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INTERETHNIC RESOURCES IN THE NETWORKING PROCESS
OF MIGRANTS FROM THE POST-SOVIET SPACE:
THE CASE OF RUSSIAN-SPEAKERS IN FRIULI-VENEZIA GIULIA


DOTTORANDA:

Anastasiya Zayakhanova



RELATORE:

Prof. Bruno Tellia



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Introduction

Relevance of the research theme

Migration became a significant factor of social changes for the last century. The global scale of migration processes causes the necessity of its study from different perspectives and by different areas of knowledge. It is conditioned by the processes of globalization, changes happening in the world economy and policy, outbreaks of ethnic conflicts and civil wars, the increasing mobility of youth and other social phenomena. In the conditions of the constantly changing society the characteristics of migration processes undergo changes as well: directions of migration, circumstances of migration, factors defining successful adaptation, motivation of migrants, social and demographic aspects of migrants and many other characteristics determining the context of migration processes and therefore influencing every particular migrant. Thus, the scope of scientific interest is constantly growing.

The dissolution of the Union of the Soviet Socialistic Republics caused new migration directions and involved people from the former USSR into the migration processes. The appearance of the Newly Independent States (NIS), rearrangement of the state borders led to loss of old identifications and to intensification of the role of new national statuses on both group and individual levels.

Under these circumstances on the one hand, the global processes become important, and on the other hand, social and economic differences and cultural peculiarities must be taken into consideration. The growth of national self-identity, resurrection of ethnic cultures and complication of interethnic relations on the post-Soviet space became the subject of studies either on the macrolevel of structures or on the microlevel of everyday social practices. Despite the fact that the NIS states became more ethnically homogeneous states in comparison with the USSR, the problems of ethnicity did not lost their significance and moreover took on a new meaning in all spheres of society. The transitional period from the USSR to the independents states brought to birth the notion of 'Russian-speakers' in a social sense rather than purely linguistic as it was before.

The relevance of the theme is determined by the necessity of understanding and careful studying the phenomenon of migration of people from the post-Soviet space with its changed national state entities. Despite the notable emigration flows of the citizens of the

NIS, these states only begin analyzing the emigration flows into the countries outside the post-Soviet space. Some concrete characteristics of migration flows stay poorly studied.

The relevance of the research is also connected with the absence in scientific literature of the verification of 'Russian-speakers' as a subject of study. Especially the migrants behavior in consideration with their ties with other former Soviets stay little studied. Attention to this side of migration processes allows understand their specifics, contribute to the new decisions for the problems of interethnic and international relations.

The case study of migrants from the former USSR in an Italian region is explained by the growing levels of emigration from the NIS states into Italy. Besides, Italy previously had flows of migrants from tsarist Russia and, thus, the opportunity for historical comparison and parallelism exists there. The particular region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia represents an average Italian region with its average levels of migration from the ex-Soviet space (in particular from Russia, Ukraine and Moldova) and almost equal to the correspondent all-Italian levels.

The level of scientific elaboration of the theme

Interethnic relations is a research subject from different perspectives: as a variation in friendship and marriage ties, as reason of conflicts, as relations between majority and immigrant population. In the focus of this research there is interethnic interaction of immigrants from the different NIS states, and therefore it is based on the literature analyzing migrants' interethnic relations on different scale: the cases of interethnic interaction of different groups, Russian-speaking migrants as a group, separate flows of emigrations from the NIS states to the near abroad and the far abroad, emigration from Russia and the post-Soviet states to Italy.

Interethnic interaction of migrants appear in different forms and studied as 'panethnic' identities in the USA (Lopez and Espiritu, 1990; Itzigsohn, 2004; Hochschild, 2007), as interaction between 'subethnicities' on the example of such ethnic groups of migrants as Jews, Chinese and Armenians originated from diverse lands (Ben-Rafael and Sharot, 1991; Der-Martirosian et al., 2004; Smooha, 2004). It is studied in Canada in the context of its high levels of racial and ethnic diversity (Breton, 1998; Fong, 2006).

For the case of Russian-speakers, David Laitin (1998) introduced the concept of ‘conglomerate identity’. In fact, the interactions of Russian-speakers are mostly studied in the frame of post-imperial studies and applied to the Russian near abroad¹ (e.g., Lieven, 1998; Poppe and Hagendoorn, 2001; Shulman, 2004; Levada, 2005; Solovei, 2008; Kosmarskaya, 2011).

In the cases of studying ‘Russian-speakers’ in the far abroad², scholars often form this group for analysis uniting representatives of different states on the base of their common language (as it comes from the name of the group) and historical background: in the USA (Solari, 2006; Erwin and Chappo, 2002), Israel (Remennick, 2003; Plotkin-Amrami, 2008), Germany (Darieva, 2000), Finland (Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2000), the Netherlands (Kopnina, 2005; Willett, 2007), Great Britain (Kopnina, 2005; Byford, 2009), New Zealand (Maydell-Stevens et al., 2007), Australia (Team et al., 2007), Argentina (Alvares, 2005), Greece (Sevach, 2011).

The Russian-speakers in Italy are studied as a linguistic group (Perotto, 2006, 2009; Perotto and Ambrosi, 2009), or as separate groups of Ukrainians (Shehda and Horodetsky, 2004; Caritas/Migrantes, 2006; Montefusco, 2008; Vianello, 2009; Solari, 2008, 2010), Moldovans (Caritas/Migrants, 2009b; Chiavarini, 2009; Vietti, 2010), Russians (Trukhina, 2004; Ryazantsev and Tkachenko, 2007; Caritas/Migrantes, 2010). Besides, immigration from Russia to Italy in XIX – early XX was a subject of research of Italian scholars (Tamborra, 1977; Venturi, 1979, 1995; Todeschini, 1997; Garzonio, n.d.; project ‘*Russi in Italia*’³) and Russian scholars (Gasperovich and Shumakov, 1996; Talalay, 2005; n.d.).

The problem is that the interethnic relations among Russian-speaking migrants in the far abroad are theoretically poorly explained and experimentally not verified.

The object of the research are migrants in FVG arrived from the USSR and the NIS. Their ethnic belonging and country of departure is specified in the thesis additionally.

The subject of the research is the process of networking of migrants from different states.

¹ All countries previously internal to Soviet borders.

² All countries previously external to Soviet borders.

³ <http://www.russinitalia.it/index.php?lang=it>

The migrants in this thesis are people born outside of Italy, previously being citizens of another state, moved and living in Italy independently of their legal status. Terms meaning national belonging are used in compliance with the political definition of nation.

The research goal is the examination of the interethnic and international interaction of migrants from the former Soviet Union in the far abroad.

The research tasks:

- to examine the theory of networks in order to verify its applicability and to distinguish bases of networks formation;
- to apply the theory of networks to the analysis of interethnic interaction of migrants from the former USSR;
- to examine notion of Russian-speakers and another notions similar to it in order to emphasize the difference between them and to validate the usage of the central term of this study;
- to retrace the character of Russian immigration to Italy in the XIX and early XX century;
- to conduct a historical analysis of interethnic interaction in the USSR with the application of sociological theories of interethnic interaction;
- to describe immigration populations of different groups of Russian-speakers, their extent and reasons of their immigration to Italy;
- to describe the individual level of Russian-speaking network in Friuli-Venezia Giulia;
- to describe the organizational level of Russian-speaking network in Friuli-Venezia Giulia.

The research theoretical and methodological basis

The research follows the constructivist theory of ethnicity. It is based on the concept of social capital and social networks, in particular, it applies a network approach to the examined object.

Theoretical and methodological approach of networks used in this study assumes that it can supply with additional information about immigrant populations in comparison with the

information obtained from the studying them in the predetermined frames of ethnicity or nation.

The empirical basis of the research

This study utilizes several research methods, combining quantitative and qualitative methods: semi-structured questionnaires, semi-structured interviews, observation, statistical analysis, secondary sociological analysis of data.

The empirical basis of the thesis are the results of the survey conducted by the author (127 semi-structured questionnaires) and 14 interviews with experts, FVG, December 2010 – April 2011) and the studies conducted with the author's participation ('Immigrati e religioni: Il nuovo pluralism delle fedi in Friuli Venezia Giulia', supervisor B.Tellia, semi-structured interviews with experts, FVG, 2010; 'Immigrati e religioni', supervisor B.Tellia, questionnaires, random sample, FVG, 2011).

The research scientific novelty

The conducted research has validated the notion 'Russian-speakers' in regard to a part of immigrants from the NIS in the far abroad. The concept of migrant networks has been applied to the analysis of migrants' international interaction. The role and place of interethnic interaction between migrants from different NIS states has been empirically determined and analyzed.

Theoretical and practical implications

The results of this research can be used for advance of mechanisms of interstate cooperation in the issues of international migration.

The results allow to formulate new approaches to issue of Russian-speaking immigrants in the far abroad. This study being a case-study of a narrow question of the single group of 'Russian-speakers' at the same time contributes to the issue of interethnic interaction and theory of social networks in general.

The thesis structure

The thesis consists of introduction, three chapters, conclusion, bibliography, and appendices. Introduction describes relevance and the level of scientific elaboration of the research theme, defines subject and object of the research, presents research goal and tasks, theoretical and methodological basis, empirical basis of the research, its scientific novelty and forms of its theoretical and practical implications. Chapter 1 focuses on theoretical and methodological approaches to interethnic interaction of migrants and its foundations. It discusses theories of interethnic interaction and presents a network approach. The network approach is often used in the study of immigrants but not for interethnic interaction of immigrants. The advantage of analysing the interethnic interaction in the frames of networks for the scope of this study is that it allows for a better understanding of the way in which interethnic ties are formed and used. This way, the foundations for interethnic interaction are derived from the existing literature on interethnic interaction and networking. These foundations are introduced and explained for the particular case of Russian-speakers in Italy. Chapter 2 describes the character of the Russian-speaking immigrant groups in Italy and Friuli-Venezia Giulia. First it deals with the definition of Russian-speakers, and then it examines migrants' groups from Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and other CIS states with their division into several occupational categories. Chapter 3 starts with the description of the research project. In what follows it presents and discusses the results of the research in two dimensions: individual level and organizational level of Russian-speaking network. Implications of this study and recommendations for future scientific research are set out in Conclusion.

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CHAPTER ONE: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO INTERETHNIC INTERACTION OF MIGRANTS AND ITS FOUNDATIONS

1.1. Interethnic interaction and social networks

The term 'ethnicity' became crucial in social sciences with the process of comprehension of decolonization in Africa and Asia, the collapse of the Communist regimes, and movements of ethnic minorities for their rights in many industrially developed countries (Guibernau and Rex, 1997; *Novaya filosofskaya entsiklopedia*, 2000-2001). International migration processes, in particular inflow of immigrants to Europe, served as additional stimulus for social scholars' interest in ethnic groups and ethnicity being a type of social organization of cultural differences and reflection of the belonging to a certain ethnic group.

The word 'ethnic' is derived originally from the Greek word 'ethnos', which can be translated as a people or a nation. The earliest dictionary appearance of the term 'ethnicity' was in Oxford English Dictionary in 1972 (quoted in Isiksal, 2002). Nowadays the Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology (Ritzer, 2007) defines ethnic groups as 'fundamental units of social organization which consist of members who define themselves, or are defined, by a sense of common historical origins that may also include religious beliefs, a similar language, or a shared culture.'

The debate about the nature of ethnicity divides scholars into two camps, namely 'primordialism' (or 'essentialism') and 'constructivism' (or 'instrumentalism'). 'Primordialism' underlines that ethnic membership is acquired through birth, while 'constructivism' claims that ethnicity is 'the product of a social process rather than a cultural given, made and remade rather than taken for granted, chosen depending on circumstances rather than ascribed through birth.' (Wimmer, 2008, p. 971). Thus, primordialists do not acknowledge the existence of multiple identities and constructivists believe that individuals choose between various identities according to self-interest.

Existing various definitions and uses of these terms reflect the multi-faceted nature of ethnicity which is belonging to a certain ethnic group and difficulty to distinguish between concepts of ethnic group and national and racial group.

The definition by Max Weber which continues to be influential stated that ethnic groups are ‘those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or of both, or because of memories of colonisation or migration’ (quoted in Hutchinson and Smith, 1996, p. 35).

Additionally, the most widely used in literature definitions of ethnicity include the following (Chandra, 2006, pp. 402-403):

According to Horowitz (1985), “[e]thnicity is based on a myth of collective ancestry, which usually carries with it traits believed to be innate. Some notion of ascription, however diluted, and affinity deriving from it are inseparable from the concept of ethnicity.”

According to Fearon and Laitin (2000), an ethnic group is “a group larger than a family for which membership is reckoned primarily by descent, is conceptually autonomous, and has a conventionally recognized ‘natural history’ as a group.”

According to Smith, an ethnic group is “a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more elements of a common culture, a link with a homeland and a sense of solidarity” (Hutchinson and Smith, 1996).

Primarily the concept of ethnicity has been used to designate differences in social, cultural and linguistic practices. Later, additional criteria appeared including for the purposes of distinguishing ethnicity from nationality. That way, an important component in all four cited above definitions is common ancestry and descent or a myth of them. Besides, one of important criteria to distinguish a group as an ethnic group is the sense of belonging, as Medaglia (2001) puts it: one belongs to an ethnic group in the case one believes oneself to be a member of that group and acts in ways that validate her/ his membership of that group (p. 58). The correlation of social and cultural boundaries, internal and external ideas on what is this or that group plays an important role in understanding ethnicity (Barth, 1970). The features that are taken into account for recognizing ethnic groups are not the sum of ‘objective’ similarities and differences, but only those which the actors themselves regard as significant (or this significance is imposed from outside).

Thus, I define an ethnic group as a people to whom most of the following conditions apply: they have a common descent, a shared history, cultural practices valued by themselves, and define themselves or are defined by others as a distinguished group.

The term 'ethnic group' is interwoven with the terms of 'national group' and 'racial group'. The concepts of race and nationality received new interpretations in relation to migration processes and appearance of immigrant minorities in the developed countries.

According to Eriksen ([1993] 1996), while modern genetics tends not to speak of races, concepts of race can be important to the extent that they inform people's actions and in this way race may assume sociological importance existing as a social construct. Banton has distinguished race and ethnicity referring race to the categorization of people and ethnicity to group identification ([1994] 1996). However, case studies for different regions of the world show that ethnicity can assume many forms including those which make race a part of ethnic ideology, and as Eriksen ([1993] 1996) argues, presence or absence of ideas of 'race' does not seem to be a decisive factor in interethnic relations.

In this study ethnicity is distinguished from race according to social construction, namely: the term 'ethnicity' commonly refers to distinctions based on national origin, language, religion, food, and other cultural markers; the term 'race' commonly refers to distinctions drawn from physical appearance (Stone, 1985). It is interesting how racial identities became important for migration practices and policies in the USA and Great Britain.

Another term which is close to the term 'ethnic group' is 'nation'. According to the Blackwell dictionary of sociology (2000), 'a nation is a society that occupies a particular territory and includes a sense of common identity, history, and destiny' (p. 204). Smith defined nation as 'population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members' (1991, p. 23). In this study nation is an aggregate of citizens of one state as a political community.

Thus in this study, the term 'nationality' is used for designation of people's belonging to a certain state; nationality may or may not coincide with ethnic group. Ethnic group is taxonomically situated inside of racial group: racial groups consist of diverse ethnic groups.

All three terms are widely used with the term 'identity' in this study. By 'identity,' I mean any social category in which an individual is eligible to be a member (whether it is an ethnic group or national group or racial group). Ethnic identity categories are a subset of identity categories in which eligibility for membership is determined by descent-based attributes.

We see that an ethnic group may or may not be racially different from others in the society of which it is a part. It may or may not think of itself and be thought of by others as a nation. It may or may not be a minority. Whatever the mixture, or in the absence of these three characteristics, ethnic groups are distinguishable culturally; they are identified, by others and by themselves, as separate; and, in the fullest sense, as individuals they join in activities and share beliefs and aspirations that express their distinctiveness. Thus ethnicity is the most inclusive of these four terms (Yinger, 1994, p. 25).

That is why the term 'ethnic group' remains central in this study which places under scrutiny interethnic relations and interaction.

Interethnic relations is a research subject from different perspectives: as a variation in friendship and marriage ties, as reason of conflicts, as relations between dominant and minor populations. In the focus of this research there is interethnic interaction of immigrants from the different NIS states, and therefore it is based on the literature analyzing migrants' alliances, migrants' adaptation, Russian-speaking migrants as a group, and separate flows of migrations from the NIS states to the Far Abroad.

The phenomenon of migrant alliances where 'alliance' is 'a close association of nations and other groups, formed to advance common interests or causes' (The American heritage dictionary of the English language, 2007) across ethno-national boundaries characterizes mostly immigrants societies. Together with establishment of ties with host society, the interactions of immigrants of different ethnic and national origin appear as well. Such interaction seems to be acknowledged and recognized since certain immigrants are grouped in alliances by scholars and politicians. These alliances may rely on racial (e.g. Latinos), religious (e.g. Muslims) and economic class (e.g. domestic workers) categories. Still the

main basis for grouping individual migrants is their ethno-national origin as the question of citizenship stays the central point for immigration policy of the receiving societies.

American reality knows 'panethnicity' defined as 'the development of bridging organizations and the generalization of solidarity among subgroups of ethnic collectivities that are often seen as homogeneous by outsiders' (Lopez and Espiritu, 1990, p. 198) on the example of the American Indians, the Asian Americans, the African Americans and the Latino/ Hispanic Americans. People in these groups may share many of the broad national culture patterns while differing significantly in the more specific patterns of their respective ethnicities (Lopez and Espiritu, 1990).

Scholars using the panethnic aggregates 'seek evidence of a strong sense of unity or linked fate across nationalities because they perceive racial identity to be a core value', or they believe that 'groups have more political and policy influence if their numbers are larger' in the conditions of the American political system (Hochschild, 2007, p. 167). Other scholars argue that this level of aggregation obscures patterns of intergroup relations. For example, relations between African Americans and black immigrants "may be at least as tense as those between 'blacks' and 'whites'", or similarly in Miami Nicaraguans resent Cuban political, cultural, and economic dominance, which is hidden by the category 'Latino' (ibid.). The latter evidences demonstrate the non-intrinsic, ascribed character of panethnicities in the USA, when the outer classification gives rise to the inner associations within aggregates. Thus, American panethnic groups can be explained in the frames of the reactive identity formation theory as products of political and social processes, rather than of cultural bonds. First of all, it is a response to the change in the political distribution system, when the state benefits from recognizing and responding to several large blocs instead of multiple groups (Lopez and Espiritu, 1990). Particularly, the data-gathering methods of census, the mobilization techniques of political parties and lobbies, the marketing techniques of the media foster a sense of panethnic identity appealing to people as members of large ethno-racial groups (Itzigsohn, 2004, p. 197).

Along with socially structured panethnicities scholars single out subethnicities on the example of such ethnic groups of migrants as Jews, Chinese and Armenians who originated from diverse lands. According to Der-Martirosian et al. (2004), 'Subethnicity results from successive influx of an ethnic group from different countries of origin, and may also include

native-born offspring of earlier immigrants. Even though these groups share an all-encompassing ethnicity, each subgroup has a different national identity and heritage' (p. 243). Subethnic concept is another variant in examining the intergroup immigrants' relations but it is applicable in the limited number of cases, otherwise, it needs be seen as one of the causes explaining international relations between immigrants.

Similarly to the American studies on interethnic relations, the studies of Israeli Jews examine ethnic division of citizens of Israel arrived from various states and continents (see Ben-Rafael and Sharot, 1991). Israeli sociologists study the split of the Jewish population into Mizrahim, Ashkenazim, and 'non-ethnic' Israelis and the further diversification into countries of origin (Russians, Ethiopians, Anglo-Saxons, Moroccans, and others) in order to erase the hegemony of one group, empower deprived groups, and to trace the birth of the nation (Smootha, 2004).

Ethnic and racial background became a subject of Canadian sociology since John Porter in his book 'The Vertical Mosaic' (1965) described a Canadian society as a class society with different types of ethnic background being found more prominently at some levels of Canada's vertical structure than at others (Fong, 2006, p. 13). While Porter, for the most part, focused on the distributive aspect of ethnicity and race, group relations in the context of high levels of racial and ethnic diversity received their attention in Canadian sociology in the subsequent years (Breton, 1998; Fong, 2006).

Thus, the studies of interethnic relations of immigrants are developed in the traditional immigrant societies as the USA, Israel, Canada, where race and ethnicity are clearly the biggest divide in social networks today. The baseline homophily created by groups of different sizes is combined with the differences in racial/ethnic groups' positions on other dimensions (e.g., education, occupation, income, religion) and the personal prejudices that often result from the latter to create a highly visible, oft studied network divide (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook, 2001, p. 420).

Specially for the case of Russian-speakers, David Laitin (1998) introduced the concept of 'conglomerate identity'. While his definition is rather wide: 'joining forces with other non-dominant identity groups' (p. 263), he uses this term to describe namely the case of Russian-speakers. Laitin's approach is predominately aimed at the examination of *identity* of members of post-Soviet states. In fact, the interactions of Russian-speakers are mostly

studied in the frame of post-imperial studies and applied to the Russian near abroad⁴. As well as in the case of the Balkan states, scholars tend to study the identity and its changes of members of newly independent nations (e.g., Lieven, 1998; Poppe and Hagendoorn, 2001; Shulman, 2004; Levada, 2005; Solovei, 2008; Kosmarskaya, 2011).

In the cases of studying ‘Russian-speakers’ in the far abroad⁵, scholars often form this group for analysis uniting representatives of different states on the base of their common language (as it comes from the name of the group) and historical background. To name only few, the migrants from the former Soviet republics are grouped and studied as ‘Russian-speakers’ or even ‘Russians’ in the USA (Solari, 2006; Erwin and Chappo, 2002), Israel (Remennick, 2003; Plotkin-Amrami, 2008), Germany (Darieva, 2000), Finland (Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2000), the Netherlands (Kopnina, 2005; Willett, 2007), Great Britain (Kopnina, 2005; Byford, 2009), New Zealand (Maydell-Stevens et al., 2007), Australia (Team et al., 2007), Argentina (Alvares, 2005), Greece (Sevach, 2011).

The cases mentioned above are devoted to the relations of the group of Russian-speaking migrants with a host society, taking the unity of the group for granted. The association of interethnic studies with the dyadic scheme ‘majority – minority’ or ‘natives – the rest’ leave almost no attention to interactions among immigrants. Another possible reason is the apparent peacefulness of immigrants’ interactions while there is a tendency of studying interethnic relations with focus on cases of significant ethnic violence – selected ‘on the dependent variable’ (Fearon and Laitin, 1996, p.716). This can be explained by the practical agenda, when the theory of interethnic relations is expected to contribute to the conflicts’ prevention, their solving and overcoming in potentially conflict and post-conflict societies, which are increasingly common in today’s world. Interethnic conflict becomes the researches’ subject more often than interethnic cooperation, because the common view contends that without a system of formal enforcement, heterogeneous groups are unable to peacefully interact for mutual benefit and are prone to eruptions of violent conflict. ‘The occurrence of peaceful interaction dramatically understated’, notices Leeson (2006, p. 891) and with historical evidence demonstrates that peaceful cooperation characterizes most heterogeneous group interaction.

⁴ All countries previously internal to Soviet borders.

⁵ All countries previously external to Soviet borders.

In the present study I seek to address the limitations of the scheme ‘majority – minority’, ‘natives – immigrants’ and of conflict-driven interethnic relations studies. At the same time I do not aim at searching for overall interethnic cooperation and friendship in the frames of presupposed community. Wellman and Berkowitz (1988) write that contemporary migrants form a new type of community which can be seen through analysis focused on ‘social ties and systems of informal resource exchange rather than on people living in neighborhood and villages’ (p.125).

Community has not been lost but transformed into social network and thus it is possible to seek explanations in the regularities of how people and collectives actually behave rather than in the regularities of beliefs about how they ought to behave (ibid., p. 33).

The idea of application the network approach to migration is not a recent one: sociologists recognized the importance of networks in promoting international movement as early as the 1920s (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1918-20). Drawing on social ties to relatives and friends who have migrated before, potential migrants obtained access to information and assistance that facilitated movement. The networks were called differently: ‘auspices of migration’ (Tilly and Brown, 1967), ‘family and friends effect’ (Levy and Wadycki, 1973), ‘migration chains’ (MacDonald and MacDonald, 1974) or ‘migration capital’ (Taylor, 1986, 1987) (Massey et al., 1998, p. 43).

Migrants ties have been incorporated into most theories that are used to explain international migration, including world systems theory (Portes, 1978), dual labour market theory (Piore, 1979), new economics models (Stark, 1991; Stark and Levhari, 1982; Taylor, 1986). Douglas Massey has elaborated the theory of migrant networks as a form of social capital (see Massey et al, 1987).

Social capital is a concept that is closely related to social networks. Networks, formal and informal, are defined as the personal relationships which are accumulated when people interact with each other in families, workplaces, neighborhoods, local associations and a range of informal and formal meeting places. According to Portes (1995, p. 12) social capital is ‘the capacity of individuals to command scarce resources by virtue of their membership in networks or broader social structures’. People gain access to social capital through membership in interpersonal networks and social institutions and then convert it

into other forms of capital to improve or maintain their position in society (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988). Following Coleman's statement that 'social capital... is created when the relations among persons change in ways that facilitate action', Massey identified migration itself as the catalyst for this change in the nature of social relations (Massey et al., 1998, p. 43).

Migrant networks are defined as 'sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin' (Massey et al., 1993, p. 448). Social capital besides material and human capital is the third crucial migration force for '(1) enabling and (2) inspiring people to migrate' (De Haas, 2008, p. 20).

Thus, networks of kinship and friendship were proved to be important to the process of migration as they increase the likelihood of international migration: individuals who are related to migrants are expected to be more likely to migrate themselves because network connections lower the costs and risks of movement and increase the expected net returns to migration (Massey et al., 1993, pp. 448-449).

Besides, scholars theorized the role of networks in the process of settlement and adaptation in the host society. Networks in the adaptation process are usually seen as ties of kinship, friendship, and ethnicity through which information and other resources are distributed and channeled (Gurak and Caces, 1992, p. 150). Evidence suggests that migrant networks lessen 'assimilation shock' if immigrants arrive in an environment where others speak their language and where living among other foreigners can prevent deportation (Curran and Rivero-Fuentes, 2003, p. 290). Networks also help migrants find employment and a place to live, and reduce their living expenses. Additionally, migrant networks are useful in arranging residence papers or in finding a marriage partner (De Haas, 2008, p. 19). Thus, migration networks can positively impact on the integration into the receiving society. At the same time they can also impose constraints:

migrant networks may work in the opposite direction, isolating immigrants in limiting their contacts to the own group and keeping them distant from the indigenous population and from organizations and institutions of the receiving society. In the longer run, migrant enclaves may develop, which often indicate social and economic disintegration (Dietz, 1999, p. 11).

The networks can also be exploitative and marginalizing of various members like newer migrants or women. Immigrant exploitation of co-ethnics is well documented (see Jordan and Duvell, 2002; Tilly, 1990).

In the case of both migration movement and settlement scholars mostly study networks in the patterns of one migrant ethnicity or nationality. These networks connect sending and receiving states ('transnational networks'⁶) but still deal with one nation in two locations. As for interethnic networks of migrants, partly they become the subject of research in the case of studying racial homogeneity (or 'panethnic groups' mentioned earlier). Scholars have proved the crucial importance of race for formation of social networks in the USA: either for adults (Marsden, 1987) or adolescents (Kao and Joyner, 2004), in friendship (Berry, 2006), marriage (Kalmijn, 1998) and work relations (Ibarra, 1995).

The mechanisms responsible for formation of ties within racial category might be similar to the mechanisms producing interethnic Russian-speaking network. On the one hand, the first reason of same-race networks is believed to be homophily. The principle of homophily, also known as the like-me hypothesis, states that social interactions tend to take place among individuals with similar lifestyles and socioeconomic characteristics (Lin, 2001, p. 39). Scholars summarize the empirical pattern of homophily in the proverbial expression 'birds of a feather flock together'. Ethnic/race homophily as psychological preference for same individuals is the same nonrational and subconscious as the national bond, which 'can be analyzed but not explained rationally' (Connor, [1994] 1996, p. 73).

On the other hand, McPherson et al (2001) suggest, that there are micromechanisms producing racial homogeneity other than the psychological preference for same-race alters. These are to include the segregation of everyday lives into different domains (residential, voluntary association, occupation, language, etc.). Wimmer and Lewis (2010) continue this line and propose that homogeneity of a network depends on such tie-formation mechanisms as availability, propinquity, homophily, and balancing. They state also that much same-race preference is a consequence of same-ethnicity preference, what corresponds Blau's discussion of 'concentric circles' (Blau, 1977). Building on Simmel, Blau argued that the transition to modern society allowed individuals to increasingly participate in multiform

⁶ Alejandro Portes (2001) distinguishing the terms 'international', 'multinational' and 'transnational', pertained 'transnational' to activities 'initiated and sustained by non-institutional actors, be they organized groups or networks of individuals across borders'.

heterogeneous circles, form a greater number of weak but integrative ties, and thus experience increased opportunities.

To examine prerequisites for the Russian-speaking networking I will follow the logics of network formation and see how kinship and friendship ties and cultural affinity facilitate inter-ethnic/-national interaction.

1.2. Kinship and friendship ties in the formation of social network

Kinship and friendship have stood up well to the large-scale social transformations of urbanization, industrialization, bureaucratization, and technological change. Kith and kin even today are ‘not relics from a pastoral past but are active arrangements for helping individuals and households deal with stresses and opportunities. They provide everything from empathetic advice and health care to capital and labor power for productive work’ (Wellman and Wortley, 1989, p. 273).

Networks of kinship and friendship were proved to be important to the process of migration as they increase the likelihood of international migration: individuals who are related to migrants are expected to be more likely to migrate themselves. The same kinship and friendship stay the basis for networking after arriving to a new society and a resource of social support. Scholars distinguish several basic ‘dimensions’ of support:

- emotional aid (the kinds included are minor emotional aid, family problems advice, major emotional aid, major services),
- services (minor services, lending or giving household items, minor household aid, major household aid, organizational aid),
- companionship (discussing ideas, doing things together, fellow participants in an organization),
- financial aid (small loans/gifts, large loans/gifts, large loans/gifts for housing),
- job/housing information (job information, job contacts, housing search).

Few ties may provide many of these dimensions. Instead, people turn to different network members in order to obtain different types of social support (Wellman and Wortley, 1989, p. 277).

Using the classification of Graves and Graves (2004), we can name these strategies respectively: kin-reliant when one typically calls on resources of the wider circle of relatives beyond the nuclear family established by marriage; self-reliant when one depends on one's own resources, those of one's own conjugal household, or the impersonal institutions of the wider society; and Peers-Reliant, when one turns to persons of roughly one's own generation and social standing (Graves and Graves, 2004, p.298). Mostly, they exist in a mixed form, when an individual implement different strategies for different tasks.

The stronger ties are with the immediate kin as parents, adult children and siblings than with the extended kin as grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, etc. Especially strong and supportive are parent/ adult child ties (Wellman and Wortley, 1989, p.274). Family ties connect simultaneously similar and different people. There are generational ties, heterosexual ties, ties with different educational and class levels that serves the diversity of resources available from the network.

Concerning the race and ethnicity, family-based ties much more likely stay homophilous, that might influence the access to the resources of the members of disadvantaged ethnic groups.

As emigrating imply a full or partial separation from the closest circle of family and friends, individuals place an important part of their support expectations on the resources that are available to them. Often the extended relatives, as cousins, aunts and nephews become substitute of the family. Besides, the importance of family ties for the process of migration is linked to the policy of family reunion: the original migrants get the right to bring in their spouses and children.

As for friendship ties, they also tend to be homogeneous. A large body of literature on homophily suggests that people prefer friends who are like themselves along multiple dimensions, including race and ethnicity. Here the effect of social balance plays an important role. it can been shown that homophily is a specific form of social balance (Davis 1963). Simply put, balance theory predicts that a friend of a friend will be a friend, as

enmity among one's friends leads to strain and is avoided (Heider 1946; Davis 1963; Holland and Leinhardt 1971; Davis and Leinhardt 1972; Johnsen 1985).

American scholars examine social balance with respect to race and demonstrate that social balance can magnify racial friendship patterns. As Moody (2001, p. 680) puts it:

If race is an important attribute for initial friendship choice, then social balance will magnify the importance of race by building cliques around an initial race-based friendship. For the same reasons, an initial cross-race friendship ought to generate cross-race friendships among friends of friends. Thus, regardless of the starting point, social balance crystallizes friendship patterns around race.

In the case of Russian-speakers it is possible to speak of social balance crystallizing friendship ties around nationalities and ethnic groups.

Scholars sometimes reduce the conception of kinship to a form of friendship (see the discussions in Craven and Wellman 1973; Fischer 1982). Yet most people (the case of the North Americans and the British) do distinguish between kith and kin, and they make important distinctions in how they expect to relate to different types of kin (Wellman and Wortley, 1989, p. 274).

There is a difference between general networks of people and migrant networks. For networks of people in general kinship is seen as a dominant source of support (Otani, 1999). As Fischer (1982, p. 82) puts it, 'an accident of birth gives us a set of consanguine relations that can never, at least formally, be sundered... while friends can be chosen and abandoned, relatives are imposed and presumably forever... what we owe to and what we can expect from relatives involves far more commitment, trust and sacrifice than is the case with nonrelatives... we are even expected to assist kin whom we dislike or have never met.' In migrant networks close kin is substituted by extended kin, and relatives are substituted by friends, compatriots. Dridzo (1977, pp. 110-111) notes the phenomenon of 'ship brotherhood', when a sort of community of people arriving on the same ship (it can be understood in the figurative sense) appear and compensate to them the absence of relatives and close friends.

Whereas most scholars make distinction between kinship and friendship and further between different types of kin (immediate and extended; parents and siblings, etc.) and kith (friendship and acquaintanceship), for this research it is more important to see the difference between ethnic and national origins of relatives and friends.

Real kinship and friendship ties function as uniting nation and compatriots. Moreover, the kinship and friendship ties often stand for compatriots' ties/communities⁷ as Brednikova and Pachenkov argue on the example of the Azerbaijani in Saint-Petersburg: 'the term 'countrymen' is associated rather with concrete people and interpersonal relations' (2001, p. 135).

Besides, the sense of kinship (on the base of real or perceiving kinship ties) is a subconscious, emotional, non-rational basis for nation unity (Connor, 1994, p. 71-73), and it influences attitudes and behavior of people, including migration practices.

In the majority of cases the kinship and friendship resources are situated inside ethnic and national groups, as the relatives are believed to come of the same ethnic group and the friendship formation and its support are expected to depend on propinquity of residence, that means living in the same or close place of one country.

The case of Russian-speaking migrants might be different due to the history of the Soviet Union and of its dissolution, and it cannot be explained only by the Soviet government's propaganda actions aimed at the "creation of a 'homo sovieticus'" despite person's ethnic belonging and home place. What was more important in the recent emergence of cross-ethnic families and friendship across the state borders on the post-Soviet space is the internal migrations in the Soviet Union. Migrations promoted better information and more frequent interactions between people of different ethnic groups and allowed to develop and maintain individual reputations for cooperative behavior (Fearon and Laitin, 1996, p. 730). Internal migrations were massive and first of all were caused by economic needs (including flows of forced migration).

The industrialization following WW II in the USSR put a great number of people to move across the country. The rural population started to migrate to the cities and to new

⁷ *Zemlyachestvo - землячество*

developments of Siberia and Far East to restore the economy of the country. In 1947, the government started 'organized labour recruitment' for the industry, construction and transport sector. Later the workforce was required for new developments of the Urals, Siberia, North and Far East. From 1951 to 1970 5.6 million people were hired in the frames of 'organized recruitment'. Not all of them resettled permanently since mostly they were needed for sectors of a seasonal nature. Komsomol youth was an active actor of labour migrations: in 1956-1961, more than 800,000 young people went to 'shock-work constructions', such as West-Siberian metplant and Bratsk hydroelectric station. The high salary, privileges and a kind of romanticism of exploring new lands made those directions popular. That was the period of construction of the West-Siberian oil and gas complex, Baikal-Amur mainline, automobile factories VAZ and KamAZ (Roshchin, 2008, p. 154-177). The whole cities appeared populated by people from all over the country. On the initiative of Khrushchev the Soviet government decided to increase the availability of food by bringing new lands, mostly in central Asia and southern Siberia, under cultivation. The government organized a campaign, largely among Komsomol youth, of persuading people to move to these lands. During 1954 alone, 300,000 young people went east (Kenez, 2006, p. 196). In 1954-1962, about a million people came to Kazakhstan to cultivate its virgin soil.

During that time the donor region traditionally was the Middle belt of the European part of the USSR, first of all Volgo-Vyatsky and Central Chernozemny regions. Regions-recipients were Kazakhstan, Middle Asia, and the Northern Caucasus. Mostly those who resettled were ethnical Russians and Ukrainians. Between 1897 and 1970 the Russian population outside the area of Russian Soviet Federative Socialistic Republic (RSFSR) increased by more than 15 million. Russians comprised nearly one-fifth of the total population of non-Russian republics in 1970 (Kolstoe, 1995, p. 46). This phenomenon can be explained in socio-economic and ethno-political trends: by processes of modernization or by so-called 'security argument'.

In the 1960-1980s, only one third of the migration flow was labor or economic migration, migration in search of a better life. Another third was educational when young people moved from rural to urban areas or from their cities to other cities. The last third part was connected with military service because the army was numerous and it was forbidden for recruits to do military service close to their home places.

After the USSR's disintegration, the Russian Federation became a new center of attraction for immigrants. By its index of migration growth in the 1990s Russia was behind only the USA and Germany. With the exception of the war-torn Transcaucasian states, it was the ethnic Russians who became a part of a large diaspora population 'without moving an inch or leaving their homes' (Heleniak, 2004, p. 1) and consequently made up a majority of the net in-migration, ranging from 85 per cent from Belarus to 62 per cent from Tajikistan. They were displaced by ethnic violence and fighting from Central Asia and the Caucasus, they were not provided with citizenship status and limited in the usage of the Russian language in some of the newly formed states. While 30.3 million foreign-born people lived in the territory of the Soviet Union at the time of its dissolution, the aggregate number fell to 27.4 million in 2000 and to 26.5 million in 2005, as many in the post-Soviet space chose to return home (Human Development Report 2009, p. 31).

Since mid-1990s, the forced migration in the region of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has gradually decreased, while the economically motivated migration has grown, when Russians and non-Russians looked for better economic opportunities in other countries. From 1990 to 1999 the net migration gain of Russia at the cost of CIS and Baltic states was 4.3 million people⁸ (Demoscope Weekly 2001). From 1989 to 2002 Russia's net immigration figure with the former Soviet Union republics was 6.8 million immigrants (Migration in the Russian Federation: A Country Profile 2008, p. 14-15)⁹.

Contemporary Russia still has significant internal migration flows mostly caused by economic reasons. The country is characterized by dramatic inter- and intra-regional economic differentiation. Thus, labour migration often turns into a means of earning good money by local standards. Wages are so high in Moscow, that its attraction for migrants is hardly surprising. In most cases migrants are supporting children, wives, husbands, parents and grandparents (White, 2009). In 2007, Moscow received 48.6 person of net migration gain for 10,000 people, while the all-Russian average was 18.2 person. Few regions are able to compete with Moscow for immigrants, such as Saint-Petersburg and Tyumen.

The scale of migrations in the Soviet Union and Russia explains two aspects important for the present research:

⁸ 3.3 million with respect of out-flow of Russian citizens beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union.

⁹ Russia received 10.9 million migrants from the former Soviet Republics, while 4.1 million persons moved in the opposite direction, that is, from Russia to the newly independent states of the USSR.

1) the experience of interethnic cohabitation and the adaptation to multicultural diversity. In the imperial Russia and the Soviet Union a more dispersed settlement pattern gave a greater opportunity for interethnic contacts, as ‘we are more likely to have contact with those who are closer to us in geographic location than those who are distant’ (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook, 2001, p. 429). People knew each other not from the abstract descriptions of ethnic groups but from the real neighboring. For example, a part of people from national republics had this experience from their studying or working outside the borders of their republic, but a majority met people of another ethnicities without leaving a home republic – the non-titular ethnicities worked and settled there;

2) the formation of friendship and kinship ties across the contemporary regions’ and states’ borders. According to Marsden (1987, pp. 128-29), urban areas, with their greater diversity within a moderate geographic distance, produce networks with higher levels of racial and ethnic heterogeneity. On contrary, the homogeneity of neighborhoods evidently influence the tendency for people with a farm background to marry others like themselves (Kalmijn 1998, p. 409). Nowadays mostly Russians and Ukrainians (who mostly were involved in the migrations as it was mentioned in the historical review) have their relatives in different parts of the country and beyond its borders due to settlement patterns. It is not a rare situation when grandchildren go to their grandparents for the summer vacations from Khabarovsk to Moscow area, or when people arrive in Russia from Ukraine for a wedding ceremony of their cousin. The relatives found themselves in different states after the USSR disintegration and obtained different citizenship if they had not choose to return to their ‘historical motherland’.

The other explanation of kinship’s transnationality and a consequence of interethnic cohabitation is interethnic marriages in the USSR. The percentage of families consisting of members of more than one ethnic group had risen from 10.2 percent in 1959 to 14.9 percent in 1979 (Gorenburg, 2006, p. 146-147). Most frequently interethnic marriages occurred in ethnic contact zones, which included ethnic border areas, areas where a minority group lives surrounded by another ethnic group, and areas with high levels of migration, such as large cities, new cities built around large industrial projects, and virgin lands (Gantskaya and Terent’yeva, 1977, p. 468). The data from regions showed that intermarriage outside of the Russian Federation was increasing primarily among culturally and religiously similar groups of Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Moldovans.

Table 1.1 Percentage of Families that are Ethnically Mixed

	Total population		Urban		Rural	
	1959	1979	1959	1979	1959	1979
Latvia	15.8	24.2	21.3	27.1	9.2	18.0
Ukraine	15.0	21.9	26.3	29.9	5.8	9.3
Kazakhstan	14.4	21.5	17.5	23.9	11.9	18.2
Moldova	13.5	21.0	26.9	36.0	9.4	11.3
Belarus	11.0	20.1	23.7	29.5	5.6	9.2
Estonia	10.0	15.8	14.2	18.6	5.1	9.0
Kyrgyzstan	12.3	15.5	18.1	23.1	5.5	5.9
Tajikistan	9.4	13.0	16.7	15.5	3.7	4.8
Turkmenistan	8.5	12.3	14.9	19.9	2.5	3.3
Russia	8.3	12.0	10.8	13.2	5.6	9.3
Lithuania	5.9	11.3	10.4	15.2	3.0	5.6
Uzbekistan	8.2	10.5	14.7	17.3	4.7	4.7
Georgia	9.0	10.4	16.4	15.5	3.7	4.8
Azerbaijan	7.1	7.6	11.8	12.1	2.0	1.7
Armenia	3.2	4.0	5.0	4.9	1.4	2.2

Source: Arutyunyan and Bromley (1986, p. 153)

The above table indicates the high proportion of intermarriages in Latvia and Kazakhstan in the Soviet Union, but the marriages there involved mostly non-titulars, as in Kazakhstan Russian-Ukrainian and Russian-German marriages predominated among ethnically mixed marriages (Gorenburg, 2006, p. 148). In the same situation with intermarriages among most white groups in the USA their increase was called the probable ‘twilight of ethnicity’ (Alba, 1985). At the same time Table 1.1 shows that interethnic marriages did not blossom everywhere: they were significantly lower in Central Asia and especially in the Caucasus. Still, as it was mentioned, people from different republics had an experience of living together, interact and communicate.

These transnational ties sometimes cause the emergence of ambiguity concerning the ethnic belonging. Because of their mixed marriages or parentage people do not identify themselves with one ethnicity. It is the same difficult for a part of people to name the place they came from. Recently, people rely upon their citizenship.

As Parrenas states (2001), ‘With the integration of national economies into a single global labor market, citizenship has become compulsory in globalization’. And it is citizenship that ‘defines identity – who you are, where you belong, where you come from, and how you understand yourself in the world’ (Joseph, 1999, p. 162). In the case of Russian-speakers,

citizenship of one of the Newly Independent States (NIS) does not always mirror identity and sometimes confuses. Sometimes people in the newly independent states obtain two passports despite the fact that most governments of the former Soviet republics do not acknowledge dual citizenship. In the case of Russian-speaking migrants in Far Abroad, in the case when they have identifying documents from two countries, one of these documents is a host country's document and the second is from the country they left. In these cases it is expected that national identities are even more blurred and also negotiated or constructed.

Besides, since partly kinship and friendship ties extend from one state to another state, the transnationalism of migrant networks receives a new development. A migrant arrived from Ukraine can have transnational connections with relatives and friends in Ukraine and also in Russia or Uzbekistan. The transnational network which in most cases is established between a host country and a sending country becomes a network between three or more countries. Due to this network a Russian woman from a small Siberian town may become aware of the opportunity to work in Italy and decide to go there enlisting her friend's from Ukraine support in obtaining a job.

1.3. Common traditions and similar life experiences in the formation of social network

In the previous subchapter I examined the role of kinship and friendship ties in the network formation. To some extent, kinship ties in their imagined form spread to all the nation. Myths of common ancestry may unite and inspire the members of ethnic community over several generations (Smith, 1992, p. 441).

There are also another mechanisms responsible for ties formation among ethno-nationals. The Russian language and origin from the former Soviet Union become the first markers for studied immigrants to pick those with whom interact. After McElreath et al (2003) I assume that markers allow people to interact with others who share their social norms, rather than assuming that markers allow individuals to selectively direct altruistic behaviors towards co-ethnics.

In the case of revising one ethnic group, the ties appearing between group members are taken for granted (Dahinden, 2010).

Russian scholars Brednikova and Pachenkov (2000, 2002), having faced the reality of interethnic cooperation among immigrants in the post-Soviet Russia, criticize the application of the theory of ethnic entrepreneurship to the Russian cases and propose their own explanations of immigrants' cooperation. They found five factors defining organization of social networks of migrants: ease (simplicity), rationality (gain), trust, pressure from outside (exclusion), and space.

Rationality (gain) becomes a decisive factor for migrants in selecting partners, suppliers, and employees. As economic migrants are aimed at prompt and relatively stable profit, their economic activities form a basis for establishing social networks. Trust/ control boundaries often overlap: people trust those whom they can control. The pressure from outside forms certain frames in which migrants have to live: preconceived attitude to migrants and complexity of bureaucratic procedures for legalizing migrants' status lead to the situation when majority of migrants are grouped in the illegal law space. Discrimination in employment together with their restricted social and financial capital makes migrants form groups in certain spheres of self-employment what causes their physical concentration in certain places (like city markets and around them). A physically shared space where different groups of migrants and representatives of locals co-exist, presents a certain frame with interpersonal interaction to take place. Migrants find their suppliers, customers, creditors through simple co-presence in the space.

The factor of ease is explained from linguistic and cultural points: migrants prone to interact with those whose actions and behavior is understandable and predictable. The main role belongs to the language 'not as a marker of social (ethnic) borders but as an instrument of communication, required for interaction' (Brednikova and Pachenkov, 2002, p. 77). 'Ease' of interaction also functions through acquaintance with cultural patterns of behavior that facilitates the interactions with 'ours'.

Likewise, the study by Perotto (2009) of the language and identity of Russian-speaking migrants in Italy showed that the language is not the only and main indicator of ethnicity in the eyes of respondents (n=100) but first of all it is 'mentality' and 'everyday habits'. Only four persons chose 'language' as an indicator, while 61 respondent and 54 respondents chose 'culture and 'mentality' respectively. Additionally, 55 people chose the pair 'language and culture' or 'language and mentality'. Informants declared that to have the common

origin and the same language is less important than to have cultural, spiritual and social affinity (Perotto and Ambrosi, 2009, p. 187).

Thus Russian-speakers are supposed to cooperate among other reasons because of common or similar culture and shared social norms, values and attitudes. Here the homophily principle appears in the form of 'value homophily'. The Russian-speakers abroad might feel closer to each other than to other immigrants and a host society because of common values.

An extensive experimental literature in social psychology established that attitude, belief, and value similarity lead to attraction and interaction. Scholars studied homophily based on intelligence, higher education attainment, political orientation, etc. It was found that people tend to assume that their friends are like them and they do not discuss areas of disagreement (McPherson, 2001, pp. 428-429).

Of course, individuals with shared ascriptive traits as race, ethnicity, and native language are likely to have shared values, means of communication, beliefs, and tastes. Two members of an ethnic network are more likely to agree and communicate, than are two randomly chosen members of the population (Bowles, 2003, p. 8). The case of Russian-speaking immigrants may show that this principle works for members of different but close ethnic groups.

Additionally to the reasons of ease of communication and predictability of behavior, people tend to be more comfortable interacting with similar others because interpersonal similarity fosters relationships of trust and reciprocity (Ibarra, 1993, p. 61).

While the willingness to trust strangers promotes civic engagement, collective action and community building, cross-ethnic confidence is believed to be low because most people are assumed to have faith in members of their own ethnic group (Bahry et al., 2005, p. 521). Cross-national surveys demonstrate that trust is lower in heterogeneous countries. Research in the United States points to less generalized faith in others when local communities are diverse. The dominant explanation is that ethnic difference breeds more particularized, rather than generalized, trust. As people extend their confidence to a narrow set of ingroups - to family, friends and others like themselves, but seldom beyond, they have trust in their ethnic group (ibid., p. 522).

As for cross-ethnic trust, it might be selective; some outgroups may be viewed more favorably than others. The interaction of Russian-speakers' belonging to different ethno-national groups might be this case, since according to Bahry et al (2005) findings, trust varies across different outgroups, depending at least in part on contact and familiarity. People display more trust in, and are more likely to give an opinion about, groups they see on a day-to-day basis. Surveys conducted in Russia during the 1990s - early 2000s reported that 25% to 30% of the population had generalized trust in family and friends and high faith in acquaintances (Rose, 1995; Gibson, 2001).

Studying Russian-speaking immigrants scholars distinguish particular features rooted in the Soviet reality, corresponding stereotypes and lifestyles that differentiate Russian-speaking immigrants from host societies and at the same time integrate immigrants in the frames of their 'Soviet heritage'. As Gradskova (2000) noticed the common past can still play an important role:

The feeling of the common Soviet identity immediately appears when several absolutely unknown women from now different countries of the former USSR meet beyond its borders [... and] when the identification according to the principle of the former past turns out much more important and integral than the present one¹⁰.

Voronkov (1999) studying Armenians and Azerbaijani living in big Russian cities found that they engage in the entrepreneurship not as representatives of their own ethnic group but as 'Russians'. He attributes it to 'principal peculiarities of ethnic construction in Russia' which are connected with 1) the presence of previous strong Soviet identity; 2) liquidation in Russian cities of ethnic communities in the 1930s and destruction of the mechanism of transfer of ethnicity in the process of socialization; and 3) specific nature of today's transformation of the Soviet society. According to Voronkov, previous national policy, aimed at the formation of the united Soviet 'ethnicity' has turned out rather successful. The general rules of play were indoctrinated on the country scale together with declaration of diversity. Diversity was promoted in the public space, but the everyday practices drew nearer. Thus the differences between former Soviet citizens are rather relative (they even

¹⁰ *«Ощущение общесоветской идентичности немедленно возникает при встрече нескольких совсем незнакомых женщин из ныне различных стран бывшего СССР за пределами его границ [...], когда идентификация по принципу бывшего прошлого оказывается куда важнее и целостнее настоящей».*

were the members of one party), and the consequence of that is the absence of sufficient stimuli to construct the particularity.

In the patterns of ‘Soviet legacy’ patterns scholars pay attention to gender roles of the Russian-speaking immigrants searching for their peculiarities in the Soviet gender system. Remennick (2005), studying cross-cultural dating patterns on an Israeli campus, suggest that Russian women are ‘popular’ in part because of their perceived compliance with gender role expectations (i.e., passive and accepting), whereas Russian men are not as popular precisely for the same reason (i.e., adhering to the traditional masculine role in courtship). The results of her research affirm the idea that despite the high rates of women’s employment and their formal equality, traditional gender role stereotypes were firmly rooted in the Soviet tradition (Gal and Kilgman, 2000; Kay, 1997). Close ideas are found in the gender studies of Russian scholars:

...the ‘state feminism’ of the Soviet model did not solve the principal task concerning the strengthening civil rights of women. It passed formal juridical changes in the women’s status but did not destroy in practice the traditional gender division of labour, assuming that for man there is ‘big’ world – world of politics and society government, and for woman there is home and family¹¹ (Ayvazova, 2001).

Khotkina (2003) notes the contradiction of the post-Soviet period when women’s high labour and professional motivation and orientation on the joining the roles of mother and labourer combines with relative conservatism of views on woman’s predestination as domestic goddess.

Otherwise, the traditional gender roles in post-Soviet space are revised as reactive to the past when along with other signs of the ‘damned communist past’, its relatively egalitarian gender relations have been condemned, and the traditional gender system proclaimed as an ideal. As a result of the resurgence of gender conservatism, women experienced higher unemployment and deskilling than men in the course of economic reforms (Buckley, 1997).

¹¹ «...«государственный феминизм» советского образца не решил основной задачи, связанной с утверждением гражданских прав женщин. Пойдя на формально-юридические изменения в статусе женщины, он не разрушил на практике традиционного разделения труда между полами, предполагающего, что мужчине принадлежит «большой» мир – мир политики, управления обществом; женщине – дом, семья».

A special attention is paid to consequences of the planned economy. Lerner and Hendels (1998) consider entrepreneurship among immigrants from the former USSR in Israel in light of communist environment and its impact on private enterprise.

Scholars distinguish the tradition of interpersonal networks in communist and post-communist countries. Bulgarians (Radoeva, 1993), Hungarians (Sik and Wellman, 1999), and Chinese (Wellman, 2001) have relied extensively on their interpersonal networks to obtain material resources in times of scarcity.

Whereas migrant networks themselves function as means and resource of services exchange, the networks of migrants from post-communist countries are expected to be even more engaged in this kind of exchange. Darieva (2000) found that Russian-speaking immigrants in Berlin 'seem still to regard social networks as economic resources using informal forms of provisioning and employment'. Such a barter without financial operations can be traced back to the phenomenon of *blat*¹². As Ledeneva (1998) observes it, under Soviet conditions, where monetary transactions were not fully functional, 'blat' provided a specific system of 'promissory notes' (*spetsificheskaya sistema nematerial'nykh vekselei*) enabling the concealment of the exchange relationships. She views 'blat' relations as a part of informal relations, together with not cheating one's neighbour, not letting the other down, keeping one's word, and corresponding to the logic of 'beating the system' and violating the rules for the sake of efficiency.

Connections engaged in blat relations still function on the post-Soviet space, as Ledeneva (1998, p. 200) puts it,

Connections in the socialist economy were predominantly 'value-oriented' (rhetoric of friendship, requests for others), while now they are driven by considerations of self-interest and mutual profit.

Immigrants brought this practice of informal exchanges of services with them as it can be observed in the Russian immigrant 'communities', as Doornick found it in Berlin and explained it as similar to relationship in the USSR:

large parts of the population were active in distributing by means of exchange the products and services they had access to as a result of their

¹² *Blat* - the use of informal contacts and personal networks to obtain goods and services under the rationing that pervaded Soviet Russia.

occupation...Social networks (blat) were much more important than they are in Western capitalist society and of greater significance for a satisfactory existence (Doomernik, 1997, p. 63).

Certainly, scholars pay attention to secularization of the Soviet society and the consequences of the atheistic legacy. It is stated that in post-Soviet Russia, the belief is more instinctive than denominational: seven out of ten adults claim that they believe in God, but much less of them regularly attend church services (Chernysh, 1999, p. 148). Alessio D'Angelo, a co-editor of the Dossier Statistico Immigrazione Caritas/Migrantes, explains the current religious situation among the Russians as 'Soviet atheistic heritage' and thinks that 'in the case of Russia 16,3% of its population is openly orthodox, but it is incontestable that, at least from the cultural point of view, Orthodoxy is a general root for the majority of the Russians, as Catholicism and Protestantism are in secular Western Europe' (D'Angelo, 2004, p. 69).

Thus, gender roles, informal ties, attitudes to religion of/ among Russian-speaking immigrants are believed to be particular and attributed from the Soviet past.

Moreover, antagonism found by Kopnina (2005) between the Russian migrants in London and Amsterdam is also explained by the effect of Soviet heritage, namely communitarianism that have created 'resentment and cynicism' in people and the 'rejection of 'community' altogether' (pp. 94-95).

Russian studies scholar Daniel Orlovsky stated in 1995 that although it is important for scholars to pay attention to the multiple new national identities emerging after the fall of the Soviet Union,

we should not forget the twin questions of new Russian national identity or identities and the historical but fertile and far-reaching matter (all too quickly dismissed as ridiculous, as something that never existed) of how to analyze the Soviet identity (including the process of nativization, or korenizatsiia) that denizens of the postcommunist order are too quick to deny (1995, p. 10).

Indeed, many former Soviet citizens abroad, especially those who left home in the late 1980s – early 1990s may still identify as Soviet citizens. It is true especially for the Russians: surveys conducted shortly before the dissolution of the USSR showed that more than two-thirds of Russians, no matter where they resided, indicated that the Soviet Union,

not Russia, was their 'motherland'. Studies conducted after the dissolution of the Soviet Union showed that the Soviet identity was still present among Russians in the near abroad (Poppe and Hagendoorn, 2001, p. 58). Pirie (1996) reviews several studies conducted in Ukraine and concludes that most Russians in Ukraine consider themselves primarily Soviet and only then Russian. In Belarus most Russians belong to the assimilating, integrating or irredentist categories of the typology ('primary titulars', 'republicans' and 'Soviets'). Russians in Moldova mainly belong to the irredentist and Russian-oriented categories ('Soviets' and 'primary Russians') (Poppe and Hagendoorn, 2001).

As for titular nations, in the three European post-colonial states of Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus colonial policies sought to either fully assimilate two peoples who were defined as regional branches of Russians (Ukrainians and Belarusians) or create a new nation by artificially separating Bessarabians (Moldovans) from Romanians. According to Kuzio (2002, pp. 244-245),

Ukraine and Belarus's inherited post-colonial legacy is profound and unlikely to be ever completely removed. The language of modernity (urbanization and industrialization) and Soviet power was Russian, with the Ukrainian and Belarusian languages defined as regional, parochial dialects that would be replaced by Russian when both of these eastern Slavic peoples were assimilated into the Russian nation. World culture was digested by Ukrainians through the medium of the Russian language and the Ukrainian language became a low status language with no future role, left to die out in rural villages.

The recent study of Belarus, Ukraine and Russia by White et al. (2010) using the evidence of national representative surveys between 2000 and 2010 suggests that feelings of 'Europeanness' have been declining in all three states, so has the wish to join the European Union (although it remains a popular option) or NATO. 'Soviet nostalgia' has been declining in parallel, more so in Belarus and Ukraine than in Russia; but there is a strong wish in all three countries to associate more closely within the Commonwealth of Independent States. Cross-tabulation of the evidence by White et al. (ibid.) suggests that Ukraine is the most sharply polarised between these two foreign policy orientations, and the one in which popular attitudes are most likely to constrain the actions of its governing authorities.

I suppose that not only the Russian language influences the opportunities for interaction of Russian-speaking migrants but also post-Soviet values, beliefs and attitudes are important for sense of closeness among these migrants.

In the survey of the Fund ‘Public Opinion’ in 1994 the Russian citizens (N=2468) were asked to name ‘Soviet’ and ‘Western’ values (Table 2).

Table 1.2

Values of the Russians in 1994

<i>Rank</i>	<i>‘Soviet’ values</i>	<i>‘Western’ values</i>	<i>Values important for respondents</i>
1	atheism	entrepreneurship	justice
2	enthusiasm	wealth	personal dignity
3	guarantees of personal social rights	businesslike character	industriousness
4	supremacy of state interests	inviolability of private property	sense of duty over personal interests
5	struggle	labour profitability	education
6	sense of duty	freedom of choice of beliefs and behavior	hospitality
7	patience	Professionalism	professionalism
8	labour discipline	non-interference of state into the citizens life	equality before the law
9	education	labour discipline	guarantees of personal social rights
10	hospitality	guarantee of political rights	disinterestedness

Source: Migdisova and Petrenko (1994).

Apart from the common values from the Soviet legacy the Russian-speaking migrants in Italy might share the same experience of immigration and settlement in the new society. The Russian-speaking migration to Italy is not a new phenomenon and can be traced back to the imperial Russia as it is seen from the historical overview. A common history of migrations before the Revolution of 1917 might take a special place in the present process of grouping and networking among Russian-speakers. As Smith (1986) notes, ‘historical sequences provide ‘forms’ for later experiences, channels and moulds for their interpretation’ (p. 25).

In the case of Russian-speakers the pre-revolution migration from the Russian Empire to Italy is treated as ‘golden ages’ because of the importance of Italy as a destination place for Russian-speakers back then.

From the methodological point of view the case of Russian emigration to Italy differs from the traditional Russian history of emigration of XX century. The Russian scholars divided the Russian emigration of XX century into four periods, basing on reasons, geographic structure, duration and intensity of these emigration ‘waves’. While some scholars note that the more appropriate term would be “period” (Polyan, 2006), the term ‘wave’ is widely used and well-established. The chronological frames of these waves point to the time of move, that is the first step of emigration, and they are as follows:

The first wave (1918-1922) – military men and civilians, fled from the established Soviet regime and hunger. It is variously estimated at from 1.5 to 3 million people;

The second wave (1941-1944) – people displaced across the Soviet border during World War II and declined repatriation, not more than 0.5-0.7 million;

The third wave (1948-1989/1990) – all the emigration of the Cold War period. It does not exceed half a million;

The fourth wave (1990-present time, sometimes this wave is dated earlier, from 1987, when the ethnic emigration from the USSR was liberalized) – emigration caused by several factors such as the liberalization of migration policies in the USSR and the successor states; ethnic conflicts and political unrest; the economic decline of the newly independent states (Codagnone, 1998). However, economic reasons (in search of higher salaries, more prestigious job, better living standards, etc.) are prevailing in both media and academic discourse. Even for the ethnic migration (of Jews, Germans, Greeks, Armenians) there were strong economic reasons.

The fourth wave is still unclosed in Russian demography. Scholars speak of ‘twenty years of emigration’ despite the fact that causes and motives for emigration could not stay the same as they were in the early 1990s. As such, some experts call the contemporary emigration “the fifth wave” differentiating it from the fourth wave of late 1980s-1990s which was “the escape from instability”.

Starting from the forth/fifth wave it is possible to distinguish the emigration from different Soviet successor states, as the previous waves united emigration flows from them.

The history of Russian emigration to Italy is important for both contemporary migrants and the host society. The migrants can repeat the models that existed before, and the host society can form its attitude towards the migrants remembering its previous experience of interacting with them. Some anthropologists from the University Ca' Foscari in Venice believe that the Italians and the Russians have a specific feeling between them, rooting in the similar temperament and love for arts, and trace it in the past (Ricci, 2010, p. 66-67). Today's migrants from Russia and Ukraine revitalize the tradition of pilgrimage and spending holidays in Italy. Besides, in some cases contemporary migrants appeal to the past as foundation of their today's actions. Therefore, the historical review of the Russian emigration to Italy constitutes a part of this work.

The tradition of the Russian presence in Italy has not a long history but is characterized by its cultural and political significance. Early Russian migrations to Italy can be analyzed in the frames of the general emigration from the Russian Empire. Till the late 18 – early 19 century the most widespread types of emigration were trips of the Russian well-to-do to Europe for studying, cure, creative activities. Such trips were commonplace. Many Russian intellectuals preferred to live abroad for long periods. Speaking of Italian case, one can name F. Dostoevsky, N. Gogol, I. Turgenev, F. Tyutchev who sojourned and created their masterpieces in Italy. The writer A. Tolstoy spent his last winter in San Remo. P. Chaikovsky wrote his 'Russian' symphony and the aria of Onegin in Liguria. Ukrainian poet Lesja Ukrainka stayed in Italy in 1901-1903. Some Russian artists gained financial support from the Russian Academy of Arts specially for their staying in Italy. The whole 'colony' of Russian artists appeared in Rome, inspired by the nature and art of Italy (Todeschini, 1997, p. 15).

In the late 19 century Italy, especially the Italian Riviera, became a popular resort for the Russian nobility. In winter 1874-75, Empress Maria Alexandrovna, the wife of Alexander II, opened the Russian seasons in San Remo. She gifted palm-trees for the San Remo shore front, which was called after her *Corso Imperatrice* and nowadays stays the evidence of the historical Russian presence in San Remo. The Russian aristocrats followed the Empress. The Russians were treated for tuberculosis and merely went for vacations there: the Olsufievs,

the Sheremetevs, the Demidovs, the Obolenskies, the Apraksins, the Bagration-Mukhranskies, the Abamelek-Lazarevs started their winter houses in San Remo. Some Russians moved to live there. The number of the Russian Empire citizens can be estimated from as indirect facts as appearance of Russian banya, pharmacy, bakery, and church in San Remo. The ex-chief procurator of the Saint Synod, senator V.K.Sabler, said that he “personally saw how the church is necessary in the town, visited by the many thousands of the sick” (Danilova, 2003). Those Russians, travelers and vacationers, brought to notice not only the art, history and natural beauty of Italy, but the political situation in Italy, its economy and agriculture, discussions about Catholicism and the Pontifical state, Garibaldi’s campaign and legacy, and other aspects of the contemporary Italian society (Todeschini, 1997).

Another reality of Russian visits to Italy was pilgrimage, as better described by Mikhail Talalay (n.d.). The pilgrimage developed in its own way not amenable either to Russian-Italian relationships, or to the fashion of elite. The 1880s became the time of the organized mass pilgrimage from Russia to Italy. Many pilgrims visited Bari and Rome on their return trip from Palestine. Rome has been abounding in Christian shrines (guides and descriptions of shrines in Rome by some Russian pilgrims, such as A. Muraviev, V. Mordvinov, archimandrite Dionisiy, contained from forty to eighty oecumenical shrines), while Bari was an important centre of pilgrimage because of the relics of Saint Nicolay, which had been relocated there from Asia Minor in XI century. The inflow of Russian pilgrims led to the arrangement of places of receipt and guidance for sanctuaries in Rome and Bari. In May 1913, the foundation stone of the Russian orthodox church was laid in Bari in the presence of the municipal head of Bari and the president of Apulia, and by 1915 the construction had been finished in the rough. The pilgrimage flow from Russia was broken by WW I, and by the revolution and civil war in Russia. The church buildings in Bari passed into the ownership of the Bari municipality. In 2008, the municipality turned over the buildings to the Russian Federation, which a year later passed it to the Moscow Patriarchate (Department for External Church Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church [DECR of ROC], 2009).

In the second half of XIX century, the Russian ‘colony’ in Italy, one of the most prosperous among Russian ‘colonies’ abroad, started to change in its structure: not only Russian nobility, scientists, writers and artists, but political exiles from different social groups came there. Whereas the Russian aristocrats circulated among the Italian ruling class, the political

exiles from different Russian social classes found their asylum in the left-winged Piemonte and leftists' Italy in general. Same area Piemonte – Turin became one of the Italian centres of the Russian political emigration after the Russian revolution of 1905, as well as Capri, towns in Liguria, Milan, Genoa, Rome, Naples. The political emigration after 1905 constitutes an interesting aspect for both Russian and Italian history and can be discussed as the first notable Russian inflow to Italy in XX century.

The Italian historians and slavists paid a special attention to the Russian emigration to Italy after the revolution of 1905. This interest was generated by a relatively significant number, but mostly by the qualitative composition of the Russian exiles. The total number of émigrés between two Russian revolutions – those of 1905 and of February, 1917 - was about several dozens of thousand people. Mostly Russian political emigrants went to Switzerland, France, Great Britain, Belgium, USA, and a smaller part to Germany, Italy, Austro-Hungary, Canada, South America, Australia. According to Venturi (1995), Russian revolutionary emigration to Italy strikes because of the presence there of the 'personages-symbols' of the history of the Russian socialism, such as Plekhanov, Chernov, Savinkov, Gorky. The Russian revolutionaries stayed in different Italian cities, including Milan, Rome, Genoa, but two main 'colonies' of Russian exiles were the Neapolitan one with Gorky at the head and the Liguric 'colony'. In 1913, the amnesty in honour of tercentenary of the Romanovs provided an opportunity for a return movement of some exiles. Another part of them returned home after the revolution of 1917, while the other part stayed in Italy and then moved to the other countries. The organized life of the Russian revolutionary emigration stopped in 1921 with the closure of the Russian publishing house 'Slovo' in Rome.

Angelo Tamborra in his book *Esuli russi in Italia dal 1905 al 1917* (1977) studied the colonies of Russian exiles in Capri, Naples, at the Riviera Liguria, the labour association of the Russian emigrants in Milan, as well as the leaders of the Russian socialistic diaspora – Lenin, Plechanov, Anan'in, Chernov, Osorgin, Zabughin – and their relations with Italian society.

Today the scholars from four Italian universities work under the project reconstructing the relations of the Russian cultural emigration with the Italian society in the first half of the 20th

century. They have created the on-line dictionary¹³ with 600 articles about people from Russia who put themselves on record.

Researchers do not divide emigration from Russia into several flows according to ethnic groups, but they do it according social status and reasons of arrival to Italy. This approach can contribute to this study as the difference between immigrants from the former USSR might be attributed to their status and reason of immigration rather than to their ethnic belonging.

It is interesting that migration from Russia to Italy before the October revolution was also heterogeneous in terms of social status and migration reasons.

1.4. The influence of receiving society on immigrants grouping

The categories of ethnicity and race often become the basis for exclusion, prejudice and discrimination. Social psychology gives the explanation to the mechanisms of this process basing on intra-group and intergroup relations. There is a great difference between in-group and out-group perception of reality: while for their own group the individuals are able to remember a big quantity of information according to which single individuals are differentiated, this does not happen in relation to other groups. In the latter case the mechanism of stereotyping comes into action: an individual is not considered by himself but often as a member of a group (Zanfrini, 2004, pp. 64-65).

In reaction to the complexity of reality, the human mind constructs categories where it puts people, objects, events, etc. This process is called social categorization and it makes to identify individuals to certain social groups because of their shared determinate characteristics which are typical for this group (ibid., p. 62). Stereotypic representations of social categories are a natural consequence of categorization and concept formation processes, motivated by the need for cognitive simplification and social structure. (Brewer, 2001, p. 20). Arguing, Deschamps (1982) made the distinction between social groups which 'dominate' and those which are 'dominated'. Members of dominating groups who are at the centre of the social system need not to be defined in the terms of their group affiliations, they are conceived of as individuals. The social categorization imposes upon those who are in dominated groups. Applying this scheme to the case of immigration, we can assume that

¹³ <http://www.russinitalia.it/dizionario.php>

these are immigrants who appear as dominated group are often categorized and labelled by the dominating group – receiving society.

Whenever social category stereotypes are positive or negative (or mixed) they influence people falling into this category. Often the outsiders are judged negatively, as people in the frames of in-group and out-group dynamics tend to evaluate others to be ‘less good’ than themselves. Likewise when in the process of definition of boundaries between ‘we’ and ‘others’ the racial and ethnic categories become an object of social valuation, difference becomes a value and very often this value is negative (Zanfrini, 2004, p. 57). In this case people try to leave physically the category or to dissociate psychologically with the category (Turner, 1982, p. 34), and they may experience ‘interdependence of fate’ which in its turn may create ‘groupness’. In opinion of Brednikova and Pachenkov (2002), the cases of ethnicity accentuation often are initiated from outside. For example, xenophobia among local population defines ‘aliens’ in the terms of ethnicity and builds up a rigid external border. Thus in Russia all the migrants from Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and other republics of Caucasian and Trans-Caucasian regions are perceived by locals as ‘Azeri’ or ‘Caucasians’, including those for whom this identity does not matter (Brednikova and Pachenkov, 2002, p. 77). This way a reactive solidarity and ethnicity identity formation forge, as it happened for Arab Americans, second-generation Cuban Americans, second-generation Korean-Americans in the USA (Rumbaut, 2007, p. 3-4). Also in the USA, as we mentioned earlier the migrant alliances appeared in response to the state policy placing certain immigrants in a wider group: Asian Americans, African Americans, etc.

By grouping migrants from different states in one category, the receiving society enforces formation of a general group cutting across national borders. This process functions as racialization and can be called like that since as Pheonix (1998) noted, race in Europe is based not only on skin color but also on nationality, ethnicity, and ‘culture’ (p. 110). This might appear in the case of grouping Russian-speakers in Italy. They are not visible minority but still considered to be different and grouped according to their cultural, national and ethnic belonging. The term ‘Russian-speakers’ itself (Ital. ‘russofoni’) is rarely used in Italy and the grouping of Russian-speakers in Italy bases on the grouping of ‘Eastern Europeans’, ‘Slavs’, ‘former Soviets’, ‘Russians’, or ‘foreigners’, that depends on the level of consideration. The observation of this process of grouping is relevant for this study because

of such grouping probable influence on the Russian-speaking population in the conditions of immigration.

The otherness of the Slavs and Eastern Europeans extends back centuries in Eastern/Western European relations and conceptualizations of each other (Wolff, 1994). In the north-eastern Italy neighborhood and historical interaction of different types with Eastern Europe possibly paved the way to prejudice towards Eastern Europeans and Slavs.

The 'negative' associations were possibly correlated with Eastern 'underdevelopment' and 'poverty', according to Wolff: 'Eastern Europe in the eighteenth century provided Western Europe with its first model of underdevelopment' by judging the regions' 'backwardness' in opposition to Western 'progress' (Wolff, 1994, p. 9). Wolff writes that differences between Eastern and Western Europe are 'in part a matter of economic disparity, the wealth of Western Europe facing the poverty of Eastern Europe, but such disparity is inevitably clothed in the complex windings of cultural prejudice' (ibid., p. 3). This division between West and East of Europe became a base for grouping as differences between 'Eastern European' regions were ignored in the effort to define differences between it as a complete entity in opposition to Western Europe (ibid., p. 356).

The otherness of Eastern Europeans was corroborated in the time of the Cold War together with attributing the otherness to the Soviet citizens. The political semiotics of the foreign policy of the USA divided Europe, distinguishing the USSR with all the communist bloc countries, on the one side, and Western Europe and the USA, on the other side (Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 1992). The countries of the European Economic Community, the predecessor of the European Union, were identified as a 'Western' Europe in contrast to 'Eastern' Europe. The normative ideas that provided the basis for this identities were defined as the 'openness', 'democracy' and 'freedom' of Western Europe and the contrasted 'totalitarian systems' of 'East-Communism' which was perceived as Western Europe's Other (Haldrup et al., p. 3). The particularity of Italy was in the fact that a part of Italians were communists or sympathized with Soviet communists and felt solidarity with the Soviet citizens. Later, the collapse of the Soviet Union and denunciation of communism changed that attitude.

Nowadays the historical groupings and generalization of Eastern Europeans and Slavs combine with groupings based on more recent stereotypizations of ex-Soviets, Russians and immigrants in contemporary Italy.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union identity borders in Europe became blurred. The EU has eliminated some borders and created a new border between West and East. As Wilson (1998, p. 154) says, the EU has had an important effect on a wide range of social and cultural identities in Europe, forcing many groups of people to reconstruct their notions of nation, state, and sovereignty, and to renegotiate the many symbolic markers to the boundaries between groups that the EU has transformed. The entrance of the European Union by some former socialistic eastern European countries seems to change the perception of these countries as 'others', but the EU building creates the boundary between countries in the European space. Eastern European countries become differentiated according to their position to the European Union and NATO: "'good' West-oriented countries" and "'bad', backwards, violent, extremely nationalist countries, which are identified as Others" (Haldrup et al.).

In Europe and Italy in particular Eastern Europeans become grouped due to 'public perceptions, particularly of their dependence on the welfare state' (Kofman et al., 2000, p. 9). The image of 'backward' Eastern Europe gives rise to a more complex hierarchy among 'white' people in Europe with its increased immigration and consequent changes in national identities. In the past, full privileges of 'whiteness' were not given to the Irish, Jews, and Gypsies and now there are even more groups of questionable 'race' in Western Europe from parts of the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia (Phoenix, 1998).

To explain the racialization of immigrants Kitty Calavita (2007, pp. 102-103) cites the fictionalized memoirs of immigration to France by Tahar Ben Jelloun (1997, p. xiv): 'Often with immigration it's the aesthetics that cause problems. Immigrants are not photogenic, except in cases of tragedy, when their image is all over the newspaper. Their looks are not reassuring'. Calavita continues that the 'aesthetics' problem derives from utility of those who are not 'photogenic', since by definition cheap and flexible labor bears the ugly stigma of poverty.

This can happen to people performing specific jobs, which by a host society are attributed only to the migrants. For instance, the work of a caregiver in Italy is the exclusive domain of certain ethno-national groups not only due to pressure from certain appropriative dynamics operated by the migrants' networks, but also as a result of ideas in the host society that these jobs are done by specific ethnic, national or regional groups (Fangen et al., p. 126). This

‘stigma of poverty’ ascribed to the professions of domestic workers and low-skilled labourers groups people of these occupations and generalizes all the Ukrainians and Moldovans in the eyes of the host society.

Because of the predominant labour migration from Ukraine and Moldova, being ex-Soviet republics, Russians in Italy are often taken for labour migrants as well. If in the beginning in Italy all the emigrants from the Soviet Union were Russians, now Italians might associate Russian-speakers with Ukrainian and Moldavian domestic workers. In general, it seems that ex-Soviet citizens are still associated with one another in Italy, in spite of nationalist trend at their homelands struggling for ethnic and cultural distinguish.

The term ‘Russian-speakers’ is rarely used in Italy – mostly in academic discourse, predominantly linguistic or sociolinguistic (Perotto, 2004; Perotto and Ambrosi, 2009). However, practical means and steps by different Italian institutions and organizations demonstrate their awareness about the role of the Russian language as ‘lingua franca’. Thus, the FVG region publishes informational materials for immigrants in the Russian language among others. For example, the manual booklet ‘Welcome to Friuli Venezia Giulia’ is available in ten languages: Italian, French, English, Spanish, Albanian, Arabic, Serbo-Croatian, Russian, Chinese, and Romanian. It is obvious that in the absence of the booklet in Ukrainian or in Moldovan (which speakers are much more numeral in Italy than Russians) the Russian language is used to reach a broader group of those former Soviet people who speak Russian as their native or second language. The same do missionaries from new churches looking for adherents among migrants from the former Soviet Union: Jehovah’s Witnesses missionaries spoke Russian to Ukrainian migrants in Udine. The commercial firms in FVG looking for a manager speaking Russian often intend to work not only with the Russian Federation but with other former Soviet republics. The advertising of the bank loans or mobile plans¹⁴ in the Russian language also gives evidence concerning the attributed status of the Russian language for the ex-Soviet group of potential customers.

In these cases the grouping of states and nations is based on the experience gained from the work with the former Soviet Union immigrants and is a result of proper or professional

¹⁴ This has an economical explanation: according to an estimate made by an advertising agent (ISI Etnocommunication 2004), immigrants spend between 25 and 30 euros per month on telephone cards (Idos, 2004, p. 15).

preparation. Still, Italian mass media often judge foreigners in general transmitting and influencing the public discourse. As Ono and Pham wrote (2009), 'We now live in a hyper-information society. Media play an increasingly significant educational and social networking role and are noteworthy because they help people make sense of themselves and their relationships with others' (p. 3). While such grouping of immigrants is observable in many countries of immigration, the Italian case has additional importance of media roots in their precedence in the treatment migration issues systematically. According to Hanretty and Hermanin (2009), the media have been quicker than many other sections of Italian society in their appraisal of the immigration phenomenon, when economic migration to Italy surfaced, while the Italian politico-institutional system took time to address the phenomenon in a comprehensive manner (p.2). This trend is seen even from the special attention of scholars to the treatment of immigration by the Italian media which became particularly frequent since the 1990s. Some scholars pointed to the development of anti-immigrant racism in Italian society from the mid-1980s onwards (ibid.). The negative connotation of the word 'immigrants' might influence the desire of immigrants to be divided from other groups of immigrants and distinguished by proper nationality.

The analysis of the press by Sciortino and Colombo (2004) describes the evolution of the Italian discourse through 1969 to 2001 when the terms 'foreigner', 'immigrant', 'extracomunitario' (outside the European Community) changed their meaning and frequency of usage. The results of the analysis show that through 1998-2001 the Italian newspaper 'La Stampa' (see the table) used almost equally frequent both nationality (25%) and the term 'immigrant' (21%) addressing the topics of foreigners in Italy. The prevalence of attribution to foreigners their nationality in media might influence the awareness of their audience about different nationalities of immigrants, on the one hand, but, on the other hand, with almost the same frequency of usage of the term 'immigrant' the names of nationalities and 'immigrants' become synonyms, substituting each other for a change.

Table 1.3

Characterization of the foreigner ($n = 87$) and Context of the news ($n = 1962$) in the newspaper *La Stampa*, 1998–2001, % (Sciortino and Colombo, 2004, p. 108).

Nationality	2 5	Deviance	2 7
‘Immigrant’	2 1	Politics and legislation	2 6
‘Clandestine’	1 7	Arrivals, irregular entries, traffic	1 0
Adjectives such as <i>desperate, displaced, phantasms</i> , etc.	1 1	Anti-clandestine operations, raids, evictions	7
<i>Extracomunitario</i>	5	Socio-cultural changes	5
Religious categories	7	Urban degradation	4
‘Foreigner’	4	Protests against immigrants	2
Racial categories	0	Marginality, poverty, hardship	3
Personal names	3	Protests by immigrants or pro-immigrants	4
Geographic areas	2	Work, economy	3
Racial terminologies	1	Racism, prejudice	2
‘Nomads’	2	Acts of violence against foreigners	1
Occupational slang	1	Other	6
‘Foreign worker’	1		
‘Third World’ origins	0		

The table displays another aspect of the discourse about foreigners – their irregular entries and illegal status in the host society. As such, Calavita (2005, pp.403-404) says that illegal immigrants are ‘to the worst jobs and excluded from social membership not only by virtue of their status as immigrants but by their illegality’. Analyzing the Italian law, she continues, that ‘the precariousness of legal status that is doled out in small increments... mirrors their [illegal immigrants] contingent and begrudging welcome as the uninvited guests whose job it is to clean up’ (ibid., pp. 413-414). In fact, the Italian and European policy is another reason of self-grouping of immigrants from the former Soviet Union. First of all, none of these countries is a member of EU. In the terms of immigration the basic process of international displacement, acculturation, and psychological adaptation is the same for residents from and outside EU, there are differences in the institutional conditions and the attitudes of receiving population. None of these countries is a Schengen area member and thus, the nationals of these countries have similar strategies in order to enter Italy and to stay there. They have to apply for visas or to violate the law crossing the border without

documents. In this sense Ukrainians are alienated from Poles who joined the Schengen area, and Moldovans are alienated from Romanians who have the opportunity to enter Italy without visa. As consequence, Ukrainian and Moldovan workers tend to stay in Italy for longer periods that influences their residence strategies and makes their experience analogous. Besides, under these circumstances from the moment of preparation to the travel to Italy the networks start playing a more important role for Russians, Ukrainians, Moldovans and Belarusians than for those nations which have less restricted access to Italy. One of the evidences of that are internet forums for Russian-speakers which become information sources and transfer the information from more experienced migrants to recent or potential ones. For example, the forum of the website 'Russian Italy' contain topics discussing invitations for visa, working visa, business visa, student visa, medical insurance and bank account needed for visa issue, visas for children, visa through tourist agency, multiple visa, visa refusals, visa application centres, revocation of visas, etc.

Another source of Italian discourse, apart from press, is cinema. According to Ciavola (2010, p.280), 'the extracomunitario is the new figure of migrant who has replaced the figure of the terrone, the Italian migrant who was represented in Italian cinema in the past'. The immigrant becomes the pivot for emphasizing raising issues of 'marginalization, exclusion, unemployment, cultural differences, and value clashes which occur in contemporary Italian society' (ibid.).

One of latest films about ex-Soviets in Italy is the film 'La sconosciuta' ('The unknown woman') by Giuseppe Tornatore (2006). The film tells the story of Irina from Ukraine (played by the Russian actor, Ksenia Rappoport). In the first hour of the film, Irina arrives in a northern Italian city (actually Trieste) and slowly but resolutely starts making her way into the home of the Adacher family who are goldsmiths. The Adacher household is made up of a couple and their four-years old daughter. Since the narration flows in a style deliberately spatially and temporally disorienting, the audience little by little discover that Irina was a prostitute, forced into slavery by Muffa. Although spectators follow Irina closely, and experience the world from her viewpoint, the intent and direction for her actions are completely unknown to them. The same obscure and unknown stays the identity of the main character Irina who lives in the 'hybrid condition of being 'in-between' the identities of Self and Other, Italian and extracomunitario' (Nathan, 2010, p. 264). Being both the Self and the Other at the same time includes being both immigrant/ citizen, sexual victim/ voyeur,

mother/ assassin, judge/ criminal. This makes the film to be of subtle cultural relevance to the situation in contemporary Italy: according to Nathan, ‘the migrant condition is now a mature and integral part of the Italian national cultural discourse’ (ibid., p. 278).

Neither a movie itself, nor critics and anthropologists writing about this film, pay a special attention to a particular origin of Irina. The same does the actress Rappoport in her interview to the Russian newspaper, ‘It is a story of a broken life. And it is absolutely unimportant where it was broken, what nationality the person has...’ (Yuferova, 2009, p. 9). She could be of any nationality, she is a generalized character of the immigrant in Italy.

Cinema as well as press ‘both reflects and shapes society’ (Bullaro, 2010, p. xvi). Numerous studies have focused on the result and cause of the mentioned discourse – on ordinary Italians’ attitudes towards immigration. Calavita gives a comparative analysis of three studies that have measured Italian attitudes toward immigrants and immigrants’ rights. These studies varying in methodology and sample characteristics have generally consistent findings: they suggest relatively high levels of support for immigrant voting rights while simultaneously revealing images of immigrants as potential criminals and, to a lesser extent, as contributing to unemployment (p. 365). According to the research of Facchini and Mayda (2008), comparing public attitudes towards immigration in different countries, Italy (3.55%) and Germany (2.54%) have the most hostile public opinion to immigration among Western European countries (p.9).

At the same time there is a solid block of support for immigration and immigrant rights in Italy. Catholic charity associations, as Caritas, concern for the humanity of immigrants. An article in the periodical ‘Civiltà Cattolica’ warned that it is a ‘grave mistake’ to perceive immigrants only as ‘instruments of the labour market’, ignoring their ‘human dignity’ (Calavita, p. 363). Another pro-immigrant force is labour unions that advocate on behalf of immigrants, potential members (ibid., p. 366), and help them gain access to jobs, health care, housing, and coveted residence permits.

The treatment of immigrants by native institutions influences the immigrants’ organizing process. With native institutions willing to include newcomers, immigrants are less inclined to establish their own organizations (Vermeulen, 2006, pp.38-39). It in its turn facilitates immigrants’ integration into the receiving society instead of confronting it organizing separate ethnic or immigrants’ organizations. Pro-immigrant groups not only help

immigrants with everyday problems but stay against the construction of immigrant difference and expend their efforts at immigrants' integration.

CHAPTER TWO: RUSSIAN-SPEAKING IMMIGRANTS IN ITALY AND FRIULI-VENEZIA GIULIA IN THE LATE XX – EARLY XXI

Immigrants from the former Soviet Union have not been investigated as one group in Italy before¹⁵, although their populations in other countries have been a topic of thorough research. The common language, as well as shared history and cultural traditions and values, justifies grouping all Russian-speaking migrants together for the analysis of their immigration experiences.

The majority of Russian-speaking migrants in Italy and particularly in the region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia come from Ukraine, Moldova and Russia. By 31.12.2010 the Ukrainians represent the fifth nation (200,730 people) among the resident foreign citizens in Italy and the Moldovans ranks ninth (130,948 people) with an increase comparatively to 2007 of 45 percent and 89.2 percent respectively, and to 2003 of 1,576.8 percent (12,730 people in 2003) and 1,877.6 percent (6,974 people in 2003). The statistics tells about the migration boom from Ukraine and Moldova to Italy between 2003-2007. The emigration from Russia to Italy has more gradual character: the number of Russian immigrants is 30,504, and in 2003 it was 10,825 (Caritas Migrantes, 2011).

The citizens of other newly independent states of the Soviet Union also constitute a part of immigration to Italy. By 31.12.2010 among the residents in Italy with at least 1,000 people there are migrants arrived from: Belarus (6,975), Georgia (6,520), Lithuania (4,524), Latvia (2,257), Uzbekistan (1,294), Kazakhstan (1,221), and Estonia (1,029). The share of women is high, ranging from 58.9 percent for Armenia to 87.7 percent for Georgia (Caritas Migrantes, 2011, pp. 476-77).

These figures can be underestimated since the immigration from these countries has partly illegal character. Mostly it is a flow of irregular immigrants who arrived with tourist visa and overstayed its expiry date. A part of migrants enters clandestinely (Ricci, 2006, p. 57).

¹⁵ Except the research by Monica Perotto (2010), though a linguistic one.

No reliable statistics are available to estimate the number of undocumented migrants, but, for instance, for illegal Ukrainians studies indicate ‘a very high amount, if not the same of regular one’ (Montefusco, 2008, p. 345). There are opinions that total number of the Ukrainians is about 400-500 thousand people (Ricci, 2006, p. 57) but without exact criteria for such an estimation these figures, popular in political and public discourse, can be evaluated as guesswork.

The previous regularization decrees adopted by the Italian government have shown the potential of illegal immigration from Ukraine and Moldova. Following the 2002 regularization decree the presence of the Ukrainians jumped from the twenty-seventh place to the fourth place (from 14,035 to 112,802 persons) of the largest immigrant communities in Italy (Caritas Migrantes, 2006, p. 56). Out of 341,000 applications from domestic workers, 27 percent were submitted by Ukrainians (IOM, 2008c, p. 21). The ‘great regularization’ of 2002 mobilized a large part of Moldovan immigrants as well: they presented 31,217 applications of the total number of 703,000 (4.4%) (Caritas Migrantes, 2009b, p. 2). Thus, the number of regularized Moldovans has increased from 7,000 in 2002 to 26,000 in 2003 (ISTAT, 2004).

The different degree of presence of the Ukrainians, Moldovans, Russians, and other nationalities in Italy influenced the formation of ethnic communities there. Thus in Friuli-Venezia Giulia it is possible to distinguish two ethnic communities – the Ukrainian community and the Moldovan community – as the strongest and the most functional among the NIS national communities. The Russian community in FVG has its specific traits and is discussed here below as well, but first it is important to explain and validate the usage of the term ‘Russian speakers’ in this study.

2.1. Definition of research population: Notion of ‘Russian-speakers’

The term ‘Russian-speakers’ in its initial meaning corresponded to all the people speaking the Russian language and it is still a working term for linguists. In this sense the contemporary Russian-speaking community is polyethnic. Though estimates vary, there is thought to be a worldwide population of approximately 145 million first language speakers of Russian and 265 million Russian speakers in total (Lewis, 2009). According to Yatsenko (2007), in Russia about 119 million people consider the Russian language to be their mother tongue and 27.1 million speak it as the second language. It is the state language of the

Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus and an official language of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and particular regions of Ukraine (Dnepropetrovskaya, Donetskaya, Zaporozhskaya, Luganskaya, Nikolaevskaya, Kharkovskaya and Khersonskaya oblasts), the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and on the territories of the unrecognized governments – Transnistria and Gagauzia (Volodarskaia, 2009, p. 24).

To understand the choice of the term ‘Russian-speakers’ in our work we consider it important to shed light on the similar existing terms and to explain the different usage of the term ‘Russian-speakers’ in political and sociological discourse.

Today in literature different terms are used to identify the population of the former Soviet Union and in particular its Russian population, such as ‘citizens of the former Soviet Union’, ‘former Soviet people’, ‘Russian diaspora’, ‘Russian compatriots’, ‘Russian-speakers’, ‘Russians’, ‘Russian world’. Besides, there are the terms ‘Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)’ and ‘Newly Independent States (NIS)’ and the terms produced from them such as ‘population of the CIS/NIS countries’, ‘citizens of the CIS/NIS countries’, etc.

Starting from the basic term ‘*Russians*’, it is important to notice that the English word ‘Russians’ has two meanings in the Russian language: the first one is ‘russkie’, that is Russians by ethnocultural nationality; the second term, ‘rossijane’ (*россияне*) means the citizens of the Russian Federation despite their ethnic belonging. As Brubaker points,

‘rossijane’ in principle construes Russianness in territorial rather than ethnocultural terms, but in practice serves more as a ‘politically correct’ substitute for russkie (politically correct because it acknowledges the multiethnic population of Russia) (Brubaker, 2000, p. 16).

Applied to the migration studies the term ‘Russian’ is often applied to repatriates who came from the former USSR, as it happened in Israel and Germany.

The media call the Russians living in both the near abroad and the far abroad ‘*Russian compatriots living abroad*’. In Russia the term ‘compatriots’ (*sootechestvenniki* - *соотечественники*, that is people who share a common fatherland - *otechestvo* - *отечество*) is a legal status which is regulating by the Federal Law ‘On Russian Federation’s State Policy toward Compatriots Living Abroad’. According to the Law the compatriots are ‘the persons, having been born in the same state, living or having lived in it and having the characteristics of community of language, religion, cultural heritage,

traditions and customs, as well as the heirs of line of the named persons'. The compatriots abroad are 'the citizens of the Russian Federation, permanently living outside the territory of the Russian Federation' and 'the persons and their descendants, living outside the territory of the Russian Federation and belonging, as a rule, to the people, historically living on the territory of the Russian Federation, and also having freely opted for spiritual, cultural and legal connection to the Russian Federation; persons, whose relatives in the direct line ascending previously lived on the territory of the Russian Federation, including: persons, who were citizens of the USSR, living in the states, comprising the USSR, having received the citizenship of these states or having become stateless persons; emigrants from the Russian state, the Russian Republic, the RSFSR, the USSR, and the Russian Federation, having had a corresponding nationality and having become the citizens of a foreign state or stateless persons'. (The Federal Law of the Russian Federation, 24.05.1999. N 99-ФЗ, st. 1, 2).

Batanova points out the extensiveness and equivocalness of this definition and gives her interpretation of the term: 'a Russian compatriot abroad is an individual originating from the previously common state (Russian state, Russian Republic, RSFSR, USSR, Russian Federation), speaking the Russian language, identifying him-/herself with Russia and being loyal to it, perceiving spiritual and cultural links to the ancestral home, sustaining the contacts with the Russian Federation'. In such a case the 'compatriot' shall respond to all the characteristics specified in the definition (Batanova, 2008). Still, this meaning as a blend of legal, ethnographic, and identitarian notions is overlaid by a *mélange* of criteria based on some combination of descent, ethnicity, past citizenship, and spiritual-cultural orientation.

A part of Russian experts presents the term '*Russian world*' which is to unite Russia and Russia abroad. The term cultivates the sense of collective distinctiveness and mission and possessing what Max Weber called 'irreplaceable culture values'. This term relying on the cultural basis is widely used in the political discourse giving ground to see it as a 'pan-idea'. One of the examples of such a usage is the term 'a Russian world country' introduced by Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church at the opening of the 3rd Russian World Assembly in Moscow (November 3, 2009) which would mean a country that 'sees itself as part of the Russian world, if it uses Russian as the language of international communication, promotes the Russian culture, and preserves the general historical memory'. Till now it is

rather doubtful that former Soviet republics building their national identities around national languages and cultures are prone to call themselves ‘Russian world countries’.

‘Soviet/ex-Soviet people’, ‘people from the states of the former Soviet Union’ are two other terms used for describing former compatriots. Strictly speaking, the former term must be limited by a group of people of a certain age who were born and grew up in the USSR. The latter term when addressing to the people themselves also suits upper-age groups and connotes the past. As Czech President Vaclav Havel said, ‘The unwitting nostalgia in the West for the old order may be discerned even in such superficial matters as how they refer to our countries. From the Czech Republic to Kazakhstan we are, and will no doubt remain for some time, ‘post-communist countries’ and ‘former members of the Warsaw Pact’...’ (Foreign Affairs, Mar/April 1994, p.2). The term ‘former USSR’ was more suitable for an early period after dissolution of the Soviet Union when the remembrance of it was fresh and psychology of people did not readjust to the new reality.

The other term with an abbreviation is ‘citizens of the CIS (the Commonwealth of Independent States)¹⁶’ or its English substitute ‘the NIS (newly independent states) of the former USSR’. They differ from each other in two senses: the first sense is that at the moment CIS includes not all the former republics of the USSR but eleven of them (except Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Georgia), while ‘NIS’ refers to all 15 countries comprised the old Soviet republics; the second difference is that the ‘CIS’ term (‘*CHI*’ in Russian) is widely used on the post-Soviet space, the ‘NIS’ has no fixed Russian analogue and is not used by people in these countries for describing the space or for self-definition. Both terms with prefix ‘citizens’, ‘people’, ‘population’ refer to all the groups of population of relevant 11 or 15 countries. So, both terms are wider than the term we need for a specific part of all the population of these countries. Here we arrive to the term ‘Russian diaspora’.

The term ‘*Russian diaspora*’, as well as ‘Russia Abroad’, ‘Russian emigration’, historically means the community of the émigré who left Russia during the civil war and after the defeat of the White Armies in 1920-1921 (Raeff, 1990). After the dissolution of the USSR there

¹⁶ The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was created in December 1991. In the adopted Declaration the participants of the Commonwealth declared their interaction on the basis of sovereign equality. At present the CIS unites: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine.

has been a telling change of meaning and this term or the term 'new Russian diaspora' was applied to 25.2 million Russians in the former Soviet non-Russian republics who became a "diaspora population without moving an inch or leaving their homes" (Heleniak, 2004, p. 1).

Nowadays Russian politicians and journalists use the word 'Russian diaspora' as a synonym, on the one hand, of the Russian and the former Soviet population living in the far abroad countries, and, on the other hand, of the Russian population in the near abroad states.

Some scholars widely accept the term 'Russian diaspora' in academic texts affirming the existence of this diaspora. A part of them goes even further and uses the term 'diaspora' for minorities in the Russian Federation, labeling them as 'inner diasporas' (Toshenko, 1997; Lallukka, 2000): for instance, 'Tuvyn diaspora in Moscow' (Dargyn-Ool, 2006) or 'Tatar diaspora in Russia' (Vishnevskiy, 2000). The self-evident diasporas on the post-Soviet space are classical Jewish, Armenian and Greek diasporas. Vishnevskiy revises also German diaspora (or semi-diaspora) and Ukrainian diaspora which is similar to the Russian one but is bigger and more disperse, and concludes that the number of diasporas on the post-Soviet space is 'very big' (Vishnevskiy, 2000, p. 127).

Other scholars use this term with caution and dispute the 'universalization' of the diaspora, which, paradoxically, leads to the disappearance of the diaspora (Brubaker, 2005, p. 3), described by the widely used set of features including following: 1) dispersal from an original homeland, often traumatically, to two or more foreign regions; 2) alternatively or additionally, the expansion from a homeland in search of work, in pursuit of trade or to further colonial ambitions; 3) a collective memory and myth about the homeland, including its location, history, suffering and achievements; 4) an idealization of the real or imagined ancestral home and a collective commitment to its maintenance, restoration, safety and prosperity, even to its creation; 5) the frequent development of a return movement to the homeland that gains collective approbation even if many in the group are satisfied with only a vicarious relationship or intermittent visits to the homeland; 6) a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time and based on a sense of distinctiveness, a common history, the transmission of a common cultural and religious heritage and the belief in a common fate; 7) a troubled relationship with host societies, suggesting a lack of acceptance or the possibility that another calamity might befall the group; 8) a sense of empathy and co-responsibility with co-ethnic members in other countries of settlement even where home has

become more vestigial; and 9) the possibility of a distinctive creative, enriching life in host countries with a tolerance for pluralism (Cohen, 1997, p. 26).

The ‘contra-diaspora’ scholars consider that the Russian population in the near abroad, does not meet the requirements of the cited above diaspora definition, since this population is characterized by amorphism, diffuse outlines, lack of consolidation and members’ orientation towards the informal ties of family, friends, colleagues (Pilkington and Flinn, n.d.). In the international practice ‘the term ‘diaspora’ is not used when discussing the presence of descendants of British people in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Canada, and the United States. Nor is the term applied to the many German colonies established in central and eastern Europe as far as the Volga (all but vanished since 1945), nor in several Latin American countries’ (Chaliand and Rageau, 1995, p. xiii). The application of the term is the same arguable towards the Russians in the new abroad. Laitin calls it a ‘beached diapsora’ (1998, p. 29). Brubaker proposes to use in this case the term ‘accidental diasporas’ making the difference between ‘movement of peoples across borders’ and ‘movements of borders across peoples’ (Brubaker, 2000, p. 2).

The term ‘diaspora’ is applied to the population in the far abroad as well that would seem to fit our case if there were no even two doubts or arguable questions: whether it can be called a diaspora as we discussed above; and whose diaspora it is – ‘Russian’ diaspora, or diaspora ‘of ex-Soviet citizens’, or ‘Russian-speaking’ diaspora. The reason of rejection of the term ‘diaspora’ in this thesis is a doubt in the diaspora existence in the case of emigrants from the post-Soviet space. Even if we agree on the application of the term diaspora, there is a need to choose and admit an attributive adjective. The central term with two conditional assumptions seems to be too precarious and unreliable.

The term ‘*Russian-speaking population*’ has already become a cliché in a few years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The content analysis of newspapers provided by Laitin in Kazakhstan, Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine in 1998 demonstrated that the term ‘Russian-speaking’ had taken root in all four republics and it had been the third most used category in nationality discourse to identify the social group that had been left stranded by the Soviet Union in the countries of the near abroad.

In the immigration studies it often becomes an umbrella term inclusive of all arrivals from the former Soviet Union (Pilkington, 1998; Laitin, 1998; Maydell-Stevens et al., 2007). It is

clear that in this case the term ‘Russian-speakers’ refers not merely to the common language but to some common customs, habits, modes of behavior, social norms originating from the Soviet and the earlier Russian Empire’s past.

The process of identification of ethnically non-Russian population speaking Russian started in the Soviet Russia in 1920. The first after-revolution census had questions either about ethnicity or about native language. The results of that census (which is not total as it was conducted in war conditions) and the next census of 1926 showed the difference between the number of ethnic Russians and the number of those who stated the Russian language to be their native language. In 1926 the Russian-speaking population apart from ethnic Russians was 6.4 million people, in 1989 it almost tripled to 18.7 million, including 8.3 million Ukrainians (18.8% of their total number), 2.9 million Belarusians (28.5% of their number), 1.2 million Jews (86.6%). The 1989 census’ results could be blurred since it had the question about ‘the second fluent language of the peoples of the USSR’ in addition to the question about ‘native language’, and 68.8 million people chose the Russian language as their ‘second language’. It could happen that, for example, a resident of Kyiv, who showed himself an ethnic Ukrainian but completely lost the Ukrainian language, was able to call it ‘native’ and Russian as the language he spoke fluently.

The 1989 census showed the number of people who stated that they speak Russian fluently or as native speakers. It was about 80 percent of total population of the Soviet Union and such a proportion explains the usage of the term ‘Russian-speakers’ towards the major part of former Soviet peoples nowadays. Though not all of them would state their ethnicity as Russian (but, for example, Ukrainian, Kazakh, Jewish, and others), they speak Russian as native-speakers (or quite often, it is their first language). The émigrés themselves whose common language is Russian use the term ‘Russian-speaking’ defining their community, and they are grouped in the public opinion in the ethnonim Russian-speakers.

The common language is also used for political gains, as politicized linguistic consciousness emerged in the later Middle Ages. Then belonging to a language community could serve for political claims, as Bartlett ([1994] 1996) illustrates: In 1300, when Wenceslas II of Bohemia was offered the Polish throne, the Polish envoys reportedly said that ‘there will be one king for us and the Bohemians and we will live together amicably under a common law. For it is fitting that those who do not differ much in speaking the Slavic language enjoy the

rule of a single prince'. The other example is the Polish claim to Pomerelia supported by the argument 'that there is one and the same language in Poland and Pomerelia and that all the people who customarily reside there speak Polish' (Bartlett, [1994] 1996, p. 130).

Besides, in the studies which group Russian-speakers, the language is used as a proxy for ethnicity or the degree of cultural difference or affinity between ethnic groups. Mostly it happens in the cases with a small presence of Russian-speaking immigrants without intense prevalence of one specific ethnic group. Where is a strong community and a large presence of one ethnic group from the former USSR, the researchers tend to single them out, as, for instance, the Ukrainians in Canada.

While scholars find this term to be inaccurate for categorizing the part of the population of the newly independent states out of Russia who are non-titular Russian speakers (since there are also the titular ethnic groups in the new states who are also Russian-speakers), it underlines the suitability of this term for describing all the population of the former Soviet Union in far abroad which speaks Russian.

Thus, the term 'Russian-speakers' being not a mere linguistic term and not politically committed is used in this study for the sociological grouping of people without referring to linguistics. In this study, Russian-speaking migrants are understood to be migrants originated from the former republics of the USSR who share historical destinies, common social roles, interests, and culture (Kosmarskaya, 2011, p. 57).

The specific focus is on Russian-speaking migrants who live in the region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia.

2.2. Russian immigrants in Italy and Friuli-Venezia Giulia

Russia has different character of migration in comparison with Ukraine and Moldova, because of its more favorable economic development. The Russian Federation became a centre for immigration from the countries of CIS, which was initially forced migration and then shifted to voluntary economic migration. The emigration from Russia to far abroad is directed primarily towards the USA, Germany, Israel, Finland, and Canada. According to the data of the Federal State Statistics Service (FSSS), 20,326 people departed to CIS countries and 12,132 people departed to the far abroad in 2009 (FSSS, 2010). Official Russian statistics does not represent the real scale of emigration because it takes into

account only those who has changed allegiance and those who are registered by consulates abroad. The newspaper 'Novaya gazeta' gives the number of 440,000 people who emigrated from Russia in 2005-2009, and about 95,000 people every year (Sanders, 2010, p. 73). The head of the FSSS Konstantin Romodanovskiy estimates the annual number of departures from Russia in 300,000 people, including 30,000 – 40,000 people emigrating for permanent residence (RIA 'Novosti', 04.02.2011).

In Italy there were 25,059 citizens of the Russian Federation by 31.12.2009. Among them 20,650 (82.4 %) are women, 2,311 (9.2 %) of them are children (Caritas/Migrantes, 2010, p. 68). Mostly they are based in the province of Milano (2,568), Rome (1,677), Napoli (932), Torino (814), and Rimini (665) (Caritas/Migrantes, 2010, p. 70). In the region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia there were only 577 people in 2009 (IRES FVG, 2009).

By 31.12.2010, there were 30,504 Russian residents in Italy. The Russians in Italy are comparatively not numerous group ranking 27th among immigrant groups (Caritas/Migrantes, 2011). The Russian studies of the Russian emigration to Italy are realized in the frames of studies of emigration to the 'Southern Europe and the Mediterranean' or 'the countries of new immigration' – Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece (Trukhina, 2004; Ryazantsev, 2007).

The main reasons for migrating for Russians are start of a family and study. Indeed, the Russian scholars mention that a raising number of Russian women are married to the citizens of Italy. The statistics provided by Caritas indicates that in 2008 there were 961 marriages of Italian men with Russian women, that is 5,3% of the total number of marriages of Italian men to foreign women (Caritas/Migrantes, 2010, p. 68).

In 2008, there were 24,548 marriages between Italians and foreigners in Italy, including 6,308 marriages between Italian women and foreign men. While Italian women in 45.8 % of all international marriages married men from Africa, Italian men in three cases out of five married women from Europe. They concluded a marriage with Romanian women in 13.7 % of cases (2,506 marriages) and with Ukrainian women in 10.6 % (1,940 marriages). The marriages with Brazilian women constituted 9.7 %, with Poles – 6.7 %, with Russians – 5.3 % (961 marriages), with Moldovans – 4.7 % (857 marriages) (Caritas/Migrantes, 2010, p. 135).

The statistics confirms the idea of Kalmijn (1998) that marriage patterns result from both preference and opportunity. Mostly the opportunity depends on the size of women groups presented in Italy, but in the case with **Russian-speaking wives** (first of all, Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians) the partial interpretation of opportunity lays in contract work of Italian men in these countries: enough to remember the women from Soviet Togliatti in Turin.

Likewise among today's Russian-speaking 'wives' in FVG there is a group of women who arrived to Italy from the USSR or soon after its dissolution. They married Italians who worked in the USSR and its successor states for 'Danieli Officine Meccaniche' (in Moscow, Zhlobin) or 'Cogolo Concerie' (in Moscow, Togliatti, Kaluga, Ryazan). Mostly this group of immigrants being the oldest and well-adapted to the Italian society is responsible for collective activities of Russian-speaking community. As these women left the Soviet Union, they created cultural associations not only for Russians or only Belarusians but for all former Soviet citizens. Their core group established the Russian Orthodox parish in Udine despite their own ethnic and religious belonging. Still they regard people from all the newly independent states as compatriots.

Those women who arrived later as well as their Italian husbands could use dating agencies and the Internet to find spouses. In the 1990s for the women from the CIS a marriage to a foreigner became a life strategy as a response to the changing society. For the 'mail-order bride' industry Slavic women having been liberated after communism became a new brand as it is seen from the number of international marriage brokers in these countries. In 2004, the University of Rhode Island (USA) studied 219 web sites of marriage agencies. There was information about 119,649¹⁷ women from the NIS of the USSR. The countries with the largest numbers of women were the Russian Federation with over 62,000 women, followed by Ukraine with almost 32,000, and Belarus with almost 13,000. Countries with a few thousand recruited women were: Kazakhstan (3,037), Kyrgyzstan (4,190), Latvia (1,760), and Uzbekistan (1,139). The other countries had less than 1,000 recruited women: Azerbaijan (204), Estonia (551), Lithuania (626), Moldova (884), and a few countries had less than a couple of dozen women, Armenia (23), Georgia (7), Tajikistan (8), and Turkmenistan (25) (Hughes, 2004, p. 52).

¹⁷ Not all of these women were aimed at the marriage as partly these sites also offered escort services.

The marriage to a foreigner became a new model of adaptation under conditions of the transition society (Anashkina and Pogodina, 2003). As an example demonstrating the effect of economic factor of marriage migration it is possible to cite the study by Lunyakova (2001, p. 95) about the level of life of numerically growing families of single mothers in Russia: ‘... overwhelming majority of examined population of single mothers’ families (up to 90%) lives below low-income poverty threshold: average per capita incomes of these families do not reach considerably the size of living wage...’.

With time the situation has changed. The economic aspect stays but it is not the main factor anymore. Marriage emigration to the countries of the far abroad has no more ‘‘sausage’, that is to say economic, underlying reason’ (Konygina, 2004).

Russian and Ukrainian scholars studying the phenomenon of ‘marriage emigration’ specify three main reasons why women look for marriage to a foreigner, namely: the lack of men of marriageable age in the corresponding countries (97 men for 100 women), low ‘quality’ of majority of men in homeland (their economic insolvency, pernicious habits), and difficult situation of family institution, when woman has to shoulder the burdens of the family without equal participation of man (Rybtsova, 1997; Makhovskaya, 2003; Korableva et al, 2005; Kalugina, 2008). Anashkina and Pogodina (2003) add the reasons conditioned by the situation in the receiving countries such as ‘demographic problems in the countries of Western Europe’ and ‘psychological and cultural needs and requirements of a part of men from Western society’, that is close to the idea of Kalmijn (1998) that not only opportunity influences the possibility of marriage but also preferences. Besides, among the facilitators of marriages with foreigners they mention opportunities granted by open society.

The opportunities to meet a spouse from other ethnic group, race, and country rose for citizens of CIS countries with their inclusion in the global mobility. Among recently married women from Russia there are many those who met their future husbands during their studying or working abroad.

The intermarriages between Italians and Russian-speaking women indicate that ethnic and religious boundaries are weaker than they used to be. Simultaneously these marriages themselves help to weaken these boundaries: first individuals lose their negative attitudes toward another group and weaken their prejudices and stereotypes, and then this applies not

only to the immediate partners but to a range of members of their social networks (Kalmijn, 1998, p. 396).

Russians become invisible migrants in Italy in both statistical and cultural terms. The marriages to Italian men provide them not only with the Italian citizenship but with a higher insertion in the life of society. The birth of children and their fostering in Italy even strengthen the Russian women ties with the Italian society.

While this group is named ‘wives’ in the present research because of their prime reason of arrival (and they often describe themselves so), it does not mean that all of these women are housekeepers depending on their husbands. They can be seen among the groups of students and workers, or vice versa - as the above mentioned Italian statistics demonstrates, the presence of working Ukrainian and Moldovan women influences the marriage patterns in Italy as well. Indeed, the fluidity of these groups is obvious: the studies tell that about a half of temporary labour migrant women from Russia want to ‘establish themselves abroad for a long period’, and 20 percent of them hope to do it by marriage (Ryazantsev and Tkachenko, 2008, p. 64).

It is important to remember that they are not only wives in Italy but mothers as well. Their children are Italians with Russian or Ukrainian or Belarusian roots. Nowadays the eldest of them are teenagers and having upbrought in Italy with their Italian fathers and relatives they have no any need to adjust to this society. Another case are children brought by their mothers from homeland in their teen age – so-called ‘1.5 generation’ of immigrants. From the observation, they speak Italian with no accent and studied in the Italian schools, but in comparison with children born in Italy many of them tend to keep the ties with their first homeland: they go there once in several years, they look for friends among Russian-speakers, etc.

Another important group of Russian-speaking migrants in Italy is **university students**. According to the UNESCO data, in 2007, over 2.8 million students were enrolled in educational institutions outside of their country of origin and thus, can be named foreign students as ‘foreign students are defined as people enrolled in a regular educational program in a particular country without having the citizenship of that country’ (Thissen and Ederveen, 2006, p. 19). This number is a result of several phenomena such as the change from an elite to a mass system of higher education occurred in the 1990s, the end of the Cold

War and the rise of market liberalism in many countries with ‘a sharp increase in the numbers of foreign students, mostly from developing countries, studying in western universities’ (Healey, 2007, p. 334).

Nowadays, China sends the greatest number of students abroad, amounting to almost 421,100 per year. The Russian Federation ranks tenth with 42,900 students abroad after India (153,300), the Republic of Korea (105,300), Germany (77,500), Japan (54,500), France (54,000), the United States (50,300), Malaysia (46,500), and Canada (43,900). These ten countries account for 37.5% of the world’s mobile students, reported by 153 host countries with such data (Global Education Digest 2009, p. 36-37).

Stimulated by the EU-financed ERASMUS and Socrates programmes, international student mobility within Europe has increased rapidly over the past decades. In 1987/1988 only a little over three thousand students within the EEA1 went to another (candidate) EU/EEA-country for a limited period of time on an ERASMUS-scholarship. In 2003/2004, their number has risen to almost 136 thousand (European Commission, 2005a).

From the research on international education several motives to study abroad, seen from a student perspective, emerge. First of all, people seek for a better education abroad for their future careers (Thissen and Ederveen, 2006; Mazzarol and Soutar, 2002). Then, the education abroad is used as a means of emigration (Healey, 2008). And finally, people want ‘to see the world’, ‘to get new friends’ (Ledeneva, 2002). It is clear that these motives are connected with each other, and being examined at a personal level, an individual can reveal the reasons of all types.

The motives of the first type include the opportunity to get better education and to obtain specializations not available from home universities as well as the general opportunity to get the higher education in the conditions of its demand. For example, China doubled its student population in the late 1990s or Vietnam had 22 million people of school-age from its population of 82 million in 2006. Such a demand is not the case of all student-sending countries neither of Russia and Ukraine. Russia has seen the reduction of its general students’ number recently caused by the births declining in the 1990s, while Ukraine had a boom of appearance of new educational institutions since the gain of its independence from the USSR. Still, the tenth position of Russia among sending their students countries in 2007 and the growth rate of the outbound student mobility in Ukraine (9.1%), as well as in

Belarus (12%), Georgia (9%) and Armenia (9.9%) between 1999 and 2007 (Global Education Digest 2009, p. 38-39), can be explained as being ‘the only alternative for those who cannot secure a place at one of the leading universities in their home countries *and* who have the means to pay for a foreign education’ (Healey, 2008, p. 354). Besides, the financial support or scholarship from Western universities, governmental programmes or private funds become the reason to choose the study abroad. Still this reason belongs to the first group of the motives as people from not rich families often use such an opportunity to get education in general or to get a better education than they can obtain in a homeland.

The analysis of the Italian case between 1955-1988 shows that the high share of foreign enrolments in the faculty of Medicine resulted from both the limit on the total number of students admitted to the programmes and the difficulties in gaining a place at medical schools in Greece, the United States and Germany. Particularly in the technical and scientific fields, the relatively high levels of foreign student enrolment might be explained by the lack of such programmes in many developing countries (Cammelli, 1991, p. 367-368).

The motives of the second type – for a future emigration – vary from more evident to more hidden. Study abroad can be a formal reason for obtaining the documents required for entering and staying in the country. Study in the EU states sometimes is used by third-countries nationals to obtain the Schengen visa and the residence permit with a view to change the type of residence permit later. Furthermore, study abroad can be the means of adjustment to the host society for future emigration: from learning the language of a host country and being socialized in a host country context to getting the national degree and profession. The latter is especially true about Russians, Ukrainians and other CIS citizens whose degrees are not recognized in Western Europe. Besides, education from Europe for the third countries citizens can be the means for future emigration to countries other than the country of study, the same way as offshore study is the means for emigration for the Indians:

India... is widely regarded as a ‘migration’ market by the international offices of receiving universities—that is, the primary motive often ascribed to potential Indian students is the desire to gain ‘skilled migrant’ status through offshore

study and thereby gain residence visas in countries like the United Kingdom and United States (Healey, 2008, p. 348).

The third types of motives are mostly revised in psychology and cultural studies. In educational studies the cultural experience is seen as the major reason for studying abroad temporarily and only as an additional reason for long-term studying abroad. The Dutch case demonstrates that more than 80% of the VISIE-students¹⁸ who started the study abroad because of the cultural experience involved did not finish the study (Thissen and Ederveen, 2006, p. 16).

The widespread reason of studying a foreign language in its country, in my opinion, is not of a 'cultural' type motive but attributed either to the motive to get a better education (to study a language better and/ or faster than at home) or to the motive to emigrate to the country of the studying language.

The choice of the country for studying depends apart from the quality of education on a higher GDP per capita and a lower unemployment rate (Thissen and Ederveen, 2006, p. 8). Indeed, the United States hosts the largest number and share of the world's mobile students at 595,900 and 21.3% respectively. It is followed by the United Kingdom (351,500), France (246,600), Australia (211,500), Germany (206,900), Japan (125,900), Canada (68,500), South Africa (60,600), the Russian Federation (60,300) and Italy (57,300). First 11 countries host 71% of the world's mobile students. (Global Education Digest 2009, p. 36-37).

In Italy the number of foreign students was already apparent in the 1950s and developed considerably in the 1960s (Cammelli, 1991, p. 360). Nowadays Italy ranks the tenth hosting country and the fifth most popular destination country in the frames of the European exchange programme ERASMUS¹⁹, following the United Kingdom, France, Spain, and Germany. The first three countries of origin of foreign students in Italy were Italian neighbors: Albania (11,397 students), Greece (4,065) and Romania (2,853) in 2007-2008 academic year. As for the students from the CIS in Italy, for the same period the Russian

¹⁸ VISIE-scholarship issued by the Dutch government during 1998-2002. The purpose of the scholarship was to promote student mobility within the EU, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein.

¹⁹ All 27 EU-members, three EEA-countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway), and a candidate country (Turkey), participate in the ERASMUS program. Students enrolled in an educational program in one of these members may study in another member country for 3 to 12 months and receive a grant per month during that period. Currently, almost 2,200 higher education institutions participate in ERASMUS. Since the creation of ERASMUS, 1.2 million students have studied abroad under this program (European Commission, 2005a).

citizens were at 1.6 percent of all foreign students (812 students), the Ukrainians were at 1.3 percent (684), and the Moldavians with 641 students were at 1.2 percent (Immigrazione. Dossier statistico 2009, p. 178).

Within the general trend of higher percentage of foreign students presence in the north of Italy, the region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia (FVG) with a modest number of 2,054 foreign students ranks the second in Italy by the proportion of foreign students (5.9%) of the total number of region's students in 2007-2008 (Immigrazione. Dossier statistico 2009, p. 181).

Two main universities of FVG are the University of Udine and the University of Trieste. The University of Udine represents a special interest for our research since it has been involved in the international projects with Russian universities.

By November 2010, the University of Udine had 54 enrolled students from Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus²⁰, and 10 more enrolled ERASMUS Mundus students from Russia. Among the regularly enrolled students there are 20 students from Ukraine, 20 students from Moldova, 11 from Russia, and three from Belarus.

According to Cammelli (1991), for the period from 1955 to 1988 the faculties of Medicine, Engineering, Architecture, Mathematics, Physical and Natural Sciences and Pharmacy together have accounted for 70 to 84 percent of foreign student enrolments in Italy. Nowadays the statistics registers 31 percent of all foreign students in Italy choosing Economics, Medicine and Surgery. Others choose Engineering (11.6%), Philosophy (9.4%), and Law (7.1%) (Immigrazione. Dossier statistico 2009, p. 180). The students of the University of Udine (apart from the ERASMUS Mundus students) from Russia (R.), Ukraine (U.), Moldova (M.) and Belarus (B.) chose the following faculties for 2009-2010 school year:

²⁰ Counted by the citizenship. The data is provided by the Centre of Planning, Development and Assessment of the University of Udine.

Table 2.1

Faculty	Number of students from R., U., M., B.
<i>Lingue e letterature straniere</i>	20
<i>Medicina e chirurgia</i>	13
<i>Economia</i>	11
<i>Ingegneria</i>	4
<i>Giurisprudenza</i>	3
<i>Medicina veterinaria</i>	1
<i>Scienze matematiche, fisiche e naturali</i>	1
<i>Lettere e filosofia</i>	1

Speaking of the students of the faculty of Medicine and Surgery, it is noteworthy to mention that four of them are doing the course in Medicine and surgery, eight persons are learning to be nurses and one - to be a technician in biomedical laboratory.

For the same period of 2009-2010 the students and professors from Russian universities arrived to the following faculties within the programme ERASMUS Mundus:

Table 2.2

Faculty	Number of visiting professors and students within Erasmus Mundus
<i>Agraria</i>	6
<i>Lingue e letterature straniere</i>	5
<i>Lettere e filosofia</i>	3
<i>Economia</i>	3
<i>Giurisprudenza</i>	1
<i>Medicina e chirurgia</i>	1

The preference of the Agrarian faculty is linked to the character of the programme ERASMUS Mundus IAMONET-Ru, as a programme implemented by the consortium of agrarian universities in Russia and Western Europe.

The University of Udine hosts the exchange students from Russia through mobility projects, such as TEMPUS and ERASMUS Mundus, through bilateral agreements, individual governmental scholarships and Italian summer courses. ERASMUS Mundus being a type of the ERASMUS programme includes the exchange of non-EU students, university teachers and academic staff.

Nowadays, a part of students and visiting teachers from Russia at the University of Udine are the participants of the projects ERASMUS Mundus IAMONET-RU and ERASMUS Mundus II. Since the start of the ERASMUS Mundus project in 2007, 58 Russian students, university teachers and representatives of academic staff have been visiting the University of Udine for three academic years. 17 people (or almost 30 percent) came from Moscow educational and research institutes.

Table 2.3

	2007/ 2008	2008/ 2009	2009/ 2010	Total
Partner universities				
<i>Buryat State Academy of Agriculture</i>	1	6	2	9
<i>East-Siberian State University of Technology</i>	0	2	0	2
<i>Kuban State Agrarian University</i>	0	1	2	3
<i>Moscow State Agroengineering University</i>	1	0	1	2
<i>Moscow State Linguistic University</i>	0	0	2	2
<i>Moscow State University</i>	0	2	3	5
<i>Novosibirsk State Agrarian University</i>	2	0	1	3
<i>Omsk State Agrarian University</i>	0	1	1	2
<i>Orel State Agrarian University</i>	2	0	0	2
<i>Primorsky State Agricultural Academy</i>	0	1	0	1
<i>Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences</i>	0	0	1	1
<i>Russian State University of Trade and Commerce</i>	0	1	0	1
<i>Russian Timiryazev Academy Moscow</i>	4	0	2	6
<i>Samara State Agricultural Academy</i>	1	5	2	8
<i>St. Petersburg State Agrarian University</i>	0	0	1	1
<i>St. Petersburg State University of Economics and Finance</i>	0	0	1	1
<i>Stavropol State Agrarian University</i>	6	2	1	9
Total	17	21	19	58

According to Moskovtsev (2003), students form a type of occupational group: their common type of activity together with territorial concentration causes a certain commonness of interests, specific subculture and way of life, and it is supplemented and reinforced by their age homogeneity.

The students from CIS also tend to form groups where it is possible. People from CIS passing an exam to enter the university stay close to each other not only because of the common language for communication (most of them speak fluent Italian) but because of the common requirements which they need to meet to enter the university. Later, common

experience of previous education in the Soviet or post-Soviet system becomes the reason to interact with each other, discussing the differences in teaching and professional practice in general and this way facilitating their study.

In October 2008, IAMONET-RU Alumni Association was established ‘to facilitate contacts between the Alumni, their host universities and other partner organisations with an aim to enhance the personal and professional development and promote academic cooperation between the EU and Russian universities’ (IAMONET-Ru online). The association allows to make the ties between participants of the project visible and organized and to include ties with participants and coordinators from other member universities of Europe and Russia, i.e. establish bridging network.

In this subchapter dedicated to the Russian migrants we also describe the **policy of the Russian Federation** which is an important factor for Russian-speakers’ ‘groupness’. The leading role in the formation of the uniting policy in the CIS and policy towards Russian-speaking abroad lies on Russia as the legal successor of the USSR and the continuer of the Russian Empire.

Arguing that Russia has changed its attitude to its emigrants from hostility, or at least indifference, to sympathy and solidarity, Fialkova (2005) explains this change as a result of several major factors: the poor demographic situation in Russia together with unwanted illegal immigration from China and some other countries; a brain drain, which is felt in science and industry; financial problems, which can be partially solved by inviting emigrants' businesses and funds; comparison of the help (in politics, science, and economy) given to China and Latin American countries by their diasporas, as against the unused potential of Russia's own diaspora; and last, but not least, a grasp of the loyalty and basic resemblance of emigrants to those left behind.

Nowadays the policy of the Russian Federation towards Russian-speakers abroad is characterized, according to Zevelev (2008), by ‘tough rhetoric and moderate initiatives’. Mostly this policy is directed at the Russian-speakers in near abroad, who are legally stated as ‘compatriots abroad’.

The legal definition is vague and ambiguous as it was discussed in subchapter 2.1. According to Zevelev (2008), “the notion of ‘compatriots’ applies first and foremost to

ethnic Russians, but the Russian authorities refrain from mentioning this directly and include into this category all of the non-titular groups living in the CIS and titular groups retaining their Soviet traits” (p. 53-54). Shevel (2009) believes that this vague definition is a deliberate choice, as it gives to the Russian policymakers room to maneuver and to tailor citizenship policy as needed without having to change the law. The First Deputy Head of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mitrofanova explains the ambiguity of the definition by peculiarity of the situation, when, in her words, ‘a Moldovan, who studied in Moscow, is in greater extent our compatriot than a Russian who lived all his life in Moldova and does not identify with Russia’ (Kuranov, 2004).

The Russian citizens living abroad and the emigrants starting from 1917 also come within the definition of compatriots abroad in the case if they identify with ‘compatriots’. As the president of Russia making his speech at the Congress of Compatriots in Moscow in 2001, said,

Compatriot is not only a juridical category. [...] It is a question of a personal choice, spiritual identification. Long since the term ‘Russian world’ went beyond the geographical borders of Russia and even far beyond the borders of the Russian ethnos.

This kind of Russia’s ‘neo-imperialist’ rhetoric influences also the Russian-speakers abroad, as the ‘growth of the ‘Russian identification’ can be explained by changes in the official language, documents, etc.’ (Levada, 2005, p.61).

2.3. Ukrainian immigrants in Italy and Friuli-Venezia Giulia

The population of Ukraine is about 45.8 million. Ethnic Ukrainians make up approximately 78 percent of the total, ethnic Russians number about 17 percent, ethnic Belarus number about 0.6 percent. The industrial regions in the east and southeast are the most heavily populated, and the population is about 68 percent urban. About 70 percent of adult Ukrainians have a secondary or higher education (The World Factbook, 2011). According the Human Development Index (HDI) Ukraine is 85 of 180 countries with data (UN Development Programme Human Development Report, 2009). Ukrainian and Russian are the principal languages. Although Russian is very widely spoken, in the 2001 census (the latest official figures) 85.2 percent of the ethnic Ukrainian population identified Ukrainian as their native language.

Ethnic Ukrainian and Eastern Slavic identities

When Ukraine obtained the independence from the Soviet Union, civic-nation and state-institution building became central to the Ukrainian state. As Crawford and Liphart noted in 1995, the legacy of incomplete nations 'is perhaps the most important threat to the project of economic and political liberalism in Eastern Europe' (p. 189).

Studying a civic national identity and an ethnic national identity in Ukraine, Shulman (2002) finds two variants of national identification in Ukraine: ethnic Ukrainian and Eastern Slavic. Following this differentiation, it is possible to see that they influence the interaction with Russia and the Russians with polarized effect. As the ethnic Ukrainian national identity is based on the idea that Ukrainian ethnicity and Ukrainian culture and language should be the dominant integrating forces in the Ukrainian nation-state, Russia appears to be the 'other' nation against which Ukrainian national identity is defined. European culture appears as the Ukrainian 'our' taking in the account the reasons that for many centuries, beginning with the ancient Kievan Rus' state, much of Ukrainian land had either maintained close economic, political and dynastic ties with Europe or been incorporated into Central European states, such as Poland and Austria-Hungary.

In the patterns of an Eastern Slavic ethnic identity Russia is the primary 'our' as both Ukrainian and Russian ethnic groups with their languages and cultures were embedded in a common historical and cultural space (with the exception of the westernmost provinces of Ukraine, particularly Galicia). These nationalists adhere to the imperial Russian and then Soviet interpretation of Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian history that stresses the very similar historical and cultural development of these three Eastern Slavic peoples, who developed from the 'common cradle' of Kievan Rus' (see Shulman, 2002, 2004).

Since states need to be capable of implementing policies and nations need to command the loyalty of their citizens (Rubin, 1998, p. 177), Ukrainian nation building puts its basis upon an inclusive, civic nation that has its roots in the culture, language and history of the Ukrainians as the titular ethnic group (Kuzio, 2002, p. 253). Ukraine's new myths and legends portray it as a 'European' country, peaceful, a victim of past foreign incursions, different in political culture to Russia, with a tradition of democratic institutions, and a long history that legitimizes its independent statehood (Wanner, 1998, p. 103).

Ethnic Ukrainian nationalists stress that Russians and other minorities (with the exception of the Tatars and Karaim in Crimea) do not have deep historical roots in Ukraine as do

Ukrainians, whose sole homeland is the Ukrainian state. Furthermore, these nationalists characterise the historical Ukrainian-Russian relationship as one of colonised and coloniser, with oppression, forcible ‘Russification’, language damaged in purity, physical losses, economic exploitation of ethnic Ukrainians. As a consequence, the presence of Russians in Ukraine is delegitimised by presenting it as the result of imperial Russian policy and not voluntary migration. Ethnic Ukrainian nationalists argue that Russification has resulted in an unnatural division in Ukraine, especially among ethnic Ukrainians, between Ukrainophones and Russophones. The spread of the Russian language was accomplished by force (by Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union), not by free choice. Consequently, Russian-speaking culture is not regarded by Ukrainophone nationalists as having a legitimate historical foundation in Ukraine (Shulman, 2004, p. 38).

The degree of support among masses in Ukraine for different ethnic identities is seen from Table 2.4.

Table 2.4

Historical and cultural comparisons
(on scale from 0 to 10, with 0 = very different, 10 = very similar)

	N*	Similarity of Ukrainian and Russian historical paths	Similarity in Ukrainian and Russian culture	Similarity in Ukrainian and European culture
All	1,362	7.4	7.5	2.0
<i>Ethnicity</i>				
Ukrainian	999	7.2	7.2	2.1
Ukrainian-Russian	111	8.1	8.2	1.4
Russian	213	8.2	8.0	2.3
<i>Home language</i>				
Ukrainian	577	6.6	6.7	2.1
Ukrainian-Russian	292	8.0	8.0	2.1
Russian	485	8.0	8.1	1.9
<i>Region</i>				
West	259	5.9	5.5	2.2
Centre	341	7.1	7.4	2.3
South-East	613	8.1	8.2	1.8
Kyiv	76	7.0	7.7	2.3
Crimea	74	8.1	7.8	1.6
<i>Age</i>				
18-29	315	7.1	7.0	1.9
30-50	551	7.3	7.5	2.1
> 50	497	7.6	7.7	2.1

*Since sample size for each sub-group varies slightly for each of the three questions, the figures are for the question with the smallest sample size.

Source: Shulman, 2004, p. 47.

The table shows that the Eastern Slavic identity has greater strength comparatively to the Ethnic Ukrainian national identity based on the proximity to Western Europe. As the policy of the Ukrainian state is implemented through education system, young people demonstrate lower scores for similarity between Ukrainians and Russians. The Ukrainian education system utilizes national historiography in the teaching of history, and local variances, values or customs do not influence school textbooks (Popson, 2001). Nevertheless, there are territorial differences in the perception of the nation-building policy. The lowest scores for commonalities between Ukrainians and Russians were obtained in Western Ukraine, and the highest – in the South-East and Crimea. We will go back to the theme of regionalism hereinafter.

Overall, scholars find that despite the influence of the national historiography the masses seemed to have internalised to a great extent Russian and Soviet discourse on the fundamentally similar historical and cultural space shared by Ukrainians and Russians. Likewise, they appear to have adopted a key component of the 'Little Russian' mentality, according to which having close affection for both Ukraine and Russia, and being both Ukrainian and Russian, are natural, easy and normal phenomena. In general, many years of official presentation of Russians and Ukrainians as brotherly peoples, distinct from Europeans, has taken hold of the mass consciousness in Ukraine (Shulman, 2004, pp. 54-55).

The collapse of the Soviet Union divided Ukraine and Russia and brought another changes in the lives of people in these countries. One of these changes is **labour migration**. The first years of the transition to a market economy were marked with economic and social crises which has to varying degrees affected all the post-Soviet states. Salary arrears and unemployment forced economically active population to look for new economic strategies. One of them concerned migration processes: the political changes and the fall of the Iron Curtain allowed people to work across the state borders. In the early 1990s tens of thousands of people worked as shuttle traders, carrying small quantities of goods to and from abroad to try to earn money from the price difference and differences in the currency exchange rates (Malynovska, 2006). Gradually, the Ukrainians started to emigrate looking for earning.

Today Ukraine's labour population abroad is estimated from 2 to 3 million people (Malynovska, 2006; Ryazantsev et al, 2007, p. 457). Emigration is not new to Ukraine; the

emigrants of the late-1990s and early 2000s are part of the fifth wave of emigration. While previous waves brought Ukrainians to the United States, Canada, Australia, and Argentina, many fifth wave emigrants are staying closer to home moving east to Russia and west into southern Europe (Pastore, 2001). The cost of migration to west was too high in the first years, this explains why it remained for a long time mainly oriented towards ex-communist countries (mainly Russia) for commercial circulation. It became massive from 1998-1999 and the statistical visibility occurred five years behind the main arrivals (Weber, 2004, p. 50).

According to the data from social monitoring, in Ukraine 12 percent of families (either the respondent himself or a member of his family) have the experience of temporary work abroad. About 7 percent of respondents were going to work the following year. Similar results were obtained by the researchers of Kyiv Centre of Political and Conflict Studies and Kyiv International Institute for Sociology: 12 percent of respondents answered in the affirmative the question 'Does anyone of your family work abroad at the moment?'. Some other Ukrainian experts believe that every fifth working Ukrainian has the experience of labour abroad (Ryazantsev et al, 2007, p. 457). The majority of them go to take seasonal work: in agriculture, construction or in the service sector. For many families the work abroad has become an important part of their survival strategy (Malinovska, 2006).

According to information provided by Ukrainian embassies abroad, the distribution of labour migrants by destination country is: 300,000 in Poland; 200,000 in the Czech Republic; 200,000 in Italy; 150,000 in Portugal; 100,000 in Spain; 35,000 in Turkey, and 20,000 in the United States. The number of Ukrainians working in the Russian Federation is estimated at 1 million people. According to the mentioned figures and relevant studies, it is estimated that more than half of labour migrants from Ukraine work in EU member states. These destinations, unlike the eastern ones (e.g., Russian Federation) become increasingly attractive due to higher remuneration and better working conditions (IOM, 2008c, p. 24). Following IOM Kyiv analysis, the occupational status of the Ukrainian labour migrants varies in different countries, depending on the needs of the local labour markets. For instance, more than a third part of the Ukrainian women in Russia are employed in the retail trade. In Poland, employment in agriculture prevails (66.7% of female migrants). Almost 90 percent of female Ukrainian migrants in Italy are employed in domestic work (IOM Kyiv, 2007).

According to Weber (2004), the Ukrainian migration to Italy is comparatively recent. It began around 1996, because the system changed much slower (in comparison with two other migration flows from eastern Europe – from Romania and Poland), the abolition of the emigration limitation came later, and because the effective poorness was stronger. It became massive from 1998-1999 and the statistical visibility occurred five years behind the main arrivals (p. 50).

According to a survey conducted by the Western Ukrainian Centre 'Women's Perspectives' in 2003 (N=441), the average Ukrainian migrant to Italy is a married woman of between 35 and 45 years-old, high-skilled (36.7 %) or educated (36.5 percent have a university degree) and having come from Western Ukraine (Caritas/Migrantes, 2006). The high education of Ukrainian women is also confirmed by the Italian Census in 2001 which indicates that 60% of them have a higher education degree, a much greater number than that of the immigrants in general which is 40 percent (Montefusco, 2008, p. 345). Of all Ukrainian migrants 85.7 percent entered with a touristic visa. Their main professions are care workers (41.3 %) and cleaners (43.9 %) with comparatively low wages because of the irregular status of the Ukrainian immigrants. Nevertheless half of them send home more than 400 US dollars every month (52 %). The majority spend remittances for their children's education, construction of houses or paying a rent (Caritas/Migrantes, 2006).

Some scholars trace the first Ukrainian labour migration in Italy to the connections with the Polish workers' networks. Those connections could rise from the work of Ukrainians in Poland since the 1990s (Idos, 2006, p. 54). Besides, there were links of Ukrainians with Naples: as Vianello (2009, p. 77) points, Naples was the historical centre of the Ukrainian immigration. As soon as the 1980s there was a significant number of people from the Soviet Union because of the connections of the port of Naples with the port of Odessa. Probably, these connections helped to form the migration flow from Ukraine to Italy in the 1990s. The Ukrainians go to the south – Naples, Campania - because it is easier to stay and find job without documents there. Using this strategy, when the documents are obtained, Ukrainians move to the north of Italy, where they can earn more and feel closer to home. Thus, the notable flow of women from Ukraine started to arrive **in FVG** later than to the south of Italy – in the beginning of the 2000s.

According to Caritas/Migrantes, there are 4,698 Ukrainians in FVG and their proportion is almost equal to the national proportion: 4.5 % against 4.4. %, respectively (2011, p. 458).

The scholars do not tend to consider the Ukrainian labour migration as emigration (see Montefusco, 2008; Caritas/Migrantes, 2006). Most migrants divide their time between some periods abroad and some time in Ukraine. They maintain their social links to homeland and participate in economic and social life there. The primary evidence of the economic participation is the remittances sent back home which have an important and often crucial role for their households' welfare. Ukrainians send remittances home through bank transfers, express money transfers as Money Gram and Western Union, and cash transfers on home visits and by other people. According to the research data, average monthly earning of labour migrants in 2007 was USD 817, which is almost 3 times higher than the average monthly wage in Ukraine (UCSR and SSCU, 2009, p. 73-74). According to Shehda and Horodetsky (2004, p. 302), every Ukrainian immigrant in Italy maintain on average four persons at home. Many Ukrainian women left behind their husbands, children and parents. As much as 94 percent have left their children in the country under the father's or grandparents' custody, while 1 out of 3 are simply left alone (Montefusco, 2008, p. 345). Since 2004, family reunion of Ukrainians in Italy is slowly increasing despite the intention to return in Ukraine.

The huge female migration movement has a negative consequence in the form of a big social unbalance and family desegregation in Ukraine. Husbands who stayed in Ukraine are often unemployed and in the conditions when women migrate and provide the household with resources, they have a weakened status and become a burden. Weber (2004) indicates that for women from Ukraine, Moldova, Peru, Philippines and Poland departure is justified by men because 'their sacrifice for the community is honoured'; and 'movers and stayers are linked to each other inside the same system'. Besides, it believed that women are under distant social control by men since their labour as domestic workers is seen like a 'secure niche': women have the lack of freedom, they live where they work and are never left alone (Weber, 2004, p. 65). At the same time a part of Ukrainian women are divorced or widowed. This can be both cause and sequence of the migration: they have stronger need to work abroad to support their children without a husband, and they might divorce after time spent apart from husbands.

The majority of Ukrainians in FVG came from the Western part of Ukraine, which was attached to the USSR in 1939-1940. The current higher degree of economic stagnation of these regions influence the decision of its habitants to migrate abroad searching for work, while the regions' historical and cultural specifics are often called the facilitators of the process of migration.

Western Ukraine is believed to be the territory of the Ukrainian ethnic identity with predominance of the Ukrainian language in use and prevalence of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in contrast to the Eastern part of Ukraine with prevalence of the Russian language and the Eastern Orthodox Church. On the one hand, the existing regionalism in Ukraine is transferred to Italy and sometimes causes the separation of some Western Ukrainians from their compatriots from other parts of Ukraine. On the other hand, the prevalence of Western Ukrainians in Italy transforms the regional patterns. It seems that less-numbered Eastern Ukrainians join the more numerous network of Western Ukrainians. At the same, Eastern Ukrainians keeping their religion unite with Orthodox Russians and constitute the majority of the Russian Orthodox parish in Udine.

According to the statistics of Caritas/Migrantes (2011), **domestic workers** in Italy are 1,554,000 people. Ukrainians constitute 10.4 % of the all domestic workers, which is about 160 thousand people, or 80 % of the total number of Ukrainians in Italy (p.114, 451). Taking into account a large share of domestic workers among Ukrainian migrants, we examine the domestic workers migration in what follows.

As Hondagneu-Sotelo (2007, p. 4) put it, who could foreseen that at the dawn of the twenty-first century, paid domestic work would be a growth occupation. Ehrenrieck and Hochschild (2004) explains this trend by the fact that many western women to facilitate the 'double load' of their job and domestic work have to resort to the service of women from less wealthy countries. Local labor market opportunities explain Ukrainian and Moldovan women's cluster in one industry and in one type of job. Besides, their occupational concentration in this sector is influenced by the women's use of social network strategies.

Hondagneu-Sotelo (2007) paradoxically noticed that 'finding hard work isn't easy'. One of the explanations sounds like 'each newcomer woman must gain access to a separate employer, while teams of men are hired by one employer through the encargado [responsible, agent]' (Hagan, 1998, p. 61). Different case studies point that migrants look for

work in the domestic sector relying on their contacts. It is due to the fact that in whole this sector of the labour market is highly informal.

The same way, the majority of employers look for domestic workers not through agencies which from their point of view are expensive but asking their friends, relatives, acquaintances – applying the network resources. As in the example of Hondagneu-Sotelo (2007, p. 63): “At first you think, ‘How will I ever find someone?’ But then you talk to your neighbor, whose housekeeper has a friend or a sister looking for a job, and then it’s like you just fall into this whole other world”. On this point Gold (2005) mentions also the selective reason of addressing the workers’ network:

A growing body of research reveals that employers make hiring decisions on the basis of racial, ethnic, national and gender preferences (Wilson, 1996; Kim, 1999). In the United States, employers often favor foreigners over natives, Latinos and Asians over blacks or whites, and the undocumented rather than legal migrants or citizens (Wilson, 1996; Waters, 1994; Waldinger, 1995; Holzer, 1987; Waldinger and Lichter, 2003). Since employers seek an ethnically defined workforce, they find coethnic networks to be an efficient means of locating prospective employees (Gold, 2005, p. 15).

Indeed, an Italian employer who looks for a caregiver from Ukraine, most probably would use the Ukrainian network – ask an Ukrainian caregiver who works for his acquaintances.

Network scholars have emphasized that, for an individual to attain career-related outcomes that require access to information, such as finding a job or getting promoted, there is value in having a large network of non-redundant informational contacts. According to Elrick and Lewandowska (2008), Eastern European migrants have sometimes collected hundreds of telephone numbers in the destination country in order to find only one job opportunity (p. 726). Put it differently, a person reaps informational benefits by having a network of numerous people who are not themselves highly interconnected. This combination of large size and an absence of many connections among ties – or low density among ties – implies that sources of information will be diverse or unique (Wolfe Morrison, 2002, p. 1150).

In the context of scarce information about migration routes, jobs or means of integrating into the host society, some members of the network start to function as middlemen or agents. The

difference between them is in their expectations of reward: persons who exchange information for a non-material reward are 'intermediaries'; and 'agents' are persons who want to be materially rewarded for passing on information (Elrick and Lewandowska, 2008, p. 722).

Often the readiness to help for nothing gives place to the help for reward as when the people asking for help become many, it becomes a demand and gives rise to supply. For example, in Friuli-Venezia Giulia there is an actual practice to sell your job if you are leaving. Thus, the job selling became a rule of this labour sector. Here we arrive to one of the main functions of networks - structuring the job and regulating the labour market: '...the jobs exhibit some standardization with respect to wages, hours, tasks, and the lack of benefits; these similarities derive, in part, from the exchange of key information through networks and the agencies' (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2007, p. 61).

Newly arrived women who have a friend or relative already employed as a caregiver or a house-cleaner gain from them the knowledge and information important to fulfill this work and to secure themselves from undesired situations like overtime work without compensation, work without a day-off, etc. That is the way how informal apprenticeship works. In particular, socialization scholars have emphasized three types of information important for newcomers: 1) information about organizational issues and attributes (knowing about one's larger organizational context), 2) information about how to perform specific work tasks, and 3) information about role expectations and responsibilities (Wolfe Morrison, 2002, p. 1150).

After finding a job caregivers continue to meet each other. Aid from networks members is more closely linked to domestic work than to paid work. These networks are conservative, providing havens to help caregivers keep what they have and providing emotional aid and services to heal routine and extraordinary stresses (Wellman and Wortley, 1990, p. 190). Communication with others helps in avoiding and reducing the stress caused by negative characteristics of the occupancy, such as every day indignity, heavy schedule, and social isolation. The primary role of emotional support is connected with limited opportunities and less resourceful network of domestic workers. Emotional aid becomes main assistance that live-in domestics can provide to each other.

Thus, on the one hand, this occupational sector is informal and based on the networks. On the other hand, long and unpredictable hours spent by domestics in the confines of an employer's house cause the weakness or even breakdown of networks and the eventual isolation (Hagan, 1998, p. 61). The six-days working week gives to domestics restricted time to maintain ties within the ethnic networks. According to Hagan, associational activities are crucial to maintaining ethnic solidarity and reproducing ethnic culture in the host society, but 'they limit women's involvement in other neighborhood events that might provide opportunities for developing social ties with nonethnics' (1998, p. 61). Continuing she finds it ironical that 'some of the women – those who leave their children in Guatemala with relatives – still possess their closest ties with friends and family in the home community' (ibid.).

Long periods of stay in Italy of Ukrainian and Moldovan workers are explained by the costs of visa, when women know that they cannot count on free mobility during the period of work in Italy. While Romanian women work in Italy for some months or two years maximum, Ukrainian women follow the strategy of 'apnea' with no idea to root in Italy but with intention to return home (Castagnone et al., 2007, pp. 19-20). Women usually plan to stay in Italy considering the years of university studying of their children, or the time of their own retirement at home, or counting the sum needed for buying a flat/ building a house/ paying off debts, etc.

It is rather difficult to predict the real share of those who return home in future, since over time the situation changes. The newcomers may become incorporated into the larger network structure; this enables them to move on to a more desirable live-in position (e.g., better pay, more time off, fewer children). As the period of settlement increases, a few fortunate domestics (those who acquire Italian-language skills, purchase a car, and/or acquire legal status) make the transition to day domestic work or change the job for waitress, catering or become self-employed (as sewer, for example). The younger women may continue their education or make the acknowledgment of their home education in order to obtain the Italian diploma that opens up new opportunities for employment. Such cases are few but with the information about them spread through network, they might encourage more domestics to change their migratory strategy.

Still, the majority of domestic workers live in an isolated world limited by employers and some friends or acquaintances because of the specifics of their job, the Italian entry policy, and their intend to return home. The life in this ‘another world’ sets boundaries between the co-nationals of different social standing in the Italian society and at the same time provides labour solidarity between different nationalities: Russian women working as live-in caregivers might have more contacts with their Ukrainian or Moldovan colleagues sharing the interests and concerns of this professional group rather than with ‘Russian wives’ who are occupied in more mainstream Italian jobs or keep their houses.

2.4. Moldovan immigrants in Italy and Friuli-Venezia Giulia

The Republic of Moldova is the second smallest of the former Soviet republics and the most densely populated. It is one of the poorest countries in Europe. Its industry accounts for less than 15% of its labor force, while agriculture's share is over 30%. The country lacks mineral resources and is almost fully dependent on imports of energy inputs (gas, oil, and coal). First three ethnic groups (2004 census) are Moldovan (83.7%), Ukrainian (6.6%), and Russian (1.7%). Main religion is Christian Orthodoxy (96%). Main languages are Moldovan and Russian (The World Factbook, 2011).

In the former USSR, a **Moldovan identity** was developed by the Soviet authorities as a way of legitimizing their rule and proving that the region was not ethnically Romanian. The alphabet of the Moldovan language, which is Romanian, was changed to Cyrillic. Soviet Moldovan historiography downplayed any historical ties to Romania and exaggerated Besarabia’s Slavic ties. It claimed, for example, that 40% of Moldovan vocabulary came from Slavic roots (Kuzio, 2002, p. 256).

Although 20 years passed since the independence of Moldova, its scholars believe that evolution of the Moldovan ethnic and civic identity is not completed yet, and they do not know the final result of the evolution (Grek, 2010). As with many post-Soviet states, Moldova must decide how to define itself in relation to Russia. But, in Moldova’s case, the state has to define itself also vis-à-vis Romania with whom it shares a flag, language and, prior to the nineteenth century, even a history for its Bessarabian region. The cultural intelligentsia are oriented towards Romania and largely in favor of unification. This has led

to a rather unusual situation where the intelligentsia, who would be instrumental in providing for 'cultural hegemony' and a new national historiography, deny the very existence of the Moldovan state as an 'artificial' Russian and Soviet construct. As in many postcolonial states, the cultural intelligentsia are cut off from the 80% of the population living in rural areas who maintain a parochial, local identity (Kuzio, 2002, p. 256).

According to one of the latest surveys of international relations in Moldova conducted by the fund 'Priznanie', in general, pro-Romanian sentiment in the Moldovan society is not that strong as it is believed to be, and it is balanced by anti-Romanian sentiment. 'It is arguable that in Moldova there is no popular opinion concerning the Romanian question, which is a subject of now damped and then recrudescend public discussion' (Ava.md, 2010). Unionism as political project and ideology is supported by 13-15 % of population: 14.8 % of respondents agreed on the statement 'Moldova and Romania must unite in one state'; 12.8 % did not agree on the statement 'Moldavia and Romania are two different states, which must develop independently'. The statement 'without the Romanian support Moldova will not be able to resolve its contemporary problems' collected 20.8 % of accepted with 73 % of those who do not agree on it.

The survey showed that pro-Romanian sentiment in Moldova is restricted by the pro-Russian sentiment, based on the evaluation of the role of Russia in the historical path of Moldova, including the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. The statement 'The creation of the Moldovan SSR in 1940 influenced positively the historical destiny of the Moldovan nation' was supported by 55.1 % respondents, not supported by 26.5 %, the other 18.4 % were undecided (Ava.md, 2010).

A part of Moldovans obtain a Romanian passport to have opportunity to move free in the EU countries (300,000 people acquired the double citizenship before 2001 – Caritas Migrantes, 2009b, p. 2).

The other part of Moldovans perceive themselves as closer to the Russians. Mostly that is the urban population of Chisinau, but not all of them, since there is also the Moldovan 'intelligentsia' from Chisinau who struggled for independence from Russia and believed that the Moldova's future is in its cultural and linguistic distinction from Russia.

The bi-lingual tradition of Moldova influence the ability of Moldovans to adapt abroad ‘with relative ease and effectiveness’, as it is reported by a number of the non-Moldovan stakeholders interviewed by Schwartz (2007, p. 10). He mentions that it is borne out in the migrant experience in Russia and Italy, and therefore I would narrow this finding exactly to these countries linguistically close to the Moldovans rather than speak of general ‘adaptation abroad’. This finding can be reviewed as a consequence of the migrants rational choice of the destination country, when the linguistic repertoire becomes one of the most precious resources for a worker.

The population of Moldova according to the data of the National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova (2010) is 3,563,695 people living in-country. As of mid-2006, approximately one-quarter of the economically active population of Moldova was **working abroad**. This suggests that 345,000 individuals are migrant workers representing 25.4 per cent of Moldova’s economically active population (Lücke et al, 2007, pp. 17-18). According to the same source, 58.4 percent of migrants are male and 41.6 percent are female, with the main sectors of employment of Moldovans abroad being construction (51.6%), transport (10.8 %), housekeeping and care (7.8 %), trade (11.6 %), services (21.4 %), industry and mining (5.5 %), and agriculture (3.9 %).

In the early 1990s, Israel was the predominant destination of Moldovan emigrants, and to a lesser extent, Germany and the United States. By the end of the 1990s, emigration directions have changed towards the CIS countries (IOM, 2008a, pp. 18-19). The majority of Moldovan migrants (59 %) are found in the Russian Federation, most of whom are men employed in construction. Italy is the second destination country, (approximately 17 %), mostly for women. In Italy main cities of Moldavian presence are Rome (around 13,000 Moldovans), Milan (5,800), and Padua (4,850) (IOM, 2008a, pp. 23-25). In general, the majority of Moldovans are situated in the northern part of the country and to a lesser extent the southern part. The majority of them arrived to Italy for work as well as Ukrainians. However, the Moldovans show a higher percent of young people and men in comparison with Ukrainian group (Ruzzeddu, 2008, p.5), what points at their higher involvement in construction and industry work in Italy. Still, the domestic care stays the main employment field for Moldovans. About 96,000 (from the total 130,948 people) Moldovans work in domestic sector comprising 6.2 percent from the total number of domestic workers in Italy (Caritas/Migrantes, 2011, p. 114, 458).

In FVG there are 2,308 immigrants from Moldova. This number constitutes a smaller proportion than in Italy in general – 2.2 percent in FVG against 2.9 percent of the national level (Caritas/Migrantes, 2011, p. 458).

In 2006, the average Moldovan migrant in the EU countries was around 36 years old, tended to be female (58.5 %), from either rural or urban areas (56.5 % and 43.5 %), and typically had secondary (31.4 %) or tertiary (34.4%) college education with a high proportion of university degree (28.9 %) (IOM, 2008a, p. 27). According to the data of the Italian scholar Vietti, the Moldovans in Italy are predominately women (66 %). The major part of Moldovans are between 30 and 50 years old (53 %), married (55 %), and occupied in care and domestic work (65 %), construction and industry (20 %) (Vietti, 2010, pp. 31-32).

The Moldovan migration is one of the most recent ones, contemporary with the one from Ukraine. It can be explained by a strong degree of poverty in Moldova in combination with higher costs of travel to Italy. It is known, that sometimes Moldovans go to work in Russia to earn money needed for departure to Western Europe. In 2006 an average sum required for departure to the CIS is of 103 USD, and to the EU – 3,584 USD (Lücke et al, 2007, p.33).

The high percentage of labour migrants from Moldova may lead to occurrence of ‘**culture of migration**’ (Cohen, 2004) establishing new traditions of seeing migration as part of everyday life. It is when migration is ‘deeply ingrained into the repertoire of people’s behaviour, and values associated with migration become part of the community’s value’ (Massey et al, 1998, p. 47).

For all Moldovan migrants allegiance to home is indisputable, according to the recent research by Schwartz (2007) focused on the Moldovan migrant communities in Italy, the Russian Federation, and Israel. Increasing remittances are the principal means through which Moldovan emigrants express their link to Moldova. Migrants tend to interpret remittances as ‘their contribution to the wellbeing of Moldova’ (Schwartz, 2007, p. 18). IOM Migration and Remittances Study 2006 finds that 40 percent of Moldovans live in households receiving remittances. Recipients are older people in their late forties who receive an annual average of 1,400 US dollars in remittances, which represents over 50 percent of their total earnings and are three times greater than per capita GDP (Orozco, 2007, p. 5).

The migrants' earnings spent in Moldova show their intention to return home. Mostly people buy houses and apartments, cars and home assets, pay for their children education but have no opportunity to establish their own business to provide themselves with earning back home. Meanwhile 'social aspirations continue to rise. New needs have been created, and these in turn create still further needs' (Brettell, 2003, p. 70). Thus, the low percent of investing in self-employment can cause the return to the strategy of working abroad in future.

2.5. Immigrants from other states of the former USSR

The next group of Russian-speakers in Italy and FVG is Belarusians. They are 5,952 in Italy and 121 in FVG. The presence of Belarusians is caused mostly not by labour migration but by two facts of Italian-Belarusian collaboration: the sojourn of Italian workers in Belarus and summer vacations of Belarusian children in Italy. The Italian workers started to work in Belarus in the late 1980s, and many of them brought wives from there to Italy. After the Chernobyl disaster of 1986 Italian non-governmental organization started to invite children from Belarus to recover the health during summer holidays with Italian families. The programme lasts by now. Meanwhile the children from Chernobyl grew up, and some of them turned back to Italy to do their studies there.

Table 2.5

State	N of residents in FVG, 31.12.08 (IRES FVG)	N of residents in Italy, 31.12.10 (Caritas/Migrantes)
Belarus	121	6,975
Armenia	63	666
Uzbekistan	49	1,294
Lithuania	41	4,524
Latvia	35	2,257
Georgia	30	6,520
Kazakhstan	30	1,221
Estonia	18	1,029
Azerbaijan	12	324
Kyrgyzstan	6	743
Turkmenistan	n/d	61
Tajikistan	n/d	41

The immigrants from other NIS states are less observable as they are not numerous groups in FVG. Armenians have their community based on the old diaspora of Armenian immigrants. Others because of their small presence in FVG sometimes appear to be involved in the Russian-speaking community life as often they have no compatriots living close to them.

CHAPTER THREE: RUSSIAN-SPEAKING NETWORK IN FRIULI-VENEZIA GIULIA

3.1. Research design

This study utilizes several research methods, combining quantitative and qualitative methods for analysis of immigrants networking as a dynamic social process: semi-structured questionnaires, interviews with experts, statistical analysis, secondary sociological analysis of data.

Empirical basis of the thesis is the results of the survey and interviewing conducted by the author and researches conducted with the author's participation: 'Immigrati e religioni: Il nuovo pluralism delle fedi in Friuli Venezia Giulia' (under supervision of Bruno Tellia, 2010; semi-structured interviews with experts), 'La fede degli immigrati' (under supervision of Bruno Tellia, 2011; questionnaires).

The region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia was chosen as a **research location** for practical reasons and on the basis of some objective characteristics. Being a northern region, Friuli-Venezia Giulia is characterized with a higher presence of Russian and Russian-speaking migrants in comparison with the regions of the south (Perotto, 2009) and active cultural associations of Russians (Ryazantsev, 2007).

Besides, the region has average rates of the concerned migrants which are close to all-Italian levels. Therefore, it is representative in the scale of all Italy.

Table 3.1

	Italy	FVG
<i>Immigrant population</i>	7.5 %	8.5 %
<i>Immigrants from Ukraine</i>	4.4 %	4.5 %
<i>Immigrants from Moldova</i>	2.9 %	2.2 %
<i>Immigrants from Russia</i>	0.7 %	0.7 %
<i>Immigrants from Belarus</i>	0.15%	N/A

(Caritas/Migrantes, 2011, pp. 476-77, p. 458)

The sampled population was a purpose-oriented and does not claim to be strictly representative according to the universe which is all the Russian-speaking migrants in Friuli-Venezia Giulia. The unknown characteristics of the universe complicate the representation requirements. Still, the number of respondents is sufficient to make some qualitative implications and give quantitative evaluations of the basic required parameters.

The sample of 127 migrants in Friuli-Venezia Giulia was examined with the questionnaire in regard to the following variables:

1. gender (with a strong prevalence of female migrants);
2. nationality – country of origin (with presence of four countries: Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus);
3. occupation (with presence of four groups: domestic workers, ‘wives’, students, other workers);
4. province in Friuli-Venezia Giulia (with presence of all four provinces: Udine, Trieste, Pordenone, Gorizia).

According to these variables respondents are divided as follows:

Table 3.2

Gender			
	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
<i>Female</i>	106	83,5	83,5
<i>Male</i>	21	16,5	100,0
Total	127	100,0	

As in Italy in general, in Friuli-Venezia Giulia the majority of migrants from the former USSR are women. In our survey there are 106 females (83.5 %).

Table 3.3

Nationality			
	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
<i>Ukraine</i>	58	45,7	45,7
<i>Moldova</i>	20	15,7	61,4
<i>Russia</i>	35	27,6	89,0
<i>Belarus</i>	8	6,3	95,3
<i>Armenia</i>	3	2,4	97,6
<i>Georgia</i>	2	1,6	99,2
<i>Kyrgyzstan</i>	1	,8	100,0
Total	127	100,0	

While Russians are not numerous immigrant group in comparison with Ukrainians and Moldovans, they comprise 27.6 % of respondents because of their status of the backbone of Russian-speaking network. The naturalized persons appear in the respective category of origin.

Table 3.4

Occupation			
	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
<i>Domestic workers</i>	65	51,2	51,2
<i>'Wives'</i>	29	22,8	74,0
<i>Students</i>	9	7,1	81,1
<i>Other workers</i>	24	18,9	100,0
Total	127	100,0	

The division into four occupational groups is conditional and made on the basis of the analysis conducted in Chapter 2. The group of women married to Italian men is called 'wives' as they often use this self-appellation.

Table 6

Residence			
	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
<i>Udine</i>	76	59,8	59,8
<i>Pordenone</i>	23	18,1	78,0
<i>Gorizia</i>	5	3,9	81,9
<i>Trieste</i>	23	18,1	100,0
Total	127	100,0	

The province of Udine was emphasized because of its higher percentage of immigrant population in comparison with other provinces. The provinces of Friuli-Venezia Giulia go as follows according to the number of immigrants: Udine is the first, followed by Pordenone, Trieste, and Gorizia. Moreover, Udine displays a better developed infrastructure and more activities of Russian-speaking migrants: ex-USSR immigrants established and run two cultural associations and a parish of the Russian Orthodox church.

Three main strategies were used to **find the Russian-speaking immigrants**, namely through key informants, the snowballing method and searching on specific locations. The method of snowballing is a well-established method of studying those migrants with whom issues of illegality and trust are central (see Bloch, 1999).

As a first introduction to the research field I interviewed key informants who introduced me to eleven Russian-speaking migrants. Through the snowballing method 38 respondents were found. The major part of respondents was approached by attending special locations (meeting places of migrants, police headquarters – ‘Questura’, the medical insurance office, the Italian language courses for immigrants, churches, the Russian language chair at the university) – 57 respondents, and events (cultural and informational events) – 21 respondent. By using different strategies and locations I tried to prevent a strong selectivity in finding the respondents.

The fieldwork started in 2010 with interviewing key informants and took course through December 2010 - April 2011 with the surveying migrants. Often migrants answering the questionnaire started to reflex on their life in Italy and their migrant experience or even told their life story. In these cases the interviews were either tape-recorded or later transcribed

from memory. This information (in the form of quotations and life stories) is used in the analysis similar to in-depth interviews as it gives a more complete view of migrants' life and interaction. All respondents were interviewed in Russian; it was a prerequisite for identifying them as Russian-speakers. All the data were gathered through face-to-face-interviews done by myself. The results were incorporated and analyzed in the SPSS program. The additional sources of information were the results of researches implemented by CARITAS and IRES FVG.

The first interviews with experts were made in 2009 on the stage of the initial acquaintance with research field to get information about object and subject of research which were little-known to the author at that time. In 2010, the tasks for expert interview were formulated and interviews were conducted for the second (or in several cases, for the third time). Besides, several interviews were taken for a project 'Immigrati e religioni in FVG'. The composition of informants consisted from leaders and activists of public organizations, priests and a churchwarden, ethnic entrepreneurs (N=14). The informants circle was formed on the basis of purposive sample and 'snowballing' method. This approach guaranteed performance of the principal of communicative community where the formation of group unity usually takes place.

The questionnaire (Appendix 1) consists of 67 questions (a part of them was grouped in the table form and therefore, the questions in the questionnaire are numbered from 1 through 39). Thirteen variables are objective and characterize the respondents geographic and social parameters. Other variables are subjective and refer to the respondents opinions and estimations.

The questionnaire starts from an appeal to respondents with a description of a survey and a brief instruction for filling the questionnaire. The first two questions orient respondents in a surveying topic with the help of chronological sequence of events and actions of a migrant. The questions about social and demographic parameters are situated after the conceptual block of questions and conclude the questionnaire.

The questionnaire is aimed at revealing the ties among immigrants from the ex-USSR and measuring the role of these ties with in the adaptation of respondents. With this view the possible contacts of respondents are divided into four main groups: compatriots (relatives

and friends), friends immigrants from CIS states²¹, friends immigrants from non-CIS states, host society (Italian friends and structures).

These contacts are evaluated from two perspectives: objective and subjective – in order to avoid informant bias²². From the objective, or behavioral, perspective the specifics of respondents' actions and real ties are measured, such as propinquity of interaction, situations and places of interaction and type of support received from different contacts. The supporting functions of network ties are multiple, including emotional nurturance (e.g., expressive support) and resource and information assistance (e.g., instrumental assistance). From their personal relationships, immigrants obtain company, advice, money, and emotional support, along with many other types of support. Social scientists originally treated social support as a generalized resource available from network members to deal with routine problems, acute crises, and chronic burdens. Yet socially supportive resources differ, and analysts recently have been distinguishing between different types of support: that is, emotional aid, material aid, information, and companionship.

To understand the subjective, or cognitive, perspective I measure opinions and estimations of respondents concerning relations between three most numerous groups: Russians, Ukrainians, and Moldovans (questions No. 17-20).

The questions 14-16 and partially question 11 measure the role of the Russian language in establishing contacts. Besides, question 11 also measures the degree of involvement in the Russian-speaking network through the media channel.

²¹ The usage of the term 'CIS' (Rus. «СНГ») in the questionnaire is determined by the extensive use of this term in the mass media and political discourse on the post-Soviet space. At the mundane level the CIS is perceived as all 15 ex-USSR republics despite the fact that the CIS actually does not comprehend the Baltic states and Georgia.

²² Informant bias is the discrepancy between self-reported and actual behaviours (Knoke and Yang, 2008).

3.2. Individual level of Russian-speaking network (based on the results of the quantitative research)

First, we discuss **results characterizing the respondent group**, such as age, marital status, the reasons for emigration, source of information for choosing Italy, length of stay in Italy and in FVG, citizenship and ethnicity, education, job in home country and in Italy.

The functional analysis of Russian-speaking networks implies the revelation of those important characteristics of network members that may influence the process of networking and adaptation through this network. First of all, the demographic specifics is of importance in this process.

The average **age** of the respondents is 43 years. For women the average age is 44 years, and for men it is 40 years (for immigrants in Italy the average age is 31.5 years, and for Italian citizens it is 43.3 years)²³. Among all the respondents only 62.2 % are under the age of 50 years old, but 95.3% are under the age of 60. It is explained by the fact that many domestic workers are women of senior age who are especially vulnerable to unemployment in their home countries and use the strategy of labour migration.

Table 3.5

Cross-tabulation of Age and Occupation category

Age	Occupation category				Total	Percent	Cumulative Percent
	<i>Domestic workers</i>	<i>'Wives'</i>	<i>Students</i>	<i>Other workers</i>			
20-24	1	1	5	1	8	6,3	6,3
25-29	2	3	1	1	7	5,5	11,8
30-39	9	10	1	6	26	20,5	32,3
40-49	17	9	2	11	39	30,7	63,0
50-59	32	6	0	3	41	32,3	95,3
60-69	4	0	0	2	6	4,7	100,0
Total	65	29	9	24	127	100,0	

²³ Caritas/Migrantes, 2010.

The age of immigrants can be considered as their most important resource for adaptation. The attribution to one or another generation influences the migrants' perception of the changes happening in their lives and, therefore, their choice of the strategy of adaptation. Besides, they have different education and social connections, and the elder migrants have 'old' resource capital. The scholars believe that there are less chances for people of elder age to incorporate into new conditions and particularly for women of medium age (Avraamova and Loginov, 2002). In the context of this research, the elder age is significant for the formation of the Russian-speaking network as, firstly, elder people tend to look for support and resources among compatriots and, secondly, for many of them people from the former USSR are perceived as compatriots.

Table 3.6

Cross-tabulation of Marital Status and Gender

Marital Status	Gender		Total	Percent	Cumulative Percent
	female	male			
<i>Not married</i>	14	6	20	15,7	15,7
<i>Unregistered marriage</i>	8	5	13	10,2	26,0
<i>Married</i>	57	10	67	52,8	78,7
<i>Divorced</i>	11	0	11	8,7	87,4
<i>Widow(er)</i>	16	0	16	12,6	100,0
Total	106	21	127	100,0	

Among the respondents 52.8 % are married and 10.2 % have unregistered marriage, meanwhile 15.7 % were not married, and the divorced and widow(er)s constitute 21.3 % of the respondents. Only 13.2 % of women were never married, while for men this percent is higher – 28.6 %.

Table 3.7

Cross-tabulation of Marital status and Occupation

Marital status	Occupation category				Total
	<i>Domestic workers</i>	<i>Wives</i>	<i>Students</i>	<i>Other workers</i>	
<i>Not married</i>	8	0	6	6	20
<i>Unregistered marriage</i>	3	1	3	6	13
<i>Married</i>	33	24	0	10	67
<i>Divorced</i>	7	3	0	1	11
<i>Widow(er)</i>	14	1	0	1	16
Total	65	29	9	24	127

The majority of labour migrants are married or have been married, what confirms the idea that labour migration of one or both spouses is a financial solution for families. The results of researches demonstrate that for a majority of labour migrants, working abroad is the main possibility to improve their families position, and for a part of population it is a resource for surviving.

The gender misbalance among migrant workers intends that majority of labour migrants follow individualistic model of migration when migrants leave their families at home and support them by sending remittances. Families and children being left behind become important part of migrants contacts and sources of support, that develops transnational ties of migrants personal networks.


Speaking of **reasons for emigration**, we can state that in general the emigration of Russian-speakers to FVG was not ‘forced emigration’ which is emigration of people displaced by conflicts (armed conflict including civil war; generalized violence; and persecution on the grounds of nationality, race, religion, political opinion or social group), or by natural or environmental disasters²⁴. Only three persons from our respondents asked for asylum in Italy (all three are Armenians), while others emigrated voluntarily.

The majority of respondents named the employment as their reason to migrate to Italy – 59.8 %. This answer embraces either professionals looking for application of their skills and knowledge or people who do unskilled work and who migrated for primarily economic

²⁴ <http://www.forcedmigration.org/about/whatisfm/what-is-forced-migration>

reasons. The latter respondents specify that they need money for education of their children, to pay off the debts, to help children's families, to buy house or apartment.

Figure 3.1. Reason for emigration



Mostly these are citizens of Ukraine and Moldova who migrate searching for work. In these cases, a personal choice transforms into a phenomenon of a larger scale and assumes the aspect of social character. As it was said in Chapter 2, in Ukraine and Moldova migration to Italy becomes a style of life and an example of a collective behavior which appeared once in almost spontaneous manner and produced a sort of tradition that favors emigration of masses and develop migrant networks.

Table 7.8

Cross-tabulation of Reason for emigration and Nationality

Reason to emigrate	Nationality							Total
	Ukraine	Russia	Moldova	Belarus	Armenia	Georgia	Kyrgyzstan	
<i>Employment</i>	43	10	20	2	0	1	0	76
<i>Starting family</i>	5	15	0	4	0	1	1	25
<i>Reunion with family</i>	9	2	0	1	0	0	0	12
<i>Study</i>	1	8	0	0	0	0	0	10
<i>Asylum seeking</i>	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	3
<i>Other</i>	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Total	58	35	20	8	3	2	1	127

‘Starting family’ reason ranks second and it is highly illustrative to see the gender structure of migrants according to their reason for emigration. All 25 respondents arrived to Italy to start their family are women what is in line with the tendency of women marriage migration.

Table 8

Cross-tabulation of Reason for emigration and Gender

Reason for emigration	Gender		Total
	F	M	
<i>Employment</i>	63	13	76
<i>Starting family</i>	25	0	25
<i>Family reunification</i>	8	4	12
<i>Study</i>	8	2	10
<i>Asylum seeking</i>	2	1	3
<i>Other</i>	0	1	1
Total	106	21	127

The majority of respondents’ answers are not conflicting with their current occupation and status. Still, the cross-tabulation of the categories of ‘reason for emigration’ and ‘occupation’ reveals the conditional character of an occupation category when a person can move from one category to another following the migration strategy or life’s changes.

Table 3.10

Crosstabulation of Reason for emigration and Occupation category

	Occupation category				Total
	<i>Domestic workers</i>	<i>'Wives'</i>	<i>Students</i>	<i>Other workers</i>	
<i>Employment</i>	59	1	0	16	76
<i>Starting family</i>	1	24	0	0	25
<i>Reunion with family</i>	4	2	2	4	12
<i>Study</i>	1	1	7	1	10
<i>Asylum seeking</i>	0	1	0	2	3
<i>Other</i>	0	0	0	1	1
Total	65	29	9	24	127

For instance, two persons, who had arrived for study and work, married Italian citizens and stay in Italy by this reason. Among students there are two who arrived to FVG to join their families (in both cases they are children of migrants engaged into domestic work).

In the context of network such persons can appear ‘bridges’ connecting the realities of people from different occupational categories that serves to the greater diversity of a network.

One of the questions of practical interest is the search of reasons according to which migrants have chosen **Italy as their destination**. In general, contemporary migrations are prompted by push and pull factors, when conditions in a home country exclude people, and a host country obtains attractive features. The basis for the choice of destination is the difference between living standards and labour markets at home and in a potential host country, but people generally do not perceive this difference as the difference in gross domestic product or in level of unemployment or in another economic indicators. Instead, they form their evaluation on basis of information obtained from different sources.

The migration of Russian-speakers is motivated by the presence of relatives and friends staying in Italy and/or having experience of such migration: the majority of migrants have obtained the information for their travel to Italy from their relatives and friends either in Italy (59.1 %) or at home (21.3 %). Few respondents named as their sources of information Italian structures (4.7 %) or web-sites about Italy (1.6 %). Therefore, informal channels of information were more important for respondents.


Table 3.19

Information source about migration paths

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
<i>Relatives and friends back home</i>	27	21,3	21,3
<i>Relatives and friends in Italy</i>	75	59,1	80,3
<i>Web-sites about Italy</i>	2	1,6	81,9
<i>Employment agency</i>	3	2,4	84,3
<i>Tourist agency</i>	6	4,7	89,0
<i>Italian structures</i>	6	4,7	93,7
<i>Other</i>	8	6,3	100,0
Total	127	100,0	

Most of the respondents did not embark upon a secondary migration within Italy and arrived to Friuli-Venezia Giulia as their first destination in Italy, and 15 % of the respondents first lived in another Italian region. In general the average **length of stay in FVG** is 6.84 years, and for **Italy** the average is 7.24 years. Standard deviation is 4.9.

Figure 3.2. Length of stay in Italy and FVG



The moves to FVG are explained by advantages of the region. For example, two respondents who had a previous experience of living in Naples mentioned that they had removed to Friuli-Venezia Giulia because of higher salaries and the geographical situation which is closer to home. Scholars noticed the higher proportion of migrants from Central and Eastern Europe in FVG and provinces of Udine and Pordenone in particular, and explain it by ‘geographical position and historic inclination of this zone’ (Caritas/Migrantes, 2011, p. 356). Those who did make a second move were labour migrants looking for work.

Besides, the inflow of Russian-speaking labour migrants in FVG might be explained by the existing networks and communities of their co-nationals, as well as their settlement in the region. According to the analysis of the regional Institute of Economic and Social Researches IRES FVG, the major or minor spatial concentration of certain communities in certain areas of the region is connected to the strength of friendship or kinship networks and also to cultural traditions of the country of origin: the possibility to live in a strait contact with other people from the same national community, from the same linguistic group or religious community (2008, p. 28).

The cross-tabulation of **citizenship and ethnicity** demonstrates the prevalent matching of these two categories. Only four Ukrainian citizens are ethnically Russians, two persons with Moldovan citizenship are ethnically Ukrainian and Russian; besides, there are two ethnically Russians with Belarusian citizenship, and three Russian citizens are not ethnically Russians. These are not numerous cases, however, for the networking the existing cases of mixed ethnicity and citizenship may provide bridges between different ethnic and national groups.

Table 3.102

Crosstabulation of Citizenship and Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Citizenship							Total
	<i>Ukraine</i>	<i>Moldova</i>	<i>Russia</i>	<i>Belarus</i>	<i>Armenia</i>	<i>Georgia</i>	<i>Kyrgyzstan</i>	
<i>Ukrainian</i>	54	1	1	0	0	0	0	56
<i>Moldovan</i>	0	18	0	0	0	0	0	18
<i>Russian</i>	4	1	31	2	0	0	0	38
<i>Belarusian</i>	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	6
<i>Armenian</i>	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	3
<i>Georgian</i>	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
<i>Kyrgyz</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
<i>Other</i>	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
<i>N/A</i>	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Total	58	20	35	8	3	2	1	127

In terms of **education** 55.1 % of respondents studied at institutes of higher education, including 10.2 % of those who have not graduated from it, and 6.3 % of those who obtain a degree of Candidate of Science (equivalent to PhD degree). It is a high level of instruction in comparison with all-immigrants level – 12.6 % of immigrants in Italy are graduated (Caritas, 2010, p. 69). The higher education obtained in home country does not usually serve in Italy as a diploma from the CIS states is not recognized in Italy (with some exceptions).

Table 3.113

Education			
Level of education	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
<i>Secondary education</i>	11	8,7	8,7
<i>Vocational secondary education</i>	46	36,2	44,9
<i>Undergraduate education</i>	13	10,2	55,1
<i>Higher education</i>	49	38,6	93,7
<i>Candidate of Science</i>	8	6,3	100,0
Total	127	100,0	

Speaking about a group of labour migrants, they also are characterized with a high percentage of university-educated people: 41 of 89 respondents studied at higher education institutes, and 36 of them graduated (40.5 % of all respondents from the labour migrants group). Now they work in different professions and, thus, for them work in Italy is not perceived as an opportunity for new professional experiences or obtaining a higher work qualifications, it is a financial solution.

The high educational level of the respondents with Russian citizenship – 80.7 % (for Ukrainians it is 45.6 %, and for Moldovans – 45 %) in the frames of network approach can be explained by the findings by McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) for Mexican migrants: in communities with small migration networks, the probability of migration is increasing in education up to reasonably high levels of schooling, resulting in positive selection of migrants. This is consistent with high costs of migration being the determining factor of who migrates in these communities. In contrast, in communities with large networks, where migration costs are lower, migration propensities are decreasing in education. Besides, low-skilled migrants are believed to be the main beneficiaries of network effects since ethnic enclaves provide services mainly to migrants with low skills in general and low levels of host-language fluency in particular (ibid., p. 3).

Table 3.124

Cross-tabulation of Education and Occupational category

Level of education	Occupation				Total
	<i>Domestic workers</i>	<i>'Wives'</i>	<i>Students</i>	<i>Other workers</i>	
<i>Secondary education</i>	7	1	0	3	11
<i>Vocational secondary education</i>	28	8	0	10	46
<i>Undergraduate education</i>	3	3	3	4	13
<i>Higher education</i>	26	15	4	4	49
<i>Candidate of Science</i>	1	2	2	3	8
Total	65	29	9	24	127

Migration often relates to the alteration of social status. It is documented that for a majority of Russian-speakers migration alters their status lower in comparison with their country of origin where their high level of education or training held them in a higher social position. From this perspective it is worth to compare migrants' job in their home country and their jobs in Italy.

Adaptation to a **new professional activities**, its effectiveness to a great degree is determined by the experience of **previous working practice**. The obtaining working experience means that a person has undergone the second socialization before arrival to Italy, possesses professional skills and is able to realize them in the new conditions.

Table 3.15

	Job in home country		
	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
<i>Worker</i>	28	22,0	22,0
<i>Office worker</i>	68	53,5	75,6
<i>Entrepreneur</i>	8	6,3	81,9
<i>Housewife</i>	3	2,4	84,3
<i>Pensioner</i>	1	,8	85,0
<i>Student</i>	16	12,6	97,6
<i>Unemployed</i>	2	1,6	99,2
<i>Other</i>	1	,8	100,0
Total	127	100,0	

The histogram comparing jobs in home country and in Italy demonstrates the increase of the number of workers and housewives in Italy in comparison with home country and decrease of the number of office workers. As may be supposed there is a shift from office workers at home to workers in Italy. The cross-tabulation of 'job in home country' and 'job in Italy' justifies this supposition.

Figure 3.3. Job in home country and in Italy




Table 3.16

Cross-tabulation of Job in home country and Job in Italy

In home country	In Italy							Total
	Worker	Employee	Entrepreneur	Housewife	Student	Unemployed	Other	
Worker	22	3	2	0	0	0	1	28
Office worker	36	16	1	8	4	2	1	68
Entrepreneur	5	1	1	0	0	1	0	8
Housekeeper	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Pensioner	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Student	2	1	4	2	6	1	0	16
Unemployed	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	2
Other	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Total	70	21	9	10	10	5	2	127

A significant group of former office workers became workers in Italy. Housewives to a great extent are also former office workers. The shift from one occupation to another and

occupational downgrading is seen even stronger through comparison of sectors of employment at home and in Italy (Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5).

Figure 3.4. Employment sectors in home country




Figure 3.5. Employment sectors in Italy




Table 3.17

Cross-tabulation of Job in Italy and Occupational category

Job in Italy	'Occupational' category				Total
	<i>Domestic workers</i>	<i>'Wives'</i>	<i>Students</i>	<i>Other workers</i>	
<i>Worker</i>	56	2	0	12	70
<i>Office worker</i>	4	10	2	5	21
<i>Entrepreneur</i>	0	3	1	5	9
<i>Housekeeper</i>	1	8	0	1	10
<i>Student</i>	0	4	6	0	10
<i>Unemployed</i>	3	2	0	0	5
<i>Other</i>	1	0	0	1	2
Total	65	29	9	24	127

Women married to Italian citizens usually are classified as housewives, but in the reality they often become unemployed in Italy and perceive themselves as unemployed (Figure 3.5). In this study, 'wives' demonstrate comparatively high level of integration into the local labour market, as a half of them works and four of them study for future employment. According to a member of the board of the Russian-speaking association 'Zemlyachestvo' in Turin, the head of the Russian school Victoria Maksimova, the phenomenon of employment of women from the former USSR married to Italian men is recent: 'Even twenty years ago almost all women forgot that they were engineers, teachers, doctors, technologists or lawyers. They simply gave birth to children and became housewives. And now many of them spare no time on recognition of their diploma, enter universities, finish special courses or schools, change their qualification, retrain for high-demand professions, find job, open their own business.'²⁵

Several respondents chose two answers to the question about their job in Italy - 8.7 % of the respondents. Six people (four workers and two 'wives') are also students in Italy. Two students are self-employed.

²⁵ Retrived from <http://www.mia-italia.com/node/273> on 23.05.2011

Table 13.18

Second Job/Occupation in Italy				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
<i>None</i>	116	91,3	91,3	91,3
<i>Office worker</i>	2	1,6	1,6	92,9
<i>Entrepreneur</i>	1	,8	,8	93,7
<i>Student</i>	7	5,5	5,5	99,2
<i>Unemployed</i>	1	,8	,8	100,0
Total	127	100,0	100,0	

Therefore, the essential characteristic of Russian-speaking migrants is a high degree of their heterogeneity – there are different classifying attributes inside this conditional group – Russian-speaking migrants are not similar in terms of ethnicity, age, occupation, reason of migration. The special attributes of Russian-speakers are the prevalence of women and the high level of education.

The next part of analysis comprises **the results concerning network and networking process**. Interethnic contacts and ties in the context of ‘Russian-speakers’ network were assessed as functioning in five domains (kinship, friendship, acquaintance, work and religion domain) and providing four types of social support (emotional aid, material aid and resource assistance, information, and companionship). This order structured the following description of results and their analysis.

As some scholars notice, direct questions about inter-ethnic ties causes such ties to be over-reported because of a social desirability bias. On the other hand, a more indirect method whereby core regions are first delineated may while more accurate, generate too little inter-ethnic ties (Smith, 2002). In this study, the proportion of different types of inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic ties is more important than a simple number of respondents’ mentions of their intra-ethnic ties. Thus, the questions about ties and sources of support contain a range of answers as follows:

- ‘relatives and friends at home’,
- ‘relatives in Italy’,

- 'employer',
- 'friends compatriots',
- 'friends immigrants from other CIS states',
- 'friends immigrants from non-CIS states',
- 'Italian friends',
- 'Italian structures'.

Such a division with a restricted number of possible answers (from one to three for different questions) is believed to give a more balanced information about the proportion of inter-ethnic ties.

In order to evaluate the ties and relations between migrants from different CIS states, the following groups serve as comparison groups, these are:

- compatriots,
- immigrants from non-CIS states,
- Italians.

In order to confirm the existence of ties in the frames of the Russian-speakers network two domains are used: **acquaintance and friendship**.

The respondents answered three questions about: the quantity of compatriots acquainted in FVG, the quantity of migrants from other CIS states acquainted in FVG, and the quantity of migrants from non-CIS states acquainted in FVG.

The results are delivered in Figure 3.6.

Figure 3.6. Acquaintances in FVG among compatriots, migrants from other CIS states, migrants from non-CIS states





Figure 3.7. Acquaintances in FVG among compatriots, migrants from other CIS states, migrants from non-CIS states



The distribution of quantity of acquainted migrants from other CIS-states goes close to the one of acquainted compatriots, while the distribution curve of the quantity acquainted migrants from non-CIS states appreciably differs. As such, acquaintances from CIS states are often evaluated by respondents as acquaintances from home country or close to each other.

The classical question about three main friends was restated as ‘Where from are your three closest friends here?’. This formulation is a variation of Smith’s question who found that

estimates of inter-ethnic friendships were “much higher” when a direct question was asked and “least” when a name generator, network approach was used (Smith, 2002).

Table 3.19

Three closest friends are from:

	Responses		Percent of Cases
	N	Percent	
<i>Ukraine</i>	152	40,8%	119,7%
<i>Moldova</i>	48	12,9%	37,8%
<i>Russia</i>	86	23,1%	67,7%
<i>Belarus</i>	17	4,6%	13,4%
<i>other CIS states</i>	11	2,9%	8,7%
<i>Italy</i>	46	12,3%	36,2%
<i>non-CIS states</i>	13	3,5%	10,2%
Total	373	100,0%	293,7%

The CIS states were named in the majority of responses: 84.3 % from 100 %, or 247.3 % from 293.7 % of total responses. The named CIS states are Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Lithuania, and Uzbekistan. Italian friend(s) was mentioned in 36.2 % of responses. Immigrants from the countries outside the former Soviet space have got 10.2 % of mentions.

The cross-tabulation of the nationality of respondents and their friends reveals different composition of friendship ties among different nationalities. Compatriots make up approximately two thirds of the closest friends compositions of respondents from Ukraine and Moldova, a half of the composition of Russian respondents, and one fifth of the composition of Belarusian respondents. Ukrainian and Moldovan respondents more incline to have friends among co-nationals, than Russian, Belarusian or other respondents, as the former obviously have more opportunities to establish friendship ties within larger groups of their co-nationals presented in FVG, as the number of compatriots in the place of destination has an effect on the size and composition of the personal networks of newly arrived immigrants (Jariego, 2011).

One Ukrainian respondent in Pordenone said that ‘even twelve years ago it was not important who you are – Ukrainian, Russian or someone else. If you met anyone from the former USSR, you could shout from the other side of the street, ‘Hello!’. You meet someone

and you are so glad that you hang out together for several days. And now everything is changed, people do not even greet one another.’

Table 3.20

Cross-tabulation of Nationality and ‘Three closest friends’

Nationality	<i>‘Three closest friends are from...’</i>							Total
	<i>Ukraine</i>	<i>Moldova</i>	<i>Russia</i>	<i>Belarus</i>	<i>Other CIS²⁶</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Non CIS²⁷</i>	
<i>Ukrainian</i>	118	7	22	10	1	9	5	172
<i>Moldovan</i>	8	38	4	0	0	5	4	59
<i>Russian</i>	21	3	53	1	0	22	3	103
<i>Belarusian</i>	4	0	6	5	0	6	1	22
<i>Other CIS</i>	1	0	1	1	10	4	0	8
Total	152	48	86	17	11	46	13	373 ²⁸

Totals are based on responses.

Rather, respondents from Russia and Belarus substitute co-national friends by CIS- and Italian friends. Consequently, they more often have heterogenic compositions of their closest friends with 24 % and 46 % for CIS friends and 21 % and 27 % for Italian friends. The cross-tabulation of closest friends of respondents and occupation of respondents demonstrates another explanation for respectively high level of Italian friends among Russians and Belarusians which is connected with their occupational categories.

²⁶ except Ukraine, Moldova, Russia, Belarus (6 names).

²⁷ except Italy (7 names).

²⁸ Not all the respondents named three friends.

Table 3.21

Cross-tabulation of Occupation and 'Three closet friends'

	<i>'Three closest friends are from...'</i>							Total*
	<i>Ukraine</i>	<i>Moldova</i>	<i>Russia</i>	<i>Belarus</i>	<i>Other CIS</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Non CIS</i>	
Domestic workers	100	37	28	6	3	9	9	192
'Wives'	20	0	33	6	3	19	2	83
Students	5	1	13	0	0	7	1	27
Other workers	27	10	12	5	5	11	1	71
Total*	152	48	86	17	11	46	13	373

*Totals are based on responses.


The composition of three friends set of respondents-students and respondents-'wives' seems to reflect a better developed process of social integration in the receiving community: there is a significant presence of Italians - 25.9 % and 22.9 % respectively. Respondents of the categories of domestic workers and other workers mentioned Italians as their friends in 4.7 % and 15.5 % of responses.

Besides, this cross-tabulation divulges that none of occupational categories is enclosed in a category of one nation of CIS states and they have a heterogenic composition of the set of their closest friends. Even respondents from a workers occupational category which is believed to be the most closed group have friends among migrants from CIS and among Italians. It is interesting that while domestic workers from Russia are comparatively rare migrants, Russian friends are mentioned by domestic workers in 14.6 % of responses. It can mean that friendship ties cross the occupational categories.

Language use and its significance are analysed hereafter as in the studies devoted to Russian-speaking immigrants, the Russian language often serves as a common identification tool in the formation of Russian-speaking community, and it is found to be conceptualized by the migrants in an abstract and idealized way (Byford, 2009). In this study, to avoid the ambiguity and uncertainty of cognitive views of respondents the role of the Russian language in networking is measured in the behavioral vein. The usage of Russian is

compared to the usage of the native language²⁹. The following histograms provide with this comparison as the difference of percentage of answers to the questions ‘Do you usually start to talk in a street to a unfamiliar person who speaks your native language?’ and ‘Do you usually start to talk in a street to a unfamiliar person who speaks the Russian language?’.


Figure 3.8. ‘Do you usually start to talk in a street to a unfamiliar person who speaks your native language/ the Russian language?’ (n=127)



²⁹ Native language corresponds to titular language of the national group.

Figure 3.9 represents the results for all national groups except Russian one for methodological reasons: to contrast native language and Russian language which coincide in 100 % for our Russian respondents.

Figure 3.9. ‘Do you usually start to talk in a street to a unfamiliar person who speaks your native language/ the Russian language?’ (n=92), except Russian respondents



The results for separated groups of Ukrainian respondents and Moldovan respondents are presented in Figures 3.10 and 3.11.

Figure 3.10. ‘Do you usually start to talk in a street to a unfamiliar person who speaks your native language/ the Russian language?’ (n=58), Ukrainian respondents





Figure 3.11. *‘Do you usually start to talk in a street to a unfamiliar person who speaks your native language/ the Russian language?’ (n=20), Moldovan respondents*



All four variations reflected in the histograms have the same general trend of preference of native language to the Russian language (except in the case with the answer ‘Sometimes’ from Ukrainian respondents, but in general the sum of positive answers for native language is still higher). The general trend is the same: slight prevailance of native language over the Russian language as a mean of identification and possible inclusion into ‘we-group’. The steady following of the Russian language after the native language might signify that the Russian remains a close language for respondents in the same way as it operated in the USSR.

Along with personal contacts in the frames of the Russian-speaking network, impersonal interaction, such as **consumption of Russian media** with a certain periodicity indicates the inclusion of an individual migrant in the Russian-speaking network (in this study, such a periodicity was established as ‘sometimes’, ‘often’ and ‘very often’). Respondents were asked about their consumption of Russian newspapers and magazines (either papercopies, or online) as more affordable in economic terms in comparison with Russian television.

Figure 3.12. The frequency of reading Russian newspapers and magazines (either on paper, or online), n=127





Figure 3.13. The frequency of reading Russian newspapers and magazines (either on paper, or online), n=92, except Russians



More than a half of respondents read Russian newspapers periodically: 52.7 % of all the respondents and 51.1 % of all the respondents except Russians. It is interesting that non-Russian migrants read Russian newspapers and magazines more often than their national ones: 51.1 % (Ukrainians) to 45.6 % (Moldovans). On the one hand, it is explained by the broader availability of the Russian press in comparison with Ukrainian and especially Moldovan press. In FVG, international news stands offer Russian newspapers ‘Argumenty i Fakty’ and ‘Komsomolskaya pravda’ and several Russian magazines. On the other hand, the

consumption of Russian press by respondents from other CIS states confirms their perceived proximity to Russia (or at least to the Russian language) and reflects the information interconnectedness of the CIS states when news about events in Ukraine, Moldova and other CIS countries can appear in the Russian press.

As a consequence, reading Russian press might reinforce the migrants' sense of community with Russia and might serve as a mean for reshaping migrants identity, resulting in a stronger affiliation to the Russian-speaking network.

In general the found results confirm the existence of Russian-speaking network which is weaker than national networks but stronger than networks with non-CIS immigrants.

It goes without saying that the functioning of Russian-speaking network does not intend the absence of ethnic or national networks. Ukrainians and Moldovans have their independent networks in FVG naturally overlapping with the Russian-speaking network.

The closest friends and acquaintances first of all are comprised of co-nationals, then – of immigrants from the CIS states leaving far behind acquaintance and friendship ties with non-CIS immigrants. Less numbered populations of Russian, Belarusian and other CIS immigrants have more heterogenous sets of their closest friends.

Native language slightly prevails over the Russian language as a mean of identification and possible inclusion into 'we-group'. The steady following of the Russian language after the native language might signify that the Russian remains a close language for respondents in the same way as it operated in the USSR.

More than a half of respondents read Russian newspapers periodically. It is interesting that non-Russian migrants read Russian newspapers and magazines more often than their national ones.

The boundaries of the Russian-speaking network are fluid and spread to other migrants groups and institutions of the host society.

In order to explain **what resources are available from the Russian-speaking network** we examine four types of social support available through the network, namely: information, material aid and resource assistance, emotional aid, companionship.

To the extent that different ethnic and national groups obtain different occupational positions with different social resources, investigating these groups' interactions divulges the types of social resources to which people have access and explains the motivation of interethnic networking.

The high rate of help received from relatives intends that the basis of migrants networks are kinship ties above all or that the relatives are more effective in lending support.

Table 3.22

Cross-tabulation of 'Who helped you arrive in Italy?' and Nationality

	Nationality							Total
	Ukraine	Moldova	Russia	Belarus	Armenia	Georgia	Kyrgyzstan	
<i>Relatives and friends back home</i>	12	4	8	1	3	0	0	28
<i>Relatives in Italy</i>	15	5	11	4	0	0	1	36
<i>Friends compatriots</i>	14	4	4	0	0	0	0	22
<i>Immigrants from other CIS states</i>	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
<i>Immigrants from non-CIS states</i>	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
<i>Italian friends</i>	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
<i>Middleman/private agency for a fee</i>	10	5	1	0	0	1	0	17
<i>Official Italian structures</i>	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	3
<i>Employer</i>	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	3
<i>Nobody</i>	3	1	8	2	0	0	0	14
Total	58	20	35	8	3	2	1	127

The results demonstrates that immigrants from 'other CIS states' were not a resource employed for arrival to Italy. Here 'immigrants from other CIS states' intend acquaintances and friends from the CIS states. The question about the national belonging of middleman could help to reveal additional effect of international links between CIS-citizens as a life story did (Appendix 2), but such a question was not provided in the questionnaire as the whole theme of ethnic criminal and half-criminal networks was not touched in this study.

Table 3.23

Cross-tabulation of 'Who helped you make your documents in Italy?' and Nationality

	Nationality							Total
	Ukraine	Moldova	Russia	Belarus	Armenia	Georgia	Kyrgyzstan	

<i>Relatives and friends back home</i>	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
<i>Relatives in Italy</i>	11	0	14	3	0	0	1	29
<i>Friends compatriots</i>	2	3	3	0	0	0	0	8
<i>Immigrants from other CIS states</i>	3	2	2	0	0	0	0	7
<i>Immigrants from non-CIS states</i>	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
<i>Italian friends</i>	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
<i>Middleman/private agency for a fee</i>	2	1	4	1	0	0	0	8
<i>Official Italian structures</i>	5	0	5	1	3	0	0	14
<i>Employer</i>	25	10	6	1	0	1	0	43
<i>Nobody</i>	5	3	1	2	0	1	0	12
<i>Someone else</i>	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Total	58	20	35	8	3	2	1	127

Employer ranks first as a source of help for arranging documents; he was addressed in 33.9 % of all cases, and in 58.5 % cases in the group of domestic workers. It is explained by the existing practice of immigrants legalization in Italy. Likewise, the prevalent help of employers with housing is explained by the specifics of domestic workers labour: a significant part of them are live-in workers.

What is interesting that in terms of friendship ties, friends from CIS (7 cases) were as much helpful for respondents as friends compatriots (8 cases), while immigrants from non-CIS and Italian friends were less helpful with this type of support (2 and 2 cases).

Table 3.24

Cross-tabulation of 'Who helped you find accommodation in Italy?' and Occupational category

	Occupational category				Total
	Domestic workers	'Wives'	Students	Other workers	
<i>Relatives in Italy</i>	7	22	2	4	35
<i>Friends compatriots</i>	20	1	1	10	32
<i>Immigrants from other CIS states</i>	5	0	0	2	7
<i>Immigrants from non-CIS states</i>	2	0	0	0	2
<i>Italian friends</i>	1	2	0	0	3
<i>Middleman/private agency for a fee</i>	1	1	0	0	2
<i>Official Italian structures</i>	1	1	3	3	8
<i>Employer</i>	25	1	0	2	28
<i>Nobody</i>	2	1	3	3	9

<i>Someone else</i>	1	0	0	0	1
Total	65	29	9	24	127

The help of immigrants from CIS (7 cases) was useful in accommodation search for respondents from labour migrants. Unlike ‘wives’ and students labour migrants have to search accommodation themselves and prefer to diminish the costs for it as much as possible. Often they rent apartments together sharing fees and payments.


Table 14

Cross-tabulation of ‘With whom do you live in Italy?’ and Occupational category

<i>With whom do you live in Italy?</i>	Occupational category				Total
	Domestic workers	‘Wives’	Students	Other workers	
<i>Alone</i>	16	1	5	3	25
<i>With my family</i>	17	28	3	16	64
<i>With compatriots</i>	7	0	0	4	11
<i>With migrants from CIS states</i>	6	0	0	1	7
<i>With other migrants</i>	1	0	0	0	1
<i>With Italians</i>	18	0	1	0	19
Total	65	29	9	24	127

The answers to the question ‘With whom do you live in Italy?’ clearly demonstrate behavioural practice of immigrants concerning interethnic interaction within Russian-speaking network. The results show that the category of labour migrants living not with their family and not with their employers, can divide their residential space either with compatriots (11 cases) or with migrants from other CIS states (7 cases). Co-habitation is probably based on the similar life situations and the perceived propinquity of people, and it strengthens levels of propinquity bringing neighbours in a constant contact through mingling with one another on a daily basis and sharing common activities.

Figure 3.14. 'Who helped you find job or place at school in Italy?'



The majority of respondents³⁰ have used informal channels for employment: their friends compatriots (38.1%) and relatives in Italy (21.2%). The sum of all the informal channels (relatives and friends) demonstrates the absolute prevalence of the informal practice to find job (or place at school – for a group of students) - 75.3 %. A significant part of the respondents claim that nobody helped them find their job, that means, they followed individual strategy. Few immigrants used the services of official structures in Italy - 1.7 % of respondents.

It is interesting that the resource of immigrants (from CIS and non-CIS states) was helpful only for workers as the cross-tabulation reveals it. This finding means that these are less-qualified jobs which are available through migrants' networks. It is connected with specifics of current employment of the majority of Russian-speakers in FVG. In the case of searching less-qualified and lower-paying jobs, intra-ethnic ties are beneficial for people whose ethnic groups are concentrated in this kind of jobs (in this study, Ukrainians and Moldovans). Conversely, interethnic ties can be a beneficial resource for migrants whose national groups

³⁰ Except those who do not work/study and did not work in Italy (n=118).

are concentrated in other kinds of jobs. For instance, interethnic ties can be a beneficial resource for Ukrainians and Moldovans in the case of searching higher-income jobs, because such ties increase their options in the search of a better information (cf. Ooka and Wellman, 2006).

Still, Ukrainian respondents mentioned that they address to Moldovans in the need of work, as well as Moldovans mentioned that they interact with Ukrainians looking for job. It is interesting that Georgian women who had just arrived to Udine went to the Ukrainian park in search of work.

Table 15

Cross-tabulation of 'Who helped you find job in Italy?' and Occupational category

'Who helped you find job in Italy?'	Occupational category				Total
	Domestic workers	'Wives'	Students	Other workers	
<i>Relatives and friends at home</i>	0	0	0	3	3
<i>Relatives in Italy</i>	13	9	0	3	25
<i>Friends compatriots</i>	33	2	0	10	45
<i>Immigrants from other CIS states</i>	6	0	0	3	9
<i>Immigrants from non-CIS states</i>	2	0	0	0	2
<i>Italian friends</i>	0	3	2	0	5
<i>Middleman/private agency for a fee</i>	5	0	0	0	5
<i>Official Italian structures</i>	1	0	0	1	2
<i>Employer</i>	1	1	0	0	2
<i>Nobody</i>	3	11	2	4	20
Total	64	26	4	24	118³¹

In general, the Russian-speaking network obtains beneficial resources for the lower-paying jobs searches. The high percentage of those who employed as office workers on their own (47.4 %) signifies that the Russian-speaking network is not effective (or not mature enough) to provide help in the higher-paying jobs search.

³¹ N=118, as not all respondents work or have experience of employment in Italy.

Table 167

'To whom do you address if you have questions about life in Italy?' (Q12)

	Responses		Percent of Cases
	N	Percent	
<i>Relatives and friends at home</i>	12	5,2%	9,4%
<i>Relatives in Italy</i>	34	14,8%	26,8%
<i>Employer</i>	21	9,1%	16,5%
<i>Friends compatriots</i>	56	24,3%	44,1%
<i>Friends immigrants from other CIS states</i>	35	15,2%	27,6%
<i>Friends immigrants from non-CIS states</i>	4	1,7%	3,1%
<i>Italian friends</i>	29	12,6%	22,8%
<i>Italian structures</i>	34	14,8%	26,8%
<i>Other</i>	5	2,2%	3,9%
Total	230	100,0%	181,1%

The majority of the respondents named their friends compatriots as people to whom they address their questions about life in Italy – 44.1 %. The friends compatriots must be the most addressed people because they could have the same problems and can explain questions in a more comprehensive way. Friends immigrants from other CIS states (except home country) are the second most frequented source of information – 27.6 %. The answers ‘Italian structures’ (state and non-governmental organizations), ‘Italian friends’, and ‘employer’ collected 26.8 % , 22.8 % , and 16.5 % respectively. It is evidence of the fact that respondents have quite high level of confidence in the host society members and institutions.

Table 17

Cross-tabulation of 'To whom do you address if you have questions about life in Italy?' and Nationality

To whom do you address if you have questions about life in Italy?	Nationality							Total*
	Ukraine	Moldova	Russia	Belarus	Armenia	Georgia	Kyrgyzstan	
<i>Relatives and friends back home</i>	5	3	2	0	2	0	0	12
<i>Relatives in Italy</i>	15	4	13	2	0	0	0	34
<i>Employer</i>	14	3	4	0	0	0	0	21
<i>Friends compatriots</i>	34	9	13	0	0	0	0	56
<i>Friends imm-s from other CIS states</i>	20	4	8	2	0	1	0	35
<i>Friends imm-s from non-CIS states</i>	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	4
<i>Italian friends</i>	7	5	12	5	0	0	0	29
<i>Italian structures</i>	12	6	6	5	3	1	1	34
<i>Other</i>	4	0	1	0	0	0	0	5
Total*	113	34	61	14	5	2	1	230

**Totals are based on responses.*

In general, friends immigrants (co-nationals, friends from the CIS and non-CIS) are important source of information (41.3 % of all responses) for respondents as well as Italian side in the name of institutions, friends, employers (36.6 %). Both of them are more important source of information than a popular source of instrumental help – relatives (20 % of responses even if to count the category 'relatives and friends back home' as relatives). This is connected with comparative informational closeness of a family when available information is well-known to all the members of family and new information can be obtained only from external sources. Prevailing tendency to rely on informal sources among respondents relates more broadly to the nature of networks of Russian-speaking migrants. The share of mentions of immigrants from CIS as information sources is 15.2 % and it varies only slightly for different national groups of respondents: from 11.8 % for answers from Moldovans to 17.7 % for answers from Ukrainians.

Table 18

'Where do you address if you need borrow money?' (Q13)


	Responses		Percent of Cases
	N	Percent	
<i>Relatives and friends back home</i>	21	11,2%	16,8%
<i>Relatives in Italy</i>	34	18,1%	27,2%
<i>Employer</i>	8	4,3%	6,4%
<i>Friends compatriots</i>	52	27,7%	41,6%
<i>Friends immigrants from other CIS states</i>	24	12,8%	19,2%
<i>Friends immigrants from non-CIS states</i>	2	1,1%	1,6%
<i>Italian friends</i>	6	3,2%	4,8%
<i>Bank/ credit organization</i>	16	8,5%	12,8%
<i>Other</i>	25	13,3%	20,0%
Total	188	100,0%	150,4%

In addition to information, respondents also turned to friends and relatives during times of need to borrow money. The majority of the responses - 41.6 % - was given to the answer 'to the friends compatriots' and 'to relatives in Italy' – 27.2 %, a significant part of the responses was given the answer 'to the friends immigrants from the CIS states' – 19.2 %, The answer 'to the friends Italians' was chosen in 4.8 % of the responses the answer 'to the friends immigrants from outside the former USSR' - in 1.6 % of the responses.

It is indicative that 12.8 % of responses were given to the variant 'bank/ credit organization': despite the predominance among migrants of informal borrowing amounts of money, the formal practices and behavior patterns start to apply to them.

Summarizing the answers to the questions 12 and 13, it is possible to say that friends in particular were found to occupy a very prominent role in migrant networks. If we unite the categories of friends immigrants, the combined friends category registers a percentage of 41.3 % for Q12 and 41.6 % to Q13. While kin-based ties also figure, they are less prominent: 20 % and 29.3 %. As it was specified in Chapter 1, the dominance of friends ties over kinship as a source of social support is particular for migrant networks and it is evident from our case.

Figure 3.15. 'How often do you interact with immigrants from non-CIS states...'



In general, the interaction with immigrants from non-CIS states stay much less frequent. The questionnaire suggested concrete situations where this interaction could take place, but all variants garnered almost insignificant frequencies (means from 1.57 to 1.35).

The individual's subjective assessment of co-operation between different nationalities of the former USSR was taken into account as presenting **cognitive perspective of assessment**. This type of assessment is cognitive in nature and evaluates hypothetical situations.

Table 3.30

'Do compatriots help each other in Italy depending on your experience?'

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
<i>Never</i>	0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<i>Seldom</i>	8	6,3	6,3	6,3
<i>Sometimes</i>	26	20,5	20,5	26,8
<i>Often</i>	56	44,1	44,1	70,9
<i>Very often</i>	30	23,6	23,6	94,5
<i>I do not know</i>	7	5,5	5,5	100,0
Total	127	100,0	100,0	

The cases of help between compatriots obtained the highest mean: $\bar{a}=3.9$ (with the answers range from 1 'never' to 5 'very often'). No one respondent chose the answer 'never' assessing the frequency of help between compatriots.

Table 19

Evaluation of frequency of Ukrainians – Moldovans cooperation

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
<i>Never</i>	3	2,4	2,4	2,4
<i>Seldom</i>	22	17,3	17,3	19,7
<i>Sometimes</i>	28	22,0	22,0	41,7
<i>Often</i>	17	13,4	13,4	55,1
<i>Very often</i>	15	11,8	11,8	66,9
<i>I do not know</i>	42	33,1	33,1	100,0
Total	127	100,0	100,0	

Table 20

Evaluation of frequency of Ukrainians – Russians cooperation

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
<i>Never</i>	1	,8	,8	,8
<i>Seldom</i>	13	10,2	10,2	11,0
<i>Sometimes</i>	26	20,5	20,5	31,5
<i>Often</i>	52	40,9	40,9	72,4
<i>Very often</i>	13	10,2	10,2	82,7
<i>I do not know</i>	22	17,3	17,3	100,0
Total	127	100,0	100,0	

Table 21

Evaluation of frequency of Moldovans – Russians cooperation

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
<i>Never</i>	2	1,6	1,6	1,6
<i>Seldom</i>	15	11,8	11,8	13,4
<i>Sometimes</i>	29	22,8	22,8	36,2
<i>Often</i>	27	21,3	21,3	57,5
<i>Very often</i>	6	4,7	4,7	62,2
<i>I do not know</i>	48	37,8	37,8	100,0
Total	127	100,0	100,0	

The majority of answers ‘I do not know’ for the nationally mixed groups of help was received from the respondents of different nationality from those being considered.

Comparison of situations demonstrates that according to estimations of respondents, compatriots help one another more often ($\bar{a}=3.90$). It is interesting that Ukrainians and Russians are believed to cooperate with each other more often ($\bar{a}=3.60$), than Moldovans and Russians ($\bar{a}=3.25$), and Ukrainians and Moldovans ($\bar{a}=3.22$).

The respondents answering the question in what kind of situations migrants from the CIS states help each other named different cases. The range of the answers covers following types of support: emotional aid (‘for psychological support’, ‘problems at home’, ‘compassion’), material and instrumental aid (‘when there is nothing to eat’, ‘to get some money’, ‘to sit with children’, ‘studying the Italian language’, ‘when someone is ill’/ ‘disease’), information (‘for execution of documents’, ‘guidance’, ‘if someone needs advice’, ‘to find accommodation’, ‘to find work’), companionship (‘leisure time’/ ‘for rest’/ ‘meeting people’, ‘during cultural events’, ‘at church’).

Emotional aid was the most mentioned by respondents (two thirds of responses). The ways of emotional help provision are considered in what follows.

In this study, emotional help and companionship are verified together via questions about leisure time. Five-item scale regarding the frequency of the respondents contacts and interaction with another migrants in different situations covering seven domains was used to assess the frequencies of communication and interaction with compatriots and migrants from


other CIS states. The frequencies of contacts with compatriots serve as standard indicators.

The seven domains are:

- home,
- work,
- church,
- street/park,
- café/restaurant,
- cultural association,
- on-line (ICQ, Skype, forums).


The frequencies of meetings influence also the instrumental support as ‘the delivery of support is not based on who you know but on how you know them’ (Wellman, 1999, p. 581).

Figure 3.16. *‘How often do you meet for interaction with compatriots and migrants from other CIS states at your or their home?’*




In this comparison, home stays the place more reserved for meetings with compatriots rather than with migrants from other CIS states.

Figure 3.17. *‘How often do you meet for interaction with compatriots and migrants from other CIS states at job?’*




Mostly, respondents do not meet their compatriots as well as migrants from other CIS states at their jobs. This can be explained by the character of job (as domestic job in general is an individual type of work).

Figure 3.18. *‘How often do you meet for interaction with compatriots and migrants from other CIS states at church?’*




The majority of respondents do not meet either compatriots or migrants from the CIS at church, that can mean that they do not attend any church (for further details see subchapter 3.3.2).

Figure 3.19. *'How often do you meet for interaction with compatriots and migrants from other CIS states in street/ a park?'*




In comparison with other places, street or park are the most frequently mentioned places of meetings.

Figure 3.20. *'How often do you meet for interaction with compatriots and migrants from other CIS states in a café/ restaurant?'*




While some respondents said, ‘We do not go to café or restaurants here as we need to save money’, the figures show that the Italian practice to meet with friends outside becomes a popular habit among respondents.

Figure 3.21. ‘How often do you meet for interaction with compatriots and migrants from other CIS states in association?’




For the vast majority of respondents, national and Russian-speaking associations remain something outlying and remote: ‘I have heard of an association but I do not know where it is located exactly’. Several respondents had no any idea of their existence at all: ‘Is there any?’.

Figure 3.22. *‘How often do you meet for interaction with compatriots and migrants from other CIS states on-line?’*



The usage of on-line communication stays limited either because of lack of computer skills especially among aged respondents or because of scanty access to computers and internet among respondents who are domestic workers.

For all the places of interaction, frequencies of interaction with compatriots are higher than with migrants from CIS. In general, the most frequent meetings with compatriots and with immigrants from CIS happen in street/a park, at home and in a café. Church, job, associations and internet stay less popular places for interaction, notably that associations, job and church are the places where frequencies of respondents interaction with either compatriots or migrants from CIS are more similar than in other examined places.

Figure 3.23. 'How often do you spend your free time with...'

The relatives and friends 'back home' are the first contacts for respondents. In the conditions of substantial distance from homeland, communication with family and friends 'back home' become almost irreplaceable source of positive emotions, safety, sustention of sense of stability, etc. According to Argyle (2003), positive events in the lives of relatives or friends may considerably enhance mood, create feeling of happiness, one of factors of which is notion that loved ones are all right.

Friends compatriots rank second ($\bar{e} = 3.45$), and friends from the CIS rank third ($\bar{e} = 2.79$).

Table 22

'How often do you spend your free time...'	\bar{e}	Std. Deviation
<i>with friends/relatives back home (phone/internet)</i>	4,03	,925
<i>with relatives in Italy</i>	2,72	1,578
<i>with employer, his family</i>	1,58	1,123
<i>with friends compatriots</i>	3,45	1,013
<i>with friends from other CIS states</i>	2,79	1,213
<i>with friends migrants from non-CIS states</i>	1,91	1,042
<i>with friends Italians</i>	2,43	1,225

As it is showed in other researches, of all the role categories, friendship with compatriots was found to be the most prominent, followed by kinship ties. What is interesting in the context of this study is that respondents noted that they were provided with help in search of job, with housing, information, financial and emotional support through ties with migrants from the CIS. These ties and help received from them are more substantial than ties with other immigrants, who are not from the CIS. Thus, links to migrants from the CIS take a significant part of personal networks of immigrants speaking Russian.

The help of official structures is not very significant but its share indicates that the civil practices of adaptation to the host society start being in use as well.

Respondents from different occupational groups apply to different sources for instrumental help and support. Respondents married to Italian citizens rely on their spouses and Italian relatives. They as well as respondents students more often address to their Italian friends, and tend to use official ways and structures more often than respondents from the category of labour migrants.

At the same time, the emotional help and support is required from compatriots or immigrants from the CIS by respondents from all occupational categories. Similar persons may be more conducive to exchange of support on the basis of their empathy towards each other.

Dissimilar persons obtain different positions and, hence, are useful for one another as sources of more diverse resources. In this case weak ties can provide better connections to different social milieus – what was called ‘strength of weak ties’ (Granovetter, 1982).

Together with the results received from answers to the questions about different types of support we can see that emotional support is given more frequently than instrumental support between migrants originated from different CIS countries. Giving money or help with processing documents are the least frequent behaviours. The prevalence of emotional support can be explained by greater empathy of women, who constitutes the majority of respondents.

This general description is valid for three larger groups under examination. However, differences between groups can also be observed. For example, Ukrainians and Moldovans

declare having received significantly more informational help and more attention to their personal problems than the other groups.

The following part focuses on **adaptation of Russian-speaking migrants** to the host society according to several indicators, such as:

- number of friends Italians;
- leisure time with Italians;
- reading Italian newspapers;
- addressing questions about life in Italy to Italian structures;
- addressing for money loan to Italian banks;
- proficiency in the Italian language;
- intention to stay in Italy.

The extent of the social adaptation to the host society is often measured by *the number of local contacts/ friends*. Difficulties in making friends serve as indicators of social isolation and exclusion, while having many friends means a high degree of social integration. In terms of network approach friends ties with members of a host society are indispensable source of information and different types of aid. The Russian proverb, ‘A hundred friends are worth more than a hundred roubles’, epitomizes the value of friends ties for Russians and former Soviets.

Table 23

Number of Italian friends			
	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
<i>No one</i>	23	18,1	18,1
<i>1-5</i>	32	25,2	43,3
<i>6-10</i>	20	15,7	59,1
<i>>10</i>	52	40,9	100,0
Total	127	100,0	

Table 24**Cross-tabulation of Nationality and Italian friends' number**

Nationality	Italian friends' number				Total
	0	1-5	6-10	>10	
<i>Ukraine</i>	16	20	8	14	58
<i>Moldova</i>	2	6	5	7	20
<i>Russia</i>	5	4	7	19	35
<i>Belarusians</i>	0	1	0	7	8
<i>Others</i>	0	1	0	5	6
Total	23	32	20	52	127

According to this indicator of adaptation to the receiving society, the most adapted are Russians and Belarusians.

Thirty-one respondent reported to have at least one *close Italian friend*. The most adapted national group according to this indicator is Russian respondents: 22 of 103 mentions. Ukrainian and Moldovan respondents much less reported having Italian friends: nine of 172 mentions and five of 59 mentions, respectively.

To measure the friends ties to members of a receiving society, not only the number of friends is important but also *the frequencies of socializing* with them.

Table 25**Cross-tabulation of Nationality and Frequency of spending free time with Italian friends**

Nationality	Frequency of spending free time with Italian friends					Total
	<i>Never</i>	<i>Seldom</i>	<i>Sometimes</i>	<i>Often</i>	<i>Very often</i>	
Ukrainians	26	16	11	3	2	58
Moldovans	4	9	2	5	0	20
Russians	7	6	11	9	2	35
Belarusians	0	1	2	4	1	8
Others	1	0	2	2	1	6
Total	38	32	28	23	6	127

The total mean for the group is 2.43. The mean is higher for Belarusians (3.63) and others (3.33) but is based only 8 and 6 cases. Among three bigger groups the Russian group of respondents has the highest mean – 2.8, the Moldovans obtain the mean of 2.4, and for Ukrainian respondents the mean is just 1.95. In general, the frequencies of spending free time with Italian friends are proportional to the number of such friends.

The first requisite for a successful adaptation in a foreign country is *knowledge of its language*. Comfort and feel-good in a host country, opportunities of adaptation to the labour and the whole social environment directly depend on the capability to establish adequate verbal contacts, to fill in without troubles the official documents, etc. Therefore, the Italian language command according to the self-evaluation of respondents is an important indicator of the migrant characteristics.

In this study, the proficiency in the Italian language is another indicator of integration as both a pathway to economic success and social integration and a result of such integration.

Some of our respondents arrived with preliminary knowledge of Italian on different levels: ones studied the basics with the help of phrase-book, others have university education specializing in the Italian language. The problem is that not all the migrants have opportunity to study the language systematically. The majority of domestic workers have no time to visit special classes of Italian organized for immigrants but they study the language directly from members of the host society – their employers, first of all.

The average level of Italian for all the respondents is 3.89 (on the scale from 1 – ‘I do not speak it’ to 5 – ‘fluent’ level). However, the level of knowledge varies from case to case depending on the combination of conditions such as type of work, occasions for contacts with Italians, personal interest or disinterest in exploring the host society and future plans. One group reveals uniformity: it is ‘wives’ who speak Italian either well or fluently. In the context of network their knowledge of the Italian language becomes an additional resource in demand from some members of other occupational categories.

Table 26.38

Cross-tabulation of Level of proficiency in the Italian language and Occupation category

Level of Italian	Occupational category				Total	Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Domestic workers	'Wives'	Students	Other workers			
1. <i>I do not speak it</i>	0	0	1	0	1	,8	,8
2. <i>Bad</i>	7	0	3	2	12	9,4	10,2
3. <i>Not bad</i>	19	0	2	6	27	21,3	31,5
4. <i>Good</i>	28	9	1	9	47	37,0	68,5
5. <i>Fluent</i>	11	20	2	7	40	31,5	100,0
Total	65	29	9	24	127	100,0	

According to the survey results, 31.5 % speak Italian fluently; 37 % assess their proficiency as 'good'. Only 10.2 % consider their proficiency level as insufficient. There is no correlation between level of Italian and preferable social ties: those who are not satisfied with their proficiency in Italian also have Italian friends, apply to Italian official structures and spend their time with Italian acquaintances and friends.

Table 3.39

Cross-tabulation of Level of proficiency in the Italian language and Age

Level of proficiency in Italian	Age						Total
	20-25	26-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	
<i>I do not speak it</i>	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
<i>Bad</i>	1	0	4	4	1	2	12
<i>Not bad</i>	2	1	2	8	12	2	27
<i>Good</i>	1	5	7	11	22	1	47
<i>Fluent</i>	4	1	13	15	6	1	40
Total	8	7	26	39	41	6	127

Age influences on the self-assessment of the level of the Italian language: respondents who are closer to 'medial age groups' more often speak fluent Italian.


Table 3.40

Cross-tabulation of Proficiency in Italian and Frequency of reading Italian press

Level of proficiency in Italian	Frequency of reading Italian press					Total
	Never	Seldom	Sometimes	Often	Very often	
<i>I do not speak it</i>	1	0	0	0	0	1
<i>Bad</i>	6	3	3	0	0	12
<i>Not bad</i>	8	3	5	6	5	27
<i>Good</i>	6	9	17	11	4	47
<i>Fluent</i>	2	8	9	14	7	40
Total	23	23	34	31	16	127

The additional indicator of proficiency in Italian is incorporation of Italian sources in everyday media consumption. Besides, *consumption of a host society press* can be a separated indicator of social integration. Reading Italian press results in a better understanding of a host society and in gradual formation of a sense of belonging to this society.

Figure 3.24. Frequency of reading Italian press



The overall mean is 2.95 that is higher than the mean for reading national press (2.65). This result might indicate a shift in the media consumption from co-ethnic to the mainstream products and, hence, adaptation of the respondent group to the Italian society.

Addressing Italian friends and institutions in times of difficulty is another indicator of social adaptation of immigrants. When respondents face with a need for money, they (would) turn to Italian friends in 4.8 % of cases and to bank or credit organization in 12.8 % of cases (Table 3.29). Jointly, 17.6 % of respondents address (or would address) for a loan to agents of the host society. Respondents address their questions about life in Italy to Italian friends in 12.6 % of cases and to Italian structures in 26.8 % of cases (Table 3.27).

Another indicator of social adaptation of migrants is their *intention to stay or leave a hostland*. The wish to return home, to move to another place often is connected with unsuccessful adaptation at the present place of migrants living, what caused the choice of the answers to this question as a criterion of the evaluation of adaptation. According to this criterion adaptation of the respondents goes quite satisfactorily, as 38.6 % of them plan to stay in FVG for a period of more than 10 years.

Besides, this indicator demonstrates that the significant part wants to stay in Italy and FVG for a long period and, therefore, it is appropriate to speak about the policy of integration towards them.

Table 3.41

Plans for future				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
<i>To return home within 2 years</i>	19	15,0	15,0	15,0
<i>To stay in FVG from 2 to 5 years</i>	20	15,7	15,7	30,7
<i>To stay in FVG from 5 to 10 years</i>	16	12,6	12,6	43,3
<i>To stay in FVG for more than 10 years</i>	49	38,6	38,6	81,9
<i>To move to another Italian region</i>	0	0,0	0,0	81,9
<i>To move to another country</i>	6	4,7	4,7	86,6
<i>I do not know</i>	17	13,4	13,4	100,0
Total	127	100,0	100,0	

However, the wish to move to another place or return home is not always connected with unsuccessful adaptation. It can be explained by new opportunities of career development, business, etc., appeared as a result of successful adaptation. Additionally, noting that 13.4 % could not answer the question we can suppose that ties with homeland and family at home

develop the sense of temporary staying in Italy. The majority of labour migrants perceive themselves as temporary residents, in searching for a living.

Plans to stay in FVG or return back do not seem to depend clearly on the nationality of respondents. There is a retraceable dependence on the status of migrants in Italy: in 23 cases from 29 'wives' plan to stay in FVG. Among labour migrants who are usually perceived as temporary labour force, there are either those who plan to return home within 10 years or those who would like to stay in FVG; the proportion of these groups is almost 2 to 1 (49 cases to 25 cases).

Table 3.42

Cross-tabulation of Plans for future and Nationality

Plans for future	Nationality							Total
	Ukr	Mold	Rus	Belar	Armen	Georg	Kyrgyz	
<i>To return home within 2 years</i>	13	0	6	0	0	0	0	19
<i>To stay in FVG from 2 to 5 years</i>	8	6	5	0	0	1	0	20
<i>To stay in FVG from 5 to 10 years</i>	10	4	2	0	0	0	0	16
<i>To stay in FVG for more than 10 years</i>	17	8	15	7	0	1	1	49
<i>To move to another Italian region</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<i>To move to another country</i>	3	0	2	1	0	0	0	6
<i>I do not know</i>	7	2	5	0	3	0	0	17
Total	58	20	35	8	3	2	1	127

Table 3.43

Cross-tabulation of Plans for future and Occupation

'Your plans for future':	Occupation				Total
	Domestic workers	'Wives'	Students	Other workers	
<i>To return home within 2 years</i>	14	0	3	2	19
<i>To stay in FVG from 2 to 5 years</i>	18	0	2	0	20
<i>To stay in FVG from 5 to 10 years</i>	9	1	0	6	16
<i>To stay in FVG for more than 10 years</i>	14	23	1	11	49
<i>To move to another Italian region</i>	0	0	0	0	0
<i>To move to another country</i>	2	2	1	1	6
<i>I do not know</i>	8	3	2	4	17
Total	65	29	9	24	127

Table 3.44

Cross-tabulation of Plans for future and Marital status

Plans for future	Marital status					Total
	<i>Not married</i>	<i>Unregistered marriage</i>	<i>Married</i>	<i>Divorced</i>	<i>Widow(er)</i>	
<i>To return home within 2 years</i>	5	3	7	0	4	19
<i>To stay in FVG from 2 to 5 years</i>	1	2	11	1	5	20
<i>To stay in FVG from 5 to 10 years</i>	2	4	6	2	2	16
<i>To stay in FVG for more than 10 years</i>	5	3	31	6	4	49
<i>To move to another Italian region</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0
<i>To move to another country</i>	3	1	2	0	0	6
<i>I do not know</i>	4	0	10	2	1	17
Total	20	13	67	11	16	127

Regarding marital status, the major share of those who want to stay in FVG for a period longer than 10 years falls within divorced respondents, who all are women in this survey. Perhaps, they believe that in Italy they have more opportunities in general and a better opportunity to sustain their children in particular.


Table 3.45

Cross-tabulation of Plans for future and Age

Plans for future	Age						Total
	20-25	26-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	
<i>To return home within 2 years</i>	1	1	2	4	9	2	19
<i>To stay in FVG from 2 to 5 years</i>	1	1	3	2	12	1	20
<i>To stay in FVG from 5 to 10 years</i>	0	1	1	8	6	0	16
<i>To stay in FVG for more than 10 years</i>	2	3	14	19	9	2	49
<i>To move to another Italian region</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<i>To move to another country</i>	3	0	3	0	0	0	6
<i>I do not know</i>	1	1	3	6	5	1	17
Total	8	7	26	39	41	6	127

There is an obvious connection even if not a linear one: the longer respondents live in FVG, the more is their intention to stay there.

Figure 3.25. Percentage of those who intend to stay in FVG for > 10 years



In general, respondents from Russia and Belarus are more adapted to the host society than the respondents from Ukraine and Moldova. Age and occupation also might correlate to the degree of social adaptation of immigrants. In general, Russian-speakers are more prone to social integration versus separatism. Contact areas with the host population are observed, which introduce the paths for further integration into Italian society.

The Russian-speaking network is highly fragmented into different domains, in this study they are 'domestic workers', 'wives', 'students', 'workers'. Besides, it is divided according members' nationality as the independent networks exist (first of all, Ukrainian and Moldovan networks).

Ties with people from other CIS states mostly do not appear on the stage of preparing trip to Italy. They appear after arrival to Italy, and there they often rank next to ties with compatriots: as a source of information about Italy, as a source of a loan, in help with proceeding documents.

For labour migrants international ties with migrants from the CIS helped in searches of accommodation and dividing rentals and costs by cohabitation. It reveals that the network first of all assists in search of job for workers within the network and, hence, these are less-

qualified jobs which are available through it. The Russian-speaking network is not effective (or not mature enough) to provide help in the higher-paying jobs search.

The respondents evaluate the level of help between different national groups of the CIS compatriots as rather high level (from 3.60 to 3.22 using 5-point scale). Answering the question in what kind of situations migrants from the CIS states help each other respondents named different cases. The range of the answers covers following types of support: emotional aid, instrumental aid, information, and companionship.

While the ties with immigrants from the CIS are weaker than the ties with compatriots they provide better connection to different social milieus and other types of resources. The respondents from different countries show different level of adaptation to the host society. The migrants from Russia demonstrate the higher level of adaptation to the receiving society and as a group might become a source of particular resources which are hardly accessible for other groups. In general, social dissimilarity of Russian-speakers contribute to their potential access to diverse resources.

3.3. Organizational level of Russian-speaking network (based on the results of the qualitative research)

The institutions with activities aimed at Russian-speakers play an important role in the communication, coordination and control inside the Russian-speakers network. Personal ties usually do not go further than ties in dyads or small groups, while organizations present opportunities for a broader interaction and fostering the sense of solidarity with even if virtual Russian-speaking community. This subchapter observes cultural associations, church, newspapers, and ethnic entrepreneurs.

With regard to the number of Russian-speakers organizations in Friuli-Venezia Giulia, its Russian-speaking immigrant population has a more secular character: it has organized four cultural associations and one parish.

Apart of Russian-speakers organizations embracing people of different national origin, there is a cultural association of Ukrainians, a cultural association of Moldovans, and a religious community of Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church.

An important characteristic of Russian-speaking migrants is their social activity and first of all, organization of Russian-speaking **cultural associations**. Although not nearly majority of migrants participate in them, associations activities have significance for institutionalization of Russian-speaking immigrant population.

In the region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia there are four cultural associations of immigrants from the former USSR. Specifics of Russian-speakers associations is the absence of unique ethno-national basis. These associations represent interests of different national, ethnic and social groups of immigrants from the former USSR. Despite their heterogeneous composition, they are often referred by migrants as ‘Russian associations’. Indeed, three of this organizations are members of the Coordinating Council of Associations of Russian Compatriots in Italy of Italian North (KSAR SI) which was organized in 2007 and comprises 15 associations of northern Italy³². Nevertheless, the associations of FVG do not define themselves as straightforwardly in relation to the Russian Federation as a state and underline the membership of people of diverse nationalities in them.

The main functions of these associations are as follows: ethnic and cultural propaganda, presentation of immigrant community, sustenance of ties between immigrants and their countries of origin, facilitating adaptation and integration of immigrants.

1) Cultural association of migrants from the ex-USSR ‘Unità’ in Udine positions itself as a cultural association ‘created on a voluntary basis and for non-commercial purposes from initiative people who are interested in the arrangement of conditions for preserving our culture, traditions and national specifics and for transfer of this heritage to their children.’³³

2) Association ‘Russkiy dom’ in Trieste was organized in order to ‘develop and sustain cultural relationships between people of the former Soviet Union and Italy.’³⁴

3) Association ‘Centre of International Development between Italy and Russia’ in Palmanova declares its aim as follows: ‘carrying on activities in the field of social supply of immigrants, support of integration, participation in the social life.’ It organizes ‘mass events

³² http://www.ksarsi.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=63&Itemid=105&lang=ru

³³ http://www.unita.nm.ru/main_ru.html

³⁴ <http://www.ruskiydom.it/rus/chisiamo.htm>

and other activities which are connected with intercultural policy and international development.’³⁵

4) One more association of Russian-speakers in Trieste, ‘Rodnik’, functions more as a music and dance workshop for Russian-speaking migrants.

The first Russian-speakers association in FVG, ‘Unità’, appeared in 1999. Thomas and Znaneicki (1918-1920) stated that 100 to 300 immigrants to be presented in a place in order to establish of the first ‘society’ (an informal immigrant organization). It means that the creation of a formal organization as association might need more numerous immigrant population. Of course, not all of them participate in associations life but the substantial number of immigrants justifies the appearance of associations and raises the chances of activists groups formation. Nowadays the associations have no strict membership and many of their members appear random at one event or another. About a hundred, maximum two hundred people at once frequent the main events. The activists of the FVG Russian-speakers associations are usually a group from seven to twenty people.

It is proved that founders of immigrant organizations are people who have attained an above-average level of education (Gimez and Wilpert, 1987, p. 107). Thus, the high educational level of Russian-speakers could stimulate establishment of several associations of Russian-speaking immigrants.

Gender disproportion of Russian-speakers in FVG led to the leadership of women which is not a new phenomenon among the Eastern European immigrants in Italy as scholars pointed it out (Caritas/Migrantes, 2010). All Russian-speakers associations in FVG were established by women married to Italian citizens, and the associations’ backbone consists of those women who are more stabilized in FVG: either from the group of ‘wives’ or from labour migrants who brought their families to FVG and intend to stay there for living. Stability of membership is crucial for associations as it helps a trust-based functioning of associations while mobility damages it (Grootaert, 2001, p. 14). At the interview time, the heads of associations were ‘wives’ except the association ‘Russkiy dom’, which is headed by a Belarusian man who first came to Italy as a host child of the program ‘Chernobyl’, then returned to Italy as a student and now lives and works in Trieste.

³⁵ <http://www.wcrj.org/organizations/402/>

Men participating in the events of associations are mostly husbands and children of women involved in the associations activities. Women in families considered to be networks keepers in general and supporters of links with associations in particular. Besides, there are several men who are professional artists or amateurs. Many women bring their children to events especially of school age, and in fact, many mothers become members of these associations for education of their children.

In terms of supra-national basis of Russian-speakers associations their national composition become a distinct trait and a point to observe. The participation of people of different nationalities clearly represents the occupational specifics of the respected national groups in FVG: at events one can see predominantly Moldovan two-parent families with their children, Italian-Russian families, Italian-Belarusian families, Ukrainian mothers with children or Ukrainian single women. However, associations have their specifics as they do not proportionally represent the whole immigrant population of Russian-speakers. In associations, there is a larger share of Russian female labour migrants and wives from the former Soviet republics than their share in the region scale. For example, a Kyrgyz woman who thinks that she is the only one Kyrgyz in FVG looks for interaction in the Russian-speaking association.

Italians also are participants of associations events. Mostly they are husbands or friends of Russian-speakers. A special case is Italian couples who adopted kids from Russia or Ukraine and want them to be aware of their roots and keep the knowledge of the Russian language by participation in folk groups and Russian language schools. Representatives of Italian authorities frequent some events of social and political orientation, for instance the evening organized in Palmanova in collaboration with the World Congress of Russian Jewry consecrated to the memory of victims of Kristallnacht.

It is interesting what the heads of the associations think of interethnic interaction among Russian-speakers as they observe many cases of such interaction.

When there are problems like registration here, renovation of permit of stay, searches of job, there are no language or ethnic or identity barriers. All address to all, and all look for everything. In general, it is a tendency among the Ukrainian women who arrive here for work. They start knocking all the doors, they start searching (the president of the CIDIR).

To achieve their goals the associations organize celebrations for civil and religious occasions. Mostly these are cultural events without political background. It is seen that many basics of interethnic interaction and of policy towards ethnic groups laid in the USSR moved abroad with its former citizens.

The focus of cultural events represents the Soviet traditions and habits. The main celebrations are New Year Day (usually the associations celebrate ‘Old New Year Day’ – New Year day according to the Julian calendar – as New Year day stays for celebration with families), 8th of March – Women’s day, 9th of May – Victory Day. These celebrations have equal importance for migrants from the ex-USSR despite their national or regional origin.

Celebrations of *Maslenitsa* (a folk celebration, corresponding to the Western Christian Carnival), Eastern Orthodox Christmas and Easter indicate that mostly the cultural events are centred around Slavic and in particular Russian culture. The same way performances for celebrations are based mostly on Russian cultural traditions, as it was in the USSR. The Russian culture as a uniting culture for different ethnicities within the Soviet Union tends to remain in this role in immigration. At the same time the content of performances includes also folklore of ‘smaller’ ethnic groups as it was in the USSR.

Consequently, the dance and song collectives of the associations use in their performances folk dances and songs of Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Moldovans, and Caucasian folk traditions. ‘We try to represent all the cultures of the former USSR. We have a Nanay dance. As they say, ‘*A single thread from everyone*’. The main thing is ethnic costumes’ (the president of ‘Unità’).

The Russian language is believed to be the uniting factor for associations members. ‘The language unites us. The doors of our association are open to all Russian-speakers’ (the president of ‘Russkiy dom’). Many activities of the associations are dedicated to the language maintenance and its manifestation as group heritage.

The associations organized small Russian language libraries (two of them exist in Udine and Trieste) and Saturday schools for children (in Udine, Palmanova and Trieste) with a primary aim to teach them Russian.

Many people want to support their Russian language. These are not only Russians but also people from former republics who are of age of 40-50 years old. They studied Russian in school and now they speak it perfectly. They want to pass on this knowledge to their children. Children from mixed families also frequent our school (the president of 'Russkiy dom').

The specifics of gender and educational proportions of Russian-speaking immigrants in FVG guaranteed the staff supply since a part of immigrant women have pedagogical degree and specialization in philology. Their degrees are not automatically acknowledged by Italian authorities but they are enough for Russian-speaking parents. Teachers of the Russian language do not have to be ethnically Russians, and there is no difference for students ethnic belonging as well. 'Our teacher, a Moldovan, does not make the division between ethnicities, or which passport you have in your pocket. She is an open minded person, and she is a nice person.' (president of the CIDIR). The president of the association 'Unità' says 'all the teachers who work for us are Ukrainians. Almost everyone of them taught the Russian language as a foreign language. Thus, they have an experience of teaching Russian as foreign language.' In the school of Trieste the teachers are Belarusians.

The schools also conduct artistic classes for children's acquaintance with Russian and Soviet culture. At children performances for matinees spectators might see a hodgepodge of Russian fairy tales, Soviet animated cartoons, Soviet children songs, and references to Italian life. Thanks to professional education of teachers these classes may have quite high level of training, like classes of dances at the group 'Alfa Dance' in Trieste organized by a man from Armenia and a woman from a Baltic state.

Thus, schools function as cultural vehicles for supplying an appreciation of history and traditions of their parents origin country. This education cultivates curiosity and the ability to identify with their homeland and to take pride in the ancestral culture.

The associations also propose the language classes for foreigners and translation services. The ethnically diverse composition of the associations led to a broader language repertoire. For example, 'Russkiy dom' provides the translation and interpreting services from Russian, Ukrainian, Moldovan, Armenian, Tatar, Azerbaijani, and Lithuanian.

Different hobby clubs appear and vanish in the frames of associations initiated by the members with particular interests and skills. The commonly encountered hobby clubs are dance and song groups with rather high professional level of their participants.

The cultural associations of Russian-speakers partly became the ground for artistic activities of people with specialized education. For example, the president of 'Unità' is a professional teacher of pop singing and a soloist of the orchestra graduated from the State Musical College named after the Gnessins in Moscow. There are professional ballerinas in some associations' dancing groups.

The artistic activities of associations are in great favour of the host society institutions and of sending states consulates.

We have a folklore ensemble "Steppe" and we organize exhibitions, festivals, concerts and not only in FVG. We have worked in Rome, Naples, since hardly anybody has folk groups. We are going to work to Teraccino, between Rome and Naples, on 2nd of May... Now we are invited to Rome. A Russian minister is coming there for celebration of 9 of May. The first secretary of the Russian embassy has called me and said that they need a concert but have no money. So, there must be a minimum of people and a maximum of professionalism (the president of 'Unità').

Assistance to immigrants with orientation in Italy being a highly important work is provided only by 'Russkiy dom' within a project of the province of Trieste. The association president tells,

When I arrived to Italy, I had to undergo different situations and I knew what people needed. I decided to help to my friends, than – to friends of my friends... We explain different legal questions starting from invitation of relatives, how to get a permit of stay, how to find a lodging, where to find a job, what kind of rights and obligations there are, how to open a bank account and remit the money to help relatives, how to learn the language, how to apply for citizenship, how to enter into a marriage with Italian or 'our', how exchange the passport for a new one. Our assistance is for Russian-speakers, and we have more Ukrainians addressing for consultations.

Indeed, many associations activities depend on the support of local authorities and non-governmental funds and, hence, on external links of associations.

The Russian-speakers associations establish and maintain relationships between one another, with host societies institutions, sending societies institutions, and with other immigrant organizations in FVG.

The inter-organizational relationships of the associations allow them to exchange with resources, transfer successful routines, establish communication networks and spread trust (Vermeulen, 2006, p. 53). The relations between Russian-speakers associations in FVG are friendly but usually they do not coordinate with one another at the regional level and at this point can hardly become a socio-political power in FVG to be able to speak with one voice.

The collaboration of the associations takes course in the frames of the Coordinating Council of Associations of Russian Compatriots in Italy of Italian North (KSAR SI), as three associations of FVG are its members and participate in the annual meeting of the Council. These meetings contribute to the associations links to the state and non-governmental institutions of the Russian Federation such as the RF Embassy in Rome, the RF Consulate in Milan, the Federal Agency 'Rossotrudnichestvo', the International Council of Russian Compatriots, the Fund 'Russian World' and others.

According to the associations leaders, they receive some help from Russia. For example, the president of 'Unità' says,

We receive a lot of help from the Embassy. They conduct the courses for the teachers [of the Russian language]. In 2009, we were in Vienna and got the textbooks for all our children from there, it is a kit from four books. These are very interesting textbooks created specially in Moscow for children abroad, who are neither Russians nor foreigners.

The president of 'Russkiy dom' mentioned non-material help of Russia – 'moral support'.

Any kind of help or support from embassies of other CIS states was not mentioned by the interviewees. The association 'Russkiy dom' has an intention to start a course of Ukrainian and counts on the textbooks supply form the Ukrainian Embassy which disseminates

textbooks of the Ukrainian language, but mostly did it among ‘purely’ Ukrainian associations.

The more active work of the Russian Federation authorities in supporting their ‘diasporas’ to a large extent is explained by the existence of ‘diaspora’ in Russian Near Abroad. The policy of the Russian Federation was aimed primarily to this population but later the Russians in Far Abroad joined the ‘world Russian diaspora’.

In Friuli-Venezia Giulia, the main connector with Russian-speakers organizations in other countries is CIDIR in Palmanova. This association invites artists and public figures from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, as well as activists of Russian associations from other Italian regions. For instance, at the celebration of 9 of May CIDIR hosted a musical group of Russian-speakers from Israel. Besides, with the help of this association some children participate in summer Russian language camps organized in Italy, other European countries or Russia.

The Russian-speaking associations maintain the relations with organizations of other immigrant groups, partly because of activities of the Union of Communities and Associations of Immigrants of Friuli-Venezia Giulia (UCAI FVG), which includes 56 immigrant associations from FVG. There is also the separated national association of Ukrainians ‘Ucraina-Friuli’ and a Moldovan association. The relationships of the Russian-speakers associations with the Ukrainian association were not univocal in the beginning but the change of its leader seemed to make relationships better. This case demonstrates the dependence of associational policies on the leaders’ personal ideas and views.

Our president is in Codroipo. She is for the purity of culture, the purity of language and almost for shutting in our shell. We are already far from our Motherland and to divide nations into groups, sub-nations is not wise, in my opinion. We conducted cultural events but we could not do them together with the Russian association, because she does not like it, that is we should ‘preserve ourselves’. I am against it (an activist of ‘Ucraina-Friuli’).

With the change of leaders in the Ukrainian association the president of the Russian-speakers association in Udine reports to have good relations with Ukrainian community:

There is Father Roman, a Ukrainian. We meet each other often. He was going to make a book about caregivers, I helped him: I had found writers, translators. Then they organized a celebration of the Ukrainian Independence Day, we were honorary guests. You can imagine this: the independence from Russia, and we are their guests – complete insanity! Nevertheless we have peaceful relations, we wonderfully interact.

The Moldovan association in Udine was organized by a Moldovan woman with the help of theUCAI FVG but this association is not active yet. Still, the intention to create an independent association is a significant mark of development of the Moldovan community in FVG.

The Russian-speakers associations also interact with religious organizations, first of all with Eastern Orthodox parishes. The president of CIDIR believes such interaction to be advantages to both sides:

In Venice they first organized the Orthodox parish and then a secular organization. Why is it convenient? Because a secular organization can do some things together with a parish, to obtain grants from state and so on. A parish can do another things together with support of a secular organization. As they say, ‘two hands hold one head’. It is great that people work together (I am speaking about Venice), conduct mass events, and promote language, culture, and religious belonging.

Religion becomes another factor for expanding network as it is observable from the example of ‘Russkiy dom’ in Trieste which has well-established tradition of mutual support with the Serbian Orthodox church.³⁶

The associations function as hubs for information flows, and a place of meeting and finding friends. Some migrants address them to the associations for orientation on the first phase of their arrival or later when faced to some problems. Except strictly instrumental and informational help associations provide emotional and psychological support.

³⁶ I go into greater detail in the following part dedicated to religion and church.

In the terms of networking, associations establish ties and reduce opportunistic behaviour by creating repeated interaction among individuals, which enhances trust (Dasgupta, 1988, Gambetta, 1988, Fukuyama, 1995, cited in Grootaert, 2001, p. 14). At the organizational level associations function as places for discussions and joint decisions on questions important for Russian-speakers as a community (establishment of the Russian Orthodox parish and Saturday schools for children).

The associations of Russian-speakers in FVG provide people with links to their motherlands, educate children. Many want to maintain their Russian language and to pass it on to their children. Besides, the associations present Russian-speakers to the host society and create a positive image of Russian-speakers in FVG.

The character of the Russian-speaking immigrant population in FVG led to appearance of several Russian-speakers associations with emphasis in their activities on Russian children schools. The associations unite people despite their ethnonational origin or social status in Italy. To a great extent the unificating process is based on the principles of interethnic interaction and total equality existed in the USSR.

The Russian-speakers cultural associations use the patterns of the Soviet model of nationalities policy with Russian culture as a pivot and with representation of other cultures. The post-Soviet period added new traits to it, such as Eastern Orthodox culture and attention to the religious part of life in general. The policy of the Russian Federation towards 'Russian compatriots' caused the inclination of the associations to 'Russian world'. The appearance and activities of the associations are influenced by the policy of the receiving society embodied in the financing from the region, provinces and communes.

The associations are linked to other Russian-speakers organizations in Europe and in the world through organizations of Russian compatriots, of so-called 'Russian world', and of Russian Jewry.

In general, the number of the Russian-speakers associations in FVG indicates the evolution of immigration process, but this process is not mature as the types of their activities coincide and there are no specific organizations divided according particular interests of certain groups of immigrant population (e.g. artistic, sports, youth, and women organizations).

An important role in migrants communities and networks is played by **religious organizations**³⁷. Often religious practices of immigrants take place on the individual level. When religious life takes on its form in organizational state, it may become one of the resources of social capital for immigrants, as immigrants religious institutions develop community centres, along with places of worship, social spaces, and activities whose function it is to maintain social ties among members.

Many studies have emphasized that religious communities have been among the oldest and most successful venues for generating social capital. Shared cultural outlooks, regular gatherings, and similar systems of beliefs that promote sacrifice and assistance are instrumental in the success of religious communities (Kazemipur, 2002, p. 14).

The network based on the religious participation in some cases joins, in others initiates, but anyway evolves the immigrants' networks. Namely because of the role in establishing informal networks immigrants' religious congregations are believed to be helpful for adaptation and incorporation of immigrants into host society. Except the primary reason – the desire for religious and spiritual support, immigrants contact and become involved with religious organizations for a range of reasons as different case studies reveal. Religious organizations provide formal and informal social services aimed at facilitating the process of adaptation (Bankston and Zhou, 1995; Ebaugh and Chafetz, 2000). They provide connections to housing, food, and other necessities of life for the largely illegal immigrants who frequent them. Other organizations offer language instruction and classes to help with navigating the naturalization process (Cagde and Ecklund, 2006, p. 1575). Some congregations provide formal ethnic programs for second-generation children that help young people to reach higher levels of academic achievements and to avoid dangerous and destructive forms of behavior (Bankston and Zhou, 1995).

A network of immigrant adherents supports a broader network of co-ethnics or/and co-nationals but at the same time may segregate them. The study of the immigrants from the post-Soviet space in Italy demonstrates these two trends, when existing 'Russian-speaking' network overlaps with religious congregations.

³⁷ A part about religion is based on Zayakhanova, 2010; 2011.

The portrayal of the religious situation within the group of Russian-speaking immigrants in Italy cannot be restricted to only Russian Orthodoxy, as well as Russian Orthodox believers cannot be limited to one ethnic and national group.

The Russians, the Ukrainians and the Moldovans are three ex-Soviet nations which mostly represent the post-Soviet space and Russian Orthodoxy in Italy and in Friuli-Venezia Giulia in particular. While Russian immigrants are not that numerous (25.786) as Ukrainian or Moldovan immigrants (174.129 and 105.600)³⁸, they are considered to be the backbone for the Russian Orthodox church in Italy, as the Russian Orthodox believers constitute the majority of the population of Russia. There are no official data on the number of members of one or another confession in Russia, but according to the survey by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center WCIOM³⁹ (December, 2006), approximately 91 million people consider themselves to be Orthodox believers.

In Moldova and Ukraine the Orthodox adherents are divided between respectively the Moldovan Orthodox church and the Metropolis of Bessarabia (under the Romanian Orthodox church), and between the Ukrainian Orthodox church of Kyiv Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Orthodox church of Moscow Patriarchate, and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church. Additionally, in Ukraine a significant body of Christians belongs to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic church.

At the same time the Eastern Christianity is believed to be unifying factor for the Orthodox Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Moldovans. Kuznetsova (2011) states that the shared religion 'gives to the people being in fold a form for keeping memory about their history, their ancestors, which becomes an organic part of their culture' (p. 280). She illustrates her statement with such facts as the Russian Orthodox believers pray on the one language, live according to one calendar, celebrating the introduction of Christianity into Russia, the memory of saints Cyril and Methodius on 'Slavonic Literature and Culture Day', remembering soldiers died on Kulikovo pole and during the Great Patriotic War (ibid, pp. 285-294). According to Kuznetsova, the Patriarch of Moscow and all Rus' is the uniting figure for all the Orthodox believers on the space of ex-USSR (except Georgia). They pray for him on every liturgy in every church subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate of the

³⁸ by 31.12.2009, Caritas/ Migrants 2010.

³⁹ <http://wciom.com>

Russian Orthodox Church (ibid, p. 284). It is also pointed out that pilgrimage for the saint places on the territories of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus gives the feeling of common roots and the unity of history (ibid, pp. 299-300).

Thus, on the one hand, the Russian Orthodox Church is traditionally multiethnic, using the territorial but not ethnic factor for its organization, and it might remain the same abroad. On the other hand, divisions of Orthodox believers in Ukraine and Moldova can be projected in emigrants' communities.

Apart from Eastern Orthodox believers, among Russian-speaking migrants in FVG there is a number of Greek Catholics, Muslims, Jews, few adherents of Armenian church, Protestantism, Buddhism and of new religious movements. A part of the former Soviets are atheists.

Still, the principal role in the Russian-speaking community of FVG plays the Russian Orthodox church because of the demographic specificity of the immigrant flow: the prevalence of ethnically Russians, Ukrainians and Moldovans leads to a greater share of orthodox believers. Besides, Orthodoxy is important for Russian-speaking immigrants because of the cultural tradition as Alessio D'Angelo, a co-editor of the *Dossier Statistico Immigrazione Caritas/Migrantes*, puts it:

in the case of Russia 16,3% of its population is openly orthodox, but it is incontestable that, at least from the cultural point of view, Orthodoxy is a general root for the majority of the Russians, as Catholicism and Protestantism are in secular Western Europe (D'Angelo, 2004, p. 69).

There is no exact number of orthodox believers of the Moscow Patriarchate in Friuli Venezia Giulia. According to the data of Caritas/Migrantes there are 26.975 *all orthodox immigrants* in FVG (31.12.2007) (Caritas/Migrantes, 2009, p. 207). As the priest Aleksey (Yastrebov) of the Venetian Russian Orthodox parish and a visiting priest of the Udine Russian Orthodox parish believes,

Here the terms 'Russian-speaking' and 'Orthodox' overlap to a great extent, match. It is not possible to say that they are the same, but they match to

significant degree. About 80 percent of Russian-speakers are orthodox believers here.

The Russian Orthodox (the Moscow Patriarchate) parish is the only one in Friuli-Venezia Giulia. *Parrocchia dell'Esaltazione della Croce del Cristo* is located in Udine and was established in September 2001 on the base of the Russian orthodox community that existed from 1999. The history of the organization of the Russian Orthodox parish in Udine confirms it as the appearance of the parish is a result of actions of the Russian-speaking network of FVG.

It was established by the group of associates, not everyone of them were orthodox believers but they lent support. Previously, the letter to the His Holiness Patriarch Aleksei was written, containing 90 signatures, half of them were from permanent residents,

witnesses the president of the Centre of International Development between Italy and Russia (CIDIR) Elena Toukchoumskaia.

Still the parish is supported by the Russian-speaking believers and exists on the donations of its parishioners.

Today *Parrocchia dell'Esaltazione della Santa Croce* numbers about 100 regular parishioners who originally are from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. The majority of Udine parishioners are Ukrainians. According to the president of CIDIR Elena Toukchoumskaia, the Ukrainians comprise about 60 percent of the parishioners. This can be explained by both their larger presence in FVG and their stronger religiosity. The priest Aleksey who has been serving in Italy for seven years thinks that Moldovans and Ukrainians go to church more often than Georgians, Serbs and Russians.

In the situation of a small and thus limited in its resources the Udine parish, immigrants attend it (of course, except for religious practice) to spend time with others from their ethnic and religious group and to maintain their Orthodox identity.

This common religious identity becomes the uniting factor for Orthodox people of different nations, according to the priest Aleksey:

Ethnically the Moldovans and the Ukrainians cannot unite together, there is no way. It must cling either to ideology of the former soviet Union or imperial ideology, there are no other variants... That is why the church is a rich soil for the internationalism in the finest sense of this word and for onward motion in all senses – in spiritual sense and in civil sense as well... Our aim and opportunity is that people at least do not feel enemies and percept those important events which we all had, like the 9th of May⁴⁰, as not something negative but positive experience, common value, that unites us.

In Udine there is also a community of Ukrainian Greek Catholics which is ethnically homogenous and mostly unites Ukrainian-speakers. Another parishes and communities frequented by the Russian-speaking immigrants (Romanian Orthodox parish, Serbian Orthodox parish, Protestant parishes, etc.) are also established by another immigrant groups.

Away from home, in FVG, orthodox believers from considered nations are divided between three churches: a part (mostly Russians and Ukrainians) attend the parish of the Moscow Patriarchate, another part (Moldovans and few Ukrainians) go to the parish of the Romanian Orthodox church, and other part (mostly Ukrainians) go to the community of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic church, despite its catholic belonging.

A part of those who live in FVG attend the liturgies at the Moscow Patriarchate's church in Venice. Furthermore, the fact that the Church Slavonic language is the ritual language for Serbian church, together with the unity of sacraments of Russian and Serbian churches, makes it possible for adherents of the Moscow Patriarchate to attend liturgies at the Serbian Orthodox Church in Trieste. The Serbian church of St Spyridon groups around itself the Serbian community of Trieste and Orthodox community in general as it embraces migrants from different countries under the sole condition that they be Orthodox. In turn, Serbs sometimes attend the liturgies at the Udine Russian parish.

Such a variety, on the one hand, provides the Russian-speaking orthodox believers and the Russian-speaking network with extent ties, and, on the other hand, divides them and makes the network less dense.

⁴⁰ Victory Day.

The multiethnic character of the congregation also brings about some challenges. The major of them, according to the analysis by Ebaugh (2003) are issues related to: language usage, which is often a highly contested issue and one that poses dilemmas for the clerical and lay leaders responsible for congregational policy; incorporation of ethnic customs, when emphasis on ethnic differences in multiethnic congregations can cause ethnic segregation; and participation in the administration of congregational affairs.

Whereas for the Church of the Moscow Patriarchate there is no question which language to use for worship services (it is the Church Slavonic language), a part of Eastern Orthodox believers prefer to go to other churches with the usage of their native language. (In Udine, foremost Moldovans attend Romanian Orthodox parish where the service is hold in Romanian). The awareness of ethnically different parishioners makes the priests additionally use the Italian language during the service or the Romanian language as in the case of the Venetian parish. However, the priest of the Venetian parish Aleksey finds that the problem of the language use is attributed more to the future and to the hypothetical situations:

If there were a significant part or a half of the parish [of the Italian parishioners], then it would be possible to fulfill the liturgy once a month completely in Italian – after all, all ours understand Italian. [...] Even with loss of the language, we should consider this variant as well, there is the national identity, which we have to retain somehow, even despite the fact that a person does not speak Russian at all. There could be even the course of the Russian language for Italian-speakers... As Greeks – they have courses of Modern Greek. Whom they conduct these courses for? It is obvious, that anyone may join, but still there are people among them who descended from mixed marriages and who wanted to know their native language.

As for today's situation, in the Udine parish people use Russian as a mean of communication. 'Language is a huge field that unites people, in our case – people of different ethnicities, even in the borders of Russia, not speaking of the USSR' (priest Aleksey). Though it is not rare when women from Ukraine speak Ukrainian in the parish. The proximity of Russian and Ukrainian languages make the languages understandable for both sides and does not make it necessary to create 'parallel congregations' rather than one congregation.

The incorporation of ethnic customs in the activities of a congregation is both inclusive and exclusive for multiethnic congregations: on the one hand, it creates a sense of ethnic identity and makes immigrants feel comfortable in the religious setting; on the other hand, it can alienate members of different ethnic groups. It seems that case of the Russian Orthodox church is exceptional because of its history and experience: Italian researchers looking on from an outside perspective point out that the historical presence of various ethnic groups and languages under one united territorial administration has encouraged the coexistence of different cultures and customs in Russia. This factor influenced the Russian Orthodox Church and let Western orthodox people assimilate easily (Introvigne and Zocattelli, 2006, p. 116).

More challenging issue for the Russian Orthodox parishes abroad is connected with ethnic representation among clerical leaders, on administrative boards, and in the lay leadership. In the conditions of the small parish of Udine this issue is solved in a functional way. It is more important that the priest has a possibility to arrive and serve in Udine than his ethnic or national belonging (but in the frames of the Moscow Patriarchate). Thus, the Udine parish was served by Moldovan, Russian and Ukrainian orthodox priests. The parish's churchwarden, a Russian woman married to an Italian, has more stable position to keep the parish in comparison with Ukrainian domestic workers who might move to another region or return home. The parish's acolyte, a lay man who helps to serve, is a young man from Ukraine. The choir constitutes from Ukrainian and Russian women.

However, the most numerous part of Russian-speakers, whether they attributed to Orthodoxy or Catholicism or another religion, do not attend their ethnic church at all. The majority of the respondents⁴¹ – 77 people – reported never attending their ethnic church.

The low level of church attendance, the religious division within Russian-speakers, and the division within Russian-speaking orthodox believers lead to the absence of one uniting place for broad social interaction and wider networking on the base of religious institutions. The Udine parish lacked a permanent priest, who could change this state of things: in the situation when the church is represented in the person of one priest rather than institutionally, his role can scarcely be overestimated.

⁴¹ From the survey conducted among the Russian-speaking immigrants in FVG in 2010 (N=127).

The small size of the unique Udine parish influences its development in two ways: people sometimes do not know about the existence of the parish, and more people would go to church if there was a greater opportunity to meet more people there – to communicate with their friends and to establish new contacts.

Nevertheless with the permanent priest the parish in its present state considerably contributes to the interaction between Russian-speakers. The cultural associations of Russian-speakers participate in religious celebrations, the priest and the parishioners take part in events of cultural associations - it can be an illustration of how religious institutions and their members interact within a larger community context.

As it was noticed in the research of London and Amsterdam Russian communities, ‘even if not all Russian churchgoers in London and Amsterdam are religious in any strict sense, the church functions as a magnet for those who feel alienated from Russian culture. For occasional church attendants, the Orthodox church seems more of social club than a religious organization’ (Kopnina, 2005, p. 176).

The CIDIR’s president points out that the parish is ‘not only an institution of the religious format but a family in the conditions of the diaspora’:

Why do people come to the parish? People come not only to pray to the God, but to exchange their books, to find a job, to talk about who knows what: which doctor to go to, where to find the Russian language course to send a child to – that is a normal secular life goes there but in the frames of the religious community, that I believe to be absolutely normal.

The church becomes a place for interaction across borders of *social positions*, but in the case of the Udine parish it does not happen to a great extent, as they are *women labour migrants* who regularly attend the Russian orthodox parish in Udine: about 80 percent of parishioners are labour migrants, or putting it more precisely and noting that about 80 percent of parishioners are women, they are domestic workers in Italy. This corresponds to the observation of Perotto (2009, p. 71) made at the Bologna Orthodox parish that mostly the more devout parishioners are Ukrainian and Moldovan women with comparatively modest social background.

Social isolation of women who work in as caregivers 6 days a week (majority of Russian-speaking caregivers) may lead to the absence of social life and connections with groups or communities, and then the church community becomes a place of such congregation. Stresses caused by work and by problems in family left at home may force to the reconsideration of the role of religion. All together these factors explain the higher presence of domestic workers in the parish of Udine where they receive the kinds of religious and ethnic community support not available in other parts of their lives.

As for the groups of Russian-speakers with other social positions, students almost never visit the parish, and only restricted number of 'wives' attend service there despite the fact that mostly they have heard of the parish or even attended it earlier. Generally, it can be explained by the 'Soviet atheistic heritage' in Russia, where the belief is more instinctive than denominational: seven out of ten adults claim that they believe in God, but much less of them regularly attend church services (Chernyh, 1999, p. 148). In reference to this social side of church membership, it seems that a part of students and working wives, on the one hand, receive their portion of social interaction during the working week and more tend to spend weekend's mornings alone or with their family. On the other hand, they may use this free time to develop ties with non-ethnics. For example, wives are engaged with their families activities on weekends and often go to Catholic church with their children. While the Russian wives are few in the parish, they function as the backbone of the parish, since they are permanent residents in FVG. One of them is a churchwarden, playing an important role in the parish in the situation of not having a regular priest.

Women in general stay parish-holders by their number and frequency of church attendance. The results of the survey demonstrate that the majority of churchgoers are women (42 persons) with the mean age of 49 years old. Men attend the church less often. From 21 men included in the survey five men attend church at least 'seldom', mostly appearing for big church celebrations. Few children attend the liturgies with their mothers and they do not receive religious education at the parish since there is no Sunday school for them, however there are plans to organize such a school with a regular priest. The Saturday Russian schools for children organized in Udine and in Trieste by Russian-speaking associations have no lessons dedicated to religion at the present moment.

In the Udine parish there are also some Italians; they can either be those who have Russian or Ukrainian wives or those who have orthodox friends. There are other cases, described by the CIDIR president: 'Italians do not come because of their idle curiosity, these are people who really believe in God and hope that a miracle can happen in this church. They come because they are in need: they are ill or have some problems'. These people do not become members of Russian-speaking network, while those who attend the parish with their wives or friends are already members of this network in spite of their level of proficiency in the Russian language.

Another creation of immigrant population is **ethnic enterprises** and immigrants shops which are regulated by the law of supply and demand. The demand for specific ethnic goods and services gave rise to appearance of Ukrainian and Moldovan 'parks' in Udine and Pordenone which function as informal meeting places and small markets of ethnic food. Every week minibuses from Moldova and Ukraine bring small amounts of food for selling it in one-two days of a stop in a town. Besides, they transport passengers and parcels between Italy and Moldova or Ukraine and bring money from Italy to immigrants families but these services are available to co-nationals only.

For all Russian-speakers Ukrainian parks act partially as ethnic shops, as the drivers say that not only Ukrainians buy some goods from them.

Different people come here to buy something, but they are from the Soviets, they speak Russian. They buy from us the food they miss – buckwheat, black bread, herring. But of course, mostly our clients are Ukrainians (a driver from Chernovtsy, Ukraine).

Otherwise, in Udine there is a Romanian grocery shop selling some 'Russian' food (supplied by a Ukrainian woman) and there is a shop of a Russian couple. In fact this food is imported from Germany where large Russian-speaking immigrant population exists. Selling food from these points is definitely aimed at immigrant population and fulfilled by co-nationals with knowledge of tastes and preferences of migrants.

The knowledge about goods available from these private sellers is handed over from one person to another.

Many our customers get information about us from one other. Besides, we sell some goods at celebrations of the association. There we give to people our visiting cards with our mobile numbers and our address. If someone asks for something special, we get them know when this product arrives via sms (a couple selling 'Russian' food).

Another strategy is implemented in the shop 'Russkiy dom' (a namesake of the association) in Trieste. Its owner, who is a Georgian, tells that his shop sells Russian food and souvenirs for Italians, not for Russian-speakers: 'Who is going to buy these goods from the former Soviets? There are only care-givers here.' While the owner had graduated from the Italian university with a degree of architect, he decided to run another kind of business since 'there were no opportunities for me to find a job in my profession in Italy'.

In general, the food on sale represents the diversity of potential customers and the mixture of different ethnic cuisines in the former USSR: there are food products of different ethnic groups of the ex-USSR – from Belarusian birch sap to Georgian spices.

The proprietors of a cafe of the Russian bliny in the centre of Udine reckoned on Italian clients from the beginning but soon they realized that many Russian-speakers go to their place as well. Lyudmila, one of two Russian women who opened *blinnaya* in 2011, said that Ukrainians and Azeri visit their cafe. As in the case with ethnic groceries' consumption eating bliny in this cafe is partially a sort of symbolic consumption where bliny is a nostalgic product.

In Udine, there is a particular small enterprise – agency 'Vostok' - organized by a Ukrainian immigrant in Ferrara and being awarded by Camera di Commercio of Ferrara for 'the originality of activity' ('La Nuova Ferrara', 2006). It helps immigrants solve different legal questions. The agency in Udine is one of its six branches. It has Italian staff but it keeps its target on immigrant population and Russian-speakers first of all.

Additionally, as the president of theUCAI FVG pointed out in her interview to the newspaper 'Messaggero Veneto', many Ukrainian women and women from the ex-USSR decided to take a step of establishing their business, opening laundries and tailor's shops (Barella, 2007). According to one of ethnic entrepreneurship theories, it is explained not so

much by the entrepreneurial character of the studied population as by its reaction to blocked opportunities in the labour market (Volery, 2007, p. 31).

Russian-speaking press is a form of functioning culture of Russia abroad and a factor of enculturation of Russian-speaking immigrants (Sevach, 2011, p. 4). In this research, Russian-speaking press is studied first of all as an institution uniting Russian-speaking immigrants.

Mass media is crucial in providing the basis on which groups of immigrants perceive themselves a community – ‘imagined’ (Anderson, 1983) or ‘symbolic’ (Hunter, 1974). The role of native-language press is evident in following: the consolidation of different immigrant group into a wider community of Russian-speakers in Italy, elaboration of its common values, stereotypes and interests, the reinforcement of the Russian language, culture and the symbols of common heritage, performance of organizing function, structuring different social groups and merging them into a community. The immigrant press strives for group cohesion to overcome the contradictions between groups, as the need for moral support, understanding and cooperation seems to be very high (Zilberg and Leshem, 1996, p. 186). Immigrant papers are not only sources of information for new immigrants, but also serve as agents for promoting their social and economic activity.

There are two types of newspapers produced in Italy for Russian-speaking immigrant population in FVG: 1) small local newsletters for a restricted circle of readers; 2) newspapers of the national level.

The associations or the parish intend to publish and time to time publish small newsletters. An example of it is the newsletter ‘Leleka’ published by the Ukrainian association and distributed for free through the Ukrainian Greek Catholic religious community. Such newsletters function as announcement boards giving information about up-coming events in an association or a parish. They hardly can be determined as real mass media with their particular functions and role in an immigrant community.

Russian-speaking newspapers operating at the national Italian level are ‘La Nostra Gazzetta’ and ‘Slovo’. Both periodicals are informational newspapers functioning also as popular digests. The weekly newspaper ‘Slovo’ primarily appeared in Portugal. Now it consists of three parts devoted to Portugal, Spain, and Italy and it is distributed in these countries. It is

interesting whether this newspaper has any effect on the mobility of labour migrants between these countries, as its information can help migrants get know about opportunities in other countries and get ready to re-orientate and adapt to a new environment. The part dedicated to Italy is smaller than a 'Portuguese' part and has news about the main political events in the country. The editorials are published in Russian.

'La Nostra Gazzetta' is an Italian biweekly newspaper in the Russian language with summaries of materials in Italian. It has a circulation of 20, 000 copies. The newspaper covers world news, 'news from motherland', Italian news, topics of economy, culture, religion, history. It has no direct targeting at women audience but with respect to the gender proportion of Russian-speaking immigrants in Italy it contains columns about cuisine and children education which are considered to be interesting for women. Mostly the 'news from homeland' covers the Russian news and therefore it enables its multi-national readers to maintain continued participation in Russian affairs.

Zilberg and Leshem (1996) who studied Russian language press in Israel note that 'the popularity of the native-language press among Russian immigrants can be explained by the tradition brought from the country of origin. Reading was a favourite way of leisure for average Russian citizens...' (p. 179). Despite this developed 'reading culture' the Russian language immigrant newspapers are not in high demand in FVG. It does not mean that the custom to read press was not transferred to new place of living. The development of online press, availability of imported Russian and Ukrainian press in FVG and interest to Italian press might cause the dispersion of audience. Besides, among Russian-speaking immigrants there are people belonging to different functional groups, who being even of the same nationality are bearers of sometimes mismatching cultural stereotypes, practices and skills. They could need more newspapers to match their tastes.

There are no intellectual debates in the existing Russian-speaking media in Italy. The examined newspapers have no their own information sources in the NIS states and they have not succeeded to become a 'floor' for Russian-speaking writers, publicists living or sojourning in Italy; the later prefer to make publications in their correspondent home press. Likewise, Russian-speaking bloggers living in Italy are more known at home country (for example Andrey Mal'gin whose record about vacations of the Russian President's wife in

Italy was reprinted by many Russian and Ukrainian news agencies). Thus the Italian Russian-speaking press has a limited influence on Russian-speakers in Italy.

Both newspapers cost about two euro at retail and they are run mostly as commercially-motivated organizations. They actively advertise immigrant business (import/export trade with the CIS, small businesses, restaurants and cafe, tourist agencies, Russian schools and courses, etc.). 'La Nostra Gazzeta' and 'Slovo' are examples of adaptation to Western conditions. While in regard to the press of the White emigration in Berlin it was noted that assimilation of newspapers was weaker than assimilation of emigrants themselves and their children (Lysenko, 2000).

In general, the Russian-language newspapers act as vehicles of commercial and social interaction between Russian-speakers. The mere existence of these newspapers institutionalizes the Russian-speaking migrants, the newspapers unite readers despite their nationalities and contribute to their better understanding one another.

Thereby, Russian-speaking migrants in Friuli-Venezia Giulia have several places for communication and interaction. First of all, this is cultural associations of immigrants from the former USSR. The Eastern Orthodox parish is also of great importance for Russian-speakers, but it does not act a central uniting institution for them. It is connected not so much with diverse religious belonging of Russian-speakers (still the majority of them in FVG are Eastern Orthodox) as with a general not high level of religiousness of the former Soviets. As for the existing religious differences inside the Russian-speaking population, they add another layer of complexity for Russian-speaking immigrants.

The parish and associations despite their local and fragmented character and financial vulnerability, function as hubs of Russian-speakers network, where meetings and interaction take place as well as assertion of identity which is mostly build by laws laid in the Soviet policy for nationalities. They provide Russian-speakers with interaction, companionship and psychological support. However, the associations do not coordinate with one another and at this point can hardly become a socio-political power in FVG to be able to speak with one voice.

In FVG ethnic entrepreneurship of Russian-speakers is aimed first of all at selling ethnic goods. Shops and markets have different targets and different customers. So far, they supply a need in ethnic goods – either as real consumption with relation to more cheap and customary alimentation (mostly, for a group of caregivers who seek to save money to send them home), or as symbolic consumption. Apart from ethnic goods, need in assistance with legal procedures and documents becomes an obvious demand of Russian-speaking migrants. To supply this demand the agency ‘Vostok’ was organized by an immigrant woman from Ukraine.

Russian-language newspapers in Italy do not enjoy wide popularity as one could expect considering the specifics of Russian-speaking immigrant population character such as habitude to read periodicals and newspapers and inheritance of traditions of the White emigration press (Garzonio, n.d.). The limited audience of the newspapers in Italy can be connected with development of online press and online sources of information which allow to get news about homeland and necessary information on the internet, along with the quality of published newspapers in consequence with lack of staff and absence of distinct editorial line which could attract readers by the original delivery of information. In general, newspapers act as commercially-motivated organizations and try to satisfy people from different countries and different social groups. At the same time even the existence of these newspapers institutionalizes the Russian-speaking migrants, the newspapers unite readers despite their nationalities and contribute to their better understanding one another.

CONCLUSION

This study arose out of two concerns. The first originated in the methodological nationalism prevailing in migration studies nowadays. As the case of Russian-speaking migrants in the far abroad demonstrates, it is not a decisive approach. This study is an attempt to conceptualize migrants' interaction in the boundaries actually perceived by the migrants, moving beyond simplistic division into discrete national migrant flows.

The second concern arose from the recent discussion about Russian-speaking migrants in different countries. The Russian-speaking migrants are defined as migrants originated from the former republics of the USSR who share historical destinies, common social roles, interests, and culture. The current study focuses on social processes and relations – the real ties and interactions among Russian-speakers in the far abroad – rather than examines subjective identification answering the question whether different ethnic groups of people speaking Russian consider themselves as one group.

To evaluate interethnic interaction and ties among Russian-speakers a network approach was used. The network approach is often applied in the study of immigrants but not for interethnic interaction of immigrants. The advantage of analysing the interethnic interaction in the frames of networks for the scope of this study is that it allows for a better understanding of the way in which interethnic ties are formed and used.

In the frames of network approach prerequisites for interaction of Russian-speaking migrants in the far abroad were set as follows: kinship and friendship ties, common traditions and similar life experience, and the influence of receiving society. In Chapter 1 these foundations were introduced and explained for the particular case of Russian-speakers in Italy. It is expected that prerequisites for interethnic networking of Russian-speakers originated in internal migrations, intermarriages, and fostered cultural affinity which were distinctive for the USSR. Besides, it is assumed that the contemporary Russian-speaking immigration into the states of the far abroad continues from the previous Soviet emigration and in the case of Italy from the previous migration from the Russian Empire. In Italy the pre-revolutionary Russian-speaking migration fell not so much into ethnic groups of migrants as into their social classes and reasons of migration to Italy, namely: vacationers, students, pilgrims, and political exiles.

The post-Soviet migration became divided into national flows from the former republics of the USSR in compliance with their national building. As Chapter 2 revealed the most numerous flows of Russian-speaking migrants to Italy and the region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia (FVG) are from Ukraine, Moldova, and Russia and caused by labour migration, marriages to Italians, and studying. In the labour migration flow there is a specific flow of domestic workers, the actors of which we distinguished in this study in a separate group for analysis because of the massive character and particular features of this occupation.

The networking process among Russian-speakers is discussed in Chapter 3 in two dimensions: individual level and organizational level. At the individual level of analysis, the networking process of Russian-speakers in FVG was compared to the interaction with other observable actors in migrants lives, such as compatriots, other immigrants, and members of receiving society. This comparison and opposition allowed to provide an intrinsic view on interethnic interaction of Russian-speakers. The quality of these ties and interaction was examined via different types of support available through such interaction: information, material aid and resource assistance, emotional aid, companionship. In the context of this study logic the ties among Russian-speakers might be stronger and more often actualized as to compare with the ties with other immigrants or local population.

The quantitative research (n=127) revealed that networks of compatriots play the first role in the migrants lives, while ties with Russian-speakers from other CIS states are of second importance on the average. The exception was the Russian newspapers consumption among non-Russian CIS migrants which surpassed the consumption of home country press. The ties with migrants from other CIS states become actual in the cases of searching information, a need in small loans and for emotional support.

The analysis was conducted for different groups of Russian-speaking migrants which appear depending on migrants' nationality, occupation, gender, age, plans for future, length of living in Italy. It is interesting that for labour migrants group the interethnic interaction within Russian-speaking network was found to be helpful for job and accommodation search. The absence of such support for other types of migrants can be explained, on the one hand, by non-mature network and on the other hand, by more individual model of migration among them.

The discussion of organizational level of the Russian-speaking network (based on observation and 14 interviews with experts) showed that the Russian Orthodox parish and Russian-speaking associations despite their local and fragmented character and financial vulnerability, function as hubs of Russian-speakers network, where meetings and interaction take place as well as assertion of identity. They provide Russian-speakers with companionship and psychological support. However, the associations do not coordinate with one another and at this point can hardly become a socio-political power in FVG to be able to speak with one voice. The Moscow Patriarchate parish is also of great importance for Russian-speakers, but it does not act a central uniting institution for them. It is explained not so much by diverse religious belonging of Russian-speakers (still the majority of them in FVG are Eastern Orthodox) as by a general not high level of manifested religiousness of the former Soviets. In FVG ethnic entrepreneurship of Russian-speakers involves first of all selling ethnic goods and targets at both Russian-speaking clients and local population. The Russian-language newspapers published in Italy do not enjoy wide popularity but their mere existence institutionalizes the Russian-speaking migrants; the newspapers unite readers despite their nationalities and contribute to their better understanding one another. In general, the analysis of the organizational level found out that Russian-speakers' networking is mostly built by laws laid in the Soviet policy for nationalities where the Russian culture was the pillar for interaction and as it is reinforced by the discourse of contemporary Russia.

The case of Russian-speaking migrants in Italy shows that interethnic interaction is in existence in the frames of networks regardless the ethnicity's ability of boundary-making.

For all that division of Russian-speaking immigrants in Italy depending on their status, education, age and plans for future (that also resides in ethno-national groups of migrants) and depending on their nationality and citizenship, the uniting potential of Russian-speakers, revealed in the form of a social network, stays an important factor for both sending and receiving migrants sides.

A limitation of this study is that data were collected only from members of Russian-speaking network themselves what raises a question of accuracy of the results. Thus, an important next step will be collect data from representatives of the host society: e.g., experts working with immigrants can provide an outside look at the Russian-speaking networking.

In regard to future directions, one area of interest concerns the data from young people who were born in the last years of the Soviet period or after the USSR dissolution. Such a comparison was not executed in the current study as the number of such young people was not enough to draw any conclusions about their insertion into the Russian-speaking network. Additionally, research on immigrants' children living in Italy will contribute to the theme of multi-ethnic network. Whether they will assimilate with Italians or live transnational lives or they will pay a tribute to their family history without knowledge of language, history and culture of the country of origin – it will influence their attitude towards other Russian-speakers, their desire and ability to activate their connections within a multi-ethnic field, and their embeddedness into Russian-speaking network. In general, it will be useful to study interaction of immigrants from the NIS in future as more time from the USSR existence passes. The future of the Russian-speakers' networking is rather difficult to predict at the moment, as the policies of Russia and other NIS states may influence this process. Therefore, the development of Russian-speaking network remains open empirical question.

A valuable direction for the future research will be to evaluate the role of Russian-speaking network in the integration process in comparison with immigrants who stay within their national network and do not join the Russian-speaking network.

Finally, we also believe that there is a need in studies of criminal networks with multi-national composition. In this study, criminal side of Russian-speaking interaction was only superficially touched in connection with illegal arrival of some respondents to Italy.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1a

ОПРОСНИК

Уважаемый респондент!

Университет Удине проводит исследование социальных сетей мигрантов в Италии. Просим Вас также принять участие в исследовании. Ценность исследования во многом зависит от полноты и искренности Ваших ответов. Все ответы будут использованы только в научных целях, анкетирование анонимно. Для ответа обведите кружочком соответствующий номер или букву.

Заранее благодарим за сотрудничество!

1. Что для Вас было источником информации, когда Вы планировали поездку в Италию? Можно выбрать более одного ответа.

- 1) Советы родственников и друзей дома
- 2) Советы родственников и друзей, находящихся в Италии
- 3) Интернет-сайты об Италии
- 4) Агентство по трудоустройству
- 5) Туристическое агентство
- 6) Информация от итальянских структур
- 7) Другое (укажите, что именно) _____

2. Кто Вам помог (в каждом столбце обведите цифру, соответствующую Вашему ответу):

	а) доехать до Италии	б) найти работу в Италии	с) найти жилье в Италии	д) оформить документы в Италии
1) Родственники и друзья дома	1	1	1	1
2) Родственники в Италии	2	2	2	2
3) Друзья-соотечественники	3	3	3	3
4) Друзья(знакомые)-иммигранты из других стран СНГ	4	4	4	4
5) Друзья(знакомые)-иммигранты, не из стран СНГ	5	5	5	5
6) Друзья (знакомые)-итальянцы	6	6	6	6
7) Посредник/ частное агентство за оплату	7	7	7	7
8) Официальные итальянские структуры	8	8	8	8
9) Работодатель	9	9	9	9
10) Никто	10	10	10	10
11) Кто-то другой (укажите, кто)	11	11	11	11

3. Со сколькими соотечественниками, находящимися во Фриули-Венеции Джулии, Вы знакомы?

- 1) ни с кем
- 2) 1-5 человек
- 3) 6-10 человек
- 4) больше 10 человек

4. Со сколькими иммигрантами из других стран СНГ, находящимися во Фриули-Венеции Джулии, Вы знакомы?

- 1) ни с кем
- 2) 1-5 человек
- 3) 6-10 человек
- 4) больше 10 человек

5. Со сколькими иммигрантами **не из стран СНГ**, находящимися во Фриули-Венеции Джулии, Вы знакомы?

- 1) ни с кем
- 2) 1-5 человек
- 3) 6-10 человек
- 4) больше 10 человек

6. Сколько у Вас друзей итальянцев?

- 1) ни одного
- 2) 1-5 человек
- 3) 6-10 человек
- 4) больше 10 человек

7. Как часто Вы проводите свободное время в Италии с:

(в каждой строке обведите цифру, соответствующую Вашему ответу)

	<i>Никогда</i>	<i>Редко</i>	<i>Иногда</i>	<i>Часто</i>	<i>Очень часто</i>
a) родственниками и друзьями дома (по телефону, через интернет)	1	2	3	4	5
b) родственниками в Италии	1	2	3	4	5
c) работодателем, его семьей	1	2	3	4	5
d) друзьями-соотечественниками	1	2	3	4	5
e) друзьями(знакомыми)-иммигрантами из других стран СНГ	1	2	3	4	5
f) друзьями(знакомыми)-иммигрантами, не из стран СНГ	1	2	3	4	5
g) друзьями(знакомыми) итальянцами	1	2	3	4	5
h) Др. (укажите) _____	1	2	3	4	5

8. Как часто Вы встречаетесь для общения с **соотечественниками** в Италии?

В каждой строке обведите цифру, соответствующую Вашему ответу

	<i>Никогда</i>	<i>Редко</i>	<i>Иногда</i>	<i>Часто</i>	<i>Очень часто</i>
a) Собираемся у кого-то дома	1	2	3	4	5
b) На работе	1	2	3	4	5
c) В церковном приходе	1	2	3	4	5
d) В парке/ на улице	1	2	3	4	5
e) В кафе/ресторане	1	2	3	4	5
f) В культурной ассоциации	1	2	3	4	5
g) Он-лайн (в ICQ, форумах, Skype)	1	2	3	4	5
h) Др. (укажите) _____	1	2	3	4	5

9. Как часто Вы встречаетесь для общения с иммигрантами **из других стран СНГ**? В каждой строке обведите цифру, соответствующую Вашему ответу

	<i>Никогда</i>	<i>Редко</i>	<i>Иногда</i>	<i>Часто</i>	<i>Очень часто</i>
a) Собираемся у кого-то дома	1	2	3	4	5
b) На работе	1	2	3	4	5
c) В церковном приходе	1	2	3	4	5
d) В парке/ на улице	1	2	3	4	5
e) В кафе/ресторане	1	2	3	4	5
f) В культурной ассоциации	1	2	3	4	5

g) Он-лайн (в ICQ, форумах, Skype)	1	2	3	4	5
h) Др. (укажите)	1	2	3	4	5

10. Как часто Вы взаимодействуете с мигрантами из других стран, **не из СНГ**? В каждой строке обведите цифру, соответствующую Вашему ответу

	Никогда	Редко	Иногда	Часто	Очень часто
a) При совместной работе по найму	1	2	3	4	5
b) В интересах Вашего или их бизнеса	1	2	3	4	5
c) При взаимодействии с итальянскими структурами	1	2	3	4	5
d) В церковном приходе	1	2	3	4	5
e) При проведении культурных мероприятий	1	2	3	4	5
f) Для совместного отдыха	1	2	3	4	5
g) Др. (укажите)	1	2	3	4	5

11. Какие газеты и журналы Вы читаете, находясь в Италии (как бумажные, так и в Интернете)?

В каждой строке обведите цифру, соответствующую Вашему ответу

	Никогда	Редко	Иногда	Часто	Очень часто
a) Свои национальные	1	2	3	4	5
b) Российские	1	2	3	4	5
c) Итальянские	1	2	3	4	5

12. К кому Вы обращаетесь, если возникают вопросы о жизни в Италии? Не более трех ответов.

- 1) К родственникам и друзьям дома
- 2) К родственникам в Италии
- 3) К работодателю
- 4) К друзьям-соотечественникам
- 5) К друзьям(знакомым)- иммигрантам из СНГ
- 6) К друзьям(знакомым)-иммигрантам, не из СНГ
- 7) К друзьям (знакомым)-итальянцам
- 8) В итальянские структуры
- 9) Другое _____

13. Куда Вы обращаетесь, если Вам нужно занять денег? Не более трех ответов.

- 1) К родственникам и друзьям дома
- 2) К родственникам в Италии
- 3) К работодателю
- 4) К друзьям-соотечественникам
- 5) К друзьям(знакомым)- иммигрантам из СНГ
- 6) К друзьям(знакомым)-иммигрантам, не из СНГ
- 7) К друзьям (знакомым)-итальянцам
- 8) В банк / кредитную организацию
- 9) Другое _____

14. В каких ситуациях, кроме вышеперечисленных (поиск работы, жилья, регистрация), Вам доводилось использовать русский язык в Италии?

15. При встрече на улице с незнакомым человеком, говорящим на вашем **родном языке**, Вы заговариваете с ним?

- 1) никогда
- 2) редко
- 3) иногда
- 4) часто
- 5) очень часто

16. При встрече на улице с незнакомым человеком, говорящим на **русском языке**, Вы заговариваете с ним?

- 1) никогда
- 2) редко
- 3) иногда
- 4) часто
- 5) очень часто

17. Из Вашего опыта, помогают ли **соотечественники** друг другу в Италии?

- 1) Никогда
- 2) Редко
- 3) Иногда
- 4) Часто
- 5) Очень часто
- 6) Не знаю

Если да, то в каких ситуациях?

18. Взаимодействуют ли **украинцы и молдаване** в Италии?

- 1) Никогда
- 2) Редко
- 3) Иногда
- 4) Часто
- 5) Очень часто
- 6) Не знаю

Если да, то в каких ситуациях?

19. Взаимодействуют ли **украинцы и россияне** в Италии?

- 1) Никогда
- 2) Редко
- 3) Иногда
- 4) Часто
- 5) Очень часто
- 6) Не знаю

Если да, то в каких ситуациях?

20. Взаимодействуют ли **молдаване и россияне** в Италии?

- 1) Никогда
- 2) Редко
- 3) Иногда
- 4) Часто
- 5) Очень часто

б) Не знаю

Если да, то в каких ситуациях?

21. С кем вместе Вы живете в Италии? *Возможно более одного ответа*

- 1) Один/ одна
- 2) Со своей семьей, уточните _____
- 3) С соотечественниками
- 4) С мигрантами из СНГ
- 5) С другими мигрантами
- 6) С итальянцами

22. Назовите, пожалуйста, откуда родом три Ваших ближайших друга здесь?

1 _____

2 _____

3 _____

23. Говорите ли Вы по-итальянски?

- 1) Не говорю
- 2) Плохо
- 3) Неплохо
- 4) Хорошо
- 5) Говорю свободно

<p>24. Укажите, пожалуйста, Ваш возраст _____</p> <p>25. Пол</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Женский 2) Мужской <p>26. Образование</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Неполное среднее 2) Среднее 3) Среднее специальное 4) Неполное высшее 5) Высшее 6) Степень кандидата наук 7) Степень доктора наук <p>27. Укажите, пожалуйста, Ваше гражданство _____</p> <p>28. Откуда Вы приехали – страна и город _____</p> <p>29. Национальность _____</p> <p>30. Работа/ занятие дома</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) рабочий 2) служащий 3) частный предприниматель 4) веду свое домашнее хозяйство 5) пенсионер 	<p>33. В каком населенном пункте Вы живете во Фриули-В.Джулии? _____</p> <p>34. Сколько Вы живете в Италии? _____</p> <p>35. Сколько Вы живете во Фриули-В.Джулии? _____</p> <p>36. Ваши дальнейшие планы:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Вернуться домой в течение 2 лет 2) Остаться во Фриули-В. Джулии на период от 2 до 5 лет 3) Остаться во Фриули-В. Джулии на период от 5 до 10 лет 4) Остаться во Фриули-В. Джулии на период больше 10 лет 5) Переехать в др. регион Италии 6) Переехать в другую страну 7) Не знаю <p>37. Работа / занятие в Италии сейчас</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) рабочий 2) служащий 3) частный предприниматель 4) веду свое домашнее хозяйство 5) пенсионер 6) студент
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<p>6) студент 7) безработный 8) _____ другое</p> <p>31. Если Вы работали, то в каком секторе? 1) промышленность 2) сельское хозяйство 3) услуги 4) гос. управление 5) образование/ наука/ искусство 6) другое _____</p> <p>32. Причина переезда в Италию 1) Работа по найму 2) Частное предприним-во 3) Создание семьи 4) Воссоединение с семьей 5) Учеба 6) Поиски убежища 7) Другое _____</p>	<p>7) безработный 8) другое _____</p> <p>38. Если Вы работаете, то в каком секторе? 1) промышленность 2) сельское хозяйство 3) услуги 4) гос. управление 5) образование/ наука/ искусство 6) другое _____</p> <p>39. Семейное положение 1) Незамужем/ неженат 2) Гражданский брак 3) Замужем/женат 4) Разведен(а) 5) Вдова/вдовец</p>
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СПАСИБО!

Appendix 1b

QUESTIONNAIRE

Dear respondent!

The University of Udine is doing this research of social networks of migrants to Italy. We kindly ask you to take part in this research. The value of this research depends on how full and true would be your responses. All responses are supposed to be used only for the purposes of the research. Just circle the number or letter appropriate for your response . Grateful beforehand for your cooperation!

(1) What source of information did you use while planning your trip to Italy? More than one option can be chosen.

1. Advice from relatives or friends back home
2. Advice from relatives or friends staying in Italy
3. Internet-sites about Italy
4. Employment agency
5. Tourist agency
6. Information from Italian structures
7. Other (point out the details) _____

2. Who assisted you to:

	a) arrive to Italy	b) find job in Italy	c) find accommodation in Italy	d) fill documents in Italy
1) Relatives and friends in your country	1	1	1	1
2) Relatives in Italy	2	2	2	2
3) Friends compatriots	3	3	3	3
4) Friends-immigrants from other CIS states	4	4	4	4
5) Friends-immigrants from non-CIS states	5	5	5	5
6) Italian friends	6	6	6	6
7) Middleman/ agency for a fee	7	7	7	7
8) Official Italian structures	8	8	8	8
9) Employer	9	9	9	9
10) Nobody	10	10	10	10
11) Other (point out details)	11	11	11	11

3. How many **compatriots** staying in Friuli-Venezia Giulia do you know?

- 1) nobody
- 2) 1-5 persons
- 3) 6-10
- 4) more than 10

4. How many people **from other CIS states** staying in Friuli-Venezia Giulia do you know?

- 1) nobody
- 2) 1-5 persons
- 3) 6-10
- 4) more than 10

5. How many people **from other countries apart from the CIS** staying in Friuli-Venezia Giulia do you know?

- 1) nobody
- 2) 1-5 persons
- 3) 6-10
- 4) more than 10

6. How many Italian friends do you have?

- 1) Nobody
- 2) 1-5 persons
- 3) 6-10
- 4) More than 10

7. How often do you spend leisure time in Italy with:

	<i>Never</i>	<i>Seldom</i>	<i>Sometimes</i>	<i>Often</i>	<i>Very Often</i>
a) Relatives and friends back home (on phone, on the internet)	1	2	3	4	5
b) Relatives from Italy	1	2	3	4	5
c) Employer and his family	1	2	3	4	5
d) Friends from your country	1	2	3	4	5
e) Friends-immigrants from other CIS states	1	2	3	4	5
f) Friends-immigrants from non-CIS states	1	2	3	4	5
g) Italian friends	1	2	3	4	5
h) Other _____	1	2	3	4	5

8. How often do you meet people from your country in Italy?

	<i>Never</i>	<i>Seldom</i>	<i>Sometimes</i>	<i>Often</i>	<i>Very Often</i>
a) Meet at smb's house	1	2	3	4	5
b) At job	1	2	3	4	5
c) In church	1	2	3	4	5
d) In a park/street	1	2	3	4	5
e) In a café/restaurant	1	2	3	4	5
f) In culture association	1	2	3	4	5
g) On-line (ICQ, forums, Skype)	1	2	3	4	5
h) Other _____	1	2	3	4	5

9. How often do you meet people from **other CIS states** in Italy?

	<i>Never</i>	<i>Seldom</i>	<i>Sometimes</i>	<i>Often</i>	<i>Very Often</i>
a) Meet at smb's house	1	2	3	4	5
b) At job	1	2	3	4	5
c) In church	1	2	3	4	5
d) In a park/street	1	2	3	4	5
e) In a café/restaurant	1	2	3	4	5
f) In cultural association	1	2	3	4	5
g) On-line (ICQ, forums, Skype)	1	2	3	4	5
h) Other _____	1	2	3	4	5

10. How often do you meet people from **non-CIS states** in Italy?

	<i>Never</i>	<i>Seldom</i>	<i>Sometimes</i>	<i>Often</i>	<i>Very Often</i>
a) While working as employees	1	2	3	4	5
b) For your or their business	1	2	3	4	5
c) While cooperating with Italian official structures	1	2	3	4	5
d) In church	1	2	3	4	5
e) While having some cultural or social events	1	2	3	4	5
f) For leisure time	1	2	3	4	5
g) Other _____	1	2	3	4	5

11. What newspapers and magazines do you read in Italy (on-line and hard copies)?

	<i>Never</i>	<i>Seldom</i>	<i>Sometimes</i>	<i>Often</i>	<i>Very Often</i>
a) Your national	1	2	3	4	5
b) Russian	1	2	3	4	5
c) Italian	1	2	3	4	5

12. Who do you address when you have questions about life in Italy? *Not more than 3 options.*

- 1) Relatives and friends back home
- 2) Relatives in Italy
- 3) Employer
- 4) Friends compatriots
- 5) Friends-immigrants from other CIS states
- 6) Friends-immigrants from non-CIS states
- 7) Italian friends
- 8) Italian official structures
- 9) Other _____

13. Where do you address if you need borrow money? *Not more than 3 options.*

- 1) Relatives and friends back home
- 2) Relatives in Italy
- 3) Employer
- 4) Friends compatriots
- 5) Friends-immigrants from other CIS states
- 6) Friends-immigrants from non-CIS states
- 7) Italian friends
- 8) Banks/credit organizations
- 9) Other _____

14. When did you used to speak Russian excluding the situations mentioned (search for a job, accommodation, registration) in Italy?

15. Do you usually start to talk in a street to a unfamiliar person who speaks your native language?

- 1) Never
- 2) Seldom
- 3) Sometimes
- 4) Often
- 5) Very often

16. Do you usually start to talk in a street to a unfamiliar person who speaks the Russian language?

- 1) Never
- 2) Seldom
- 3) Sometimes
- 4) Often
- 5) Very often

17. Do compatriots help each other in Italy depending on your experience?

- 1) Never
- 2) Seldom
- 3) Sometimes
- 4) Often
- 5) Very often
- 6) I do not know

If "yes", under what circumstances?

18. Do people from **Ukraine and Moldova** cooperate in Italy?

- 1) Never
- 2) Seldom
- 3) Sometimes
- 4) Often
- 5) Very often
- 6) I do not know

If “yes”, under what circumstances?

19. Do people from **Ukraine and Russia** cooperate in Italy?

- 1) Never
- 2) Seldom
- 3) Sometimes
- 4) Often
- 5) Very often
- 6) I do not know

If “yes”, under what circumstances?

20. Do people from **Russia and Moldova** cooperate in Italy?

- 1) Never
- 2) Seldom
- 3) Sometimes
- 4) Often
- 5) Very often
- 6) I do not know

If “yes”, under what circumstances?

21. Who do you live with in Italy? More than 1 answer is accepted.

- 1) Alone
- 2) With a family _____
- 3) People from my country
- 4) Immigrants from CIS
- 5) Immigrants from other countries
- 6) Italians

22. What country from are your 3 closest friends in Italy?

1 _____

2 _____

3 _____

23. Do you speak Italian?

- 6) I do not speak it
- 7) Bad

- 8) Not bad
- 9) Well
- 10) Fluently

<p>24. How old are you? _____</p> <p>25. Gender 3) Female 4) Male</p> <p>26. Education 8) Secondary school (not complete) 9) Secondary school 10) Secondary vocational 11) Higher (not complete) 12) Higher 13) Candidate of Science 14) Doctor of Science</p> <p>27. Your citizenship _____</p> <p>28. Where are you from? (country, city) _____</p> <p>29. Nationality _____</p> <p>30. Occupation/Job 1) worker 2) office worker 3) entrepreneur 4) housekeeper 5) pensioner 6) student 7) unemployed 8) other _____</p> <p>31. In what sector did you work before? 1) industry 2) agriculture 3) services 4) government 5) education/science/art 6) other _____</p> <p>32. Reason to move to Italy 8) Employment 9) Entrepreneurship 10) Starting family 11) Family reunification 12) Study 13) Asylum seeking 14) Other</p>	<p>33. Where do you live in Friuli-Venezia Giulia? _____</p> <p>34. How long do you stay in Friuli-Venezia Giulia? _____</p> <p>35. How long do you stay in Italy? _____</p> <p>36. What are you plans for future? 8) Come back home within 2 years 9) Stay in Friuli-VG from 2 to 5 years 10) Stay in Friuli-VG from 5 to 10 years 11) Stay in Friuli-VG up to 10 лет 12) Move to another region of Italy 13) Move to another country 14) I do not know</p> <p>37. Job/occupation in Italy now 1) worker 2) office worker 3) entrepreneur 4) housekeeper 5) pensioner 6) student 7) unemployed 8) other _____</p> <p>38. In what sector do you work now? 1) industry 2) agriculture 3) services 4) government 5) education/science/art 6) other _____</p> <p>39. Marital status 6) Not married 7) Unregistered marriage 8) Married 9) Divorced 10) Widow(er)</p>
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THANK YOU!

Appendix 2

Examples of lifestories

1) In 2002, I went to the Ministry of Labour (of Moldavia). “Where are you sending?” They gave me a phone number of an agency which sent people to Israel. I had to pay 4000. They take picture of you, you will wait whether people in Israel would like you or not. I thought: “There is a war there, and I need to wait whether they like you there or not. I will better go to Italy for 2000”. I was refused in visa in Kiev for seven times. I contacted to a man in Kishinev. I felt that he was deceiving me. They made for us visa to Czech Republic only. Then we went on foot through a forest, through the border. We were led down by a Czech guy, he was going in front with a backpack , and our guy was following him. Then I was going with an Armenian woman, and one more woman was following us. Then it turned out that a group before us on that track was caught, but we did not know. In Germany they handed us in a car with a Russian guy or he was a German guy but he spoke Russian. They told us to take off all the golden jewellery and not to speak either because of the language or golden teeth (someone had golden teeth). He drove us to the place, we washed ourselves and ate. Germans drove us to Italy and left on the railroad station in Verona. Go where you want. One woman went to Rome, she had her relatives there. We went to Mestre because we heard that there is a place where women who look for jobs gather together. They sent us with an Italian man who must help to change the train for Mestre. We detrained, looked to the right, looked to the left, but that park was not close to the station. One woman approached us: “Vy nashi?” (“Are you ours?”) - “Nashi!” (“Ours!”) – “Do you want to eat?”. She took us to Caritas. We went there, sat to eat. I did not know at that time that if you do not want something, you can not take it. And I had boiled onion. I can eat fried, raw onion, but I cannot eat boiled one. I was sitting and bathing that onion in my tears. They said, how you can be hungry if you leave the food... Then one woman there said: “Do you want to sleep?”. That meant to sleep normally, not under a bridge. Ten thousand liras, that is 5 euro. We agreed. She took us to a house. She worked with a paralysed person and passed people through like that.

At my first job there was an old woman. A doctor came with analysis, I said to him: “She has problems with kidneys”. He was surprised that I understood that. She died in two and a half months. But I was told to take any job, so I went to her, despite the fact she was at the

deaths door. Everyone looked for a job for me: her son, the doctor, a nurse. The nurse found me one job, but I did not like it there: they had three children. Then they found me another job, there was a bed old woman and an old man. It was a big woman. I tore off my hands and back while I was lifting her. Then that old woman stopped sleeping day and night. They told me: “You do not do anything”. They always say that we do not do anything. If so, I decided to go home. They lifted my wage, but I felt that everything pain, and I thought to go home to have some rest. I wanted to stay at home but my daughter wants to enter a university in Moscow, so we need money. I came back. (a woman from Moldavia, Udine)

2) First I arrived to Calabria 10 years ago. I took some sweaters, I did not know at that time and I was just about bringing felt boots. I worked as a loader, it was a golden job. Then I made my permit and went to Udine in 2003. There were none of ours at that time. Now Ukrainians, Russians, Moldovans work in factories, in construction. I was a mechanical technician in the milk factory in Kiev before, I did not know construction and I learned it here. Now we gathered together and work as ‘artigianale’ builders – work for hire. We work ourselves without Italians, we have an hour for lunch. We pay taxes ourselves – each pay 715 euro once in three months. I visit home once a year. I divorced from my wife in 2005, but we have children. She earns 150 euro there and she is comfortable. She is a teacher of foreign languages and works a lot. All the guys brought their wives here, and mine did not want to migrate, made a dead set against it. When we were getting divorce she said that it is enough for her if I send them 100 euro a month. My children do not want to move here, why should I insist on that? I also do not want to stay here, I am going to work before my retirement, and that is it.

Once a year we with guys allow ourselves to go to Calabria. There is the Ionian sea, while I lived there, all my quinsies passed. My best friend, a Mongol guy lives there. He married a Ukrainian girl, they have children, he works – gathers oranges.

My mom is from Yaroslavskaya oblast’. I had my practical placement in Russia during the Soviet time, then I served in the army there, and I worked in Uglich, in Grozniy. (a man from Ukraine, Udine).

Italian summary

Questo studio nasce da due considerazioni. Il primo è originato dal metodologico nazionalismo prevalente negli studi attuali delle migrazioni. Come il caso dei migranti di lingua russa dimostra, non è un approccio decisivo. Questo studio è un tentativo di concettualizzare l'interazione dei migranti all'interno dei confini percepite dai migranti stessi, muovendole oltre la semplicistica divisione all'interno dei singoli flussi di migrazione.

La seconda considerazione nasce dalla recente discussione in riferimento ai migranti di lingua russa in paesi differenti. I migranti di lingua russa sono definiti come migranti originari dalle ex-Repubbliche dell'URSS che condividono destini storici, comuni ruoli sociali, interessi e cultura.

Il presente studio si focalizza sui processi e relazioni sociali – i legami reali e interazioni tra le popolazioni di lingua russa all'estero lontano – piuttosto che esaminare soggettive identificazioni rispondenti alla domanda se differenti gruppi etnici di persone di lingua russa si considerano come un singolo gruppo.

Per valutare l'interazione interetnica e i legami tra genti di lingua russa è stato utilizzato un approccio di *network*. L'approccio di *network* è spesso applicato negli studi degli immigrati, ma non per l'interazione interetnica degli immigrati. Il vantaggio dell'analisi dell'interazione interetnica nell'ambito di *network* per lo scopo di questo studio è che consente una migliore comprensione del modo in cui i legami interetnici si formano e sono utilizzati.

Nel quadro dell'approccio di *network* sono stati predisposti i seguenti prerequisiti per l'interazione dei migranti di lingua russa all'estero lontano: legami di parentela e di amicizia, tradizioni comuni e simili esperienze di vita, e l'influenza della società ospitante. Nel Capitolo 1 queste basi vengono introdotte e spiegate per il particolare caso dei migranti di lingua russa in Italia.

È atteso che i prerequisiti per un sistema di interazione sociale delle persone di lingua russa siano originati da migrazioni interne, matrimoni interetnici e promozione dell'affinità culturale nell'URSS. In aggiunta a questo, è sottinteso che l'attuale immigrazione di gruppi di lingua russa in stati dell'estero lontano continua dalla precedente emigrazione sovietica e nel caso dell'Italia dalla precedente migrazione dall'Impero Russo. In Italia la migrazione pre-rivoluzione di genti di lingua russa ricade non tanto nei gruppi etnici dei migranti quanto all'interno delle loro classi sociali e ragioni della migrazione in Italia, più precisamente: vacanzieri, studenti, pellegrini e esuli politici.

La migrazione post-sovietica si divide in flussi nazionali dalle ex-repubbliche dell'URSS in accordo con la loro costruzione nazionale. Come rivelato dal Capitolo 2 i numerosi flussi dei migranti della lingua russa in Italia e nella regione del Friuli-Venezia Giulia (FVG) provengono prevalentemente

dall'Ucraina, Moldova e Russia e sono causati dalla migrazione per lavoro, matrimoni con Italiani e studio. Nel flusso della migrazione lavorativa e' presente uno specifico flusso di lavoratori domestici, i cui attori vengono distinti come un separato gruppo per l'analisi in ragione del carattere di massa e delle peculiarità di questa occupazione.

Il processo di *networking* tra le persone di lingua russa e' discusso nel Capitolo 3 in due dimensioni: livello individuale e livello organizzativo. Al livello individuale dell'analisi, il processo di connessione sociale delle persone di lingua russa nel FVG e' stato comparato all'interazione con altri attori osservabili nelle vite dei migranti, come compatrioti, altri immigranti e membri della societa' ospitante. Questa comparazione e opposizione consentono di provvedere a una visione obiettiva sull'interazione interetnica della popolazione di lingua russa. La qualita' di questi legami e interazioni e' stata esaminata attraverso diversi tipi di supporto disponibili mediante tale interazione: informazione, aiuto materiale e assistenza con risorse, aiuto emozionale, compagnia. Dalla logica di questo studio i legami tra la popolazione di lingua russa possono essere piu' forti e le loro reti sociali possono essere piu' usate se comparate con i legami con altri immigranti o popolazione locale.

La ricerca quantitativa (n=127) ha rivelato che reti sociali dei compatrioti giocano un ruolo principale nelle vite dei migranti, mentre i legami con i gruppi di lingua russa provenienti da altri stati della CIS sono in media di secondaria importanza. L'eccezione si trova nell'utilizzo dei quotidiani russi tra i migranti CIS (non russi) che supera l'utilizzo della stampa del paese natale.

L'analisi e' stata condotta per differenti gruppi di migranti di lingua russa che appaiono dipendenti dalla loro nazionalita', occupazione, sesso, eta', piani per il futuro, lunghezza della vita in Italia. E' interessante che in riferimento al gruppo di migranti per motivi di lavoro, l'interazione interetnica all'interno del network dei migranti di lingua russa si e' rivelata utile per la ricerca del lavoro e alloggio. L'assenza di tale supporto per altri tipi di migranti puo' essere spiegato, da un lato, da un network non maturo e dall'altro da un modello piu' individuale di migrazione tra di loro.

La discussione del livello organizzativo del network dei migranti di lingua russa (basato sull'osservazione e 14 interviste con esperti) mostrano che la parrocchia Ortodossa Russa e le associazioni culturali dei migranti di lingua russa malgrado il loro carattere locale e frammentato e la loro debolezza finanziaria, funzionano come un nodo del network dei migranti di lingua russa, nei quali incontri e interazioni hanno luogo come l'affermazione di identita'. Queste forniscono le persone di lingua russa compagnia e supporto psicologico. Ad ogni modo, le associazioni non si coordinano tra di loro e a questo punto possono difficilmente diventare un potere socio-politico in FVG capace di parlare con una singola voce. La parrocchia del Patriarcato di Mosca e' anche di grande importanza per i migranti di lingua russa, ma non agisce come un'istituzione di coesione

centrale per loro. Questo è spiegato non tanto da una eterogeneità religiosa dei migranti di lingua russa (in ogni caso la maggior parte di loro in FVG sono Ortodossi) quanto da un diffuso non alto livello di apparente religiosità degli ex-sovietici. In FVG *ethnic entrepreneurship* dei migranti di lingua russa include prima di tutto la vendita di beni etnici e mira sia a clienti di lingua russa che alla popolazione locale.

Quotidiani in lingua russa pubblicati in Italia non godono di diffusa popolarità ma la loro mera esistenza istituzionalizza i migranti di lingua russa; i quotidiani riuniscono i lettori malgrado la loro nazionalità e contribuiscono ad una miglior reciproca comprensione. In generale, l'analisi del livello organizzativo rivela che le connessioni sociali dei migranti di lingua russa sono principalmente costituite da leggi che poggiano sulla politica sovietica per nazionalità dove la cultura russa è stata il pilastro dell'interazione e che è rinforzato dal discorso della Russia contemporanea.

Il caso dei migranti di lingua russa in Italia mostra che l'interazione interetnica è esistente nel quadro delle reti sociali indipendentemente dall'abilità etnica della creazione di barriere.

Con tutta questa divisione degli immigranti di lingua russa in Italia che dipende dal loro status, educazione, età e piani per il futuro (che appartiene anche ai gruppi etno-nazionali dei migranti) e dalla nazionalità dei migranti e cittadinanza, il potenziale di unione dei migranti di lingua russa, rivelata nella forma del network sociale, rimane un importante fattore sia nei paesi d'origine dei migranti che nei paesi ospitanti.

Russian summary

Это исследование стало результатом рассмотрения двух научных проблем. Первая из них – методологический национализм, преобладающий в миграционных исследованиях сегодня. Как демонстрирует случай русскоговорящих в дальнем зарубежье, этот подход не является однозначным. Данное исследование представляет попытку концептуализировать взаимодействие мигрантов согласно границам, воспринимаемым самими мигрантами, а не согласно упрощенному делению на конкретные национальные потоки мигрантов.

Вторая проблема связана с современным обсуждением русскоговорящих мигрантов в разных странах. Русскоговорящие мигранты определены как мигранты, происходящие из бывших республик СССР, разделяющие исторические судьбы, общие социальные роли, интересы и культуру. Настоящее исследование фокусируется на социальных процессах и отношениях – реальных связях и взаимодействии между русскоговорящими в дальнем зарубежье, а не на субъективной идентификации, отвечающей на вопрос, считают ли себя люди, принадлежащие к разным этническим группам и говорящие по-русски, одной группой.

С этой целью для оценки межэтнического взаимодействия и связей между русскоязычными был использован подход социальных сетей. Этот подход часто применяется в изучении иммигрантов, но не для изучения межэтнического взаимодействия иммигрантов. Преимущество анализа межэтнического взаимодействия в рамках сетей для целей данного исследования состоит в его способности дать лучшее понимание способов и путей формирования и использования межэтнических связей.

В рамках сетевого подхода предпосылки для взаимодействия русскоговорящих мигрантов в дальнем зарубежье были определены как родственные и дружеские связи, общие традиции и схожий жизненный опыт, а также влияние принимающего общества. Глава 1 представляет эти предпосылки и рассматривает их в применении к конкретному случаю русскоговорящих в Италии. Предполагается, что предпосылки межэтнического образования сетей русскоговорящих заключаются во внутренних миграциях, смешанных браках и культурной близости, характерных для СССР. Кроме того, сделано предположение, что современная русскоговорящая иммиграция в страны дальнего зарубежья продолжает традиции предшествующей советской эмиграции и в случае Италии - миграции из Российской империи. В Италии предреволюционная русскоговорящая миграция делилась не столько согласно этнической принадлежности мигрантов, сколько согласно их социальному классу и причинам миграции в Италию, а именно: отдыхающие, студенты, паломники и политические ссыльные.

Постсоветская миграция разделилась на национальные потоки из бывших республик СССР в результате национального строительства последних. Как описывается в Главе 2, наиболее многочисленные потоки русскоговорящих мигрантов в Италию и регион Фриули-Венеция Джулия (ФВДж) - из Украины, Молдавии и России, и вызваны они трудовой миграцией, браками с итальянскими гражданами и учебой. В потоке трудовой миграции существует особый поток домашних работников, участники которого выделены в данном исследовании в отдельную группу анализа по причинам массового характера и специфики занятия.

Процесс образования и использования сетей среди русскоговорящих в ФВДж обсуждается в Главе 3 в двух плоскостях: на индивидуальном уровне и на организационном уровне. На индивидуальном уровне анализа этот процесс сравнивается с взаимодействием с другими существующими в жизни мигрантов субъектами, такими как соотечественники, другие иммигранты и члены принимающего общества. Это сравнение и противопоставление позволило обеспечить объективный взгляд на межэтническое взаимодействие русскоговорящих. Качество связей и взаимодействия рассмотрено через разные типы поддержки, доступные в рамках такого взаимодействия, а именно: информация, материальная помощь и ресурсная поддержка, эмоциональная помощь и предоставление компании. Согласно логике данного исследования связи между русскоговорящими должны быть сильнее и более часто используемыми по сравнению со связями с другими иммигрантами или местным населением.

Количественное исследование (n=127) обнаружило, что сети соотечественников имеют первостепенное значение в жизни мигрантов, в то время как связи с русскоговорящими из других стран СНГ в среднем находятся на втором месте по значимости. Исключением стало потребление российских газет среди мигрантов из СНГ (кроме россиян), частота которого опередила частоту потребления прессы из соответствующей страны происхождения. Связи с мигрантами из других стран СНГ актуализируются в случаях поиска информации, необходимости небольших заёмов и для эмоциональной поддержки.

Был проведен анализ разных групп русскоговорящих мигрантов, образованных на основе таких признаков, как национальная принадлежность, профессия, пол, возраст, планы на будущее, длительность проживания в Италии. Интересно отметить, что для группы трудовых мигрантов межэтнические взаимоотношения оказались полезными при поиске работы и жилья. Отсутствие подобной поддержки для иммигрантов других групп может быть объяснено, с одной стороны, недостаточным развитием сети, и, с другой стороны, их индивидуальной моделью миграции.

Анализ организационного уровня русскоговорящей сети (на основе наблюдения и 14 интервью с экспертами) показал, что приход русской православной церкви и культурные ассоциации русскоговорящих, несмотря на их ограниченный и разрозненный характер и финансовую уязвимость, функционируют как узел русскоговорящей сети, где происходят встречи и взаимодействия, а также подтверждение идентичности. Однако ассоциации не координируют действия между собой и в связи с этим едва ли могут представлять собой социально-политическую силу в ФВДж, способную выражать общее мнение. Приход Московского Патриархата также имеет важное значение для русскоговорящих мигрантов, но при этом не играет роль объединяющего института. Это объясняется в основном не столько разнообразием вероисповеданий русскоговорящих иммигрантов (большинство из них в ФВДж - православные), сколько общим невысоким уровнем проявляемой религиозности среди бывших граждан СССР.

В ФВДж этническое предпринимательство русскоговорящих включает в себя, в первую очередь, продажу этнических товаров, и направлена она как на русскоговорящих клиентов, так и на местное население. Русскоязычные газеты, публикуемые в Италии, не пользуются большой популярностью, однако сам факт их наличия способствует институционализации русскоговорящих мигрантов; периодические издания объединяют читателей, несмотря на их национальную принадлежность и содействуют их лучшему пониманию друг друга. В целом, анализ организационного уровня выявил, что образование и функционирование русскоговорящей сети строится на законах, которые лежали в основе советской национальной политики, где русская культура являлась основой межнациональных отношений, и в соответствии с дискурсом в современной России.

Случай русскоговорящих мигрантов в Италии показывает, что межэтническое взаимодействие существует, несмотря на способность этничности создавать границы. При всем разделении русскоговорящих мигрантов в Италии в зависимости от их статуса, образования, возраста и планов на будущее (что характерно и для этно-национальных групп мигрантов) и в зависимости от их национальности и гражданства потенциал русскоговорящих к объединению, выявленный в форме социальной сети, является важным фактором как для стран происхождения, так и для принимающих стран.