In this article the Author analyses the Fichtean concept of becoming. Only apparently does the Doctrine of Science of the last phase of Fichte’s philosophy override the relation between Abso-lute and empirical reality and reduce itself and its doctrine of "I" to ontological, religious and mystical thought. What Fichte sets out as the presupposition of knowledge is not simply being, but the manifestation of being. Thus, the Doctrine of Science continues to hinge on the difference between being and thought, and through this difference the "I" forms itself as reflection between unity and plurality, as striving (becoming) that is the real form of every existing being. Fichte can state, then, that whatever is does not exist and whatever becomes is. This is one of the first philosophical points of view that tried to avoid not only the dogmatic structures of metaphysics but, before Nietzsche, also the modern structures of Kant’s epistemology.

Fichte e il divenire

FURLANI, SIMONE
2014

Abstract

In this article the Author analyses the Fichtean concept of becoming. Only apparently does the Doctrine of Science of the last phase of Fichte’s philosophy override the relation between Abso-lute and empirical reality and reduce itself and its doctrine of "I" to ontological, religious and mystical thought. What Fichte sets out as the presupposition of knowledge is not simply being, but the manifestation of being. Thus, the Doctrine of Science continues to hinge on the difference between being and thought, and through this difference the "I" forms itself as reflection between unity and plurality, as striving (becoming) that is the real form of every existing being. Fichte can state, then, that whatever is does not exist and whatever becomes is. This is one of the first philosophical points of view that tried to avoid not only the dogmatic structures of metaphysics but, before Nietzsche, also the modern structures of Kant’s epistemology.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11390/1102170
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