The Theory of Ideal Objects and Relations in the Cambridge Platonists (Rust, More, and Cudworth)

The essay focuses on the theory of ideal objects and relations in the writings of George Rust, Henry More and Ralph Cudworth and examines their idealistic metaphysics framed within the context of their theological concerns. From their works, there emerges an objective idealism of a Platonic kind, which they use to integrate and support Christian metaphysics against scepticism, empiricism, materialism, and the irrationalism of the enthusiasts. Moreover, Rust, More and Cudworth saw Platonic metaphysics as a powerful theoretical weapon against the voluntarism of Descartes, who conceived truth as dependent on divine will. This Cartesian doctrine was regarded by the Cambridge Platonists as a threat both to scientific knowledge and to moral life. The essay shows how the Cambridge Platonists’ objective idealism was a significant episode in the long history of Platonic rationalism that survives also in contemporary philosophy.