The 2011 popular referendum has abolished the norm setting among the principles for setting water prices the “adequacy of capital remuneration”: in the promoters’ own strategy, this aims at stopping any commercial approach to the supply of water and sanitation services and oblige to manage them as “common goods”. This article, rooted in the contemporary theory of common properties, analyzes the potential usefulness of the“commons” idea in the economy of a service whose industrial complexity and financial needs call in any case for a role of capital markets. Alternative financial mechanisms are discussed, showing that they should be considered as complementary to water tariffs rather than alternatives
I conti senza l'oste. Come pagheremo il servizio idrico dopo il referendum
MASSARUTTO, Antonio
2011-01-01
Abstract
The 2011 popular referendum has abolished the norm setting among the principles for setting water prices the “adequacy of capital remuneration”: in the promoters’ own strategy, this aims at stopping any commercial approach to the supply of water and sanitation services and oblige to manage them as “common goods”. This article, rooted in the contemporary theory of common properties, analyzes the potential usefulness of the“commons” idea in the economy of a service whose industrial complexity and financial needs call in any case for a role of capital markets. Alternative financial mechanisms are discussed, showing that they should be considered as complementary to water tariffs rather than alternativesI documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
