In Plato's Republic the prime cause of all things, the Good, is presented both as transcending every form of being (509b9-10) and as the supreme Idea, that is to say as the supreme being. The seeming inconsistency between these two characterizations could point to the paradoxical relation subsisting between the absolutely transcendent Good and its supreme self-revelation (the Idea of the Good): by revealing itself the "agathòn epékeina tês ousías" constitutes the highest being and has to be therefore considered as identical with the "idéa tou agathoû"; on the other hand its absolute transcendence implies a clear supereminence in regard to the Idea of the Good. This article tries to highlight and illustrate these antinomic aspects of Plato's notion of the Good by help of both the so-called "ágrapha dógmata" and the evidence concerning the Demiurge.
Idéa tou agathou-agathón epékeina tês ousías. Ueberlegungen zu einer platonischen Antinomie
LAVECCHIA, Salvatore
2005-01-01
Abstract
In Plato's Republic the prime cause of all things, the Good, is presented both as transcending every form of being (509b9-10) and as the supreme Idea, that is to say as the supreme being. The seeming inconsistency between these two characterizations could point to the paradoxical relation subsisting between the absolutely transcendent Good and its supreme self-revelation (the Idea of the Good): by revealing itself the "agathòn epékeina tês ousías" constitutes the highest being and has to be therefore considered as identical with the "idéa tou agathoû"; on the other hand its absolute transcendence implies a clear supereminence in regard to the Idea of the Good. This article tries to highlight and illustrate these antinomic aspects of Plato's notion of the Good by help of both the so-called "ágrapha dógmata" and the evidence concerning the Demiurge.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
