Who is responsible when a computer or a robot makes a mistake? Can we trust decisions concerning lives of humans taken by machines following processes that we cannot check or understand? These questions are just some examples of challenges that contemporary AI poses to law theory, since they contest our habitual distinctions between humans and cyborgs, between responsible and non-responsible beings, between determined and free agents. Based on Turing's considerations concerning the nature of an algorithm, this essay supports some claims about personhood and action suggesting that any solution to these problems requires a previous understanding of the notion of the human form of life.
Automi, responsabilità e diritto
Gabriele De Anna
2019-01-01
Abstract
Who is responsible when a computer or a robot makes a mistake? Can we trust decisions concerning lives of humans taken by machines following processes that we cannot check or understand? These questions are just some examples of challenges that contemporary AI poses to law theory, since they contest our habitual distinctions between humans and cyborgs, between responsible and non-responsible beings, between determined and free agents. Based on Turing's considerations concerning the nature of an algorithm, this essay supports some claims about personhood and action suggesting that any solution to these problems requires a previous understanding of the notion of the human form of life.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
