In What Sense Can an Evolutionary Meta-Ethical Skeptic Be Moral?

Evolutionary meta-ethical scepticism is the view according to which there cannot be any justification for our ethical practices, norms, or systems, since evolutionary theory has made it clear that there is no room for moral values in the fabric of the universe. Several supporters of it have claimed that this form of scepticism leaves normative ethics untouched. I want to discuss this conclusion, and I try to argue that in fact meta-ethical scepticism has a bearing on normative ethics, and calls for a radical revision of common sense, naive normative practices. It is true that, as several supporters of this view want to claim, they may be moral, but this is only true if the word ‘moral’ is taken in a sense quite different from the pre-philosophical sense of common usage. My argument is that ethical conduct requires normative guidance, and that a meta-ethical sceptic about norms cannot be guided by the norms about which she is sceptic. Furthermore, I discuss how first order ethics is affected by the acceptance of evolutionary meta-ethical scepticism.