Valore e autonomia dell'improvvisazione. Tra arti e pratiche

In this paper I accept Georg Bertram’s criticism against what he calls the “autonomist paradigm” in philosophy of art and I will follow his theoretical suggestion: a coherent, informed, and accomplished philosophy of art should consider not only the specific nature of art, but also its value for the human practices and as one of the human practices. However, I show the connection between human practices and art in a different, although related, way. Instead of beginning from a reflection focused on art, I rather move from the human practices, showing that “art” may be a particular way to look at and to develop human practices. I argue that the theoretical link between human practices and art can be provided by the notion of improvisation. Improvisation is not only a particular artistic technique. Rather, improvisation can be more generally understood as the paradigm of art, in the interesting sense, defended by Bertram, of incorporating and showing in a genetic way, on the one hand, the autonomous art specificity and, on the other hand, the value of art, that is, the link between human practices and art as a specific human practice. In this sense, art (as specific human practice) both derives from and is a particular way to improvise (upon) the human practices, i.e. to develop them in ways that can be valuable (both in general and artistically or aesthetically). Accordingly, improvisation as a specific artistic procedure, will be understood as that kind of artistic production in which the human practice underlying art comes, as it were, to the fore.