should be terminated, even though other member states have called for it, in other moments and on other issues (Prieto & Aguirre, 2022). All four governments understood that the previously known differences among them finally broke through, and all four agreed that a multi-party agreement between Colombia and Peru with the EU was the best solution for all without putting the regionalist project into question (Prieto, 2016; 2013). Crucially, a collective FTA with the EU was the last chance for the AC to partially recover its customs union, already almost completely dismantled because of the signing of FTAs with the US by two of its members. The multi-party agreement with the EU thus meant the definite burial of the common external tariff, and thus the actual resignation to ever constitute an Andean common market.

Emergent flexibility can be appreciated in the disposition of the Andean normative to allow Colombia and Peru to sign a multi-party agreement with the EU after a decision was promulgated to encourage all members to negotiate collectively as a bloc. D-667 was issued at the start of negotiations, prompting AC members to pursue collective negotiations with the EU in order to procure the bloc's unity. However, it also established clearly that D-598 was the norm orienting such negotiations, which in turn stated that AC member states could opt for bilateral or individual negotiations in case an agreement could not be reached with the other AC members. The flexibility granted by D-598 to negotiate bilaterally was something highly valued by AC member countries' negotiators, and furthermore, besides these normative dispositions, emergent flexibility must also be acknowledged by the fact that allowing the multi-party agreement implied in practice giving up the project's main institutional historical goal, namely constituting a common market.

Flexibility in the Mercosur agenda

- Foundation: 1991 (Asuncion Treaty)
- Members: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.
- Decision-making mechanism: Consensus.
- Example of institutional crisis: Negotiations to establish a Free Trade Agreement with the European Union.
- **Solution:** This agreement has been paralysed due to a series of disagreements between the European parliaments (which must ratify the agreement) and the South American Presidents of the countries belonging to the bloc.
- The electoral victory of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil put a new question mark. The government of the new Brazilian president brought with him, among many other things, a controversial environmental agenda, capitalised on by opponents of the agreement in Europe.
- France reiterated its objections, raising the impossibility of ratifying it in the agreed format. More recently, the parliaments of Austria and the Netherlands have come out against ratification, citing environmental concerns and a more general repudiation of the Bolsonaro administration's policies.
- In a show of emerging flexibility, in December 2021 Mercosur reaffirmed its commitment to the 'full implementation of the Paris Agreement on climate change, but also asked to take into account the different national realities' (The declaration was approved by presidents of Mercosur).

7. Flexibility in the Mercosur agenda

Mercosur was established with the Treaty of Asunción of 26 March 1991. This agreement, signed by the leaders of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay, did not create a Common Market but rather defined the objective of doing so. In parallel, after advances and retreats, Mercosur is in the final stages of ratifying an extra-bloc agreement with the European Union. However, this agreement has been paralysed due to a series of disagreements between the European parliaments (which must ratify the agreement) and the presidents of the countries belonging to the bloc. While negotiating as a bloc may have proved a positive exercise for Mercosur in terms of identity construction, the protracted and difficult course of these bi-regional negotiations has also highlighted inherent weaknesses within the organisation. After more than 20 years of negotiations, they began to accelerate in 2016, following the political turnaround in Argentina (through elections) and Brazil (through a 'soft coup'), which brought liberal-conservative forces to power. This new situation implied a modification of Argentina's offer towards levels of coverage similar to those of the rest of the bloc, as well as the relaxation of Brazil's position on some sensitive issues, such as government purchases and rules of origin for the automotive sector. Despite all these elements for the conclusion of the treaty, some disagreements of degree inhibited its signature in 2017, while the subsequent electoral victory of

Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil posed a new question mark. The government of the new Brazilian president brought with him, among many other things, a controversial environmental agenda, capitalised on by opponents of the agreement in Europe. On the economic front, however, Bolsonaro's government was even more flexible than his predecessor, accepting the reduction of regional content required for duty-free car trade and quotas for key products, such as meat or ethanol, at levels that had not met the expectations of previous decision-makers. With all this, Mercosur gave a final push for the conclusion of the agreement. In anticipation of an eventual political turnaround in Argentina, the European Commission managed to persuade reluctant EU members of the agreement in the same direction, and an agreement in principle was signed in 2019. However, after the fires in the Amazon, France reiterated its objections, raising the impossibility of ratifying it in the agreed format. More recently, the parliaments of Austria and the Netherlands have come out against ratification, citing environmental concerns and a more general repudiation of the Bolsonaro administration's policies. The key factor is the environmental crisis provoked by the Bolsonaro government and its support of Brazilian agriculture, its irritating climate change denialism, its threats to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, and also its alignment with the US while questioning Mercosur itself and, therefore, the agreement with the EU. In this way, the agreement was once again stalled in part due to Bolsonaro's climate change denialism. This again shows the Brazilian influence in the bloc and the strong presidentialism that has taken over Mercosur's institutionality.

However, in a show of emerging flexibility, in December 2021 Mercosur reaffirmed its commitment to the full implementation of the Paris Agreement on climate change, but also asked to take into account the different 'national realities'. In the document, the Mercosur signatories called on developed countries "to meet the annual mobilisation target of \$100 billion from 2020" to achieve global compliance with the Paris Agreement commitments. The declaration was approved by the presidents of Argentina, Alberto Fernández; Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro; Paraguay, Mario Abdo Benítez; and Uruguay, Luis Alberto Lacalle Pou, as well as Bolivia, Luis Alberto Arce, whose country is in the process of joining Mercosur.

Unasur: When flexibility is not enough

- Foundation 2008
- Members: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Paraguay, Surinam, Uruguay, Venezuela
- Decision-making mechanism: Consensus
- Example of institutional crisis: Lack of consensus on the choice of a Secretary General.
- **Solution:** Unasur successfully faced the political crises of Bolivia (2008), Ecuador (2010), Colombia-Venezuela (2010) and Paraguay (2012), and also offered its support to handle the territorial dispute between Chile and Bolivia, and had a proactive role in the crisis of Honduras (2009).
- In April of 2014, the Unasur troika, composed of former foreign ministers of Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador, visited Venezuela to try to reach a formal agreement between the parties to resolve the conflict between the opposition and Maduro's government (which failed).
- Former General Secretary, E. Samper, insisted on Unasur's mediating role. Short after, Ernesto Samper's term in charge of Unasur's General Secretariat came to an end, and from then on the organisation's role was relegated to that of a mere observer.
- In the meanwhile, given the lack of consensus for the election of a new Secretary-General among the organisation's member countries and fundamentally in the face of Venezuela's blocking of Argentina's proposal to appoint José Octavio Borbón as the new Secretary-General, in 2018, during Bolivia's Pro Tempore Presidency, five South American countries announced the suspension of their membership of Unasur (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay and Peru).
- The lack of institutionalisation made institutional and emergent flexibility insignificant for maintaining the regionalist project, even more in the absence of institutional inertia that could have accustomed national - and regional - bureaucrats to solve institutional problems jointly.

8. Unasur: When flexibility is not enough

Unasur's project (founded by all the South American countries in 2008) has been described by scholars, on the one hand, as post-hegemonic in the sense that the South American countries left the United States out of Unasur and criticised the role of the Organization of American States (OAS) in the region and, on the other hand, as post-liberal in line with criticism of the international financial system derived from the Bretton Woods agreements and the Washington Consensus in the 1990s.

The initially latent and later evident conflict between Venezuela and other Unasur member countries ended up making the initiative disappear after the death of Hugo Chávez and subsequent conflicts with the government of Nicolás Maduro. Unasur successfully faced the political crises of Bolivia (2008), Ecuador (2010), Colombia-Venezuela (2010) and Paraguay (2012), and also offered its support to handle the territorial dispute between Chile and Bolivia and had a proactive role in the crisis of Honduras (2009). Such success is understood as its capacity to support national governments vis-à-vis domestic threats to their constitutional order and to mediate in member countries' conflicts such as the ones between Colombia and its neighbours. However, this successful record was disrupted when the Venezuelan opposition parties rejected the legitimacy of Nicolás Maduro's designation as Venezuela's president

in 2014. The situation became even tenser between parties when Unasur condemned the sanctions imposed by the United States on Venezuelan officials and problems further deepened with the election of Ernesto Samper (former president of Colombia) as Secretary General of Unasur, as a portion of Venezuelan opinion perceived him as a biased actor with strong support towards the government of Nicolás Maduro. Despite the above, Samper insisted on Unasur's mediating role and convened a series of meetings (some publicly known and others in secret) in which former presidents José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (Spain), Martín Torrijos (Panama) and Lionel Fernández (Dominican Republic) participated, as well as an official representative from the Vatican. Each one of them was considered biased, both by the Venezuelan government and the opposition, until in early 2017 Unasur made its last attempt to bring the parties in conflict closer together through a document called the "Democratic Coexistence Agreement", which was rejected by the Venezuelan opposition. Shortly afterward, Ernesto Samper's term in charge of Unasur's General Secretariat came to an end, and from then on the organisation's role was relegated to that of a mere observer. In the meanwhile, given the lack of consensus for the election of a new Secretary General among the organisation's member countries and fundamentally in the face of Venezuela's blocking of Argentina's proposal to appoint José Octavio Bordón as the new Secretary General, in 2018, during Bolivia's Pro Tempore presidency, five South American countries announced the suspension of their membership of Unasur (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay and Peru), while Ecuador announced its exit in 2019 and Uruguay in 2020, leading to the de facto dismantling of the organisation, although the remaining members (Venezuela, Bolivia, Surinam and Guyana) still refuse to declare its termination. To put it bluntly, the lack of a collective identity, which was absolute in the cultural and ideological dimensions and very weak in the inter-group one, made institutional and emergent flexibility insignificant for maintaining the regionalist project, even more in the absence of institutional inertia that could have accustomed national - and regional - bureaucrats to solve institutional problems jointly.

Pacific Alliance and over-flexibility

- Foundation: 2011 (Lima's Declaration), 2012 (Paranal's Declaration)
- Members: Chile, Colombia, Peru and Mexico
- Decision-making mechanism: consensus
- Example of institutional crisis: failure of the "Convergencia en la diversidad"
- **Solution:** This convergence was a strategy designed by the former Foreign Minister of Chile, Hernando Muñoz, with support of Eclac, during the second government of Michelle Bachelet (2014-2018).
- The former Chilean foreign minister, concerned about the state of progress of the Pacific Alliance, in an attempt to bring Chile closer to the region and take advantage of political affinities with the Argentine government, promoted a work agenda to bring positions closer on common issues with Mercosur.
- Muñoz made agile use of the emerging flexibility mechanism (convergence in diversity strategy) provided by the PA as a flexible institution with little bureaucracy (it is impossible to think of something similar emerging from Mercosur). This was not enough to bring the PA out of its initial institutional lethargy derived from its very low level of intra-regional trade.
- The above show us the limited usefulness of using emerging flexibility mechanisms in regional organisations that are already flexible and therefore seem to require greater institutionalisation.

9. The Pacific Alliance and over-flexibility

The agreement establishing the Pacific Alliance was signed in 2012. The Pacific Alliance pursued a regional dialogue with Mercosur following the principle "convergence within diversity". In November 2014, on the initiative of the former Chilean Foreign Minister Hernando Muñoz, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ministers and Vice Ministers of Trade of the PA, Mercosur, a representative of the Association of Caribbean States (ACS), senior representatives of the Idb, Oas, Caf, Aladi and representatives of the private sector and academics met in Santiago in what was called the "Regional Integration Dialogue: Pacific Alliance and Mercosur". At the event, the former Chilean Foreign Minister, with the clear objective of implementing his strategy of "convergence in diversity", pointed out that regional integration is a priority for Chile and all those present: "This meeting is an example of the shared desire and commitment that brings us together. Our dialogue has the potential to constitute a relevant milestone in this process of building a common Latin American space, in a clear allusion to the problem of the high level of institutional fragmentation in Latin America".

Muñoz had already announced in the same year Chile's intention to generate spaces for dialogue between the PA and Mercosur to make the PA a bridge to the "Asia factory". In this regard, Muñoz indicated that "Chile values the Pacific Alliance as an economic integration scheme

and trade platform of collective projection to the Asia-Pacific region; but it will not share any pretension of conceiving the Alliance as an ideological bloc that excludes or antagonises other integration projects" (El País, 2014). This included the European concept of "differentiated speeds" that the European Union applied with some of its less developed partners. Although in principle the "Convergencia en la Diversidad" initiative was intended to generate convergence between the two blocs, structural conditions related to the collective identity of both Mercosur and the PA prevented it. But at the same time, the very process of socialisation promoted by Chile also prevented it, since the possibility of socialising points in common is quite limited when considering an initiative of these characteristics, where there are differences in all the structural variables that define the collective identity. Besides that, Muñoz made agile use of the emerging flexibility mechanism (convergence in diversity strategy) provided by the PA as a flexible institution with little bureaucracy (it is impossible to think of something similar emerging from Mercosur). This was not enough to bring the PA out of its initial institutional lethargy derived from its very low level of intra-regional trade. In this sense, the potential for convergence of integration processes in Latin America imagined by the former Chilean foreign minister is not such and was only an attempt to re-establish a bloc with a hybrid collective identity that is gradually losing its initial dynamism. The PA is currently stagnated and without the support of its main partner, Mexico.

Despite the failure of Muñoz's strategy, he did not give up and, in 2017 in the face of then-US President Donald Trump's announcement to leave the TPP-11 negotiations, Muñoz again made use of an emerging flexibility mechanism to deal with the looming crisis, again without success. Although the use of this emerging flexibility mechanism was positively received by the parties, the meeting failed to revitalise either the TPP or the PA, which points to the limited usefulness of using emerging flexibility mechanisms in regional organisations that are already flexible and therefore seem to require greater institutionalisation.

Conclusions

1. On the one hand, despite the institutional inertia or institutional flexibility of each case reviewed, the crisis events show that when there is sufficient will on the part of the actors to generate mechanisms for emerging flexibility in decision-making, then the regional project continues to function, but stagnates (momentarily or permanently) as in the cases analysed in Sica, Can, Mercosur and Pacific Alliance.
2. On the other hand, when emergent flexibility does not emerge, then the regional project begins to disintegrate, as the Unasur case shows.
3. In addition, as we saw in the case of the Pacific Alliance, emergent flexibility is not very useful when it is applied in institutions that are excessively flexible.
4. The role of regional actors, beyond presidents, is key to understanding the functioning of existing sub-regional organisations (except in the case of Mercosur).
5. Finally, it seems that it is more useful for the future of regional integration in Latin America to create strong regional and sub-regional organisations with more bureaucracy to create a collective identity, as this allows for the continuity of the project(s).

10. Conclusions

In order to answer the main question of this session, emergent flexibility is useful as an institutional crisis exit mechanism when it is applied to regional organisations with a certain degree of institutionalisation (bureaucracy) derived from their collective identity. The complexity of Latin American regionalism can be shown by the number of regional institutions created from the mid-1960s to the present day. Each project has its own particularities and contexts. However, a distinctive feature of the regional initiatives created since the late 1990s has been the demand for little bureaucracy in the regional institutions that have been built, as opposed to the idea of creating regional bureaucracy to support the projects, as shown by the European experience. All this also shows the different Latin American collective identities, almost always sub-regional and geographically contiguous, except in the case of the Pacific Alliance.

Thus, on the one hand, despite the institutional inertia or institutional flexibility of each case reviewed, the crisis events show that when there is sufficient will on the part of the actors to generate mechanisms for emerging flexibility in decision-making, then the regional project continues to function, but stagnates (momentarily or permanently), as in the cases analysed in Sica, Can, Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance. On

the other hand, when emergent flexibility does not take place, then the regional project begins to disintegrate, as the Unasur case shows. Therefore, the role of regional actors, beyond presidents, is key to understanding the functioning of existing sub-regional organisations (except in the case of Mercosur).

Finally, it seems that it is more useful for the future of regional integration in Latin America to create strong regional and sub-regional organisations with more bureaucracy to create a collective identity, as this allows for the continuity of the project(s). However, this is a general conclusion, and one that is likely to be contested by both Latin American and Canadian elites (because it involves public spending). From the point of view analysed here, it seems to be more efficient to strengthen the remaining regional institutions, based on intergovernmentalism, in order to avoid the traditional fragmentation of Latin American regionalism in the future. At the same time, it is necessary to use the existing institutionalism to build bridges in the direction of strengthening regional institutionalism, while respecting the different collective identities that exist in the region.

Further readings

1. Búzás, Z. And Graham, E. (2020). Emergent Flexibility in Institutional Development: How International Rules Really Change, *International Studies Quarterly*, Volume 64, Issue 4, December 2020, Pages 821- 833, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa049>
2. Checkel, J. (2020). International Institutions and Domestic Politics: Rethinking the Institutions-Identity Nexus. Paper prepared for the European Consortium for Political Research General Conference (Virtual), 24-28 August 2020.
3. Pietrangeli, Giulia. 2009. 'Supporting Regional Integration and Cooperation Worldwide: An Overview of the European Union Approach.' In Philippe de Lombaerde and Michael Schulz (eds), *The EU and World Regionalism: The Makeability of Regions in the 21st Century*, 9-44. Aldershot: Ashgate.
4. Prieto, G. C. 2013. *The Role of Collective Identity and Regional Institutions in the Andean Community*. Thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of PhD in Politics, Faculty of Humanities.
5. Prieto, G., & Aguirre, J.C (2022). Identity and Regional Institutions in Latin America. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*. Retrieved 22 Oct. 2022, from <https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies>

Questions for discussion and debate

1. The collective identities of the EU and the Pacific Alliance are similar but their interests are different. How can this identity similarity be harnessed to reconfigure EU-LATAM relations?
2. Beyond cooperation, what specific strategies could be pursued in the future of the relationship between the two blocs?
3. How could the Pacific Alliance's emerging flexibility mechanisms strengthen relations with the EU?