Traditionally, classical philosophers used teleological explanation to account for the order of the cosmos and to ground the normativity of human action. The progress of the sciences challenged the teleological perspective on reality, but only the rise of Darwinism opened a possibility which seemed able to account for the whole of reality without final causes. From that point of view, teleological explanation is still possible, but it takes forms which are compatible with physicalism. This essay discusses the capacity of postDarwinian teleology to account for our experience of the normativity of our actions, and it critically utilizes some recent arguments by Thomas Nagel in order to suggest that intentional and teleological explanation is prior.
Il problema delle cause finali nella concezione evoluzionistica del mondo
DE ANNA, Gabriele
2013-01-01
Abstract
Traditionally, classical philosophers used teleological explanation to account for the order of the cosmos and to ground the normativity of human action. The progress of the sciences challenged the teleological perspective on reality, but only the rise of Darwinism opened a possibility which seemed able to account for the whole of reality without final causes. From that point of view, teleological explanation is still possible, but it takes forms which are compatible with physicalism. This essay discusses the capacity of postDarwinian teleology to account for our experience of the normativity of our actions, and it critically utilizes some recent arguments by Thomas Nagel in order to suggest that intentional and teleological explanation is prior.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
