Cornelio Fabro suggested that Kant’s conception of freedom leads to existential atheism and existential amoralism, and these, in their turn, entail theoretical atheism. This essay analyses and supports Fabro’s argument. In particular it focuses on Fabro’s claim that no one can be the ruler of oneself, and on his view that, on an existential level, i.e. from the first personal perspective of an agent, only a reference to God can ground a substantial moral obligation. On the ground of the suggested theses, Fabro’s interpretation of Kant seems plausible, and Kant’s unintended role in the development of modern atheism seems clear
Fabro interprete di Kant: libertà trascendentale, amoralità e ateismo
DE ANNA, Gabriele
2012-01-01
Abstract
Cornelio Fabro suggested that Kant’s conception of freedom leads to existential atheism and existential amoralism, and these, in their turn, entail theoretical atheism. This essay analyses and supports Fabro’s argument. In particular it focuses on Fabro’s claim that no one can be the ruler of oneself, and on his view that, on an existential level, i.e. from the first personal perspective of an agent, only a reference to God can ground a substantial moral obligation. On the ground of the suggested theses, Fabro’s interpretation of Kant seems plausible, and Kant’s unintended role in the development of modern atheism seems clearFile in questo prodotto:
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