We analyze the voting behavior of a small committee that has to approve or reject a project proposal whose return is uncertain.Members have diverse preferences: some of them want to maximize the expected value, while others have a bias towards project approval and ignore their information on the project value. We focus on the most efficient use of scarce information when members cannot communicate prior to voting, and we provide insights on the optimal composition of the committee. Our main result is that the presence of biased members can improve the voting outcome,by simplifying the strategies of unbiased members. Thus, committees with diverse members perform as well as homogeneous committees, and even better in some cases. In particular, when value-maximizing members outnumber biased member by one vote, the optimal equilibrium becomes unique.

Voting in small committee

GRAZIANO, Clara;
2014-01-01

Abstract

We analyze the voting behavior of a small committee that has to approve or reject a project proposal whose return is uncertain.Members have diverse preferences: some of them want to maximize the expected value, while others have a bias towards project approval and ignore their information on the project value. We focus on the most efficient use of scarce information when members cannot communicate prior to voting, and we provide insights on the optimal composition of the committee. Our main result is that the presence of biased members can improve the voting outcome,by simplifying the strategies of unbiased members. Thus, committees with diverse members perform as well as homogeneous committees, and even better in some cases. In particular, when value-maximizing members outnumber biased member by one vote, the optimal equilibrium becomes unique.
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
Journal of Economics 2012.pdf

non disponibili

Tipologia: Altro materiale allegato
Licenza: Non pubblico
Dimensione 326.9 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
326.9 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11390/865468
 Attenzione

Attenzione! I dati visualizzati non sono stati sottoposti a validazione da parte dell'ateneo

Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 0
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 0
social impact