The logical structure underlying Kant’s concept of the ‘mathematical’ as well as ‘dynamic’ feeling of the sublime is given by the theory of “negative exhibition,” according to which the exhibition of reason’s ideas by the imagination can be only negative: it can only be shown that ideas – as ideas – cannot be shown.The connection between this thesis and the Critique of Pure Reason demonstrates that the theory of the sublime is a reflection on transcendental philosophy as such. Kant does not explicitly apply this theory of the sublime to art. In fact, he seems to deny that art can be sublime, although his theory of “aesthetic ideas” can be considered an application of the logic of “negative exhibition” to artistic creation. H., in contrast, does apply the Kantian concept of the sublime of art. However, he criticizes it as a model of “bad infinity” and considers it the lowest form of art because of the conflict between its form and content. Since art, for H., is the “sensible exhibition of the idea,” it does not fulfill the conditions for the comprehension of the Absolute, which can be attained only be means of philosophy. Hence, by exhibiting the impossibility of an exhibition of the Absolute, only sublime art, and not beautiful art, can express the core of art. The concept of the sublime as negative exhibition therefore shows the difference between transcendental and absolute idealism.
Negative Darstellung. Das Erhabene bei Kant und Hegel
BERTINETTO, Alessandro Giovanni
2006-01-01
Abstract
The logical structure underlying Kant’s concept of the ‘mathematical’ as well as ‘dynamic’ feeling of the sublime is given by the theory of “negative exhibition,” according to which the exhibition of reason’s ideas by the imagination can be only negative: it can only be shown that ideas – as ideas – cannot be shown.The connection between this thesis and the Critique of Pure Reason demonstrates that the theory of the sublime is a reflection on transcendental philosophy as such. Kant does not explicitly apply this theory of the sublime to art. In fact, he seems to deny that art can be sublime, although his theory of “aesthetic ideas” can be considered an application of the logic of “negative exhibition” to artistic creation. H., in contrast, does apply the Kantian concept of the sublime of art. However, he criticizes it as a model of “bad infinity” and considers it the lowest form of art because of the conflict between its form and content. Since art, for H., is the “sensible exhibition of the idea,” it does not fulfill the conditions for the comprehension of the Absolute, which can be attained only be means of philosophy. Hence, by exhibiting the impossibility of an exhibition of the Absolute, only sublime art, and not beautiful art, can express the core of art. The concept of the sublime as negative exhibition therefore shows the difference between transcendental and absolute idealism.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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