Katà tòn orthòn lógon. Linee per una rilettura della tradizione aristotelica della giustizia

The present essay considers the specificity of the concept of justice as virtue in the Aristotelian tradition. This concept stands out both for the conjunction of virtue as its subjective constituent and equality as its intersubjective constituent, and for the rational ground of this conjunction, the Aristotelian doctine of practical reason. In the contemporary debates the autors that refer to Stagirite’s ethics have shown that his concept of justice presupposes a specific dialectical methodology too, that of the Topics. This methodology fits Aristotelian justice also for the contemporary pluralistic and multicultural frameworks. From this perspective the notion of human flourishing, the Anscombian equivalent of the Aristotelian eudaimonia, constitutes an orientation for practical reason and a parameter for dialectical rationality. Hence, justice can be redefined as the social virtue of human flourishing.